Community organisation in fishing villages in southern Thailand: the role of phu yai ban in local resource management

Masae, Awae

Award date:
1996

Awarding institution:
University of Bath

COMMUNITY ORGANISATION IN FISHING VILLAGES IN SOUTHERN THAILAND: THE ROLE OF *PHU YAI BAN* IN LOCAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

submitted by Awae Masae

for the degree of Ph.D.

of the University of Bath

1996

COPYRIGHT



ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

ABSTRACT

This thesis is concerned with the analysis of policy implementation and the involvement of village official leaders (phu yai ban) in Southern Thailand. Its main foci were on the implementation of policies related to common property resource (CPR) management at the local level, particularly at the village (mooban) level, and the role of phu yai ban in planning and implementing these policies. The study views that significant changes occur in implementation stages, especially at the local level. These changes are influenced by the context in which policy is implemented. Local official leaders who are responsible for implementing CPR management policies make decisions according to local contexts, and their decisions determine the achievement of policies. Recent reforms in the organisational structure of natural resource management planning in Thailand were designed to allow local leaders to participate formally in planning, in order to meet the needs of the local people and to encourage more effective implementation.

The research fieldwork was undertaken in two freshwater fishing villages in Southern Thailand by means of participant observation. The main fieldwork was undertaken in June 1993 until July 1994 in tandem with the collaborative project on floodplain fishery management between the University of Bath and the Prince of Songkla University. Some of the data presented in this thesis was obtained through this project's fieldwork. Two local projects related to CPR management taking place in the study area were used as case studies for an in-depth analysis.

The findings of this thesis show that although phu yai ban play a key role in implementing CPR management policies at the local level, there are several factors affecting their performances. These factors include historical backgrounds, socio-economic conditions, and organisational arrangements of communities in which they are situated. Moreover, the conventional administrative arrangement and bureaucratic culture provide obstacles to their full involvement in planning and effective implementation of local CPR management projects. Conclusions are given on prospects of more sustainable local CPR management in Thailand.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to many people and organisations from whom I received support and assistance throughout the period of this study. Although I am unable to mention all of them here, the following deserve my special thanks.

First of all, I owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. J. Allister McGregor for his support in various aspects and for his patience in dealing with several difficulties related to my study. Thanks also to Dr. Adrian Winnett who provided very useful comments on my work. I am also grateful to Dr. Geof Wood and all staff members of the Centre for Development Study at the University of Bath who have always been supportive.

Thanks to the British Council and ODA for their financial support throughout the study. Without their financial support, this study would not have been possible.

In Thailand, many people deserve special mention. My special thanks to Dr. Somsak Boromthanarat, the Director of Coastal Resources Institute (CORIN) at Prince of Songkla University, and other staff members of CORIN, who provided support and assistance in various forms. My thanks should also go to the Dean of the Faculty of Natural Resources and the Head of the Department of Agricultural Development who not only provided me a chance to take a study leave, but also allowed me to use many facilities they have for my study. In the villages where this study took place, many local leaders and villagers deserve thanks for their co-operation and their warm welcome while I was in their villages. Finally, I must not forget Nipon Khaaoreuang who was the assistant researcher to the PSU-CDS Floodplain Project. He did not only make invaluable contribution to the PSU-CDS Floodplain Project, but also provided support to this work.

Many friends and colleagues at Bath University also played an important part in the time of my study. Douglas Saltmarsh, Richard Friend, Lawrence Kitchen, Jawanit Kittitornkool and all Thai students have always been helpful to me in various occasions. They all helped in creating more pleasant social environment for my life in

Bath. Richard Friend in particular spent a lot of time helping in correcting my English.

Thanks to my family, particularly my ageing parents, for their encouragement to my education. Despite their illiteracy, my parents have always seen the importance of providing education for their children. Their spiritual support has always been an important drive for my success.

At the home front, special thanks and love to Suchada for being patient and supportive. Although she had to struggle hard to look after our young children on her own, she has never shown her tiredness.

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my three sons, Nasruddeen, Shareef and Nawaawi, who were too young to understand what I was involved in and why I had to be absent for the last two years.

Finally, as a Muslim, I must not forget to thank God for opening my mind to the importance of education.

TABLE OF CONTENT

LIST OF MAPS, TABLES AND FIGURES

MAPS

TABLES

FIGURES



Map 1: Southern Thailand showing the location of the study site



Map 2: Tambon Thung Samet showing the settlement of Ban Nua Phru



Map 3: Ban Nua Phru showing residential area and land use pattern



Map 4: Bueng Yai community, its settlement, and its administrative divide



Map 5: Ban Bon Lay showing residential area and land use pattern

CHAPTER ONE

THE STUDY OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT IN RURAL THAILAND

1.1 Introduction

The problem of natural resource depletion is one of the most important issues in contemporary development. In most developing countries, natural resources are the basis for the livelihoods of rural inhabitants. Allowing natural resources to be continually degraded can cause a great adverse impact on the well-being of the rural population who are the majority of the population in these countries. Frequently the issue of natural resource degradation is viewed as being related to directions of development policies adopted by individual countries. In countries where economic growth is perceived to be the primary development goal, the extent to which natural resources are degraded is likely to be high. Thailand's experience of development has been referred to as 'uneven development' (see Parnwell, 1996, especially Chapter 1). From the beginning of its formal development plans, the emphasis has been on economic growth. The effects on rural livelihoods and the environment have, until recently, been overlooked. This has made the problem of natural resource depletion and environmental degradation a serious issue despite the country's economic achievements.

Thailand is a predominantly agrarian country with over two thirds of the population residing in rural areas. Rural livelihoods which are natural resource based remain important to Thailand's development. Despite this, most of the country's past development policies, as guided by its National Economic and Social Development Plans formulated on a five-year basis, have not weighted rural development and natural resources management as very important. The primary emphasis on

accelerating economic growth during the 1960s and 1970s, has undermined the rural way of life by overexploiting vital natural resources. In prioritising an increase in GNP, the first four five-year Plans (1961-1981) widened the disparity between urban rich and rural poor (see Krongkaew, 1985; Suphachalasai *et al.* 1990). Many natural resources, such as forest, waterbodies, and fishery resources, were placed in a precarious position. More recent recognition of these problems, however, has meant that the alleviation of poverty and conservation of natural resources and the environment, have been stressed in later development plans. This has been coupled with the introduction of structural reforms in development administration, emphasising participation of local organisations in the planning process. This marks an important change in Thailand's rural development administration system, which was highly dependent on central planning bodies. The change is very important in reshaping the system of development administration in Thailand, especially at the local level. These reforms provide a chance for local administrative bodies and local leaders to play a significant role in the planning process related to rural development, which also includes the management of natural resources at the local level.

Many natural resources in rural areas in Thailand are common property resources. Each of these resources is used by certain numbers of local beneficiaries which are small in their proportion to the total population. Before the administrative reforms mentioned above, policies towards the management of these resources were centralised. Nation-wide regulations were designed for particular types of natural resources, regardless of local variations of resource conditions and socio-economic patterns of resource users. In practice, the actual management of natural resources at the local level remained largely dependent on traditional systems. However, these traditional systems were not recognised by the state as important. The recent changes in the development administration structure have brought about a reassessment of the role of traditional management systems. There is a growing recognition of the need for these traditional systems to be integrated into the formal policy process through the participation of local organisations and official leaders in the planning process. The new discourse of participation in state development

planning does not always fit with the local level realities. As the official leader of the village in the Thai administration, the *phu yai ban* plays a crucial role in the implementation of government policy at the local level. In order to understand the actual application of recent reforms of development administration structure, it is therefore necessary to have a detailed understanding of the role of this local leader and local organisations. This thesis presents a detailed study of the role of *phu yai ban* and local organisations in natural resource management, based on fieldwork in two fishing villages in southern Thailand.

In this introductory chapter, the discussion will highlight the importance of natural resources in Thailand's rural development, the nature of this study and the study area, and the study fieldwork. This discussion will provide a background to the relationship between development policies and natural resource conditions in Thailand, the importance of and my interest in conducting this study, and methodology employed in this research.

1.2 Rural Development in Thailand and The Importance of Natural Resources

Different views of rural development and natural resource management have emerged in Thailand. Though the country's development began to be formalised through the introduction of national development plans in the early 1960s, the focus on rural development and natural resource management is rather recent. This is evident in the emphases of different National Economic and Social Development Plans (henceforth referred to as Plan or Plans), which will be discussed in this section.

During the first three Plans (1961-1976), the concept of development centred on the acceleration of overall economic growth as the key strategy for promoting the country's development. It was assumed that in line with general views benefits of an increase in the Gross National Product (GNP) would trickle down to the whole

population and there was no need for specific emphasis to be given to rural development (Wirajnibhawan, 1993). Similarly, the wealth of natural resources in most parts of Thailand (see Donner, 1982) meant that the importance of conserving and managing these resources was largely overlooked. As a result, early development Plans had a significant negative impact on rural population and the environment. This was evident in the emergence of income disparity between the majority poor rural population and the handful of rich urban dwellers. At the same time, there was an emphasis on the expansion of infrastructure and industrialisation, but without proper assessment of the environmental impact. Agricultural production was also promoted through the employment of modern technologies and the expansion of cultivated land, but this too seriously exploited and degraded many valuable natural resources. It is argued that during the first three Plans natural resources were viewed as a state possession which should be utilised and invested in national development (Wirajnibhawan, 1992). As a consequence, many natural resources such as forest, land and fisheries were at risk (Panpiemrat, 1990). The imbalance between the achievement of economic growth, income distribution and natural resource depletion became an important consideration in the later Plans.

The Fourth Plan (1977-1981) was the first to deal with problems that had emerged from previous Plans. The Plan specifically addressed the importance of reducing economic and social disparities among different social groups, and improving the management of the environment and major natural resources among its main objectives. However, concepts and strategies for dealing with these issues were imprecise, and rural development appeared to be only a small component of the Plan. As regards natural resource management, only major natural resources, such as forest resources and coastal and marine fishery resources, which were considered as important to the economy of the country at the macro level, were clearly recognised in the Plan. Those which are important for rural livelihoods, but do not contribute much to the national economy in term of GNP, such as freshwater fishery resources and non-commercial forest resources in small forest areas, were not emphasised. These natural resources are mainly common property resources which, as will be argued here, require specific plan and management strategies.

It was not until the Fifth Plan (1982-1986) that rural development was first given a strong emphasis. In this Plan, a separate section was devoted to rural development and a new concept of rural development involving area specification and the use of an interdisciplinary approach in planning was introduced. With respect to natural resource development, the Plan focused on the management of selected areas where natural resource problems were significant for poverty eradication. In other areas, most natural resources were left to be managed under general policies. Moreover, the Fifth Plan also introduced a structural reform in the development administration system. This included the introduction of provincial planning and the co-ordination between four major ministries -- The Ministry of the Interior, The Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives, The Ministry of Health, and The Ministry of Education -- in the planning and implementation processes with respect to rural development. Under this structural reform, changes were also made at the local level with a greater authority given to local planning bodies, especially the sub-district council (*sapha tambon*). It also marked the beginning of efforts to introduce a bottom-up approach in the country's rural development planning, departing from the conventional top-down approach which had dominated rural development since the introduction of formal planning.

Nevertheless, the implications for natural resource and environmental planning were still not clear at the local level. The inclusion of local organisations appeared for the first time in the Sixth Plan (1987-1991), with an emphasis on people's participation in the administration and management of natural resources and the environment through these organisations. The Plan also stressed the necessity to consider environmental consequences alongside economic and social development. In order to effectively apply this idea, the Cabinet decided, shortly after the commencement of the Sixth Plan, that every provincial government should develop guidelines for natural resource and environmental management, alongside its rural development plan. In addition, both provincial and district development bodies were also entitled to extend their rural development plans to cover the management of the environment and natural resources within their territories (CBAMNREP, 1990). In the planning

process, it was expected that these bodies would co-ordinate with lower level administrative bodies, i.e. *sapha tambon* and village committees, in gathering information related to natural resource and environmental issues. In this Plan, therefore, the notions of sustainable development and local participation began to be introduced in development planning. Combining these two ideas appeared to offer an appropriate means of dealing with the problems of the imbalance between rapid growth and environmental degradation, and its effects on rural population.

The application of these development concepts has continued in the Seventh Plan (1992-1996) used in the period of this study. In this plan, two specific sections are dedicated to the management of natural resources and the environment: one for environmental development; and another for the management of natural resources. In each of these sections, specific guidelines were set in dealing with different types of natural resources and the environment (see NESDB, 1992).

As a consequence of the Sixth and Seventh Plans, several attempts have been made to improve the condition of natural resources and the environment in the last few years during their implementation. These included revisions of related regulations, especially the Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act B.E. 2535 (1992), and the restructuring of government bodies concerned with natural resource and environmental management to correspond with the objectives of these policies (Wirawattananond, 1994, pp. 216-217). Additionally, a special budget allocation is set to promote environmental and natural resource management locally, especially at the provincial, district, and municipal levels (see DEQP, 1991; Wirawattananond, 1994).

Clearly the recognition of natural resource and environmental issues in Thailand has increased in the last few years. This is not only because of the emphasis of the last two Plans, but also because of greater media interest in such global issues. Growing interest in the subject can be seen from the emergence and restructuring of various movements and organisations, both in the government and non-government sectors, to deal with environmental and natural resource issues. With respect to

environmental problems, anti-pollution movements in urban areas are common, but movements concerned with natural resource degradation seem to concentrate mainly on major issues which are important to the country's economy at the macro level, for example, deforestation, depletion of marine fishery resources, and the impact of large dam construction. Issues such as resource depletion and conflict over the use of common property resources at the local level have not been recognised by the state. This is largely because they are not seen as significant for the country's economy, despite being crucially important for local livelihoods. Although in theory all common property resources are protected by law and related regulations, they are often neglected by concerned bodies. The negligence of state implementing bodies in enforcing these regulations effectively is partly due to benefits generated from these resources. Since the resources are used mainly by local people, and they benefit over the long term, these benefits can be considered as dispersed. It is observed that policies which benefits are dispersed are likely to receive a negative response or inactive reaction from bureaucrats (Grindle and Thomas, 1989; Thomas and Grindle, 1990). Moreover, because most regulations are designed for nation-wide application, it is not uncommon to find that they contain details which do not correspond with the actual conditions of natural resources in particular situations and the system of traditional management existing in particular localities. Since most natural resources of this type have their own history of traditional management, the low applicability of the state regulations means that they are likely to be left for traditional organisations to allocate among local users. Leaving common property resources under traditional arrangements can be efficient under conditions where cohesiveness is high among members of an organisation, and the organisation is relatively undisturbed by outside forces (see Ostrom, 1990; Singleton and Taylor, 1992). However, these conditions are unlikely to be met in most rural areas in Thailand, where high levels of government intervention on local organisations are often witnessed. The attempt to formalise and integrate local administration into central bureaucratic systems seems to weaken both the functions of traditional organisations, and the power of traditional leaders, as a new form of organisation is created and legalised under the leadership of official leaders. At the same time, traditional organisations are unlikely to be completely replaced by

formal organisations in rural societies (Riggs, 1964). Interactions between local organisations and formal organisations, and hence their leaders, are likely to be unavoidable, especially when dealing with delicate matters such as common property resource management.

The management of common property resources (CPRs) is a complex issue. Their common pool principle, which excessive use of one user affects the welfare of other users, implies that common agreements must be met in the allocation and distribution of resources among users. Moreover, it is necessary that users are aware of the carrying capacity of a particular resource if sustainable use is to be achieved. In reality, the increase in demand for resources is positively associated with an increase in the user population and the improvement of technology to exploit the resources. Additionally, changes in living standards often mean an increase in needs, which accelerates the exploitation of natural resources, if no appropriate management strategy is employed to control it. In Garrett Hardin's most frequently cited article, 'The Tragedy of the Commons', he argues that common property regimes lead to overexploitation of resources because of the freedom of use over the commons (or CPRs) and the increase in the user population. He asserts that if 'the tragedy of the commons' is to be prevented, it is necessary for concerned bodies to limit population growth and issue conservation regulations in order to sustain the commons (Hardin, 1968; see also Hardin, 1993). Hardin's propositions have generated a great deal of interest and research in searching for solutions to the overexploitation of the commons. Several studies have been devoted to gaining a better understanding of the degradation of CPRs. As a result, at least two different management approaches perceived to be effective for this type of resources have emerged: the first prefers management via state regulation of rights and access to the resources; and the second favours a traditional or community-based approach. Since both approaches have their own strengths and weaknesses, no explicit answer can be given to the question of which approach is more effective. Observations in different parts of the world illustrate mixed achievements in their application. The historical perspectives of resource use, the strengths of concerned government bodies, the strengths of communities or groups, and the nature of traditional values within those

communities or groups, all seem to affect the applicability of these approaches (see Taylor, 1992). The employment of the regulatory approach seems to be preferable to state agencies once state bodies become involved in resource management. Nevertheless, the application of a regulatory approach can face complications and be ineffective if the regulations issued are not carefully designed to correspond with the reality of the problems within each community. This situation is common in many rural areas in Thailand, where centrally designed government regulations related to common property resources are rarely enforced.

As mentioned earlier, many natural resources in rural Thailand are common property resources, and their management depends predominantly on traditional organisations of local users. A question has arisen over the inability of the state to fully control these resources. The answer to this question lies in the relationships between the state and local communities in the contemporary Thai administration with respect to natural management issues. Although the idea of integrating local administration into the national administration system was first introduced over a century ago in 1892 during the reign of King Rama V, its significant effects on local communities have been quite recent, and predominantly on general administrative business. Many other local affairs, especially at sub-district (*tambon*) and village (*mooban*) levels, remain least disturbed. Under traditional arrangements, common property resources are managed through norms which are either unique to particular communities, or part of a larger society. In these arrangements, traditional leaders or elders have an important role in maintaining existing norms (see Wetchaphitak, 1991; Tongdeelert and Lohmann, 1991). The recent increase in state penetration of local communities, together with structural reforms in the development administration system, clearly strengthens the power of formal leaders over traditional leaders. Additionally, pressure has been placed on natural resources due to the increase in population and the changing needs of that population, making the problem of common property resource management more critical than in the past. Although, as has been noted, there exist several policies and regulations related to the management of different natural resources, several questions arise concerning the effectiveness of their enforcement. These include questions about the

appropriateness of regulations to local conditions, and the role of local leaders, especially *phu yai ban*, in contributing to the management of common property resources available in their communities. The roles of *phu yai ban* in rural development and in the management of common pool natural resources are increasingly important, since they are given more opportunity to participate in both planning and implementation of policies under the recent reforms of administrative structures.

1.3 The Nature of the Study and the Study Area

Given the fact that most rural areas in Thailand face rapid change toward modernisation and a market economy, natural resource depletion is certainly one of the major problems that confront rural inhabitants. Many natural resources have been exploited to increase the overall economic productivity of the country without a careful consideration of the long-term consequences. As a result, many rural communities which depend largely on the richness of natural resources for their livelihoods, have suffered from problems related to natural resource degradation. Moreover, the discussion in the previous section pointed out that one of the major obstacles to the management of natural resources, especially common property resources in rural areas in Thailand, is the contradiction between implementation and existing policies or whether policies are right.

The gap between policy and practice is not unfamiliar to social scientists who are interested in public administration and policy implementation in Thailand. Central to this ineffectiveness is the fact that whilst policy-making is dominated by central government and central departments, policy implementation relies on different levels of government offices, who take instruction from their central departments (see for example Panpiemrat, 1990; Voratheppputipong, 1984). Lack of correspondence between centrally constructed policies designed for nation-wide application, and actual locally occurring problems and their contexts, is viewed as a key issue. It is argued that this issue can be alleviated if participation of local people in the policy process is promoted (Panpiemrat, 1982). The fact that recent

development policies have taken great account of local participation in rural development in general, as well as in more specific environmental and natural resource development, has instigated this study, which investigates how these policies are applied in a local context with respect natural resource management. It is often argued that participation of local people is likely to be limited under Thai culture which is highly hierarchical, therefore, investigating the involvement and the importance of local leaders, especially village official leaders or *phu yai ban*, is considered vital for further understanding of obstacles to and effectiveness of natural resource management at the local level.

1.3.1 The Nature of this Study

This study considers the role of community organisations in the management of natural resources at the local level in Southern Thailand, by focusing on the role of *phu yai ban* in handling natural resources related to freshwater capture fisheries. Whilst I was researching the management of floodplain fisheries in a floodplain ecosystem in the region for the Centre for Development Studies (CDS), University of Bath, I discovered that a number of natural resources available in this area are considered by local people and officials to be under threat, and many local people are concerned about their future. Foremost among these are fishery resources, which form an important source of earnings to the majority of settlers in the area (see Masae, 1994; Masae and McGregor, 1996). It was observed that the management of fisheries requires further investigation if this common property resource is to be maintained. Other related resources such as swamp forest must also be considered, since their condition is believed to be connected with the decline of fisheries. My interest was aroused by the fact that fishing in this area has a long history, perhaps dating back to the first established community which is believed to have taken place over 400 years ago. The survival of fishing should have evolved over time through the adaptation of these fishing communities, enabling them to cope with economic and social changes. However, in the last few decades the fisheries have declined significantly. While there are state regulations to control the exploitation of both fishery and swamp forest resources in the area, both are subject to limited

enforcement. At this point, I realised that the question of ineffective implementation must be addressed, and consideration must be given to the role of implementors themselves. Moreover, it seems that the success of many development programmes or projects, is dependent largely on the attributes of the leaders of organisations undertaking these programmes or projects (Korten, 1980). Since the issue was observed to be local, and it is widely known in Thailand that most official work in rural areas is left to local official leaders, the investigation of the role of *phu yai ban,* who is the lowest official and has the closest relationship with resource users, was an obvious focus. Based on this understanding, this study has taken the *phu yai ban* as a key actor in dealing with resource management policies and problems facing resource users. The study will treat the *phu yai ban* both as the leader of the village community and a member of the village community of which he is a part. In considering the role the *phu yai ban* plays, special attention is given to their participation in effectuating policies related to the management of common property resources. This is based on the widely held assumption that local participation is essential if local resource management is to be sustained. It is also motivated by a belief that participation of ordinary villagers is likely to be restrained in Thai society, because of its highly hierarchical structure. Therefore, the focus should be given on the participation of *phu yai ban* who is the closest representative of villagers in their efforts to participate in the present structure of development administration.

The *phu yai ban* is the lowest official in Thai administration, and comes to power through the village election. A *phu yai ban* is generally elected from villagers whose educational qualification and personal behaviour meet the requirements of the state. The *phu yai ban* usually resides in the village which he/she leads. This makes him/her have the closest relationship with the community among officials and leaders. Being in this position he/she should play a significant role in the management of natural resources available in his/her community, as these are important for the livelihoods of his/her fellow villagers. Additionally, as the link between natural resources and rural livelihoods is often strong, he/she should see the significance of management for sustainable use. However, being an official agent in

charge of all administrative duties assigned by the state, at the same time as being the top leader of his/her village community, a *phu yai ban* is located between his/her village community and the state. This position is very important for mediating between the state aims and the community needs. Thus all *phu yai ban* have two primary obligations to fulfil; to follow state commands, and to respond positively to the need of villagers.

Ideally, every *phu yai ban* should act positively both with respect to the state and to his/her fellow villagers. It is often assumed that all the state commands are a response to people's needs, and for the benefit of those needs. However, this is not always the case, as conflicts between state rules and people's needs are widespread in Thailand. The *phu yai ban* often plays an ambiguous role. Hirsch (1990) refers to him/her as an agent of state penetration of the village. At other times *phu yai ban* have been the representatives of villagers in their struggles against the state (see also Wetchaphitak, 1991). Furthermore, there are likely to be several factors which can influence the *phu yai ban's* performance in fulfilling their primary obligations. These include the personal backgrounds of each *phu yai ban*, the expectations of different groups he/she is connected to, and the environment in which he/she is working. Interactions between these factors are crucial in understanding the actual role each *phu yai ban* plays, even if his/her formal or official role is clearly stated. The influence of these factors and the consequences of their interactions should be taken into consideration in the analysis of *phu yai ban*'s role in dealing with common property resource management.

1.3.2 The Significance and Objectives of the Study

This study is significant not only because it deals with the issue of natural resource management in rural areas, which is crucial for sustainable development and increasingly popular among students of development studies, but also because it provides a unique study on the role of *phu yai ban* in the management of natural resources at the local level. Moreover, by focusing on the involvement of *phu yai ban* in the policy process, or more specifically in policy implementation process,

this study seeks to provide a more penetrating understanding of the contemporary policy process in rural Thailand, than has hitherto been offered. Though there appear to be many studies dealing with rural leaders and development in rural Thailand, they rarely emphasise the role of *phu yai ban.* Most research on village-state relations in Thailand to date focuses on the sub-district level or *tambon*, which encompasses a number of villages, and on the role of *kamnan* or sub-district official leaders (see Turton, 1987; Ingavata, 1990; Gohlert, 1991).

Additional to the main focus mentioned above, this study aims specifically to find out the capacity of *phu yai ban* to pursue the management of threatened common property resources, in response to related policies and the needs of local people. In order to fulfil this main objective, the investigation has sought to understand how much power *phu yai ban* have in dealing with natural resource management, the degree of their involvement in the policy process related to natural resource management under the present administrative structure, and their interactions with factors influencing their performance in dealing with this management. With respect to these factors, consideration will be given to both the context in which the policy process takes place and the content of policy in question. The investigation of policy context will take social, political and economic factors into consideration, both with reference to formal organisational and local community framework. However, the main focus is the investigation of the local community, as its attributes are central to the success of sustainable management of common property resources (see Ostrom, 1990 and 1992; Massey, 1994; Singleton and Taylor, 1992).

1.3.3 The Study Area and the Selection the Study Villages

In fulfilling the above objectives, the selection a proper research design was essential before conducting fieldwork. Since the research aims to provide an understanding of a complex issue which relates to several different factors, drawing an area boundary and selecting research techniques was necessary in order to correspond to the nature of data needed and the fieldwork. Originally, fieldwork was undertaken in several villages (*mooban*) in the study area, but it was discovered that

a combination of different geographical and political settings between villages significantly affected the management of common property resources. Understanding the relationship between physical and political characteristics of Thai villages requires an understanding of the village arrangement in the Thai context.

In brief, *mooban* is the smallest unit in the Thai administration, which is drawn based on the population size in terms of household numbers. This system of arrangement derives from the administrative reforms of King Rama V over a century ago, and their goals of modernisation. While a few types of villages can be found throughout the country (see Wijeyewardene, 1967), two main categories can be drawn with respect to their physical characteristics and political boundaries; (a) villages which are relatively separated in their settlements from their neighbouring villages, and (b) villages which are part of the larger settlements and separated only for administrative purposes. Clearly this categorisation may not be useful for all kinds of village studies in Thailand since there may still be many differences within each category, but it is valid for this study as far as the village administration and management of common property resources are concerned. This presumption is based not only on observations within the study area, but also from my experience of field visits in other areas of Thailand, especially in the southern region. After mature consideration, only two villages were selected for this study; each village representing one of the categories discussed above. The selection of these two villages was also because they are both important fishing villages in the area.

The villages selected for this study are both located in the floodplain ecosystem of Phru Thung Samet swamp and Bueng Yai lake in Southern Thailand (Map 1). These two villages were given the pseudonyms 'Ban Nua Phru' and 'Ban Bon Lay.' Ban Nua Phru is located to the northwest of Phru Thung Samet swamp whereas Ban Bon Lay is part of a large and densely populated community called Bueng Yai community, located on the west bank of Bueng Yai lake. Comparing their location and their relationship with neighbouring villages, it is clear that Ban Nua Phru is separated more clearly from other villages than Ban Bon Lay (see Map 2 and Map

4). Ban Bon Lay is aggregated into Bueng Yai Community, since its separation is only marked by its political boundary.

All pseudonyms of the places employed in this thesis reflect either the locations or main physical characteristics of the places; this is useful because the resemblance between the characteristics of a location and its pseudonym is helpful for both the reader and myself. At the same time, naming a place on the basis of its location and main physical nature is not atypical in the Thai context, as it is commonly observed in the field and in literature that names of places are given in a similar manner. The term '*Ban*' in Thai can either means 'house' or 'village.' Occasionally, it is used as equivalent to 'community' which is sometimes not differentiated from 'village' in a generic sense, especially when the settlement in the community is seen as a single settlement, though it is officially divided into various 'administrative villages.' In this study the term is used only to refer to 'village' which is its most common meaning. The term 'Nua Phru' contains two words, '*nua*' means 'north', and '*phru*' means 'swamp.' Therefore, 'Ban Nua Phru' can be translated as 'the village at the north of the swamp.' Similarly, the term 'Bon Lay' comes from two words, '*bon*' and '*lay*', which mean 'on' and 'sea' respectively. Actually, the word '*lay*' or '*le*' is used only among southerners as a short form of '*thale*,' the full word for 'sea' in the central Thai language. The name 'Ban Bon Lay' given to this village resembles 'the village on the bank of the sea', in which 'the sea' here is used as a substitution of 'lake' in the term 'Bueng Yai lake.' Again, this is not drawn from a vacuum, since the term '*thale*' is also used in its real name, and means 'lake' in this case. For clarification, the pseudonyms given to both villages are based on their locations with reference to Phru Thung Samet swamp and Bueng Yai lake, two main landmarks of this ecological system. For Phru Thung Samet, the name was given to reflect its main characteristic, which is that of a large field (*thung*) covered by swamp trees (*samet*). A similar logic is used in naming Bueng Yai lake, the name of which reflects my first impression of this large (*yai*) natural reservoir (*bueng*) like waterbody. The Phru Thung Samet swamp and Bueng Yai lake are important not only because they form major landmarks of the area, but also because their natural

characteristics are related to the way of life of people settling in the area. Hence, it is important to briefly describe their settings.

Bueng Yai lake is the largest natural freshwater lake in Thailand. The lake forms a component of the Songkhla lake system located across three southern provinces of Songkhla, Patthalung and Nakhorn Sri Thammarat. Bueng Yai lake itself is located 14 kilometres to the east of Khuan Mangkhud district headquarters in Patthalung province. The lake stretches over two sub-districts or *tambon* -- Tambon Bueng Yai and Tambon Khuan Phanang (Map 4). The lake forms the northmost part of the Songkhla lake system which is connected to Thale Nua, the upper part of Songkhla lake. It is connected to the swamp area to the north and east. To the west of the lake, the land is dominated by paddy fields and rubber plantations. The lake has an area of about 30 square kilometres or about 2,800 hectares. It has an average depth of 1.5 meters with the highest level of water of about 3.00 metres at the peak of the rainy season and the lowest of about 0.80 a meter in the dry season, measured at the deepest point of the lake.

The water quality of Bueng Yai lake is complex. Its proximity to the sea and its connections to the Songkhla lake system which opens onto the sea at its southern end, make the water in the lake vary seasonally in its salinity. Moreover, its connection with a peat swamp in which the water is acidic also affects the quality of water in the lake. Acidity levels are higher in the rainy season than in the dry season. An acid-base measurement shows the variation from pH 3.0 in November, to pH 9.2 in June, with an annual average value of pH 7.25. The variation mainly results from variations of inflowing water from the surrounding swamp, and variations in the level of saltwater intrusion into the lake (Tansakul, 1987). Seasonal variations of substantial levels of saltwater intrusion affect the water salinity in the lake, and is believed to affect fishery conditions. Historically, however, salinity levels of the lake were much higher than at present. Water salinity was at its highest during the driest season of the year due to the intrusion of saltwater from the adjacent eastern coast through Khlong Rawa near Ranot. However, since 1956, several water gates had been constructed near Ranot because of concerns over rice

production in the district. Having cut off the main channels of saltwater intrusion into the lake, there has been a substantial reduction in salinity, despite some remaining saline intrusion via groundwater and other channels. Consequently, the lake is now predominantly freshwater, a change which is believed to have had a significant effect on the richness of its fishery resources. The substantial seasonal variations of salinity in the past are presupposed as beneficial for the productivity of the fisheries. This is explained in terms of its potential to recruit a variety of fish species to the lake in different seasons through fish migration. It is also believed that the high level of salinity in the driest season, together with a better circulation of water in the past, helped in keeping the lake free from aquatic weeds covering. The change in hydrological dynamics resulting from the aforementioned water gates construction, is seen to be the main factor behind the presently apparent choking of water weeds in the lake. It is believed to encourage a higher rate of sedimentation which is perceived to correspond to the decrease in the productivity of the fisheries (Tansakul, 1992).

The swamp surrounding the lake is connected to Phru Thung Samet swamp. This swamp consists of a combination of swamp forest (*paa samet*), sedge (*krajoot*), rough grazing, and contains some land suitable for rice cultivation. Most of the swamp forest is degraded forest and is regarded by the state as a public forest area. However, most of the land is informally occupied by residents of surrounding communities. In the rainy season, the flood turns the swamp into a floodplain area, which allows fish to disperse widely and makes the area an important fishing ground.

There are a few villages located on the west bank of Bueng Yai lake, in the adjacent area and in its nearby swamp. These villages differ in their access to different natural resources. Villages located further inland have better access to land suitable for rice and rubber production than those located on the banks of the lake and in the swamp. On the other hand, villages on the banks of the lake and in the swamp have better access to fishery resources, and these villages are known locally as fishing villages. Ban Bon Lay is one out of seven villages forming Bueng Yai community,

which is known as a long settled fishing community in this area. The lake and the community are not only well known for their fishing, but also for the lake's beauty and the community's handicraft activities which have attracted a steady flow of outside visitors.

Phru Thung Samet is one of the largest floodplain swamps in southern Thailand. Its boundaries extend to the north and the east of Bueng Yai lake. It covers an area of 195,545 *rai* or around 31,287 hectares, and stretches over five districts in three provinces -- Songkhla, Patthalung and Nakhorn Sri Thammarat (Poosakulsuk and Keawnooh, 1994; CORIN and FEKU, 1994). It is believed that Phru Thung Samet used to be covered predominantly by healthy rain forest and enriched with wildlife. Moreover, most of the swamp was under water throughout the year, thus it was also rich in freshwater fish; only part of the swamp was covered by swamp forest (*paa samet*). However, beginning about 50 years ago, there have been several natural and social phenomena, including a hurricane, a series of forest fires and flooding, and various human activities, that have harmed natural resources by creating marked changes in the physical conditions of the swamp (Poosakulsuk and Keawnooh, 1994). The area is now covered predominantly by swamp trees known locally as *samet* (*Melaleuca leucadendra* (L.) Linn.), sedge grasses known as *krajoot* (*Lemna minor* L.) and *joot nooh* (*Eleocharis ochrostachy* Steud), and rough grassland used for grazing cattle and water buffaloes. The low-lying areas of the swamp are covered with acidic water for most of the year, while the remainder floods during the rainy season and can remain covered in water between October and March. Some of these areas are used for swamp rice cultivation. The level of water acidity is higher in the dry season because of the restricted availability of water compared to the rainy season; this water acidity ranges from pH 2.8 to pH 3.5 (CORIN and FEKU, 1994). There are several canals and water channels running through the swamp, which are used mainly as alternative transport routes between villages which have access to them. More importantly, they are essential for transporting rice and *krajoot* from areas inaccessible by road. However, though the canals are also used as fishing grounds, they are not considered to be as significant as the swamp itself.

At present, there are several settlements in and around Phru Thung Samet. It is estimated that there are about 23,000 inhabitants in 33 villages located in and around the swamp. However, not all these villages are actively involved in fishing. The majority of the villages are located to the east and northeast of the swamp, and are predominantly farming villages (Poosakulsuk and Keawnooh, 1994). Only a few villages located on 'islands' (*khuan*) in the middle of the swamp, and those at the northwest of the swamp are actively involved in fishing; Ban Nua Phru is one of these villages.

The physical characteristics of Bueng Yai lake, its adjacent swamp and Phru Thung Samet swamp, allow the villagers of Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay to practise fishing as one of their main sources of income. Additionally, rice farming and handicrafts from *krajoot* are also widely practised. These three activities are common to the majority of households in both villages, and raising of livestock, especially cattle and water buffalo, is also found in some households. These animals are raised mainly for selling rather than as draught animals, as most of the ploughing in this area nowadays is done by small hand tractors (*kwai lehk*). The details of the economic characteristics of these villages will be discussed later, in the chapter specially devoted to the backgrounds of these villages. The main purpose here is to point out that the active involvement of both villages in fishing, though in different degrees, was the main criterion for selecting them for this study.

As mentioned earlier, though a few villages were included at the beginning of this study, and the decision to concentrate only on two villages was taken at a later stage, it is important to clarify the reasons for selecting these two villages. There are a few reasons behind the selection of Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay, other than the reason that they are both prominent fishing villages. First of all, these two villages differ in their historical perspectives, which to a certain degree influences the way their communities are organised. The fact that the settlement in Ban Nua Phru is quite new whereas Ban Bon Lay is part of a long settled community, is considered as interesting for making comparison of the influence of historical factors on

community organisations. Secondly, they differ in their relationship with their neighbouring villages, especially with respect to the control over natural resources. This difference also affects their relationships with natural resources, and hence their management. Thirdly, both of them are connected with newly developed projects related to the management of fishery resources; this is important for an in-depth analysis of the role of communities and their leaders in these projects, which represent policy implementation at the local level. It is important to point out that despite the existence of another project in a nearby village, projects undertaken in Ban Nua Phru and in Bueng Yai community are clearly different in their origins and their spatial relationships with the villages, making them useful for the purposes of comparison. Finally, these two villages are the most accessible villages, both socially and politically, of all the villages originally included. This social and political accessibility was crucial for this study, as it involves matters which can be considered as socially and politically sensitive. After spending some time in a few villages in this area, and making some efforts to gain the trust with various people in these villages, the trust I received in these two villages can be considered to be most productive. The final decision to select these two villages, was based on the overall weighting of these criteria.

1.4 Fieldwork: A Note from Experience

Most books and manuals on social research methodology guide researchers to follow the subsequent research steps; beginning with the selection of a research topic, setting research objectives, reviewing theoretical grounds, constructing a conceptual framework, perhaps setting hypotheses before starting fieldwork, and so on. Though carefully following these steps may be ideal for conducting good research, their application in the real world can vary according to circumstances and limitations faced by individual researchers. However, when it comes to the writing about research, it is not uncommon for many researchers to indulge in a degree of mystification by presenting their research methodologies as following the above conventional process smoothly with only marginal difficulties, even though this may not fully reflect the reality. At the same time, they frequently explain how well

suited their methods are for the characteristics particular research and how they intend to conduct their fieldwork and analyse their data in a very formal way. On rare occasions, researchers do mention methodological problems they have encountered, especially during their fieldwork periods, which lead to some adjustments in the research techniques they initially prepared. In reality, conducting research in the social sciences often faces some difficulties, either before, during, or after the fieldwork stage (see Devereux and Hoddinott, 1992c; Bulmer and Warwick, 1993).

Throughout the period of conducting this research, I have experienced several things which have given rise to a mixture of feelings. This was partly related to the rather special arrangement of this research and other commitments I had at the early stage of the research that drove the research to move forward under limited conditions. Clearly, working under limited conditions is not unusual for social scientists, as Collins (1993) mentions:

> 'The fieldworker is rarely or never in the position to choose a method of research free from the constraints of time, money, social skills and linguistic resources.' (p. 68).

Many researchers who have conducted their fieldwork in developing countries recount both hardships and useful experiences during their fieldwork period with mixed feelings (see Devereux and Hoddinott, 1992a). These feelings are also shared by myself. However, in recounting the fieldwork hardships and experience, I intend not just to share experience with others, but also to unveil a 'story behind the curtain' which will allow fuller understanding of this study. This section will highlight the arrangement of this study and limitations faced in connection with this arrangement. Additionally, this section will also deal with the methodology employed for data collection, its adjustments, and reasons behind the adjustments.

The arrangement of this study is quite peculiar, since it did not properly follow the conventional processes of conducting social research, especially in its pre-fieldwork stage. This research started while I was working at Prince of Songkla University

(PSU) in southern Thailand, which is connected to the Centre for Development Studies (CDS), University of Bath, through its research on floodplain fisheries in South and South-east Asia (henceforth referred to as the PSU-CDS project); I was employed as the research officer for the Thailand component of the project, and at the same time involved in teaching at PSU. Through the connection with the project, my request to further my study was processed. It was in the early 1993 that I was informed to prepare my research proposal, and at the same time, to start implementing the research fieldwork as soon as possible. Through a close consultation with Dr. J. Allister McGregor who accepted me under his supervision, the proposal for this research was prepared in brief form, and then submitted for registration in 1993. This arrangement was based on the condition that I would be a part time student in the first year, conducting the research fieldwork in Thailand, and then I would spend the second and third years in the University of Bath to complete my study. While my commitment with PSU-CDS project and my teaching at PSU continued until mid 1994, this study had to begin with at least two limitations. The first of these was related to time management during the first year of this study, as other commitments mentioned above still had to be fulfilled. The second concerned my access to relevant literature prior to my fieldwork stage.

The fieldwork started in June 1993 in combination with the PSU-CDS project fieldwork, which continued until July 1994. Combining two research projects which were taking place in the same area at the same time was useful but difficult. The advantage of it was that I could cover a broader range of issues and gain a wider understanding of the research site. At the same time, it also meant that I had to divide my attention between two subjects with different foci. Regarding time management, I had to carefully prioritise my time allocation between different tasks. The high demands on my time meant that research techniques employed for this study had to be adjusted to meet with the time required for other tasks. However, all the adjustments made in the research techniques (which will be discussed in more detail later in this section) were done with the full awareness of the researcher and with careful consideration of their effects on both projects. This brief explanation should clarify questions which may arise in relation to the adjustments of research

techniques used in this study. It should also be noted that the reality of conducting fieldwork in rural societies denotes that no research techniques or guidelines can be fully applied without some adjustments (see Bulmer and Warwick, 1993; Gans, 1982; Frankenberg, 1982; Devereux and Hoddinott, 1992a).

Considering the period of time available for this study, the fieldwork took only one year to complete, which may be argued as being rather short for a qualitative study in rural communities. This time frame should not be a crucial issue, bearing in mind that some information was obtained through the PSU-CDS project which started much earlier. Additionally, this study did not intend to conduct a full ethnography of communities selected. It is instead an issue-oriented study which makes use of ethnographic application for the purpose of achieving a more holistic understanding of factors which are related to the issue under consideration. It should also be noted that this study also differs from other anthropological studies in the context of the relationships between the researcher and the researched. Most frequently, researchers conduct their research in societies which are alien to them in various respects. Many of them have to spend a considerable amount of time studying languages and cultures which are completely different from their original backgrounds. This is not the case with this study, as the researcher is highly familiar with the society studied. Being a southerner who was born in a rural village myself and having spent more than half of my life in rural areas, most of the social elements in rural life are not completely strange. Moreover, the communities selected for the study are those which are not new, as they are among those included under the PSU-CDS project which the researcher had been contacted since late 1992. However, it should be said that the researcher was still to some degree a stranger to the communities, since a few factors continued to alienate the researcher and members of the communities under the study. These factors will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.

Regarding the second limitation, my access to relevant literature was limited prior to the conduction of fieldwork. Being unable to come to Bath before starting the fieldwork, meant that I had to rely mainly on literature available at PSU and other

universities that I had access to in Thailand. These institutions had limited literature related to the study, especially with respect to common property resource management and policy analysis. Realising this limitation, the PSU-CDS project made some books and articles available for theoretical preparation. It was from this limited amount of literature that the research ideas and key questions were developed, which were then used as the main methodological basis for this study. In other words, no firm conceptual framework was developed before conducting the research fieldwork; the development of a full conceptual framework used in this study took place after the first round of the fieldwork was completed. Though this research arrangement may be seen peculiar, it does not necessarily lead to a serious problem in conducting social research in which the main aim is to investigate facts from the real settings, and where interpretation can be made at a later stage. Conducting qualitative research based on general ideas without specifying the conceptual framework and hypothesises is not uncommon among anthropologists (Jorgensen, 1989).

Because no firm conceptual framework was developed prior to the fieldwork, I began my field work by bringing along several questions related to the role of *phu yai ban* with respect to natural resource management and rural development. These include questions about their official duties with respect to natural resource management, the significance of these duties compared to other duties, their interests in natural resource problems, their capacity to handle these problems, and factors influencing their performance in dealing with these problems both within their villages and beyond. Together with these key questions, I also had a broad idea about the types of people that should be consulted when gathering information, and the main methodology that should be employed.

The main methodology used for this study was participant observation. Clarification of how this method was applied is important, since it covers a wide range of practices. Moreover, it should be distinguished from the observation method to avoid some confusion which may arise. Collins (1984) mentions:

> 'A standard approach to participant observation treats the options available to the researcher as lying on a continuum between complete participation -- with associate difficulties of observation -- and total concentration on observation with hardly any participation.' (p. 55).

From this statement, it can be understood that the method of participant observation is a combination of both participation and observation techniques in different degrees. Therefore, it is up to the researcher to apply these different degrees, depending on the circumstances he or she faces. It is likely that the combination of participation and observation varies with different researchers, and is illustrated in terms of their relationships with the people they study. This is of course influenced by the content of the subjects they study, the social and cultural contexts of communities under investigation, the personalities of researchers themselves after they adapt to local situations, and the ability of each researcher to communicate with the local people (see Frankenberg, 1982; Gans, 1982; McGregor, 1991; Devereux and Hoddinott, 1992b). The method primarily employed for this study falls midway on a continuum between complete participation and complete observation. It was considered to be suitable for the specific type of data needed in this study, which was qualitative and concerned with culture and norms. Collecting this type of data through other methods is questionable in terms of adequacy and efficiency (see Zelditch, 1969). The application of participant observation was judged to be most appropriate under the circumstances that prevailed at the time of the study. In order to understand the extent to which the combination between participation and observation was applied to this research, and its suitability for this study, one should consider the situation in which this fieldwork was undertaken. There are three points which are worth raising here -- the entry to the research sites, the nature of participant observation undertaken, and the relationships between the researcher and the researched.

Making an entry into the research site and community is one of the most important aspects of doing participant observation fieldwork. Thus it is often suggested that a researcher should recognise the accessibility, especially to people and their needs, as one of the most important criteria in selecting a research site, since there are usually

more than one equally good sites available. Moreover, the researcher should be well prepared and make all necessary contacts, either formal or personal, to facilitate his/her entry. Using personal contacts is often very useful (Bernard, 1988). In rural Thailand, making contacts with village and sub-district leaders is considered to be one of the first things a researcher should do. It is also important to inform the district officer (*nai amphoe*), preferably in writing. The researcher should explain the purposes of coming and ask for permission to conduct his/her fieldwork. This is essential in preventing any misunderstandings which may occur during the fieldwork period. Moreover, it is helpful in reducing any suspicions that may emerge between the researcher and the people, since their leaders will be able to provide clarification.

Most village and sub-district leaders in the area were visited at the beginning of my work with PSU-CDS project. The district officer (*nai amphoe*) as well as a few other concerned officials were contacted in person. Being a university staff member myself, there was no difficulty in making contacts with these leaders, but this does not mean that they did not have any suspicions about my research work. A few questions were asked, especially by officials at the district office, regarding details of my study, including some sensitive points. Friendly clarification was then given about the main research idea, and its anticipated benefits. To avoid creating a bad impression, I decided not to mention any points which may be sensitive for them. I made use of the first contact made for the PSU-CDS project to continue this study, which has a different focus from the earlier study, but without telling them about the change of subject. During the time of my PSU-CDS project fieldwork, difficulties arose regarding my relationships with some concerned officials in the district office, and with a few local leaders. Though there was no serious confrontation, I witnessed lack of co-operation in discussing relevant subjects, in providing information, and in avoiding meetings. These caused some difficulties in managing this research. Because of lack of co-operation from some district officials, the villages under the study were selected on the basis that confrontation could be avoided. As mentioned earlier, the selection of Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay for this study was partly

based on the better access I had with these two communities and their leaders, compared to other villages.

In conducting this research fieldwork, I managed to participate in various activities, including the every day economic activities of some households, social and cultural gatherings, formal village meetings, as well as informal social circles. Moreover, informal interviews and discussions were undertaken with key informants and concerned officials, as well as with some villagers from different socio-economic groups. As with key informants, selection was made from different groups whose interests were sometimes in conflict. All these methods are common among participant observers. However, my approach in conducting participant observation in this study differed from that of most participant observers mentioned in anthropological literature. Conventional anthropological studies of rural communities often stress the importance of adopting a holistic perspective in order to understand human activities, in which cultural and social elements play an important role (Fetterman, 1989). Accordingly, social anthropologists are expected to absorb the culture as a whole in their studies. Nevertheless, actual applications of this notion appear to be somewhat compromised, depending largely on the main focus of each study. Research in development studies often emphasises particular issues of development, and at the same time does not deny the importance of holism. Because this study is issue-oriented, a compromise method of practice was adopted following the notion widely adopted among researchers in development studies. My time constraint and my commitments with other work at PSU meant that I adopted participant observation practice in a way which did not allow me to fully absorb the whole culture of the communities I studied. Unlike most social anthropologists, I did not spend the majority of the time with the people I studied. Instead, making a few visits every month to each village was commonly practised with some over night stays in these villages. Additionally, I was also limited by the availability of accommodation in the villages. I could only stay with local households, but could not hide my status as a 'guest from the university', which may have made them uncomfortable. To them, I was always a special person of superior status, similar to government officials to whom they must show respect,

even if I tried to bridge this gap in various ways. In one village I managed to hire a room allocated as a guest house for casual tourists, and where the owner's family also stayed. This place was located outside the village, so was not representative of the social environment of the village. Because the main focus of this study is the issue of common property resource management and the role of the *phu yai ban*, its scope differs from more general ethnographic studies. The particular nature of this study allows such practice to be possible, and should not substantially diminish the quality of data obtained.

As with the relationships between the researcher and the people researched, several factors can affect types of their interactions. The questions of conformity and language ability are frequently cited in previous studies. These issues will be brought into the discussion as far as this study is concerned.

The question of how participant observers should behave in order to accomplish their research work and maximise the quality and quantity of data they need, is one of the issues widely debated. Most debates arise around 'the unending dialectic between the role of member (participant) and stranger (observer and reporter)' (Hughes, 1960, quoted in Gans, 1982). These two different roles are located at the opposite ends of the continuum line between complete participation and complete observation, as mentioned earlier. Although it is often mentioned that to be a 'total participant' or an 'unobtrusive participant observer' is the ultimate role a participant observer should play (Gans, 1982; Fetterman, 1989), it is doubtful that any fieldworker can adopt this role completely. Being an outsider by nature, with the main aim of researching the village community, it is likely that a fieldworker can participate in village life, but not in an unobtrusive manner. I prefer the term 'researcher participant' used by Gans (1982) to refer to the status of fieldworkers who undertake participant observation, including myself.

In my case, it is clear that the way I employed participant observation in this study cannot be labelled as unobtrusive. At the same time, it cannot be categorised as a 'complete observation', since it involved some amount of participation in various

activities. My relationship with the communities studied had been very good throughout the study period, and I believe that I was familiar to members of communities in general. However, I was only a sincere outsider who had a close relationship with them, but at the same time neither a full community member nor a stranger. Through my experience in these two communities, I would like to argue that the boundary always remains between being an outsider and a member of the community. However, this does not necessarily lessen the researcher's ability to access information as long as the researcher gains a high degree of trust from the community. Therefore, building the trust between the researcher and the community being researched, especially community leaders, is important in conducting participant observation. In rural Thailand, showing sincerity through friendly discussions with people, participating in social and ceremonial activities, and showing kindness by occasionally making reasonable donations to social activities and presenting small gifts to leaders and other frequently contacted individuals, are often very useful. These practices are parts of a culture practised widely throughout Thailand. Through my attempts to follow these practices, I received a very warm welcome in these two villages.

Language ability plays a crucial role in obtaining adequate information, as well as in constructing and maintaining a good relationship with villagers in participant observation. Without a good knowledge of the local language, it is difficult for researchers to conduct participant observation, because gathering information greatly depends on informal communication which is often complicated in its structure for outsiders. Moreover, being handicapped in the local language or dialect is likely to obstruct active participation in the community studied. On the other hand, being able to communicate in the local language is likely to promote better co-operation from those being researched, and also lessen the researcher's strangeness. Foreigners who conduct their qualitative research in other countries, manage to learn local languages and often hire native research assistants who are able to communicate in researchers' languages (see for example Devereux, 1992; Francis, 1992; McGregor, 1991).

Problems with respect to language difficulties were marginal in this study. Being a southerner, I do not face a major difficulty in understanding the Southern Thai Dialect or '*Bhasa Pakstai.*' Therefore, no native speaking assistant was needed in this study. However, I still have a marginal language problem, especially in speaking and understanding some expressions, since *Bhasa Pakstai* is not my first language. Though this minor problem should not have a substantial impact on my correspondence, as I can always ask for clarification of some expressions and I can use the Central Dialect (*Bhasa Klaang*) which is understandable to all villagers, I observed that a more friendly environment was obtained when I spoke *Bhasa Pakstai* with them. This issue is raised in order to remind the reader about a point discussed earlier with regard to being an unobtrusive participant observer in the village, and how this is unlikely to occur easily, even with a minor problem like this.

Data were recorded by means of making notes. No tape recording was used to assist the study, since this may have led to suspicion among villagers. This can happen when some of the subject discussed is considered as political and quite sensitive. Most of field notes were written while discussions or observation took place. Nevertheless, they were written in a short form in order to reduce communication discontinuity. This was normally followed by writing a full note immediately after each conversation, or in the evening of the same day while the data was still fresh in my mind. Some degree of analysis was involved while writing full notes. This practice is common in this type of study as Bogdan and Taylor (1975) observe:

> 'In a sense, *data analysis is an ongoing process in participant observation research.* Observers note important themes and formulate hypotheses throughout their studies.' (p. 80).

Analysing data while writing field notes was very useful for this study. It helped in refining key questions, as well as improving my views on the subject of interest. However, in terms of its analytical function, it forms only the first step of analysis with further analysis needed in the later stages.

After the main fieldwork was completed, all fieldwork notes were compiled and reorganised. It was in this stage that further analysis was undertaken. Since my status was also changed from being a part time student to a full time student, and I came to Bath University soon after the completion of the main fieldwork, the chance to concentrate on this study increased, and access to literature also greatly improved. This provided me an opportunity not just for more thoughtful analysis, but also to revise the whole idea of the work. During this period, further questions also emerged. This led to the development of a proper conceptual idea, and the decision to make another short visit to the field in August and September 1995, to conduct minor fieldwork supplementing the previous fieldwork. The major analysis of fieldwork data was undertaken after returning from this second fieldwork period, and continued alongside the writing of this thesis.

The discussion of this chapter so far has revealed the interest of the researcher in conducting this study, the significance of the problems, the issues focused on in the study, and the fieldwork experience. It is aimed to provide a good grasp of the research before the full presentation which follows. The organisation of the following parts of this thesis will begin with general concepts of policy analysis and popular participation in the policy process in Chapter Two. This chapter will include also a conceptual framework used in guiding the analysis of this study. Chapter Three will deal with a discussion about the policy process and participation in Thailand. The emphasis will mainly be on policies related to rural development, in which the management of natural resources at local levels is included. Chapter Four will deal with backgrounds of the villages selected for this study; this will cover physical, historical, social and economic backgrounds of the villages, in order to provide a basic understanding about their settings, before entering into the analytical part of the thesis which will be presented in Chapter Five and Chapter Six. In Chapter Five, the presentation will emphasise the community organisation of the villages, and their different backgrounds will be related to the differences in their organisational arrangements and politics. The discussion will cover the power structure of the organisations, including the place of local leaders. Chapter Six will concentrate on the role of village official leaders or *phu yai ban* as important actors

in the rural development process. The main focus of this chapter will be on their role with respect to the management of common property resources available in their communities. The final chapter, Chapter Seven, will provide the conclusions derived from this study, and prospects of applying the study's findings to improve the relationship between policy and practice, with references to common property resource management at local level, especially in rural Thai communities.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ANALYSIS OF POLICY AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

2.1 Introduction

In the contemporary world, policy plays a crucial role in the development of any group of people. The study of development has increasingly addressed various aspects of policy such as policy issues, policy characteristics, and policy outcomes or impacts. The study of policy is an important element in the understanding of development taking place within any administrative and political boundary.

One of the first things that is essential for studying policy is an understanding of policy as a concept. The term policy has different meanings in different contexts (see for example, Anderson, 1975; Heclo, 1972; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). However, in development studies the term can be viewed basically as the courses of action pursued under the authority of governments with regard to the development of their people (McGregor, 1991). From this point of view, policy forms an important linkage between the state and the people in which the state translates policy into action. In this sense it can be seen as one of the most important manifestations of the state. This linkage is important in understanding the relationship between the state and its people, and makes the analysis of policy an important element in the study of development. Moreover, both the state and the people are key elements in the analysis of policy, and therefore most concepts are developed around them. Because the policy process is a complex process, different views emerge on the juxtaposition of the state and the people in the process. This thesis is one of the studies which are related to the understanding of the relationships between the state and people, with particular

reference to policies related to the management of natural resources in fishing communities in Southern Thailand.

In this chapter, attention will be given to understanding the policy process and the concepts of policy analysis that have been developed over recent years. It will also underline the relationships between policy-making, implementation and outcomes, together with considering the influence of the environment in which policy making takes place, the roles of actors in the policy process, and the participation of local people in the policy process. A brief discussion will also address policy questions related to common property resources management. Finally, a conceptual framework for analysing development policy at local level will be proposed.

2.2 The Concepts of Policy Analysis and Policy Process

The term 'policy analysis' is widely used in the study of policy. It is basically concerned with identifying problems that occur in the policy process, as well as seeking solutions to those problems (Wildavsky, 1972). The purpose of policy analysis is to acquire greater understanding of the policy process, so that its quality can be improved. Due to growing problems related to policy-making and practice, the interest in policy analysis has grown steadily, and become central to academics from related disciplines such as economics, political science and sociology (Ham and Hill, 1993). This greater interest in policy analysis has brought about the development of concepts of policy analysis to deal with a variety of circumstances. Among a number of concepts developed, the process model and the political system model have been widely adopted by policy analysts since interest in the subject was first aroused. Both of these models have been the prominent frameworks for policy analysis. The following discussion will deal with these models in more detail.

2.2.1 The Process Model

The process model or 'rational model' derives from the perception that policy occurs as a process involving a series of activities. The model was first introduced by Harold

Lasswell in his article entitled 'The Decision Process' published in 1963. It is one of the simplest and most frequently used as a framework of policy analysis. According to this conceptualisation, policy is assumed to emerge through a logical path, as Jenkins illustrates; '...an issue moves through the political system in a processual way from the point of entry, through decision and implementation, until a final choice is made to proceed with or terminate a course of action.' (1978, p. 18). The process comprises various successive stages occurring over time, the number of which varies from one author to another (Figure 2.1). Generally, there are three main stages; problem formation, policy-making, and implementation (Anderson, 1975; Gordon *et al.*, 1993). However, this classification is not the core of the policy process framework. The main concern of the framework is with various actions taking place in a processual way, the involvement of various actors in each stage and the dependency of one stage on its precedent stages (Jenkins, 1978; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984).



Figure 2.1: Schematic presentation of process perspective on policy
(Source: Jenkins, 1978, p. 17)

The process model is useful in drawing attention to the ordering of policy activities which fall into different subsequent stages. It also draws attention to certain concerned bodies which at certain times are more likely to be connected to only one stage of the policy process, rather than another. This feature of policy is viewed among its supporters as an ideal representation of reality (Jenkins, 1978). Another important

characteristic of the process framework is that it is dynamic, which allows for forward as well as backward movement in response to feedback received at different stages. The opportunity to provide feedback at many points of the process means that modifications can be made whenever problems are found (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984).

Despite its advantages, there are some weaknesses in using the process framework. Its major weakness is its clearly defined sequence of stages. This characteristic is often criticised by some writers such as Grindle, Hill, Barrett and Hjern, as questionable and inaccurate when applied to the real world (Grindle, 1980b; Hill, 1981; Barrett and Fudge, 1981; Hjern and Porter, 1993). Hogwood and Gunn, who see the framework as being very useful, also agree that viewing the process in terms of clearly defined stages is dangerous, because it may be interpreted that '...any policy episode is more or less self-contained and comprises a neat cycle of initial intermediate and culminating events', which is not necessarily what actually happens in the real world (1984, p. 26).

2.2.2 The Political System Model

David Easton who proposed the system model explains policy in forms of input-output relation of political activity occurring as a system (Figure 2.2). He calls this system a 'political system' which contains a number of processes which need to be in balance in order to survive. Moreover, it forms a sub-system within other systems which are referred to as the environment (Easton, 1965; see also Ham and Hill, 1993). One of the important features of this model is the relationship between the political system in which policy-making takes place, and the environment. It can be seen that a major concern in the understanding of policy outputs is the influence of the environment -- either economic, political, or social environments -- on the political system. It is from these environments that the inputs are fed into the system, and are then processed to produce the outputs. Therefore, policy analysis must consider the economic, political and social contexts within which problems are tackled (Ham and Hill, 1993).



Figure 2.2: A simplified model of the political system

(Source: Ham and Hill, 1993, p. 13)

Despite its strength in explaining the relationship between the political system in which policy-making takes place and the environment surrounding it, several arguments arise about the inaccuracy of the model with regard to some of its assumptions. One of its major weaknesses is it pays little attention to explaining the input side with regard to the demands of policy-makers and the conversion process occurring in this stage. Another point is its assumption about the situation in 'the political system' as 'the object of political action.' This assumption overlooks the relationships between government units which are subject to continual adjustments as powers and duties or financial arrangements are altered (Ham and Hill, 1984). Moreover, the assumption about 'the political system' is criticised widely by policy analysis students as misleading. The system is labelled by its critics as 'the black box' to indicate its air of mystery (Barrett and Fudge, 1981a).

Though the process model and the political system model are presented here as separate models, they are both equally influential to the development of policy theories which have followed them, and are frequently applied in their synthesis. Most theories in policy analysis have developed as modifications of these two conceptual frameworks, to meet with various disciplines. The evidence can be seen from most of the literature related to policy analysis -- as some writers deal with more details of the whole policy process (for example Dror, 1968; Anderson, 1975; Edwards and Sharkansky, 1978), others focus on each of the main stages of the policy process, especially the policy-making stage (for example Blowers, 1993; March, 1978; McGrew and Wilson, 1982) and implementation (for example Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1981). Instead of considering actions taking place in each stage as prescriptive, most of these writers also take account of political interactions and the influence of environments which correspond to the political system model.

The process model and the political system model also share some common features, especially the fact that they are both based on the same perspective -- a top-down perspective. This means that most theories which came after them are developed along a similar path. The main characteristic of the top-down approach is that it

views the state as playing the key role in pursuing policies. Advocates of this top-down perspective assume that a policy begins with a decision made by political elites and high level governmental officials, which is then implemented through hierarchical structures of implementing organisations. Thus the top-down approach of policy analysis focuses on examining the extent to which the policy's legally mandated objectives are achieved over time, and the reasons behind the achievement (Sabatier, 1993). Though this approach has dominated the study of policy for a long time, it has recently been challenged by some findings which perceive the weaknesses of the approach in explaining policy outcomes. Many of the recent studies point out the importance of the relationship between policy implementation and its effects on policy outcomes (see Grindle, 1980b; Grindle and Thomas, 1989; Hjern and Porter, 1993). However, before discussing this any further, it is important to discuss the relationship between policy-making, policy implementation and policy outcomes.

2.3 Policy-Making, Policy Implementation and Policy Outcomes

The conventional view suggests that a model of the policy process is roughly linear. Briefly, it begins with entering issues on the agenda for government action -- a decision is then made and issues are transformed into policy, and finally, the policy is implemented (Grindle, 1980a). According to this view, policy-making forms an important step in which an affirmative decision is made and becomes, what Anderson stresses, 'the pay-off' of the entire policy process (Anderson, 1975, p. 76). The step involves a series of decisions, including the selection of policy alternatives and decision on a preferred alternative. Because it functions to make a choice of policy alternatives to be implemented, the step is seen to determine the policy outcomes. This makes the policy-making step one of the main focuses of policy analysis frequently found in policy literature.

Most of the studies on policy-making often concentrate on the complexity of the policy-making sphere. Central to these studies are power structures, the roles of policy makers, especially state policy makers, interactions in the policy-making sphere, and factors influencing these interactions (for the review see for example Heclo, 1972;

Peters, 1987; King, 1990; Barrett and Fudge, 1981b). As a consequence, several concepts have been developed to explain the context of decision-making, modes of decision-making, and their effects on the choices made (see Ham and Hill, 1993, Chapter 2). Among the concepts which are widely adopted, Grindle and Thomas (1989) suggest they can be divided into two broad categories based on the types of explanation they offer: society-centred concepts and state-centred concepts. They note that the society-centred concepts view the decision to adopt, pursue and change public policies as occurring as a result of the exercise of power and competition among individuals, groups, or classes in society or in international sphere of class-based or interest based society. Theorists in this group see policy activities undertaken by state policy makers and state bureaucrats, as dependent variables; their outcomes depend on social contexts of classes and interest groups, more than on original ideas and objectives of the activities and the organisational context of the state. On the other hand, the state-centred concepts see the organisational context of the state, rather than societal context, as being important in determining the outcomes of policy-making. According to this view, policy makers have greater autonomy and are less constrained by the society in which the policy-making takes place. Nevertheless, it does not deny the influence of the societal context on the outcomes of the policy-making. The implication of these different explanations in the analysis of policy is that the direction of policy can be understood by understanding the interactions and influences of different groups of actors in the policy-making process, and the environment in which policy-making takes place.

To many students of policy analysis, the policy-making step is crucially important in the policy process, because it plays a crucial role in determining the policy outcomes. The process approach which views policy as proceeding from one step to another, assumes that policy-making proceeds in a rational and coherent manner. That is, once a decision is made, it will be implemented in order to achieve the desired goals (Anderson, 1975). The political system approach, which emphasises the importance of political interactions in policy-making, sees policy-making outputs, which determine policy outcomes, as a result of the political interactions in a given environment. This implies that different modes of interaction affect the extent to which different actors

influence policy-making, and hence its outputs. Despite their different foci, they both assume that making a good choice in the policy-making stage means good policy outcomes. As Barrett and Fudge state: 'Decisions are seen as the outputs of the policy process, the assumption being that once made they will be translated into action' (1981a, p. 5). The process approach treats implementors as agents for policy makers. Problems which occur after the policy-making stage are seen as managerial and concerned with the effectiveness of the government administrative system in controlling, co-ordinating policy implementation in compliance with the decisive policy. Therefore, the concern of policy studies from this perspective is to find out ways to improve policy-making skills and public intervention in order to make decisive policies relevant to specific problems and issues. In order to put policy into effect, it is necessary to improve management and co-ordination among public agencies (Barrett and Fudge, 1981a).

The above views have dominated the determination of the effectiveness of public policy, and the development of policy analysis frameworks ever since the establishment of policy studies in 1960s (see Jenkins, 1978, p. 261). However, the failure of many policies, especially in developing countries, as observed by some policy analysts, does not correspond to the above assumptions. The studies of Merilee Grindle with her colleagues and some other social scientists, such as Stephen Quick, Irene Rothenberg and Gerald Sussman, indicate that policy outcomes depend not only on how good policies are, but also on how effective their implementation is, as they see many changes can occur during the implementation stage (see Grindle, 1980a; Grindle and Thomas, 1989; Thomas and Grindle, 1990; Quick, 1980; Rothenberg, 1980; Sussman, 1980). For Grindle and her colleagues, the implementation process may be as important as the policy-making process in determining policy outcomes, because it occurs over a longer time-period and may therefore be more prone to conflict. They conclude from their observations of policy reforms in several developing countries that outcomes resulting from the implementation appear not only in a bi-modal form of being successfully or unsuccessfully implemented. There can also be a third outcome which results from a significant change occurring during implementation, and this outcome may be very different to that intended by the policy

makers (Grindle and Thomas, 1989). Though the work of this group of policy analysts does not mark the beginning of the interest in the importance of implementation, their work seems to be influential in shifting the interest of some policy analysts away from the conventional policy process and political system approaches, to new more 'bottom-up' analytical approaches. Among recent studies in policy analysis, a number of them focus on implementation as their major interest. Due to this increasing interest in the study of the role of policy implementation, it is important to further explore the significance of the implementation stage in the policy process.

2.4 The Importance of Policy Implementation: From Top-Down to Bottom-Up Perspectives

Conventional policy analysts who follow the top-down approach tend to equate policy decisions with action. For them, decisions are the outputs of the policy process, and once they are made they will be implemented (Barrett and Fudge, 1981b). Policy implementation is seen as the business of translating decisions into action or 'getting things done' (Minogue, 1993, p.19). The step-by-step approach sees the implementation step as separate though related to the policy-making step, since the functions of the latter relate to specific objectives which emerge from the complex process of policy-making. The policy implementation step forms a process that includes a series of activities of putting policy into effect. These activities are concerned mainly with 'co-ordinating and managing various elements required to achieve the desired ends' (Barrett and Fudge, 1981a, p.10). These views of the relationships between policy implementation and policy-making have influenced the studies and literature on policy implementation to focus on the analysis of organisations.

In the organisational perspectives of implementation, after a policy is made by policy makers, it then is handed in to the administrative systems for execution. The tasks of executing the policy go through the state's organisational structures and processes. By adopting Weberian concepts of hierarchical organisation and management which are embedded firmly in the conventional wisdom of public organisations, the

implementation process is perceived as automatically associated with a hierarchical 'chain of command' which tends to follow-on the decisions made at the top. This perception implies that the problems of policy implementation are the matters of controls and incentives in the operation to ensure compliance and the operation of discretion. When the application is made in the context of a single organisation whose basic purpose is to carry out specific functions, problems emerging in the implementation stage are seen as a matter of 'communication, channels of communication, and control systems', which can be ameliorated through the improvement of the performance of public agencies (Barrett and Fudge, 1981a, p. 9). On this basis, effective implementation is translated as how a policy is put into effect, by taking policy-making as the starting point from which action must follow. Failure of policy is seen as being concerned with policy-making and administration. Therefore, effective policy-making as well as communication and control systems of executing organisations are the keys to success (Barrett and Fudge, 1981b; Nixon, 1980). Scholars such as Gunn (1978), Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979), suggest that by providing clear guidelines to policy makers and administrators who are concerned with policy-making, more effective policy-making is possible. They believe that if the conditions in the guidelines are met, the chances of successful policy implementation will improve. The guidelines provided by Sabatier and Mazmanian are as follows:

> '1. The program is based on a sound theory relating to changes in target group behaviour to the achievements of the desired end state (objectives).
>
> 2. The statute (or other basic policy decision) contains unambiguous policy directives and structures of the implementation process so as to maximize the likelihood that the target group will perform as desired.
>
> 3. The leaders of the implementation agencies possess substantial managerial and political skill and are committed to statutory goals.
>
> 4. The program is actively supported by organised constituency groups and by a few key legislators (or the chief executive) throughout the implementation process, with the court being neutral or supportive.
>
> 5. The relative priority of statutory objectives is not significantly undermined overtime by the emergence of conflicting public policies or by change in relevant socio-economic conditions that undermine the statute's "technical" theory or political support.' (1979, pp. 484-5).

Though Sabatier and Mazmanian suggest that policy implementation is likely to be more effective if the above conditions are met, it is arguable whether such conditions can ever be met in the real world. Questions arise in relation to the characteristics of policy and the administrative conditions. Both unambiguous policy and the total and rational control stated above are unlikely to be found in practice, especially in the area of development policy. Frequently, it is argued that policy goals are often broad, unclear and inconsistent, and so obstacles to communication appear when transferring policy from one level of the organisation to another (Minogue, 1993; Sabatier, 1993). With respect to the notion of total and rational control, it should be borne in mind that neither the policy-making process, nor policy implementation, occurs in a politics-free vacuum. They both take place in a context in which conflict, bargaining, negotiation and compromise, are commonplace. Even though some authors, such as Dunsire (1978) and Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), argue that the conflict, bargaining and negotiation that emerge in policy implementation are part of the process in which different sets of actors struggle to influence each other when putting policy into effect within a formal framework of interdependence and apparently shared purpose, their arguments seem unclear with regard to the final outputs, and whether or not they still achieve compliance with a specific policy. Moreover, questions also arise about the boundary where policy-making ends and implementation begins. There seems to be no clear boundary between these two stages, and their relationships continue. This means that problems facing policy implementation may affect the pre-set directives and structures of the policy (see Barrett and Fudge, 1981b). Together with the findings from many recent studies which clearly indicate that many changes are likely to occur during implementation due to a variety of reasons (see Barrett and Fudge, 1981b; Grindle, 1980b; Grindle and Thomas, 1989; Thomas and Grindle, 1990), these arguments mean that the concept of 'implementation as putting policy into effect' must be re-examined.

A decline in the popularity of the concept of 'implementation as putting policy into effect' has led some policy analysts to seek alternative concepts of policy implementation. These include a consideration of the importance of interactions of

different actors in the implementation process which may influence and change the policies, and further exploration of the relationship between policy and action. By emphasising the importance of actors' interactions in the implementation process, implementation can be regarded as occurring in the form of a negotiation process between policy-makers and implementors, in which bargaining and compromise are central. Also, the interaction may be influenced by the environment in which it takes place. Changes and modifications of decisive policies may occur in the implementation process as an outcome of the interactions between implementors and policy-makers, and among different sets of actors, as well as in response to the changing environment. With regard to the need for further exploration of the policy-action relationship, Barrett and Fudge suggest that:

> '...understanding the relationship between policy and action also requires an *action* perspective, which takes what is going on as central, seeks to understand how and why, and from that base explores the different kinds of frameworks within which action takes place.' (1981a, p. 26).

This perspective of policy analysis focuses on the actions and responses of actors involved, the agencies which operate policies, and factors which influence their behaviours. This aspect of analysis is particularly important in the study of policy implementation, because it provides an insight into different actions and responses that actors may have in relation to a particular policy. In other words, it helps in explaining the interaction between policy content and the organisational contexts that affect policy outcomes. Merilee Grindle is among the authors who believe that policy content and policy context are important dimensions which must be included in policy analysis. With regard to policy implementation, both policy content and policy context are seen to be significant factors determining the 'implementability' of policy (Grindle, 1980a).

Grindle's studies focus primarily on the importance of implementation in the analysis of policy, but she does not deny the concept of policy process completely. Her approach to analysis is instead a compromise between the process model and other models which consider the importance of interactions between different sets of actors

and other factors, including policy content and policy context (Grindle, 1980a). In her view, public policies are generally translated into action programmes, and policy implementation can be viewed as a function of programme implementation. With respect to the policy content, she views that the linkage built between policy-making, policy implementation, and decisions made during policy formulation about the kind of policy to be pursued, affects the shape of programmes to be executed. At the same time, the execution of that policy or programme may have a real or potential impact on given social, economic and political settings, in which the response may determine the failure or success of that execution. In other words, though policy-making is important in guiding how a policy to be executed, its outcomes are determined significantly by the action and response of different actors occurring during the implementation stage.

The above reviews of implementation research signify some degree of difference in the views of policy analysts regarding the importance of implementation in the policy process. However, they still maintain the notion of linkages between policy-making and implementation, or what Sabatier calls the 'top-down' perspective (Sabatier, 1993). More recently, studies have emerged which focus on the importance of interactions among various actors on a particular problem or issue at the operational level, without referring to policy formulation and policy decision. This view of policy analysis is referred to as the 'bottom-up' perspective (Sabatier, 1993). This approach to analysis is supported by some authors, who perceive the weakness of the 'top-down' perspective, especially Benny Hjern and his colleagues -- David Porter, Chris Hull and Kenneth Hanf. To this group of social scientists, conventional analytical frameworks for policy analysis, based on the rationality of public administration theory and the economic efficiency of political economy theory are anachronisms, especially when applied to industrial society (see Sabatier, 1993; Hjern and Porter, 1993; Hanf, 1993; Hjern and Hull, 1982). For them, the programme's success depends more upon the skills of specific individuals at local or operational level, than upon the efforts of central government officials (Hjern *et al.*, 1978, quoted in Sabatier, 1993). Hjern and Porter argue that in industrial society, there emerges an increase in the interconnectedness of public and private organisations. Therefore, implementation of

programmes is neither dependent on 'the invisible hand of markets' nor on 'the heavy hand of large government bureaucracies.' They see the implementation of programmes as being undertaken by multi-organisational clusters of organisations representing part of markets and part of government bureaucracies, which are interconnected and come together within the framework of those programmes (Hjern and Porter, 1993, pp. 249-50).

2.5 Implementors and Factors Influencing their Performance

In the previous section, various concepts of implementation were discussed, and it was agreed that implementation plays an important role in determining policy outcomes, whether they achieve the policy goals or not. Among the important features of policy implementation, complexity is often stressed. For example, Edwards and Sharkansky (1978) point out that public policy implementation forms a complicated process which may require a wide range of actions involving a large number of actors. Because various actors are involved, their interactions and their responses to the environment in which policy implementation takes place become the focal point for many policy analysts who stress the importance of implementation in driving and directing policies, whether to achieve decisive goals or to shift towards other directions. This section will discuss the roles of implementors, other actors and those factors which influence their interactions in the implementation process.

2.5.1 State Implementors and their Working Environment

In democratic states, the implementation of public policy is generally seen as being undertaken by state administrative agencies designated to take responsibility for that particular policy, although non-state administrative bodies, such as community organisations, may be utilised for the administration of public programmes (Anderson, 1975). In this context then, state administrative agencies or bureaucracies are seen as the key implementors of public policies. A bureaucracy, as viewed by Max Weber, is an organisational form which is based upon 'legal rational authority' which is applied through 'a set of rules and administrative structure which closely control the

action of the employees of the organisation' (Wallis, 1989, p. 2). By applying this authority, it is believed that employees or bureaucrats are obedient to the requirement of the organisation because they have a common belief in the importance of the system. Weber believes that the system of bureaucratic authority is important, because it allows state power to shake itself free from bourgeois control (Ham and Hill, 1993). Moreover, the bureaucratic rule introduced is seen by Weber to be an ideal rule, which can be applied not only to state organisations, but also to non-state counterparts (Page, 1992). However, variations in the interpretation and application of Weber's idea have brought about variations in its application to the contemporary bureaucratic system, which affects its reputation. With respect to the implementation of public policy, one of the classic Weberian interpretations of bureaucracy's role in delivering policies appears in terms of the relationship between superiors and subordinates in complex bureaucratic organisations. Based on this assumption, once policies are made at the highest levels of bureaucracies or by policy-making bodies, they will then be carried out by lower level bureaucrats with a very limited discretion. In other words, bureaucracy is perceived to be a rational and efficient form of organisation for policy implementation (see Smith, 1988; Wallis, 1989).

Despite the widespread adoption of the Weberian interpretation of bureaucratic systems, its application seems to be debatable, particularly with respect to the rationality and efficiency of bureaucratic administration in delivering public policies. There has been much controversy concerning the imperfection of the structure of power and functioning of bureaucracies as big organisations. Smith (1988) mentions that because the organisations are big and are constituted of different interest groups, there may be conflicts in political relationships which create a shift away from the ideal model. Conflicts within a bureaucracy may arise from the prescriptive elements of the ideal model, in which Weber assumes no clear delineation between the authority of office and the authority of expertise. Based on this assumption, officials in the hierarchy who have the authority to issue commands also have 'sufficient expertise and professional skill to command the acquiescence and support of subordinates'; a condition which may not be easily met (Smith, 1988, p. 6). This type

of conflict may lead to confusion in administrative power, between the technical expert line and a system of control by impersonal commands in the official hierarchy.

Smith (1988) also points out another problematic aspect facing the real world bureaucratic application, that is, the exercise of discretion. Ideally, bureaucrats must be bound by the rules of the organisation in making any decision regarding policy, though this is often not true in the real application. It is argued that decision-making is frequently made by lower level officials based on their own value judgement, which is partly influenced by the social and political environment. This argument is supported by various studies which indicate that lower level officials do exercise their power which then affects the performance of the organisations in pursuing policies (Smith, 1988). The work of Michael Lipsky on 'street-level bureaucracy' contributes significantly to understanding the behaviour of official actors, who interact directly with clients and workers in delivering public services and have substantial discretion in the execution of their work (Lipsky, 1980; see also Hudson, 1993). Based on his research of public services in America, Lipsky argues that street-level bureaucrats have a considerable amount of power in controlling 'service consumers.' At the same time, they confront a restricted working environment filled with limited resources, uncertainties and work pressures. These adverse circumstances compel them to modify their behaviour in order to get their jobs done and secure their working environment. Being in these circumstances, maintaining the original idea of policy command through the hierarchy of bureaucratic organisations becomes problematic, which affects the efficiency of policy implementation by state implementors to achieve pre-set policy goals.

Furthermore, it is argued that policy implementation should not be viewed as always undertaken by one organisation, but by many organisations. This means that more complicated patterns of relationships are likely to occur, not only among actors at different levels but also among actors from different organisations (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975).

It can be concluded here that the implementation of public policies is not simply undertaken by state officials following hierarchical systems of command, but rather involves political interactions among state actors, both within an organisation or between organisations, who are involved in the implementation process. Their patterns of interaction vary depending on circumstances in which they are situated. Because state actors, especially those who are dealing with providing direct services to clients, are often faced with several limitations, such as technical and financial limitation, their performance in dealing with policy implementation is likely to involve individual judgements. These individual judgements can shift the original ideas of policy they implement.

2.5.2 Factors Influencing Implementor's Performance

In the previous section, it was stated that implementing public policy does not occur in a vacuum, but rather occurs in the context of wider political, social and economic environments. The political, social and economic conditions surrounding the implementation process may influence the performance of implementors and hence policy outcomes.

The economic conditions, such as economic depression of the state or the region can create a negative impact on policy implementation. For example, Simmie (1990) quotes Mohan (1989) and Duclaud-Williams (1990) in stating that economic depression in OECD countries during 1970s influenced both the thinking and action of state actors with respect to health and educational policy. The effect on health policies appears in forms of both the excuse of money shortage to pay for the execution of the policies and the low incentives to health service. Moreover, Duclaud-Williams (1990) observes that economic depression resulted in an increasing resistance by actors to implement government policies.

With respect to social and political conditions, there are several factors worth considering. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) suggest that the analytical framework for policy implementation should take the following socio-political factors into

consideration: the nature of public opinion on the importance of policy issue; the reaction of social elites to the implementation of the policy in question; the biased character of implementing agencies; and the extent to which interest groups support or oppose the policy. From a top-down perspective, these social and political conditions may influence the outcomes of policy implementation to shift away from the original objectives. In their analysis of development policies in developing countries, Grindle and Thomas conclude that a variety of societal reactions are found at the implementation stage, depending on the policy characteristics or content. These reactions can occur in either the public or bureaucratic arena, and largely determine policy outcomes (Grindle and Thomas, 1989; Thomas and Grindle, 1990). The following are some examples of the different relationships between policy characteristics and societal reactions, as summarised by Grindle and Thomas: policies which bring a direct burden or costs to the public are more likely to receive a negative reaction, such as protest, from the public; policies which are technically complex may require competence and strong bureaucratic support; and policies which generate an immediate impact on the public are likely to receive a stronger public and bureaucratic response, than those which impacts can only be seen in the long term. In response to this likelihood, they suggest that policy changes which may create negative responses should receive solid, stable and legitimate political support, together with effective administration in order to be successful and sustained. This suggestion corresponds to that of Sabatier and Mazmanian, who also see that maintaining political support from interest groups, and from legislative and executive sovereign, is necessary to be recognised in implementing public policy (Sabatier, 1993; Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1981).

Culture can also influence policy implementation and policy outcomes, but it is often overlooked by policy makers, planners, and implementors. Cultural contributions to policy implementation may appear either in the form of support or resistance. However, because development policies are frequently designed without careful consideration, or are based on very broad assumptions about the characteristics of clients, negative contributions of culture often appear to be more prevalent. There are two main characteristics of culture which must be understood in the context of policy

implementation; first, it is broad in its coverage, and second, it has several layers at different social levels (Staudt, 1991). These two major characteristics of culture contribute to the complexity of problems related to culture in the policy process. People are influenced differently by culture, as some people are more influenced by and bound with culture, or some elements of culture, than others. Moreover, the cultural differences found at different levels of society may create different impacts on different groups of people (Staudt, 1991, quoting Hofstede, 1980). Consequently, consideration of culture should not only emphasise the difference in cultural patterns, but also the variation of culture emerging at different levels of society.

The main concern of government bodies responsible for policy implementation is that they should attempt to overcome cultural barriers in order to carry out their policies to benefit their clients. Various cultural barriers may be found along policy implementation process, such as conflicts between policy objectives and existing traditional power arrangements within target communities, conflicts in perceptions of problems and solutions between implementors and clients, and so on (see Verhelst, 1987). In reality, some barriers may arise within implementing organisations themselves, since bureaucracy operating in different countries is enmeshed in the culture of each country (Staudt, 1991). Heginbotham (1975) observes that the application of approaches to planning, implementation, and management of change under notions of westernisation in Tamil Nadu, India, bring about cultural conflicts between these notions and the traditional notions, and reduce the institutional capacity of its bureaucracy. McGregor (1991) concludes from his study of rural credit policy in Bangladesh that policy implementation has been structured in a way which allows powerful patrons and brokers better access than the poor, despite its claim to challenge the power of informal money lenders and to undermine exploitation in rural area. This discrepancy between policy implementation and its original objectives was observed to be a reflection of the domination of patronage and factionalised institutions, which forms part of the culture of production relations in Bangladesh. In Thailand, the domination of patron-client relations and hierarchy system in Thai culture is seen as obstacles to the implementation of the decentralisation policy recently introduced (Brahmanee, 1989; see also Kambhu, 1984; and Nakata, 1987).

The discussion in this section indicates that though state implementors are expected to play a key role in implementing public policy, their performances are influenced by several factors, especially the economic, social, cultural and political conditions surrounding the implementation process. These factors interact with each other and influence not only the performance of official implementors, but also the reactions of other actors and the public to the policy in question. Moreover, differences in the characteristics of public policies may generate different responses from official implementors, as well as from other actors and the public. Therefore, it is important in the analysis of policy implementation to consider the interaction between different factors and their influence on official implementors, other actors and the public. This consideration should not be limited only to the local level where the final policy outcomes can be detected. Rather it should take an account of effects which may occur at different levels where important decisions take place.

2.6 The Interaction of Actors in the Implementation Process and the Concept of Implementation Structures

As was mentioned earlier, policy implementation forms a process involving various actors. These actors may play different roles in the ongoing process of policy implementation as Grindle states '...some actors may be called to make choices about specific allocation of public resources, others may attempt to influence decisions' (1980a, p. 10). Apart from official implementors at different levels of bureaucracy, there are other actors with various backgrounds and interests. They include politicians at different levels, economic elites and recipient groups. The difference in their backgrounds and interests drives them to seek different achievements by making demands on allocation procedures. Grindle mentions that the goals of different actors are frequently in conflict with each other. Their conflicting goals may transform into contentious interactions to achieve their goals, which in turn may affect the performance of implementing officials and political elites in making decisions emerging in the implementation process.

The attempts of different actors to take part in implementing public policies is crucial, especially in developing countries where access to the policy-making process is limited for non-official actors. Grindle (1980b) states that an implementor faces the situation of conflicting demands and expectations from different sets of actors, both within and outside his/her organisation. Within his/her own organisation, the implementor is required to fulfil the broad as well as long-term expectations of his/her superiors and subordinates. Generally, his/her superiors expect him/her to manage the available resources to achieve programme or policy goals, and at the same time, to maintain 'a jurisdiction that is relatively free of open conflict in areas affected by the organisation' (p. 202). His subordinates expect him to provide proper resources and support for specific projects. Outside the organisation, a variety of actors expect the implementor to respond to their demands, which vary according to their interests. For instance, the demands of local politicians may be concerned with the positive reaction of implementors to respond to their requests. Local economic elites may wish for resource allocation to benefit them or their businesses. These actors will challenge official implementors in pursuing programme or policy goals, by attempting to influence them to implement the policy in the way which satisfies their needs. Beside these actors, there are clients who constitute the target groups of particular programmes or policies. Though these groups may be viewed as being less active in demanding government resources as compared to other groups of actors, they have the right to receive benefits from effective policy implementation. Failure of public policy implementation which adversely affects their well-being, may provoke a negative reaction towards policy implementation. A study by Cynthia McClintock in Peru shows that peasants also attempted to maximise their benefits from agrarian reforms and minimise the ways in which such reforms may negatively effect their own goals (McClintock, 1980). In addition, negative impacts on clients may drive other actors, especially local politicians, to react against the implementors, so that these politicians can attract political support of their clients (Grindle and Thomas, 1989; Thomas and Grindle, 1990). Because of the different and conflicting demands of these actors, the official implementor is seen to be under pressure in managing government resources to accomplish programme or policy goals, as well as to respond to the different demands of different actors.

To fulfil their different and conflicting expectations and goals, different actors do not only attempt to influence the policy implementor, but they also interact with each other. The importance of actors' interaction in the policy-action process is seen to be crucial by some authors such as Hanf, Hjern, Porter, Barrett and Fudge, who perceive the top-down approach to policy analysis as problematic (Hanf, 1993; Hjern and Porter, 1993; Barrett and Fudge, 1981b). Fudge and Barrett (1981) state:

> 'We considered interactions between actors as crucial arenas for understanding the policy-action process and emphasised the importance of examining the particular organizational and administrative linkages used for implementation, and the negotiations and negotiative activity take place.' (p. 251).

For Fudge and Barrett, conflict between actors may arise from their different interests and value systems, which may reflect the impact of differences in the power structure in society, and differences in values concerning the policy direction and content. This is likely to occur at various stages throughout the policy process. Therefore, actors' interactions, and interests and values involved in policy analysis, are not only related to macro-structure but also micro-structure of power, and the linkage between the two. In their view, the group of actors involved in policy implementation does not necessarily represent formal organisational structures or hierarchies, but their involvement rather appears in the form of 'creating' or 'forging' new 'chains' between policy and action (p. 254). This view is shared by Hjern and his colleagues who undertake their studies on policy implementation in Sweden, Germany and the UK. From their findings, they argue that one way to understand the policy-action relationship is to understand the actual linkages between individuals and groups involved in different parts of the policy implementation process. Based on this assumption, they propose a new unit of analysis called 'implementation structure' (Hjern and Porter, 1993). They define the term implementation structure as follows:

> 'An implementation structure is comprised of subsets of members within organizations which view a programme as their primary (or an instrumentally important) interest. For these actors, an implementation structure is as much an administrative structure through which proposive

> actions are taken as the organizations in which they are employed.' (1993, p. 253)

According to the above definition, it can be seen that Hjern and Porter view policy implementation as occurring in the form of the interaction of activities and actors in carrying out a programme of actions within their own network, rather than going through formal administrative lines assumed by top-downers. Hjern and Porter believe that the concept of implementation structure explains the context of policy implementation in which parts of many public and private organisations take part in the implementation of a programme. They state that the characteristics of implementation structures are not the same as those of formal organisations. The important characteristics which distinguish implementation structures from formal organisations include: the existence of a less formal structure and fewer authoritative relations; the more dynamic and shifting characteristics of social structures; and, the basis of participation in a programme where consent and negotiation are dominant. These characteristics are perceived as organisational rationales and programme rationales. Therefore, they suggest that implementation structures should be considered as a new unit of administrative analysis. Sabatier (1993) comments that their methodology is explicit and replicable for a policy network, and intersubjectively reliable. Because they do not begin with a governmental programme or start with a focus on the attainment of formal policy objectives, but rather with the problems perceived by actors and the strategies for dealing with them, their methodology has many strengths. These include the ability to view different consequences of governmental and private programmes, the ability to deal with strategic interaction of actors over time, and the ability to deal with a policy or problem involving a number of programmes. These areas are difficult for top-down approaches to deal with.

2.7 Local People, Local Organisations and their Participation in Policy Implementation

It is generally agreed that policy implementation forms a sub-process of the policy process, within which several management decisions take place for operational purposes. In the implementation of development policies even though official implementors are key actors in making these decisions, local people and local organisations cannot be seen only as recipients or beneficiaries of policies or programmes. Rather they can be among actors who take part, or influence the implementors in making these operational decisions. It is not uncommon for local people and organisations to influence the implementation of development policies, but earlier conventional literature on public policy seems to overlook this. This is partly due to the fact that many policy analysis students hold the view that ordinary people are incapable of understanding the complexity of policy contents, or of handling policy management. Recent findings suggest that the failure or success of many development policies or programmes, depends significantly on the reactions of beneficiaries and interest groups at various levels, including the local level. Moreover, the failure to respond to critical demands from beneficiaries may drive other powerful political groups to react against official implementors in their efforts to accomplish the policies in question. The following discussion deals with the role of local people and local organisations in the implementation of development policies. The focus will also be on their status in their relation with official implementors in implementing development policies.

In the development literature, different views regarding people's participation may be found. The term 'participation' has many connotations such as 'voluntary contribution', 'increasing people's control', 'involvement in decision-making' and alike (Pongquan, 1988). Though these connotations differ slightly in their implications, they are all derived from the basis of 'development from below' which recognises the importance of the involvement of local people and local-based organisations in expressing their needs, assessing their potential contribution, and making decisions in planning as well as implementing the development policies or

programmes which affect them. Here, the focus is on the involvement of local people and local-based organisations in planning and implementation of development policies and programmes. The notion of people's participation in development planning and implementation has been developed through the effort of academics who see the failure of centrally planned development in meeting the needs and solving the problems of local people, especially in developing countries (Cohen and Uphoff, 1980). It is argued that development planning and implementation involve a series of management decisions and choices of action which generate benefits and impacts on local populations. Such choices can be general or specific. Some of the specific choices that take place in the broader political and bureaucratic arena may generate questions about the direction and distribution of benefits to different groups of people in different settings (Bryant and White, 1984; Chopra *et al.*, 1990). From the experiences of unsatisfactory outcomes from top-down planning, and some successful stories of popular participation in many developing countries, there emerges a call for more attention to people-centred approaches which emphasise the importance of local participation and decentralisation (Cohen and Uphoff, 1980). Unlike conventional views of development planning which focus on centralised concepts of development and economic growth at the macro-level whilst ignoring the importance of the management and implementation, new approaches which are people-centred consider management and implementation issues as important in development policies. The role of people in management and implementation is also explicitly recognised (Thomas, 1985).

There are several instances of centrally planned development policies or programmes which fail to achieve their well-defined goals and produce outcomes different from those anticipated, because of changes brought about by the influence of local people and local organisations during the implementation stage. However, the failure of such policies to achieve their pre-determined goals and the difference in outcomes due to the changes occurring during the implementation stage, do not necessarily indicate a failure to meet the needs or to solve the problems of local beneficiaries. In some cases the changes produce satisfactory outcomes in the opinion of beneficiaries. In other cases, implementation of development policies or programmes faces some difficulties

and fails both in the sense of achieving their goals and in meeting the needs of beneficiaries. In Mexico, peasant organisations which have developed through a long history of battles against unfair treatment of government towards poor farmers, have been influential in Mexican politics and rural development. The success of peasant's movements in compelling the government to introduce the land reform policy beginning in the state of Morelos in 1910s, has stimulated the movement of peasant organisations throughout the nation, and provoked the government to recognise them in the creation and implementation of development policies (Barraclough, 1971). The cases of national food and nutrition programmes in two West African countries indicate that the success of these programmes was determined largely by a change from centrally planned programmes which were originally introduced by the state, to a more participatory approach which included local elites in various types of decision-making during their implementation. In these cases, local elites were traditionally powerful, and had great influence on the perception of beneficiaries towards the programmes, so that the programmes' officers could not exclude them from participating in the implementation process if the programmes are going to be effective (Ryan, 1985). In Peru, the failure in the implementation of policy for agrarian co-operatives introduced by the Velasco government, was partly due to the conflict in peasants' demands and lack of popular support which weaken the ability of official implementors to control the policy (McClintock, 1980). In Sri Lanka, the success of the Gal Oya irrigation project, which faced unforeseen crises and external problem, was due to the consolidation of local farmers who perceived changes during the implementation as positive, and therefore responded to them positively (Esman and Uphoff, 1984). The findings of a study by Montgomery (1972) on the achievement of land reform goals in a wide range of countries, show that the extent to which local people benefited from the policy depended more on the involvement of local organisations in the implementation process than on the policy's ideology.

From the above examples, it can be argued that participation of local people and organisations in the implementation process of development policies, can impact greatly on the policies' achievement and outcomes. This appears to be true for both traditional organisations, or energetic formal organisations. However, the direction of

the impact and policy outcomes may vary depending on various factors or the context of participation. By considering policy implementation at the programme or project level, Cohen and Uphoff (1980) discover that factors affecting patterns of participation in rural development fall into two categories: programme or project characteristics, and environments. However, their clarification of the characteristics of project or programme -- which cover the type of likely benefits perceived by local people, administrative characteristics, linkages, and flexibility -- emphasises only those which are likely to receive a positive response from local beneficiaries. The characteristics which are likely to generate negative responses are not included. With respect to the environment in which the programme or project is located, Cohen and Uphoff point out that physical, social, and economic settings, as well as the history of the region, determine patterns of participation. These situational factors may encourage or discourage local people from participating in the project or programme, or they may influence the direction of participation, either to support or to react against it. The difference in patterns of people's participation either to support or to oppose a programme or project will impact on the implementation of the programme or project, and hence its outputs. Though positive reactions from local people in terms of participation are preferable in the eyes of implementors and planners, negative reactions do not necessarily create negative impacts on the beneficiaries of the project or programme. Rather negative reactions towards the programme or project may put pressure on the implementors to adjust the programme or project's direction to respond to the actual needs of local people, or to the problems confronting the target groups.

The inclusion of local people in the implementation of development policy is seen to have various advantages depending on its purposes. Robert Chambers, one of the most well known advocates of the idea, says:

> 'Local participation can be analysed in terms of objectives and functions...The values ascribed to participation in its various forms include: making local wishes known; generating developmental ideas; providing local knowledge; testing proposals for feasibility and improving them; increasing of capabilities of communities to handle their affairs and to control and exploit their environment; demonstrating support for the regime; doing what the government requires to be done; extracting, developing and investing

> local resources (labour, finance, managerial skills, etc.); and promoting desirable relationship between people, especially through cooperative work.' (1974, pp. 85-86).

Though the above categorisation of the values of local people's participation is considered to be rather more descriptive than analytical, it covers the wide range of potential purposes which are well recognised by other supporters. However, not all these purposes are pursued at once in practice. Cohen and Uphoff (1980) mention that the practical purposes of participation are related to the intended benefits of the application of the approach. In other words, the practicality of participation's purposes is based on the consideration of who is supposed to benefit from it primarily. When considering the application of a participatory approach in the implementation of development policy, the main benefit of participation should go to the target beneficiaries of each policy. In this view, local people's participation is seen as imperative if the programme or project is going to benefit the local people, because it is the local people who know best about their needs and who care most about the impact of development policies on them. Montgomery and Esman (1971) assert that the inclusion of local people's participation in the process of implementation allows the official implementors to make some adjustments and modification of the programme or project for the effectiveness, efficiency and equity of administration of development policies. Thus, local people's participation should be included in the policy process, especially in the implementation stage which occurs at local level, in order to facilitate implementors in making operational decisions.

However, because implementation of development policy is generally undertaken by official implementors, the analysis of the effectiveness of people's participation in policy implementation cannot overlook the influence of official implementors and the state intervention to promote participation. It is argued that local people alone, no matter how active their participation is in the development activities, are not capable of handling all development tasks effectively without outside assistance, especially from the state (Werlin, 1989). On this basis, the extent to which popular participation benefits development policy is determined largely by the consideration of its importance in the interaction between people and the official implementors. As

various forms of the interactions are likely to occur at local level, their significance and influence can also vary. Based on his observation of various studies on the relationship between pressure groups and bureaucracy in different countries, Peters (1982) classifies the varying patterns of interactions into four different types: 'illegitimate'; 'parantela'; 'clientela'; and 'legitimate.' He views this classificatory scheme as constituting 'an informal continuum from situations in which pressure group influence on policy is regarded as quite illegitimate to situations where it is legally accepted or even required' (Peters, 1982, p. 262). This typology may be applied to the relationship between local people, who can be considered as a pressure group, and official implementors. According to Peters, different styles of interactions may be found, and the extent of pressure groups' influence on bureaucracy may also be varied, depending on the styles of their interactions. Pressure groups are likely to have more influence when their interaction is recognised as legitimate, or they are recognised as 'quasi-official arms', than the more varied response when their interaction is seen as illegitimate. In the other two forms of interaction, clientela and parantela, the influence is observed to be moderate. Therefore, the legitimacy of the participation of local people is important for its effectiveness and should be promoted.

The final point worth raising here is the importance of leadership in popular participation. The role of local leaders cannot be overlooked in the effectiveness and success of people's participation at local level. Cohen and Uphoff (1980) state that the characteristics of local leaders, both formal and informal, are important for successful participation. David Korten accredits the devotion and characteristics of leaders as a key factor behind the success of the rural development programmes he reviewed from developing countries including Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh, Philippines and Thailand. He emphasises the importance of the leaders charismatic characteristics in influencing local people and government agencies to support the programmes. Credit is also given to their strengths in confronting problems emerging in the development process, and in finding out solutions through the learning process (Korten, 1980).

The involvement of local people and local organisations in the implementation of development policy is increasingly being recognised as important, and seen to be the

key to the success of development policies, especially in developing countries. Those who support this view blame the failure of many development programmes and projects on a neglect of local participation in the planning and implementation stages. The literature reviewed in this section indicates that there are cases in which development policies were affected significantly by the reaction of local people, and the intended outputs of the policies shifted so that they were more beneficial to local people. However, as the implementation of development policy is mainly in the hands of official implementors, the effectiveness of local participation in policy depends on the official perception of the importance of participation, which is more likely to relate to patterns of interactions between local people and official implementors. Finally, effective local participation is likely to depend also on the contribution of local leaders, including formal leaders and informal leaders.

2.8 Common Property Resources and Policy Questions

In preceding sections, the discussion has been mostly concerned with general development policies with no specification of subject matters dealt with by policies. Since the focus of this study is on policy related to natural resource management, it is important to include the discussion of policy related specifically to this case, and issues related to policy implementation.

There has been a growing interest in issues pertaining to the management of natural resources, particularly common property resources (CPRs) or the 'commons', since the Hardin's most frequently cited article, 'The Tragedy of the Commons', was published (Hardin, 1968). The increase in the interest in this type of policy is partly due to the overall rise in environmental problems, driven by the speed of economic change and overexploitation of natural resources. Hardin's main ideas on the relationship between population growth and exploitation of CPRs have widely influenced students of environmental studies in various disciplines (Feeny *et al.*, 1990). His conclusions about the necessity of privatising the rights of the commons or regulating their uses and users, have led to these two approaches being widely adopted as important means of controlling CPRs for sustainable use. However, despite this

wide acceptance of Hardin's ideas, government's attempts to reduce the overexploitation of CPRs by privatising rights and regulating use and users, often meet with several obstacles, and therefore they fail to achieve successful management (Feeny *et al.*, 1990; Taylor, 1992). In order to understand why the state programmes to control CPRs are seldom associated with successful management, it is important to understand characteristics of CPRs and factors related to CPR management.

For resources to be classified as 'common property resources', they should share two important characteristics -- 'excludability' and 'subtractability' (Berkes and Farvar, 1989; Feeny *et al.,* 1990). The first characteristic, excludability, connotes the physical nature of the resources by which inclusion (or control of access) of users to these resources is problematic, or, in the extreme, virtually impossible. The second characteristic, subtractability, means 'each user is capable of subtracting from the welfare of other users' (Feeny *et al.*, 1990, p. 3). By considering these two basic characteristics, Berkes and his colleagues briefly define the term common property resources as 'a class of resources for which exclusion is difficult and joint use involves subtractability' (Berkes, 1989, p. 7; see also Berkes *et al.,* 1989, p. 91; and Feeny *et al.*, 1990, p. 4). This definition is similar to the definition given by Elinor Ostrom (1990), even though Ostrom uses the term 'common-pool resources' instead of common property resources to specify the nature of this type of resources and their use (p. 30).

The basic characteristics of CPRs mentioned above contribute to the complexity and uncertainty in their management. Successful management of CPRs requires not only an understanding of the resource system or the stock alone, but also the flow of resource units produced by the system (Ostrom, 1992). It is important to distinguish these two aspects of each resource, but at the same time it must be realised that they are interdependent. In renewable resources, which represent most CPRs, understanding these conditions is especially useful, as it is possible to determine a replenishment rate. For a renewable resource to be sustained over time, the average rate of withdrawal must not exceed the average rate of replenishment (Ostrom, 1990).

The question is how to control the rate of withdrawal of a CPR to meet its carrying capacity over time, since it involves various users who take advantage of the resource to maximise their individual benefits. Moreover, an increase in number of users and the difference in their interests in the resource which are common phenomena in most cases means an increase in pressure on the resource and in the complication of its management.

Two main views have emerged in dealing with CPR management problems. The first view prefers privatisation or the state control of CPRs. The second view stresses the importance of local people, who are the users of CPRs, to have the right or to be highly involved in managing the resources they use in the form of collective action.

Hardin is a leading supporter of the first view. He sees the importance of controlling population growth and limiting access to the 'commons.' He suggests that there are only two possible solutions to control access effectively, either to privatise the resources or to keep them as public property controlled by the state (Hardin, 1968). Although Hardin's ideas have been widely adopted, there emerge several arguments with respect to the application of his approaches. Central to these arguments are the emerging weaknesses in the application of these two approaches, evidenced in different parts of the world. Problems arise both in relation to effective enforcement and economic rationality of these approaches (see Feeny *et al.*, 1990; Berkes, 1989).

Supporters of the idea that prefers local users to take part in the management argue that obstacles to state control of CPRs relate not only to the biological and physical complexities of CPRs, but also the social, economic, and cultural diversity of users (see for example, Berkes, 1989; Doulman, 1993; Ostrom, 1990). Because of these complexities, state programmes to control CPRs, which are designed by planners from the central government, are seldom associated with successful management. Frequently, centrally designed programmes are said to be constructed with minimal knowledge of the needs and problems facing local beneficiary communities. Moreover, they are likely to be based on a misleading assumption about the homogeneity of local communities and resource users (Pomeroy, 1991). As a result,

centrally designed programmes often do not correspond to the needs and conditions of specific local communities (Ferrer, 1989).

The problems facing the application of state policy to manage CPRs at the local level is also subject to ineffectiveness of state mechanisms in implementing policies and enforcing related regulations. These problems are common to developing countries where field officials are often inactive and corrupt. Wade (1988) mentions that farmers in rural villages of India have to bribe and entertain irrigation officers when they need jobs to be done properly, although these officials in principle are responsible for the jobs in the first place. Hirsch (1995) asserts that emerging corruption and nexus between bureaucratic power, influential people, and capital, are important in understanding of the failure of local resource management project in a village in Western Thailand. He observes that the unjust treatment of local people by the state is a result of corruption and mendacity of local officials. This leads to adverse relationships between local people and officials who implement the state policy. In both the Indian and Thai cases, policy implementation at the local level appears problematic if local users depend solely on the accountability of field officials.

Critics of the idea that state should dominate CPR management also argue that it is not only the state which is capable of managing the resources efficiently; numerous groups around the world have shown their ability to manage CPRs through self-regulated rules developed by themselves (Taylor, 1992; see also Berkes, 1989). Based on observations of successful CPR management under traditional mechanisms and self-regulated bodies, many students of resource management believe that involvement of local communities is essential in solving CPR problems. To these scholars, community-based resource management and self-regulation should have a definite role within the larger framework of the resource policy (Berkes, 1985; Ostrom, 1990; Doulman, 1993).

The widely observed CPR degradation and common problems of the application of state mechanism in managing CPRs at the local level raise two important questions regarding the application of the community-based resource management approach and

the establishment of self-regulated institutions. First, why the development of community-based resource management systems and establishment of self-regulated institutions do not take place in all communities where CPR problems are apparent? Second, why do some communities experience great achievements in operating their self-regulated institutions, whereas others do not? Scholars who have wide research experience in CPR management study, such as Elinor Ostrom and Michael Taylor, have a consensus that, apart from the concern of the nature of each resource in question, the success or failure to establish community-based resource management regimes and to develop self-regulated institutions depends largely on characteristics or conditions of particular communities (see Ostrom, 1990; Singleton and Taylor, 1992). Ostrom (1990), who analyses various cases in different parts of the world, makes a very important observation about conditions of community which are promising for organising self-regulated institutions in managing their own CPRs. In a number of case studies she observed, she divides communities which are successful in establishing self-regulated organisations into two groups. The first group comprises cases in which users have had a long history of successful institutions for regulating access and managing certain CPRs in their communities. In the second group she includes cases in which CPRs were in the process of being destroyed, but later were able to successfully regulate with the help of agencies external to the user groups. Compared between these two groups, the success of cases in the first group is clearly related to the internal characteristics of communities, which can be regarded as ideological, whereas the success of the second group cannot be accredited to the internal efforts alone, as external help from the state authorities also provides significant contribution.

From her comprehensive analysis of successful cases, Ostrom (1990) draws eight 'design principles' which form essential elements or conditions that help in explaining the success of institutions in managing community CPRs towards sustainability. These design principles are briefly summarised by Singleton and Taylor as follows:

> '(1) the boundaries of user-group and of the resource are clearly defined; (2) the use rules are appropriate to local conditions; (3) most users can participate in modifying operational rules; (4) monitoring is done by the users

> themselves or by monitors accountable to them; (5) sanctions are graduated and are carried out by other users and/or officials accountable to them; (6) users and their officials have easy access to low cost arenas to resolve conflicts among users and officials; (7) the users have the right to organize their own solutions unchallenged by external governmental authorities; and (8) in larger, more complex cases, the institutional mechanism is organized in multiple layers of "nested enterprises." (1992, p. 314).

Although Ostrom tends to believe that these design principles explain the success of a set of institutions in providing sustainable solutions to the collective action and problems associated with common property resources, it is argued by Singleton and Taylor (1992) that their explanatory status is not entirely clear. The key point in their argument is these principles do not provide a clear answer to the question of why some groups of resources users are able to solve problems of collective action without assistance from external agencies, other groups are not. Singleton and Taylor also point out that Ostrom omitted an overt discussion of community in her book, 'Governing the Commons' (Ostrom, 1990), even though the successful cases or groups presented by Ostrom could all be characterised as having the attribute of community. In their view the attribute of community is important for a group to have the collective capacities to manage CPRs they use effectively and towards sustainability.

The kind of community that Singleton and Taylor (1992) view as promising to successful collective action is referred to as a set of people: (1) who hold some shared beliefs (including normative beliefs and preferences) that are beyond those constituting their collective action problem; (2) which have a fairly stable set of members; (3) who expect to be together as a group for at least a considerable length of time in the future; and (4) who have direct and 'multiplex' relationships among members. They stress that a community with these conditions is not ideological or utopian in the present time.

Conditions concluded by Ostrom (1990), and Singleton and Taylor (1992) provide a good explanation behind the success of user-groups who pursue collective action in managing CPRs. However, it does not appear that all conditions are prerequisite for a

set of people to initiate and achieve their collective action in managing their CPRs. Wade (1988) observes that groups of villagers in a rural Indian community who successfully establish and operate their corporate organisation in managing irrigation water do not show a strong connection with shared beliefs or norms outside those constituting collective action. They are also very little influenced by the motive that Wade expresses as 'a sense of devotion or obligation to a non-self-regarding "cause", such as "the welfare of the village" or "cooperative ways of doing things"', the sense which is often found in some Western rural communities (Wade, 1988, p. 196). Neither are villagers given clear rights by the state to organise themselves, nor do they receive support from powerful bodies external to the community. They strive themselves to operate self-regulated institutions which are overseen by a non-statutory organisation or council, to deal with problems facing water allocation and crop protection in their community, and to negotiate with concerned state officials who are reluctant and corrupt. Their striving in establishing and sustaining corporate organisation is steered by individuals concern of the risk they anticipate without having the organisation. It is very important to note that the movements of these villager's groups are dynamic in order to adapt with the change of problems emerging both within and outside the organisation. When new problems are faced, the non-statutory council which is organised for special purposes play the most important role in making decisions to deal with the new problems. This indicates a high degree of autonomy they have in solving problems in their communities. The institution of 'autonomous' organisation has long existed in this part of rural India, with the main role to settle dispute among villagers. Wade believes that this institution of 'autonomous' organisation does embody the idea of a standing council for village resource management, even though they are not the same things.

In Thailand, several movements are observed at the local level to deal with problems concerning CPR management. Some of these movements root from a long history of successful corporate organisation prevailing in communities, for example *Muang Fai* irrigation system in the northern region (Tongdeelert and Lohmann, 1991; Lohmann, 1995). Some movements are quite recent, and there is no clear evidence of the existence of autonomous institution in their communities which influences the

movements (see Hirsch, 1995; Rittibhonbhun *et al.*, 1993). Although all these recent movements emerged as a result of increasing pressure and conflict over CPRs, they are also steered and influenced by several forces in wider contexts. These include the growing interest in conservation ideas among academics, NGOs and media (Lohmann, 1995; Rittibhonbhun *et al.*, 1993). In connection with this growing interest, there emerges an attempt to recall and reconstruct some traditional values and beliefs to strengthen their movements (see Lohmann, 1995; Taylor, 1993). Despite the growing interest in the conservation ideas, many recent movements face several obstacles, especially in connection with the relationship between resource users and the state mechanisms which are corrupt and unreliable (see Hirsch, 1995). Although this condition is similar to the case in rural India mentioned above, the pattern of local-state relationship in rural Thailand differs from that in rural India. The complexity of relations in the patron-client network in Thailand makes negotiation difficult between ordinary people and state officials working at the local level (Hirsch, 1995). As a result, many recent movements fail to achieve their aims, due to the interference from outside and the inability of local communities to overcome difficulties emerging as part of the corrupt system (see Hirsch, 1995; Taylor, 1993). Only communities that are quite remote and have a historical reputation of successful collective action, such as those operating *Muang Fai* irrigation system in the northern region, and those who receive strong external support from NGOs, are likely to reach great achievements.

Besides their strengths, traditional mechanisms and grassroots movements with respect to local CPR management are also argued to have several weaknesses. This is especially true in conditions in which user-groups are so different in their socio-economic backgrounds and in their interests in resources they share. In such conditions, competition and conflicts are likely to take place, and mutual agreements for collective action tend to be difficult. These conditions are likely to be found in communities where capital intrusion is high and CPRs in question are used for different purposes. Berkes (1985) asserts that self-regulation seems best suited to traditional societies where 'economic activities are embedded in social relationships within the community, and are regulated by common values and rules ("the culture")

of the people who live in the society.' However, it seems to be difficult to deal with problems facing societies where economic activities are highly commercial (p. 204). This argument is supported by several observations in contemporary societies where traditional institutions appear to be weakened. A good example is Pomeroy's (1991) study of fishing communities in the Philippines, which suggests that in conditions where resources are insufficient and job opportunities are limited, fishermen tend to adopt a short-run survival strategy to meet their basic family needs. In such communities, attempts at sustainable management are unlikely to take place easily within the communities.

The above discussion provided evidence of traditional mechanisms and grassroots movements dealing with controlling CPRs for the users' benefit. There are of course state mechanisms designed for implementing policies related to CPR management in most contemporary societies. In most cases, these state mechanisms exist in parallel with traditional mechanisms or grassroots movements available locally. However, they rarely cooperate in their attempts to control the resources. Since conditions confronting CPR management nowadays have adversely affected many CPRs and their users, it is important for the state to realise the welfare of users and their dependency on CPRs they use. Certainly, sustainable management with a fair distribution of resources among users, is the ultimate aim of CPR management. Nevertheless, to manage CPRs towards sustainability is a big question in itself in many localities which are in transition. As neither government control systems nor traditional systems are likely to work effectively on their own, many students of CPR management seem to agree that a community-based management or co-management approach, the approach in which national government and local communities share authority for resource management, should be an ultimate solution (Berkes, 1985; Pomeroy, 1991; Doulman, 1993; Pomeroy, 1993). However, the achievement of co-management approach remains to be tested, as the idea involves devolution of resource management and allocation of decisions to local organisations. This is a task which provokes opposition from government authorities whose power is lessened, and also challenges the ability of local organisations to operate the resource management

system effectively. In countries like Thailand where complicated networks of patron-client relationship are evident, and centralisation of power is dominant, the application of community-based management approaches is really questionable.

2.9 Conclusion and Conceptual Framework for the Study

At the beginning of this chapter, two main concepts of policy analysis were presented: the process model and the political system model. These two models are prominent and have been widely adopted as a basis of policy analysis. The models characterise different views about how public policies are made and executed. The process model assumes public policy occurs as a process of sequential activities which is divided into various stages. It is basically seen as beginning with problem identification and formation, then policy-making, and implementation. These stages are assumed to occur in an ordered way, in which each subsequent stage depends on the preceding stage. The political system model presents policy as occurring in the forms of a relationship between inputs and outputs of the political system, and interactions in the system need to be in balance for the system to survive. It views political interactions in a given environment as being crucial in directing policy-making and its outputs. This model neither emphasises the processual way of policy nor denies it. Rather its emphasis is on interactions of actors within the political system, called by critics as 'the black box', in which policy-making takes place. Because these models are among the earliest models, most policy students regard them as ideal for policy analysis in the real world due to their various strengths. As a consequence, many concepts in policy analysis are based on them: some concepts follow the process model, and deal with each stage of the policy process; and others follow the system model dealing with interactions within and between the political system and the environment.

Though the process and political system models differ in their foci, they are similar in perspective as they both view public policy as beginning from the top and flowing down through administrative lines to the bottom. The main feature of this 'top-down' perspective is that the activities happening at the top of the administrative structure are

crucially important in affecting the subsequent activities at the bottom. In dealing with public policies, most literature following this perspective seems to overemphasise the importance of policy-making and often neglects implementation. This is mainly influenced by a perception of the effective role of bureaucratic administration in carrying out public policies, through the hierarchy of bureaucracy, once a policy is made. Therefore, good policies are assumed to produce good outcomes. Though the role of bureaucracy cannot be denied in the implementation of public policy, the results of a number of studies have rendered this assumption a debatable one. Many public policies, especially in developing countries, produce a variety of outcomes which may not correspond to the outputs intended at the policy-making stage. Central to these findings are arguments about the importance of interactions between various actors occurring at the implementation stage, which create a significant impact on the achievement of public policies. These arguments have brought about a call to re-examining concepts of policy analysis by suggesting that more emphasis should be placed on the importance of implementation and a 'bottom-up' perspective within policy analysis.

Two main views arise in response to the above call. One is the introduction of a compromise concept led by Merilee Grindle, who works mostly on the analysis of development policies in developing countries, especially Latin America. The other is the concept of 'the implementation structures' developed by Benny Hjern and his colleagues, who have experienced of public policies in industrialised countries in Europe and United States. Grindle's concept of analysis considers the importance of interactions among and between actors and the surrounding environment; this is seen as being crucial in affecting the outcomes of public policies. Whilst it does not deny the relationships between the implementors and their superiors, the results of her cross national studies stress interactions within the implementation process, rather than the superior-subordinate relationships within bureaucracy. Hjern and his colleagues, on the other hand, seem to consider the importance of implementation exclusively, and undermine the superior-subordinate relationships. To them, such relationships do not

necessarily occur as actors interact with each other 'equally' over the issue under the implementation structure, regardless of class difference and official tie with their original organisations.

In this study, which is dealing with the analysis of development and natural resource policy at the local level in Southern Thailand, consideration is given to both the concept developed by Grindle and that of Hjern and his colleagues. As situation in Thailand is considered to be in a state of transition between the strong administrative tradition, dominated by the perception of patron-client relationships, and the awakening of popular participation concepts recently introduced, the status of relationships among actors, as well as the significance of the role of official implementors, are in question. In order to deal with this situation, an adapted version of the Grindle's framework of policy implementation process is proposed for the analysis of this study as presented in Figure 2.3.

The model presented is drawn for the purpose of analysing development policies in which local people are target beneficiaries. The design of this model is based on the assumption that in developing countries like Thailand, which are in a state of transition, both state actors and non-state actors interact with each other throughout the policy process. However, the extent to which the non-state actors participate and are influential is greater in the implementation stage than in the preceding stage, since access is limited in the latter. Moreover, as implementation proceeds, the chance for actors to predict the impact policy will have on them, is greater than in the previous stage. The model does not emphasise a clear boundary between different stages, as it is not considered to be very important for this analysis. In the policy-making stage, which is represented by policy-decision, and policy design and formulation, the state political elites and bureaucratic elites, both at national and regional levels, are very influential in making decisions. Therefore, the issues, the broader content, and the shape of development policies, are all based on policy makers' perception of problems and solutions to those problems under a given set of circumstances, which are broader than the environment at the local level. At the local level where a policy



Figure 2.3: A Conceptual framework for analysing development policy

(Adapted from Grindle, 1980c, p. 205)

is implemented, field official implementors are expected to implement the policy according to the direction and design of the policy which were decided at the top. To follow the policy direction and design, official implementors are bound with rules and organisational structures of implementing organisation, which is presented as the 'organisational context' in this model. At the same time, they are faced with local actors and more specific local environments. These local actors can be local interest groups (which includes local politicians, local economic elites and local based non-governmental organisations), local opinion leaders, local official leaders, and clients. Generally these local actors are limited in their access to participation in the upper levels, due to their lack of power and the formality of bureaucratic organisations. However, at the implementation level where their access is better. They have a better opportunity to react upon policy and interact with local implementors, as well as among themselves, in order to influence the policy according to their perceptions. The context of policy implementation at this level is likely to be more significant in affecting the final outcomes of development policy. The official implementors do not seem to be very influential, as they are only field officers who are not highly knowledgeable about policy and are less powerful than their superiors in the eyes of other actors. Moreover, with the awakening of ideas of local participation in which the power of local people is stressed, local people, local leaders and local organisations are assumed to be more confident in interacting with field officials. However, hierarchical values and patron-client traditions which are prevailing in Thai societies should deter the activeness of local people and their leaders in their interaction with official implementors who are regarded as superior to them. Although the context of policy implementation at local level is likely to be similar to 'the implementation structure' suggested by Hjern and his colleagues, the extent to which local people and local leaders interact with official leaders and their influence on decision-making during the implementation process should be less significant than those of official implementors.

In this study, this model is intended to be used in explaining circumstances occurring at the lowest level of policy implementation, that is, the village level, and patterns of popular participation concerning CPR management. It is often argued that problems

related to CPR management results from the exclusion of local people in the policy process. Also, though CPRs are predominantly used by local people, policies to control the use of these resources are constructed by the state. Consequently, they are often not suited to the socio-economic patterns of local users, so that effective implementation is problematic. In this context therefore, it is useful to investigate popular participation at the lowest level, since it is here that the closest relationship between users and resources can be observed. It is assumed that if policies are perceived to create negative impacts on local users, their response is likely to be more apparent at local level than at higher levels. At the same time, local actors should react positively when opportunities are officially given to them by the state (under the present system of development administration) to participate in policy process, because it is an important chance for them to influence policy in a direction which benefits them. The question is whether these opportunities are real or rhetoric, under the circumstances which hierarchical and patron-client values remain predominant.

Among different actors at the local level, the main interest of this study is to look at the role of *phu yai ban* who is the official village leader appointed by the central government through the village election. A *phu yai ban* is considered to be an official intermediary in village administration and in the implementation of public policies at the village level. As all *phu yai ban* are elected from members of individual village communities, their role in implementing development policy is crucial not only as an official implementor, but also as a member of the village community. More importantly, the change of their role with respect to natural resource management in the rise of the ideas of local empowerment, is critical and needs an in-depth analysis.

CHAPTER THREE

POLICY PROCESS AND LOCAL PARTICIPATION IN THAILAND

3.1 Introduction

The concept of popular participation as a precondition for successful development has dominated development policy of the last decade. In rural development, participation is seen as an essential strategy for creating the opportunity for the rural poor to have their voice, the right to express their needs, access to productive assets, to gain a share in development benefits, and to make decisions (Oakley and Marsden, 1984). Based on this notion, a 'bottom-up' approach to the policy process is suggested as an essential means for policy to correspond with the needs of the masses, rather than the conventional 'top-down' approach typical of developing countries. Calls to put this idea onto the development policy agenda, have been made by many rural development scholars and international organisations, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Labour Organisation. The United Nations in particular, has made much effort to persuade various countries to adopt the idea as a basic policy measure in their development strategies (Cohen and Uphoff, 1977). These calls have influenced some academics and policy officials in many developing countries to struggle for changes in development strategies, especially with respect to rural development in their own countries.

Thailand is no exception. The widespread interest in the concept of popular participation, together with the influence of international organisations, has forced policy-makers to integrate the concept into the policy process. The central planning body, the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), which dominates the country's development policy-making, has moved from highly centralised to more decentralised strategies since the Fifth Plan, beginning in 1982.

This change recognises the importance of popular participation in the policy process as the important strategy to improve policy to meet needs of the local people. In order to promote popular participation, a series of reforms, especially structural reforms of the planning organisation, have been made. However, as the concept is considered to be rather new and the administrative system in the country is known to be highly bureaucratic, effective application of this concept has been uncertain, at least in its early stage. The question centres at the structure of the administration system and the culture of the Thai bureaucracy, which have evolved through the county's long history of independence. It is often argued that the Thai administration system and Thai bureaucratic culture will not permit the new concept to work effectively unless tremendous efforts are made (Brahmanee, 1989; Voratheppputipong, 1984). Moreover, the culture dominating the Thai bureaucracy also determines the people's ways of life, in the sense that they perceive that development roles should be played only by bureaucrats who are their 'masters'. In this way, the full application of popular participation concept in the development process at the local level is unlikely to occur easily, despite the attempts of the central government to promote it.

This chapter will discuss features of the present Thai administrative system, its historical perspectives and the extent to which the concept of popular participation is applied with respect to the rural development process. It will also highlight the existence of popular participation in rural development in Thailand, both with respect to the influence of traditional settings and external interventions.

3.2 The Thai Administrative Structure

Before discussing features of policy-making and policy implementation in Thailand, it is important to have a basic understanding of the structure of the Thai administration. An understanding of this structure provides a broad picture of different levels of the Thai government and how they are linked, which is indispensable for an understanding of the policy process in this country.

The present Thai administrative structure is a revised version of that initially introduced through a series of fundamental reforms in the 1890s, during the reign of King Rama V. The reforms marked a major revolution in the Thai administration system. This new form of administration not only introduced a constitutional government to cope with internal and external difficulties being faced at that time, but once again consolidated power in the hands of the King in Bangkok. Under the previous *jatusadom* system, which was based on the Khmer or Khom system, power had been devolved to military and civilian officials in the central and peripheral areas (Kambhu, 1984; Samudavanija, 1987). Under this new system, eleven functional ministries were established, and regional and local administrative systems were introduced. The introduction of the regional administrative system marked the beginning of the great power of the Ministry of the Interior which is in charge of all levels of the country's administration. The establishment of the local administrative system marked the start of local participation in Thai history. Nevertheless, the feature of local government in Thailand is said to be unique, since the local administrative system covered only urban and semi-urban areas. Its functions related mainly to specific tasks such as sanitary programmes and urban infrastructural development activities. However, this feature of local administrative system has changed significantly since it was first introduced (see Kambhu, 1984, pp. 67-69).

There are now fifteen ministries within the Thai central government located in Bangkok. Generally it is the central government, made up of political parties, who initiates the nation's policies and oversees their implementation. The Cabinet constitutes the central organisation responsible for implementing these policies, and the ministries serve as the mechanism which carries out the work of the central government. This form of administration is said to characterise a centralisation of power by central government 'in the interest of national security and the people's well-being, and in order to ensure uniformity in decision-making' (Kambhu, 1984, p. 69). Regional administration consists of provinces (*changwat*), districts (*amphoe*), sub-district or communes (*tambon*), and villages (*mooban*), successively (Figure 3.1). In some ways, the central government has decentralised the decision-making to these different regional government units. However, decentralisation in this context



Note: Recently, some *sapha tambon* have been upgraded to the status of Tambon Administrative Organisation, which is more autonomous than the *sapha tambon.*

Figure 3.1: The Present Thai administrative structure
(Adapted from Kambhu, 1984, p. 70).

is argued to be a form of 'deconcentration of power' rather than decentralisation in any real sense (Kambhu, 1984; see also LePoer, 1989). The local administrative system is divided into four kinds of local government namely provincial administrative organisations(*ongkaan borihaan suan changwat*), municipalities (*tesabaan*), sanitation districts (*sukaapibaan*), and the special forms of local government of Bangkok Metropolis and Pattaya City. Another form of local government exists, called *'sapha tambon'* or sub-district council, which has a mixed feature of local government and regional administration unit. The *sapha tambon* is 'a legal entity with a certain degree of self-government: a feature which encourages popular participation in the Thai system of democratic government' (Kambhu, 1984, p. 71). Most recently, many *sapha tambon* have been upgraded to be sub-district administrative organisations (*ongkaan borihaan suan tambon*); a more sophisticated local organisation which has more power than the original *sapha tambon* in the planning process. This change was made in late 1994, after the main fieldwork of this study was completed.

Of the various forms of local government mentioned above, only the *sapha tambon* applies to rural communities. The council is established at the sub-district level throughout the country. It can be regarded as a mixed form of power decentralisation as it is composed of both local leaders who hold official administrative posts including sub-district official leader (*kamnan*), village official leader (*phu yai ban*), sub-district paramedic (*phaet prajam tambon*), a local teacher, and other members who are elected from qualified persons within individual villages (see Figure 3.2). Municipalities and sanitation districts exist only in urban or semi-urban areas represented mostly by provincial capitals and district capitals respectively (see LePoer, 1989). The provincial administrative organisation consists of two bodies: the provincial council (*sapha changwat*), which is composed of elected members representing various districts within the provincial territory; and the provincial administrative office (*samnak-ngaan ongkaan borihaan suan changwat*), which is composed of the provincial under-secretary (*palad changwat*) and provincial representatives of various central departments (*huana suan ratchakaan radab changwat*). The provincial administrative office is legally entitled to derive incomes

from various sources within the provincial boundary, such as duties, services, and the issue of permits, etc., whereas the provincial council controls all the provincial expenditures.



SRDOC = Sub-district Rural Development Operational Committee

Figure 3.2: The present structure of *sapha tambon*
(Adapted from Ingavata, 1990, p. 120)

Although several levels and types of government exist in the Thai administrative system, the central government remains unitary and the most powerful. Regional governments act as an apparatus of the central government. Their main function is to carry out duties, at each individual level, in accordance with directives issued by the Cabinet, ministries, and central departments, or as directed by the Prime Minister.

They are not entitled to make any important decisions. All important decisions are made by the traditionally powerful elite in Bangkok through the chain of command. The Ministry of the Interior is seen to be the most powerful ministry in this process, as it plays a key role in the administrative framework of the state, since all the heads of the regional governments are under its umbrella. Local government, which in principle was established to promote people's participation and was supposed to be self-governing, is in reality very much dependent on the central administration system, both technically and financially. Therefore, the issue of people's participation in Thailand still needs further investigation, especially with respect to the policy process regarding rural development. In this thesis, the emphasis will be on understanding the policy process concerning rural development as related to local resource management, and the extent to which the local people gain access to the policy process.

3.3 Policy-Making and Policy Implementation in the Thai Context

Earlier in this chapter, it was stated that policy-making and policy implementation in Thailand are highly centralised. The state bureaucracy plays a dominant role, either directly or indirectly, both in the process of policy-making and policy implementation. This is largely due to the historical background of the country's administration in which bureaucrats have always been powerful not only in state administration, but also in the country's politics. The involvement of non-bureaucratic actors has been minimal. This section will explain how development policies are made and implemented in Thailand. It will also explain the interaction of the state bureaucracy with other actors at different stages of the policy process.

3.3.1 The Planning Organisation

As has been discussed in Chapter One, Thailand's development policies have been based mainly on a series of five-year Economic and Social Development Plans (later referred to as Plan or Plans), ever since the first Plan called the National Economic Development Plan was introduced in 1961 (Rigg, 1991; Suphachalasai and

Patmasiriwat, 1990; Pongquan, 1992). The National Economic and Social Development Board is the main planning body responsible for carrying out these Plans. The body was established in 1959 under the name of the National Economic Development Board (NEDB) in order to carry out the First Plan. It was later renamed the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) in 1978, in accordance with the extension of the Plan to cover social development as well as economic development (Pongquan, 1992). The NESDB forms an administrative body working closely with its executive body, the Office of National Economic and Social Development Board, in preparing, launching, implementing as well as evaluating the national economic and social policies and plans, which form the framework for the country's development (Chaisurojana, 1990; Pongquan, 1992). After national policies and plans are drafted and approved by the Cabinet, different levels of government organisations or committees will take action in formulating and executing their own operational policies in order to fit with the national policies. Several sets of committees are empowered to perform the tasks at different administrative levels. Setting up committees to be responsible for performing special tasks, or to respond to new problems, is not uncommon in the Thai administration system (Samudavanija, 1987). However, the discussion here will focus only on the organisational system dealing with rural development policies, with which this thesis is concerned.

There were several planning bodies responsible for rural development planning at different administrative levels prior to a reform made in the Fifth Plan (1982-1986), in the name of the 'new development concept' (Pongquan, 1992; Panpiemrat, 1982). Under the 'new development concept', a significant structural reform was made in order to cope with changes in the emphasis of and approach to planning, which shifted from a comprehensive approach to an integrated approach. In the new approach to rural development, co-ordination between different levels of planning -- village, sub-district, district, provincial, and national -- is emphasised, and the rural population is encouraged to play an active role in the development process instead of being only 'receivers' as they used to be (Tagoporn, 1983; see also Vandergeest,

1991). This new adjustment brought about changes in the planning organisation at different levels of the administration system, which still remain today.

Under the present structure, the National Rural Development Committee (NRDC), known as *'kaw-chaw-chaw'* in Thai, acts as the highest policy-making body responsible for formulating all rural development policies and plans, with the exception of those related to rural job creation and security zones, which are under specific bodies. The NRDC is headed by the Prime Minister and comprises Ministers of the Office of the Prime Minister, ministers and high-ranking officials from six principal ministries -- the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives, the Ministry of Industry, and the Ministry of Defence -- and other concerned units. The NESDB serves as the Secretariat to the NRDC and plays a vital role in initiating policies as well as in screening programmes (see Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4). The National Rural Development Co-ordination Centre (NRDCC) functions as a supporting body and working in co-ordinating the ministerial plans and plans from lower levels to the national plans, and in undertaking the task of monitoring and evaluating national programmes (Khoumkhainaam *et al.* 1991; Pongquan, 1992).

At the provincial level, the Provincial Development Committee (PDC) is the primary body responsible for provincial planning. The PDC is chaired by the Governor (*phuwa ratchakaan changwat*) of each province (*changwat*), and comprises a vice governor (*raung phuwa ratchakaan changwat*), the Head of the Provincial Office (*huana samnak-ngaan changwat*), and representatives from various concerned departments at provincial level. The PDC functions primarily in formulating the provincial economic and social development plans according to national development policies, guidelines and framework provided by the NRDC. The PDC formulated the provincial plans based on the district development plans within the province. It also acts as the advisory body to concerned agencies within the province. It is assisted by the Provincial Rural Development Sub-committee (PRDS). The PRDS, which is headed by a Vice Governor, and comprises two provincial representatives of the principal ministries, the Provincial Under-Secretary



1/ Sub-committee on the Acceleration of Provincial Plans
2/ Sub-committee on the Coordination of Provincial Plans
3/ Sub-committee on Regional Monitoring and Evaluation
4/ Committee on Rural Job Creation
5/ Accelerated Rural Development Committee
6/ Committee on National Rural Development
7/ Community Development Coordination Committee
8/ Provincial Job Creation Committee
9/ Provincial Rural Development Committee
10/ Provincial Community Development Coordination Committee
11/ District Rural Development Committee
12/ District Community Development Coordination Committee
13/ Tambon Rural Development Committee

Figure 3.3: Planning organisation prior to the Fifth Plan (Source: Pongquan, 1992, p. 16).



Figure 3.4: Planning organisation introduced under the Fifth Plan
(Adapted from: Pongquan, 1992, p. 28).

(*palad changwat*), and the Head of the Provincial Office (*huana samnak-ngaan changwat*), who also assesses and screens district plans before submitting them to the PDC for approval (Khoumkhainaam *et al.,* 1991; Pongquan, 1992).

At the district level, there exists the District Development Committee (DDC). The committee is chaired by the District Officer (*nai amphoe*) of each district, and consists of the Senior District Under-Secretary (*palad aawuso*) and district level representatives of various central departments concerned with rural development. The main functions of this body are to assess, approve and co-ordinate development projects proposed by various sub-district councils (*sapha tambon*) under their territorial areas. These projects are then formulated into the annual rural development plan of each district and subsequently submitted to the provincial and national levels (Khoumkhainaam *et al.*, 1991). The DDC is also responsible for controlling and evaluating the implementation of development projects at this level and at the sub-district level (Brahmanee, 1989). It should be noted here that the district level is the lowest level of the Thai administrative system which is served by appointed permanent government officials, and where representatives from most central departments are appointed. These officials are general civil servants employed by the central government. The lower levels, sub-district (*tambon*) and village (*mooban*), are served by elected leaders, their assistants selected by them from within their territorial boundaries, and elected committees which are not considered as general civil servants. Although there are some general civil servants responsible for sub-district level activities, they are based at the district office.

At the sub-district and village levels, the nature of development planning is quite different from that of the upper levels mentioned above. One of the reasons is that these two levels of administration differ in their structures from their superior units which are served by appointed officials. At both sub-district and village levels, their leaders are elected. A sub-district official leader (*kamnan*) is elected by voters within an individual *tambon* from the nominated village official leaders (*phu yai ban*) under its territorial administration, and a *phu yai ban* is elected by villagers from nominees within each *mooban*. These leaders represent the Ministry of the Interior and play an

important role in the sub-district council or *sapha tambon*, the sub-district planning unit.

The *sapha tambon* is chaired by the *kamnan* and includes all *phu yai ban* within the sub-district area, the *tambon* paramedic (*phaet prajam tambon*), and one elected representative (*phu song khunnawut*) from each village. In order to facilitate the work of the council, a District Under-Secretary (*palad amphoe*) and the Sub-District Community Development Worker (*pattanakorn*), are appointed to serve as advisors. Moreover, based on the newly introduced act, a teacher (*khru*) from one of the local schools or other qualified person, based on the *kamnan*'s selection, serves as its secretary (Office of the Prime Minister, 1994). There is another set of committees established alongside the *sapha tambon* to assist and advise it in formulating development plans and development activities called the Sub-district Rural Development Operational Committee (SRDOC) or *khana tam-ngaan sanabsanun kanpatibat-ngaan pattana chonnabot radab tambon (khaw-paw-taw)* This committee is composed of *kamnan, phu yai ban* or their assistants, the Sub-district Agricultural Officer (*kaset tambon*), the Sub-district Community Development Worker (*pattanakorn*), the Sub-district Public Health Officer (*sataranasuk tambon*), a local teacher (*khru*), the village representative in *sapha tambon (phu song khunnawut),* and a villager knowledgeable about construction (*chang khaw-paw- taw*). At the village level, there exists the Village Committee (*khana kammakaan mooban*, VC) which is headed by the *phu yai ban* of each village and composed of up to nine members of the committee.

With regard to development planning, the VC plays a role in identifying problems and needs in the village, and in developing the village development proposals to be considered at the *tambon* level. The *sapha tambon* is then responsible for identifying problems and matters related to the development of the *tambon* area based on the proposals submitted by various VCs within its territory. The SRDOC plays roles in providing technical assistance and assessing the feasibility of projects developed by the *sapha tambon* (Brahmanee, 1989; see also Wirajnibhawan, 1992; Hirsch, 1989; and Ingavata, 1990). These proposals are then formulated into the *tambon* annual

development plan (Khoumkhainaam *et al.* 1991; Brahmanee, 1989; Wirajnibhawan, 1992; Office of the Prime Minister, 1994).

3.3.2 Planning Procedure

The planning procedure for rural development in Thailand was established on the basis of the duties assigned to the above organisations. In principle, the procedure of development policy formulation and implementation currently applied can be illustrated as follows (NESDB, 1982).

At the highest level of the planning hierarchy, the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) formulates the national Plans, which form the framework of national policies that must be followed by all planning bodies (see Figure 3.4). With respect to rural development policies, the National Rural Development Committee (NRDC) draws up various policies and forwards them to the Cabinet for its approval. Once policies are accepted and approved by the Cabinet, the Civil Service Commission and the Budget Bureau, under the co-ordination of the NESDB, will allocate manpower and budgets to the principal ministries. The principal ministries then set up their policy framework (*kraub nayobai*), specify the types of assistance, both technical and financial, available from central government, and indicate the types of project to be supported on a yearly basis. Because the policy frameworks and detailed development guidelines prepared by individual ministries are likely to vary considerably, they are generally revised each year before passing down to the provincial level.

At the provincial level, the Provincial Development Committee (PDC) of each province proceeds the directives on the development policy framework and guidelines of the NRDC, which are obtained through the major concerned ministries, to districts within the provincial territory. The district planning body then transfers the directives to the sub-district or *tambon* officials in the same manner. After that, the directives are then passed downward to the lowest administrative level, the village or *mooban*.

When the directives on policy framework and development guidelines are passed from the top administrative level to the bottom, the process then begins its upward movement again in the form of development plans. This part of the new approach is clearly distinguishable from the previous approach prior to the Fifth Plan (Figure 3.3). According to this new concept, after receiving the directives from above, the Village Committee (VC) is responsible for collecting evidence of the problems and needs of villagers in each village, and then passing these upward to the *sapha tambon.* This is the first step in constructing bottom-up development propositions. When the *sapha tambon* receives propositions from several villages within its own territory, it then works together with the SRDOC in compiling problems and needs, identifying types of projects for its respective villages, and consolidating them into the sub-district development plan. In formulating the sub-district plan, the *sapha tambon* and the SRDOC must refer to the framework and follow the guidelines provided by the higher levels of administration. In this plan, the priority of each project must be determined in order to guide decision-makers at the higher levels, since there is a possibility of screening some projects out to meet pre-set budgets. Nevertheless, it is argued that the plan formulated at the *tambon* level is not a proper plan in the real sense, since it appears as a project proposal indicating the problems and felt needs of the local people, without detail indicating costs and implementation schedules (Pongquan, 1992). This is perhaps due to a lack of knowledge and skills of concerned personnel with regard to making a proper plan. The plan therefore appears in the form of a simple proposal, rather than being formally designed. The *tambon* proposals then proceed to the district where the district planning body, the DDC, scrutinises the *tambon* proposals to make sure that they are in line with the original policy framework obtained from above. The DDC then combines several *tambon* proposals into the district plan which is then submitted to the province. The provincial planning body, the PDC, with the help of the PRDS, examines the district plans on the same basis as the DDC does to the *tambon* proposals, but in a more careful manner, in order to ensure that they are consistent with the given framework. The role of the PDC is also to integrate the priorities set in the project proposals submitted by various *tambon,* with those of the districts. After that, the PDC will

consolidate the proposals from various districts into the annual provincial plan, which is set out on an agency-by-agency basis and then submitted to various ministries and their constituent departments in Bangkok via the NRDC.

At this stage, concerned departments examine various provincial proposals related to individual departments, and consolidate them into their annual workplans. The annual workplan from each department is then submitted to the Budget Bureau, and the Plan Co-ordination Sub-committee of the NRDC for final screening, before it is included into the Annual Budget Act submitted to the Cabinet and parliament for final approval. Once the final approval from parliament is obtained, the operation plans are passed down from the ministries to the provincial and lower level authorities for implementation. All these tasks occur generally on a yearly basis.

The policy and planning process under the new concept discussed above, illustrates a departure of the organisational structure and procedure from the top-down approach which dominated the policy and planning system in Thailand during the first two decades of the national five-yearly plans. In principle this new planning concept is aimed at encouraging more participation from the lower levels of the planning administration, especially the lowest levels of *tambon* and *mooban*. However, if we analyse the structural organisation of planning, it can be seen that throughout the policy and planning process under the new structural reform the state bureaucracy still has room to play a significant role in formulating policies and plans. Though at the lowest levels, the *tambon* and *mooban*, some forms of participation do exist, there seems to be a certain degree of intervention from the state bureaucrats representing different central departments in local administrative units (Vorathepputhipong, 1984, p. 433). In fact, government intervention in the practice of rural development planning occurs at all levels of planning administration, as the projects proposed from the *tambon* and *mooban* are subject to reformulating and screening by the planning bodies at higher levels, in order to correspond with the standard policy framework. This phenomenon cannot simply be interpreted as occurring because of the limitations of local organisations in preparing and formulating their own policies and plans. Rather it is a function of the administrative

structure itself, which does not fully allow for more intensive participation by local organisations. This is why Jonathan Rigg argues that the grass-roots development planning in Thailand is still centrally controlled, and should therefore be viewed with 'healthy skepticism' (Rigg, 1991, p. 201). Questions regarding the policy process and the extent to which local people participate exist not only in the area of development planning, they also arise in the implementation of development plans, which will be discussed in the next section

3.3.3 Policy Implementation

The implementation of rural development plans in Thailand relies most on the state administrative system which is highly bureaucratic. Thai bureaucracy is not only highly hierarchical, but also bound up with self-generated traditions and cultural values which are problematic for the effective implementation and promotion of local participation. These characteristics of Thai bureaucracy are seen by concerned bodies, especially the NESDB and political leaders, as obstacles to the effective application of the new concept of development. It can be seen that efforts have been made by concerned bodies at the high level in the last three Plans to improve the administrative system in order to diminish the problems and to facilitate this new approach (see Kambhu, 1989; NESDB, 1982, 1987, and 1992). Political leaders, especially General Prem Tinasulanonda, Anand Panyarachun, and Chuan Leekpai, have made their statements about the need for adjustments within the state bureaucracy to cope with the new concept of development (Kambhu, 1989; Handley, 1991 and 1992). However, the improvement of unpleasant conditions in the Thai bureaucratic system is unlikely to happen in a short time. This section will discuss the administration of policy implementation under the new concept of rural development and the obstacles which need to be investigated.

Despite the marked reform in the organisation of rural development planning introduced in the Fifth Plan discussed earlier, there has been little change in the way the implementation of development plans is undertaken. Under the new approach, the only change made with regard to this implementation is an emphasis on the

importance of achieving pre-set goals through participation of local beneficiaries. This differs from the old approach in which implementation relied solely on the routine administrative system. The routine administrative system is bound up strongly with hierarchical lines of command and rules, which are complex and time consuming (Brahmanee, 1989). Among government efforts to improve the administrative system and facilitate more effective policy implementation, attempts to co-ordinate various concerned agencies to work together on the basis of programme orientation or project orientation is a significant one. This is due to a change in the view that rural development projects cannot be sectoral, but should be integrated or intersectoral work (Na Chiangmai, 1985). Another feature which has been central to many concerned bodies, politicians and interest groups, is the effort to decentralise administrative power to the regions and localities, especially within the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), which is the most powerful ministry in the Thai administrative system (Kambhu, 1989, pp. 85-6). Traditionally, the administrative system of the MOI is strongly hierarchical, especially with respect to the decision-making process as Pakorn Priyakorn states in his research report on the administrative capacities of the MOI:

> 'Traditionally, the decision-making power structure and level of discretion in the MOI, particularly the boundaries between key personnel, were very clear. Analysed and synthesized information in conjunction with decision-making was always hierarchically top-down -- from Ministers, Permanent Secretary or their Deputies, Department Heads, Provincial Governors, Division Chiefs, District Officers, and others. Discretion actions taken by top executives were welcomed by middle and lower managers. Actually, there have been no open conflicts between bureaucrats and Ministers in the decision-making process.' (Priyakorn, 1989, p. xv).

The above statements demonstrate how strong the hierarchical bond in the MOI decision-making process is, which of course affects the implementation process of development policies as a whole. Details of this effort to devolve power within the MOI are reserved for further discussion later in this chapter.

Despite the efforts to improve the co-ordination between concerned agencies and decentralise administrative power, in practice a high degree of central administrative control remains. This means that local and regional bodies are still tied up firmly with a vertical command structure. Some of the administrative procedures which are introduced under the new structural reforms do not allow for strengthening the co-ordination mechanism at the sub-national levels of policy implementation, rather they retain the intra-agency bonds which have traditionally existed in the Thai administrative system. These problematic procedures as stated by Demaine and Malong (1987) are: each field agency should report on the performance of rural development work directly to its central administration in Bangkok; each field agency has its own budget separately allocated at its central level of administration which permits the agency to operate its programmes independently; and different standards and criteria in selecting and prioritising projects are employed by various field agencies involved, influenced by their central administrative system and discouraging inter-agency co-ordination at field level.

Problems related to the implementation of rural development policies are also associated with the monitoring and evaluation system. The tasks of monitoring and evaluating rural development policies at a local level are conducted solely by representatives of line agencies belonging to the Provincial Development Committee (PDC). Questions related to monitoring and evaluation arise regarding their purposes and methodologies. Pongquan (1992) argues that the measure of achievement of a project or programme is not based on its success in terms of the development impact, but rather it focuses on inspecting procedures, such as by considering operational problems which may interrupt the completion of the programme within the original time schedule. Additionally, the process of monitoring is designed to ensure that the budget is spent in accordance with government rules and regulations, rather than to ensure that goals and services have been secured. Finally, the remaining emphasis on the notion of a 'numerical target' may create problems in selecting proper project sites and in encouraging popular participation in the project, as selection of project sites may be biased towards the areas which have a high capacities to carry out the projects rather than the areas which need the projects (see Demaine, 1986, p. 109).

The above discussion has mentioned government attempts to improve the administrative system to support the implementation of rural development policies under the new concept of rural development, and the problems that remain with respect to the administrative structure. As policy implementation relies strongly on the state administrative system which remains highly bureaucratic, it is worth investigating further the Thai bureaucratic system and its culture, for the better understanding of its strength and weaknesses in dealing with the new concept of rural development planning.

3.4 The Thai Bureaucracy and Its Culture

The domination of bureaucrats in the Thai administrative system and over Thai society makes it important to discuss here the culture of the Thai bureaucracy with respect to development administration. Inevitably, the close relationship between Thai bureaucracy and Thai society has led the former to be seen as a reflection of the latter. The characteristics of the contemporary Thai bureaucracy and Thai society have resulted to a great extent from a long history and the evolution of the Thai administrative system and its interactions with the Thai people (see Cohen, 1991, especially Chapter 5). In order to understand the current role of the Thai bureaucracy in development administration, one must not only consider its present features, but also its historical perspectives. This section will present a brief historical background and outline the present features of the Thai bureaucracy. The emphasis will be on the role and influences of the Thai bureaucratic system on development administration, especially with regard to the promotion of local participation in the development process.

Historically, Thailand remained under an absolute monarchy for almost seven centuries, from the founding of the Sukhothai Kingdom in the early 13th century until the 1932 revolution (see Rajchagool, 1994). During the Sukhothai period, the Thai governing system was considered to be paternalistic, with the King being regarded as the father of all his people. During the Ayudhya period beginning in

1350, the introduction of the divine kingship concept as the basis for rule, changed the view towards the King to a divinity who had absolute power. This view remained until the early period of the present Chakkry Dynasty. Constitutional reform began as a result of the revolution in 1932, in which democratic principles were introduced to replace the traditional principles. Since then, the political control has alternated between parliamentary democracy and military rule. Nevertheless, those old traditional principles which are deeply rooted in Thai society, have to some extent remained and held their influence on Thai politics and administration up to the present (Nakata, 1987, pp. 168-169; Haas, 1979, pp. 3-15; Rubin, 1974, p. 3; see also Samudavanija, 1987). Because of these embedded traditional values, the Thai bureaucracy which has been bound up with and evolved alongside the monarchy, continues to be one of the most powerful institutions in Thai society up to the present, and perhaps will continue to be in the near future. Chai-anan Samudavanija, a leading Thai political scientist, mentions; '...even in the face of economic and social change, the bureaucracy's power remains supreme, and it is still appropriate to term Thailand a "bureaucratic polity"'(Samudavanija, 1987, p. 95; for a detailed analysis see Riggs, 1966).

The main characteristics of Thai bureaucracy are that it is highly centralised, paternalistic, and hierarchical (Mingmaneenakin, 1988; Rigg, 1991). The centralisation of the Thai bureaucracy means that its administrative structure is centralised and unified from Bangkok, where all ministries and departments are located. These central organisations characterise the concentration of power and decision-making, with a consequent lack of delegation of authority within departments (Samudavanija, 1987, p. 89). There exist an abundance of regulations and rules to control and unify the administrative practices of agencies at different levels. These regulations and rules overwhelm the administrative work, and make the system being well known as 'tardy' and 'inefficient' (Mingmaneenakin, 1988).

The hierarchical nature of the Thai bureaucracy in which patron-client relationship remains significant among officials and in the relationships between officials and people, is also viewed as problematic (Mingmaneenakin, 1988; Samudavanija, 1989;

Wirajnibhawan, 1987). This type of relationships is believed to be a descendant of the *'nai-phrai'* relationships which had dominated the Thai administrative system prior to the reform introduced by King Chulalongkorn, Rama V, in the late of nineteenth century. The hierarchical nature of the Thai bureaucracy functions in accordance with the centralisation of power and relates strongly to paternalism (see for example Tambiah, 1976). This form of relationship in contemporary Thai administrative system appears in the domination of hierarchical commands together with interpersonal relationships within the bureaucracy. As Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984) explain:

> '...personal forms of co-ordination came to matter more than staff relations and operational formal imperatives. Career advancement and preferred assignments could be fostered or hampered by the personal support of patrons or they were reluctant to assist. In relation thereto, the employee's loyalty was not necessarily assured to his bureaucratic superior but may have been given to his patrons. However, mainly in the past, but to some degree even recently, there was a tendency for patrons to move their clients to staff the offices to which they themselves had been transferred. This was related to the practice of discharging holder of office and replacing them by the followers of the new patron designated to head the department.' (p. 134).

Though the above statement points out the importance of the patron-client relationship within the Thai bureaucracy, and argues that the relationship does not necessarily correspond to that of superior-subordinate, the latter also seems to form part of traditional values in the system.

The above argument is supported by the view of Chai-anan Samudavanija who argues that the way Thai bureaucracy is organised and operated reflects, to a considerable degree, differential status considerations (Samudavanija, 1987, p. 91). In principle, superiors deserve to be obeyed (*patibat taam*) and respected (*krengjai*), and in return, they are expected to act on behalf of subordinates in a 'benevolent' and 'concerned fashion' (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984, p. 137). Paternalists' concern for the well-being of subordinates is separate from concern for the performance of the professional responsibilities. Samudavanija asserts that there is a real desire for a

superior to care for his subordinates regarding their well-being and personal matters as a means of enhancing his own authority. However, this concern does not extend to the performance of official tasks. The implication of these values is argued as being associated with the legal power structure of the system, which emphasises the authority of officials at high levels in making decisions while ignoring the delinquencies of their decisions. This permits high ranking officials to exercise their power without considering the importance of their subordinates. At the same time, lower level officials seem to accept their inferiority in the decision-making process in return for security in their professional positions. These attitudes are seen to cause ineffectiveness and inefficiency in development administration (Mingmaneenakin, 1988; Wirajnibhawan, 1987). In support of this argument, Rigg (1991) states that the administrative system prevailing in Thailand '...allows little room for initiative, and decisions are usually taken so that they correspond to the wishes, or the perceived wishes, of those above' (p. 201-202).

The patron-client relationship in fact goes beyond the boundary of the bureaucratic system itself; it also forms a part of the relationships between bureaucrats and people, and even among the people within society. Wirajnibhawan (1987) mentions that officials often behave like the master of the people. They prefer to use their power through commands rather than to listen to people. Many government officials see people, especially those who are in rural area, as ignorant and deprived. Based on this, they often believe that people must receive commands and help in the form of gifts from the government via officials. In combination with the persistent values of favouring superiority among normal people, the superior-subordinate roles played by the officials remain largely acceptable in Thai society (see also Mulder, 1994; Vandergeest, 1991).

Other values in the present Thai bureaucratic system, including personalism, and arrogance and disdain for those outside the system, are also apparent. Thai bureaucrats are regarded as personalistic, especially those holding high ranking positions. Samudavanija (1987) states: '...personal relationships and individual concerns remain the basis for bureaucratic behaviour' (p. 91). This behaviour is

believed to be based on a dominant structure known as a 'loose structure' prevailing in Thai society (Embree, 1950; see also Bunnag, 1979). Although this notion is highly criticised, many Thai academics view as it reflects the reality evident in Thai society (see, for example, Wirajnibhawan, 1987). As a consequence, high ranking officials prefer to make decisions by themselves, and co-ordination between different agencies is unlikely to happen easily. The feeling of being arrogant and disdained makes many officials behave as though they are superior to outsiders and their subordinates. This not only affects the role they play in the decision-making process, but also in their accountability to others, and when providing services to outsiders. In the decision-making process, it is uncommon for lower ranking officials to make any propositions or comments without being asked by their superiors. In relationships with outsiders, it is observed that these barriers prevent normal people consulting the officials, especially high ranking officials, as they are not allowed to see them easily (Wirajnibhawan, 1987).

In association with the predominant values that exist in Thai bureaucracy as discussed above, behavioural traits have also emerged which impede both the implementation of development policies and the promotion of public participation. Among the most important of these traits is a lack of co-ordination, and the top-down development syndrome.

The need for co-ordination among and between concerned government and non-government agencies, both in the vertical and horizontal sphere, is vital to the success of development administration. Although there are various factors that can affect co-ordination in rural development administration including factors related to the organisational structure and characteristics of the Thai bureaucracy, the influence of the latter is often seen as crucial. Among various characteristics of the Thai bureaucracy, personalism and disdain are major obstacles to co-ordination. Being disdainful often means that many bureaucrats are often arrogant in dealing with others, especipecially when they deal with officials of the same or lower ranks from outside their organisations, and with non-bureaucrats. Personalism and disdain characteristics are often found among Thai bureaucrats, and argued by many public

administration students to discourage effective group working among them (Wirajnibhawan, 1987). Additionally, lack of co-ordination may also be caused by the lack of intention to work for the benefits of the people, as bureaucrats tend to compete for benefits among themselves. Apart from these factors, the fact that each organisation has its own culture and budget allocated separately through its individual line of administration from the top, does not provide a strong basis for different agencies to co-ordinate effectively. This characteristic creates several problems in the implementation of development programmes, such as the overlapping of similar activities carried out by different government agencies, the disintegration of sub-projects, and the tension between governmental and non-governmental organisations, in pursuing rural development activities (see Wirajnibhawan, 1987; Mingmaneenakin, 1988; Farrington and Lewis, 1993, pp. 277-9).

It can be said that the culture and values of the Thai bureaucracy in general are still top-down, despite structural reforms to promote a bottom-up approach to the development administration. The top-down values, therefore, create a syndrome in the development administration which simply cannot be cured in the short run without a rigorous structural reform. Hence there is continuing scepticism concerning the result of promoting public participation in development in Thailand. As Samudavanija (1987) asserts:

> 'Most government development plans and programmes emphasise to get rural people involved in the development process. In practice, however, decisions on priorities, identification of felt needs, sitting, etc., are made from the top down. Officials tend to perceive and define problems and needs according to their own education, urban backgrounds, and organizational policies, centralized and formulated by the elite in Bangkok.' (p. 93).

These arguments correspond to the view of Rigg (1991) who claims that Thai bureaucratic structure does not permit a bottom-up development process to operate easily, despite increasing demands for it. He argues that even though there is a decentralisation of authority to provincial, district and local levels, as stated in the last three Plans, the operational success of the idea is doubtful. By quoting

Prasitrathsint (1987), he points out that local government units have remained tightly controlled by the centre. Two powerful ministries, the Ministry of the Interior which dominates the operation of the decentralisation policy, and the Ministry of Finance which controls the country's budget, have been reluctant to bequeath their power to the local level. The flow of information still remains organisationally top-down rather than bottom-up (Rigg, 1991, p. 302).

3.5 Local Level Administration, Politics, and Popular Participation

Much of the discussion in the earlier sections of this chapter dealt with the overall characteristics of the administrative system in the Thai context. From the above discussion, it can be seen that penetration of the central administrative system has reached every level of Thai society, from nation (*chaat*) to province (*changwat*), from province to district (*amphoe*), and from district to sub-district (*tambon*) and village (*mooban*). At the national, provincial, and district levels of the administration, it is quite clear that the system of governing these units strictly follows the rules designated by the central government in Bangkok, as the head of each of these units is a permanent civil servant appointed by the central government. Moreover, most officials concerned with administrative work are also permanent civil servants, who serve various central departments represented at each of these levels of the administration. The situation in the last two units of administration, *tambon* and *mooban*, differs greatly from those above, though they have been assimilated into the national administrative system. This is because their administrative arrangements are mainly on a voluntary basis, and their leaders are recruited through election. Although there are other types of administration categorised as local governing systems existing at different levels, they are not going to be discussed in detail here, as most of these local governments oversee only certain areas, mostly urban or semi-urban areas, which are not directly related to the focus of this study. The main purpose of this section is to discuss in more detail the features of local level administration, especially at the *tambon* and *mooban* levels. However, as these two units are directed closely by the district, their linkages with

the district administration cannot be neglected. The emphasis will also be on the extent of people's participation in the administration at these levels.

The district administration forms the principal local administrative arm of the state. It is the lowest administrative unit in which representatives of most central departments are present. The District Officer (*nai amphoe*), who is a high ranking permanent civil servant belonging to the Ministry of the Interior, is appointed by central government to oversee the overall administration of the district according to the law. According to the State Administration Act 1991, a District Officer must follow directives from the central government via the provincial government, and the commands and advice of the Governor of the province (*phuwa ratchakaan changwat*) within which the district is located (Atiphothi *et al.,* 1993). There are several central departments, whose work is related, and who have their offices and representatives at the district level. These offices are headed by the most senior officer of each office. Though administratively these officers should follow their departmental lines of administration in Bangkok, they also fall under the authority of the *nai amphoe* who is in charge of all administrative activities at this level.

With respect to the implementation of rural development policies, four out of six principal ministries concerned with rural development planning -- the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry Agriculture and Co-operatives -- have their own representatives in the form of departments with statutory functions at the district level (Hirsch, 1989b; see also Hirsch, 1990). As already mentioned earlier in this chapter, the District Development Committee (DDC) is the only planning body designated to be responsible for development planning duties, as well as to oversee the implementation of development projects within the district territorial boundary. This planning body encompasses the *nai amphoe*, the *palad aawuso* (Senior District Under-Secretary), and the heads of various concerned departments in the district, particularly the District Community Development Officer (*pattanakaan amphoe*), the District Agricultural Officer (*kaset amphoe*), the District Public Health Officer (*sataranasuk amphoe*), and the District Educational Officer (*sueksaatikaan amphoe*), who

represent the four principal ministries primarily manipulating rural development policies (Khoumkhainaam *et al.,* 1991). There are no outsiders represented on this committee. Therefore, it can be assumed that the committee manages its development duties in a conventional manner. Popular participation, either in planning or implementing development policy at this level, does not have it place at this level. The domination of the district administration extends clearly to the *tambon* and *mooban*, as many officials from the district office are entitled to the seats in the sub-district planning body and its supporting body -- the *sapha tambon* and the Sub-district Rural Development Operational Committee (SRDOC). Furthermore, some of these ministries have officials who are assigned to be responsible for implementing development works at *tambon* and *mooban* levels. These include the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives represented by the Sub-district Agricultural Extension Officer (*kaset tambon*), the Ministry of Health represented by the Sub-district Public Health Officer (*sataranasuk tambon*), and the Ministry of the Interior represented by the Sub-district Community Development Officer (*pattanakorn*). These officials play important roles in the implementation of development policies at the *tambon* and *mooban* levels, both in line with their ministries' directives and in integrated forms.

At the *tambon* and *mooban* levels, though the *tambon* official leader (*kamnan*) and the *mooban* official leader (*phu yai ban*) are considered to be official representatives of the central government who lead the administrative units and oversee all activities within their territorial administrative boundaries, they are not regarded as general or permanent civil servants (*khaaratchakaan prajam*). This is because their roles and status with respect to the administration differ to some extent from general civil servants who hold administrative posts at the higher levels (STU, 1983a). They are both recruited from within the individual *tambon* and *mooban* respectively, through a form of official election. According to present practice, a *phu yai ban* is elected by adult village members living in the government-determined *mooban,* from nominees within the *mooban.* A *kamnan* however is elected by adult members of each *tambon* from nominated *phu yai ban* within the *tambon* (for the process of election see Rubin, 1974 and Moerman, 1979, though the present situation does differ slightly from what they illustrate). This means that all *kamnan* must be elected as *phu yai*

ban first, before being a candidate for the position. Once a *phu yai ban* is appointed to the *kamnan* post, he/she still remains the head of the village he/she represents. Because they are elected from within their own communities, they must not only represent the government, but also their people. Their work as the heads of *tambon* and *mooban* is paid for by the government in the form of stipends rather than salaries that other officials receive. Their stipends are quite small when compared to their assigned roles, e.g. a newly recruited *phu yai ban* receives about 1,100 baht per month (approximately £28 per month).

The tasks assigned to *kamnan* and *phu yai ban* are time-consuming. They act as government representatives who head the *tambon* and *mooban* units of administration. At the same time, they also act as the official representatives of their people, in informing the government of their needs and problems. As official personnel, they should theoretically follow government directives to carry out and oversee any government activities undertaken at the *tambon* and *mooban* levels. There is a tremendous amount of work undertaken by 19 departments at these levels, with *kamnan* and *phu yai ban* being involved in varying degrees (see STU, 1983a, pp. 14-18). However, their main tasks include publicising government rules and other important information received from the district office to their people, allowing the people to make contact with government authorities, keeping peace and order within their territorial boundaries, assisting other officials in the completion of their work in *tambon* and *mooban*, overseeing and protecting state properties within the areas, and acting as primary sources of information for government in dealing with problems occurring in their administrative areas (STU, 1983a; Department of Local Administration, 1991). As representatives of the people in their administrative units, they are supposed to comprehend the needs of their people and the problems facing them, so that these problems and needs can be informed immediately and correctly to the government for taking further actions (STU, 1983a). Considering expectations from both government and people, these leaders can be viewed as important mediators between the government and people, which are sometimes in conflict (see Moerman, 1979). This raises the question of how these local leaders divide their roles and power to deal with conflicting expectations, and what their stances are in

such situations. Undoubtedly, differences exist in the roles played by different official leaders in dealing with such situations, which may also be influenced by several other factors. Among these factors, one cannot overlook the different needs among different groups of people within a *tambon* and a *mooban,* or even from the outside, which can influence the performance of these formal leaders and other actors (see Moerman, 1979; Keyes, 1979). This subject has only been discussed superficially in previous studies of local leadership in Thailand, especially with regard to development administration. In combination with the rapid changes in rural life towards commercialisation, in which competition over scarce resources is increasing, this subject warrants further investigation.

Under the recently introduced regulations which attempt to promote grassroots participation in development process, *kamnan* and *phu yai ban* are entitled to chair the planning bodies at the *tambon* and *mooban* levels, the *sapha tambon* and the Village Committee (VC), respectively. Actually, the *sapha tambon* has been established for a long time, but in a different structure from the present one, and was highly controlled by civil servants (see Kambhu, 1989; Ingavata, 1990).The change in the structure of *sapha tambon* which increases the power of local leaders took place quite recently in order to correspond to the introduction of the new concept of rural development planning. This concept is believed to promote the 'bottom-up' approach to planning, by expecting that through the new structural reforms of the *sapha tambon* and the planning organisation of the country as a whole, rural development planning will meet the real needs of grassroots. This is because the proposition of problems and needs starts at the lowest level planning body, the VC, and then proceeds through *sapha tambon* (for detail of their operation see Pongquan, 1992; Turton, 1987). Through this process it is assumed that information concerning the real and perceived needs of people at the village level will be gathered accurately by the *phu yai ban* and his colleagues in the VC, as they are the closest leaders to the grassroots as well as being part of the grassroots community themselves. Similarly, by appointing the *kamnan* to chair the *sapha tambon* and including all *phu yai ban* and other qualified villagers to be members, the process of screening problems and needs, and formulating the development plan in this very first step, will produce a

result that represents the real needs of the grassroots. This assumption seems to be logical if we consider the organisational structure of both VC and *sapha tambon* as institutions which are numerically dominated by local leaders who come from grassroots communities. However, the fact that the functions of these institutions do not simply depend on their organisational structures, is often seen as an obstacle to its effectiveness according to the above assumption. Among factors which must be taken into consideration are; the representativeness of these leaders with regard to their communities, the cultural or traditional dimension of paternalism in assessing needs and problems of the communities, and the influence of higher level officials who act as advisors and play dominant roles in the Sub-district Rural Development Operational Committees (SRDOC). In addition, there are questions relating to the understanding or perception of officials with regard to the concept of popular participation in development, and the structure of the planning organisation at the higher levels, which seems to overcontrol the planning process at the bottom level in various ways. Finally, questions also arise with respect to the understanding of local people themselves regarding their rights and power in participating in the development process. The following discussion will highlight some previous findings and arguments related to these questions.

Questions regarding the extent to which the local official leaders (i.e. *kamnan* and *phu yai ban*) represent people within their administrative boundaries in providing information to and requesting help from the central government through development process, are highly debatable. Rigg (1991) argues that these two positions tend to be held by the economically rich and politically powerful members of rural communities. Therefore, their perceptions about needs and problems may differ from those of the majority of villagers. This again depends on how the information is gathered and used in the process of problem and project identification at these levels, as it is more likely to be influenced by the aspirations of some villagers or cliques who are powerful and influential. Moreover, the decision-making process both in village or *sapha tambon* meetings, may also affect the outcome of project identification, and there is widespread evidence that the decision-making process in these two levels is highly authoritarian (Turton, 1987). Arguments relating

to the cultural dimension of local people and their reluctance to express their disagreement (Rigg, 1991; Wirajnibhawan, 1987), are often combined with those that highlight their familiarity with the system whereby they receive development projects as 'a gift' from the government. Although the perception that development activities as 'a gift' has been argued as changing among grassroots in some rural communities in southern Thailand (see Vandergeest, 1991), its influence still remains very strong in general. In this context, decisions relating to development projects may be highly dependent on the will of village leaders, the influence of powerful community members, and the understanding of those leaders with regard to the needs and problems of the community.

The influence of officials who work closely with rural communities and who have their roles in *sapha tambon* and in SRDOC, also forms an important issue related to the practice of people's participation. It is argued that problems and needs are often identified by these officials. Even if they are initially identified by the leaders, these officials are still influential in formulating proposals through their roles in *sapha tambon* and in SRDOC. In association with this argument, there is the claim that the domination of these officials in terms of educational qualifications and social status, has allowed them to have a great influence in directing development planning, which may in fact deviate the original idea (see Brahmanee, 1989; Ingavata, 1990, p. 130-131).

There are further questions about the uniformity in the understanding and the misconception of the participatory idea of popular participation among concerned government officials. Ingavata (1990) mentions: 'For the government, participation was measured by the use of voting procedures, ... , and the formality of group formation', which are not always the accurate measurements of the effective application of the idea. Others argue that the term 'popular participation' itself is unclear in meaning when it is translated into Thai language as '*kan mii* (having) *suan* (part) *ruam* (common, mutual) *khong* (of) *prachachon* (the people)' which can be interpreted in different ways (see Turton, 1987, footnote p. 10). This Thai phrase tends to be understood as a means or instrument to incorporate people in activities or

projects already laid out by the state (Hirsch, 1990, p.190-191). These misconceptions about the concept of popular participation may mislead its application. Finally, the problem of achieving effective local participation in the development process may be caused by a lack of understanding about this concept and a lack of awareness of its importance. A study by Pakting *et al.* (1989) in villages in Nakhorn Sawan Province in the northern region of Thailand shows a low degree of participation in development projects laid down by the government, even though this research defined participation in a broad and conventional sense. Based on his experience in administrative work, Brahmanee (1989) mentions that villagers and their leaders do not have a clear understanding about their roles under the new concept of development. Moreover, they lack the skill to identify and formulate a proper development project that can be submitted to the higher level planning bodies. He blamed this on the government's failure to clarify the concept, and how it could be applied. This argument is analogous to the view of Akin Rabibhadana and Andrew Turton who see that the government has not made serious efforts to promote popular participation in practice, so that the effect on local leaders and people has been minimal (Turton, 1987, p. 12-13).

It can be concluded from the discussion made in this section so far that the *tambon* and *mooban* administration in Thailand have been assimilated to a high degree into the wider administrative system of the state. Though their leaders, *kamnan* and *phu yai ban*, do not have the same social status as higher ranking official administrators in their relationships with villagers, the wider administrative system seems to have dominated them to a large extent in their administrative performances. When conflict between official expectations and the expectations of villagers emerge, they are placed in a difficult position to justify their roles in favour of both sides. This raises the question of to what extent these leaders represent grassroots opinion when interacting with the state administration. The introduction of the new concept of development, which claims to encourage people's participation through the organisational structure purposively adjusted, seems to have had little effects so far, on the strategies employed in the development process. This is due to several factors which may be categorised as socio-cultural factors, socio-political factors, and

structural factors, which frustrate the effectiveness of the application of this new concept. These factors may obstruct grassroots involvement in the policy process, as well as change the way the concept is applied in a practical sense.

3.6 Grassroots Participation in Rural Thailand: Some Concurring Evidence

Despite the emergence of several obstacles to the promotion of popular participation in the development process in rural Thailand, there is also evidence of grassroots movements in undertaking development activities and in interacting with state-led development activities. This evidence demonstrates the grassroots attempts to identify their needs and pursue their right to make changes in their societies. Their movements may occur traditionally or with assistance from outsiders, mainly non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and local traditional institutions. This section will review some findings about grassroots movements in various aspects of development activities in Thailand. The presentation will be divided into two parts. The first part will focus on grassroots participation in dealing with development activities in general. The second part will emphasise their movements with regard to local natural resource management.

3.6.1 Participation in Development Project

The first type of grassroots participation, participation in development activities, is not uncommon in rural Thailand. To understand this type of participation, in-depth studies involving intensive interviews with several groups and participant observation of selected cases are needed. However, these study methods are not widely used among Thai researchers. A study by Sopart Pongquan devoted solely to this subject and a collective study under the theme of Popular Participation Project of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), are among very few studies of this kind (Pongquan, 1988; Turton, 1987).

In Pongquan's report entitled 'Participatory Development in Villages of Central Thailand', several projects of different features and with different outcomes highlight a very good source of information about popular participation at village level in the Central Region of Thailand (Pongquan, 1988). Two of the cases in this report will be reviewed here as examples of projects with different features of participation and different outcomes. These two projects are the Pump Irrigation Project and the Road Repair Project.

The Pump Irrigation Project was initiated by a *phu yai ban* who saw the success of a project of this type in a nearby area, and was eager to bring a similar project to his village. This case occurred shortly before the introduction of the new concept of development to the planning system in Thailand. The *phu yai ban* and his colleagues tried hard to propose the project to relevant agencies, but it was ignored several times until he approached a local politician who had a close relationship with a relative and belonged to one of the ruling political parties at that time. When the project was approved and began to be implemented, there emerged a dispute between the *phu yai ban* clique and a clique led by a rival within the village; this dispute later spread throughout the village. The dispute was rooted from the *phu yai ban*'s claim that the project was a result of his personal connection with high ranking officials, which provoked aversion from his rival. In response to the claim, his rival announced that the project was approved through the normal planning process, not because of the competence of the *phu yai ban* and the special connection he had with high ranking officials. Moreover, he accused the *phu yai ban* of trying to change the project design in favour of him and his followers; the accusation was later found to be true, and the project was held up while further investigations were made. In the meantime, the *phu yai ban* in question died of illness, and his rival was elected to become the new *phu yai ban*. The new *phu yai ban* continued to pursue the project and worked more carefully than his predecessor in implementing it in order to show his competence. This included a form of people's participation in redesigning the project to distribute benefits among villagers, and organising the beneficiaries' group to assist the implementation and to undertake the management task after the construction was completed. Moreover, whenever problems emerged with regard to

the management of water allocation, rather than working alone, he tried to use a participatory approach to problem solving, so that the water users were satisfied. The project was very successful, both in the material and management sense.

The second project was dealing with the repair of the village road which was originally constructed through a government fund, but became damaged due to poor maintenance. A few attempts had been made through the *sapha tambon* to find funds to repair it, but none had been successful. Eventually, the people of the village expressed their need to repair the road themselves, as they were agitated with these refusals from the government. In the beginning the *kamnan* of this *tambon,* who also served as the official leader of this village, did not make much effort to seek support from other sources as he should have done. Instead, an elder who led the village temple lay committee (*kammakaan wat*) and one of his leading followers took the initiative over the issue, as the direction of the road was leading to the temple, and its repair was considered to be beneficial to the temple. They initiated the discussion with the *kamnan*, and the *kamnan* bestowed his support but refused to act as the mobiliser due to his work load and his fear of uncertainty in achieving success. The *kamnan* also tried to avoid possible difficulties because of his conflict with the wealthiest and most powerful landlord in the village. Eventually, the elders' group decided to solve the matter under the auspices of the abbot of the village temple from whom they received strong support. Through his highly respectable status, the abbot called on the villagers for any necessary contributions, as well as invoking the blessing of Lord Buddha. This special act from the abbot meant that no one in the village, including the powerful landlord, could refuse. Together with the tireless efforts of the elder and his supporters in playing their roles as liaison persons by making personal contacts with different people who were in conflict, the project received strong support from all groups in the village. The wealthiest landlord himself not only contributed a considerable amount of resources, but also sought support from the outside. At the same time, the liaison persons also launched a campaign soliciting contributions from outside the village. The District Officer was impressed by the attempts, and he then decided to offer his personal support, as well as seeking further help from concerned agencies. The achievement of the project was

very impressive. There was some degree of conflict between the wealthiest landlord and the organising committee during the implementation of the project, but the conflict was resolved through the mediation of the abbot, and did not deter from its ultimate success.

These two projects illustrate the success of development projects which differ in various aspects. Their differences can be seen from their initiation, the actors involved and their patterns of interactions, and the basis on which the projects were implemented. However, both indicate how powerful people's participation is in the completion of projects if the participation occurs willingly. It also illustrates the roles the different actors played in inspiring and organising community members, and the utilisation of indigenous knowledge and traditional institutions in organising the villagers and in achieving their success.

There is other evidence which illustrates the power of popular participation and its influence on development projects or programmes in other areas of Thailand. The survival of a group of farmers confronting production and marketing problems in a district of Chachoengsao Province in the central region of Thailand was partly due to their collective efforts in helping themselves, after a government-established farmers' group, or '*klum kasettakorn*', failed to achieve its original aims, is one example (Turton, 1987, pp. 56-58). The failure of a state-established rice bank (*thanakhaan khao*) followed by the success of a new institution with similar functions, but organised by the farmers themselves in a village in Northern Thailand, is another illustration of the ability of farmers to organise themselves, as this self-organised institution was more suited to them than government-led projects (Turton, 1987, p. 62). Though the outputs of these projects, as influenced by active local participation, are mixed in response to their original objectives, the outcomes in forms of impacts on local people are more likely to be beneficial to the grassroots, and the projects are more likely to be sustained as compared to the inflexible government projects.

3.6.2 Participation in Natural Resource Management

Natural resource management is an area in which popular participation is often noted. The fact that the quality of natural resources is important for the livelihoods of rural people has created patterns of human-environment relationship which are dynamic and symbolise the adaptation of human society in maintaining the resources they use. The patterns of human-environment relationship appear in forms of social organisations which are noteworthy for students of popular participation. In Thailand, several findings show that such organisations emerge in long-settled rural communities throughout the country, particularly in remote areas. The following cases are examples of this type of organisations found in different regions of the country: the *Muang Faai* irrigation organisation in Northern Region; the mangrove management organisation in Southern Region; and the forest conservation group in Northeastern Region.

The *Muang Faai* irrigation system is a small-scale irrigation system traditionally organised within the rural community. It is still commonly practised in many places in Northern Thailand, and the practice can be traced back over 700 years (Tongdeelert and Lohmann, 1991). It has been common among rural settlers in hilly areas for the purpose of irrigating their paddy fields, and covers over 60 per cent of the total irrigated land in Chiang Mai province alone. All activities concerned with the irrigation system are organised by villagers, who can be from more than one community. These include selecting sites to build small dams, constructing and maintaining dams and ditches, allocating water among users, setting regulations, and solving disputes among water users. These activities are overseen by committee members who are elected on a term basis, which is said to be very effective as they do care about their performance and their reputation (Tongdeelert and Lohmann, 1991). The management system forms a combination of ritual, belief and traditional forms of democracy. The system is also observed to be dynamic in order to adapt to changes occurring within the communities. This dynamism and ability to adapt are argued to be the main contribution to its survival, and is supported by the fact that

the system has survived for several centuries. It is only recently that the system has been worsened by changes in both physical and social environments within and surrounding their communities. Some of these changes occurred through the general transformation of rural societies towards a cash economy, and others are related to the ignorance of concerned government bodies about the effectiveness of the system. This led to an attempt to change the system to the more 'updated irrigation technology' combined with a so-called 'modern system' of management.

The second example of this type of organisation is taken from a mangrove management project undertaken in a coastal community in Trang province, Southern Thailand. This was a community-based management project which was associated with the Yad Fon Association (YFA), a local NGO based in the province and established for the purpose of helping coastal villagers to improve their quality of life. The community where the project took place was considered to be among the poorest in the region and their small-scale fishing was in decline. It was therefore in the interest of the association to provide assistance, and so the project was initiated in 1985 as a part of the larger project of the YFA. In the beginning, the villagers hesitated because they felt that they were powerless to overcome their problems, which they saw as too difficult and complicated. The YFA sent its development workers to interact with the villagers in working out their problems and identifying activities to be undertaken, as well as upgrading their managerial skills. Several activities were established as a result of mutual planning between the YFA development workers and the villagers, including activities for empowering individual villagers and the community, creating a savings group, improving intervillage network, and developing leadership skills for potential leaders, etc. Though the establishment of these activities was guided by the YFA development workers, during the process of implementing this project the idea of local resource management emerged within the community itself. The idea received a positive response from the YFA, and they worked together to start a project for mangrove rehabilitation and coastal fishery resource protection, as these issues were seen to be related to fishery conditions in the area. Through the co-ordination of the YFA, other concerned government officials were invited to join the project as working partners

in a participatory approach emphasised in the project. Through a series of meetings, YFA staff, concerned government officials and community leaders jointly produced a plan which covered a series of activities to pursue the project's goals. Moreover, the community leaders and YFA staff had tried hard to discuss the project with villagers as well. Traditional institutions, particularly religious institutions, were also emphasised in the organisation. The most important activity resulting from the joint plan was mangrove planting which involved several tasks, such as site selection, seed collection, planting, and monitoring. All these tasks were undertaken by community members and were organised at times which suited them. Management rules were also developed in order to maintain and use the mangrove trees in a sustainable manner. This project was very successful and led to the development of additional activities in the area (see Rittibhonbhun *et al.*, 1993).

The last case is about the movement of a forest conservation group in a national forest reserve area of Dong Yai in Buriram province, Northeastern Region. The case was popular and controversial, as it had appeared in most Thai newspapers and in foreign newspapers for a few months in 1991. The case involved a well-known Buddhist monk, Phra Prajak Khutajitto, a forest monk and foremost follower of the late Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, the most well known philosophical monk in modern Thai Buddhism. Phra Prajak was involved in the movement as the philosopher and a leading supporter of forest settlers who had been opposed to the government policy to relocate them outside their settlement area. The government intended to use the land which was labelled as 'degraded forest' for planting eucalyptus trees for commercial purposes. This policy threatened the security and livelihoods of forest settlers, who had been settled in the area long before it was included as a part of the reserve forest. Indeed, some of these villagers were brought into the forest by the military for national security purposes, during the period of communist insurgency in the region. Phra Prajak took up the cause of forest settlers in opposition to the state's policy to promote monoculture of eucalyptus, and combined it with his idea of 'social action as Buddhist truths' and his alternative development philosophy which emphasised decentralisation of power, local resource management, and sustainable cultural practices. As a consequence, while he was camping in the forest he received

strong support from the majority of the forest settlers, not only in the area where he encamped, but also expanded to other adjacent hamlets and to some NGO workers. At the same time, his movement displeased the civil and military authorities who supported the state policy. In due course, Phra Prajak was arrested twice, together with some of his followers, and charged with encroaching the Dong Yai forest. However, because he was a popular monk, he was forced by the government through the highest Buddhist monk institution in Thailand, the Maha Dhera Samakhom, to leave the priesthood and stop his popular movement, instead of being imprisoned. Although the actual achievement of his movement was not great, the movement had brought about many changes to the way grassroots movements were viewed in the history of conservation movements in the country as a whole (see Taylor, 1993 for details).

These cases are only a few examples to substantiate the existence of popular participation in development with respect to natural resource management in local areas in Thailand. The purpose of bringing these cases into discussion is partly to illustrate that even though the situation in rural Thailand has been presented as being an obstacle to grassroots movements and popular participation, there exist some grounds and culture which are bases for popular movements and popular participation. The three examples presented here demonstrate cases with mixed backgrounds remaining in rural societies which are promising for enhancing popular participation at local levels. However, the success or failure of their application depends largely on whether concerned bodies recognise or ignore such valuable elements. The first and last cases demonstrate how these important elements were ignored, and create a negative impact on local people, whereas in the second case, the situation was reversed.

3.7 Conclusion

The discussion in this chapter so far illustrates that the system of administration in Thailand after King Rama V underwent a series of reforms, has been dominated by a centralisation of power in Bangkok. The administration is characterised by

paternalism and hierarchy; features which are descended from a long history of relationships between rulers and people. These characteristics form part of the dominant values in the Thai administrative system and of bureaucrats who remain the most powerful group in the state; some academics consider the system as a 'bureaucratic polity' (Riggs, 1966). With respect to development administration, planning and implementation of development policies have traditionally been completely controlled by the central government and its regional arms of provincial and district governments.

However, during 1980s the concept of rural development was introduced and was followed by reforms in the structure of rural development administration. The new concept of rural development focuses more on grassroots participation in the development process through local level organisations, both at *mooban* and *tambon* levels, known as Village Committee and *sapha tambon*. By regulating these two institutions to comprise local leaders and members from within each grassroots community, they are expected to function effectively in formulating development plans to meet the real and felt needs of the local population. Nevertheless, questions have emerged concerning the application this new ideology in Thailand. These questions relate to different issues ranging from the cultural values deeply rooted in Thai society as a whole, the conceptions of this ideology among concerned officials, and the attention of the officials in promoting this ideology, to the suitability of the newly adjusted administrative structure itself.

In spite of the above potential difficulties, a precedent for active grassroots movements in rural communities in different regions of Thailand does exist. These movements demonstrate mixed results, depending on the types of outside intervention, especially from concerned government bodies and NGOs. More importantly, it should be noted from the cases illustrated in this chapter, and in other cases elsewhere, that the involvement of different types of local leaders, especially charismatic leaders, in these movements are a key factor in determining their success. Under a wide range of issues related to the achievement of grassroots

participation, this study is interested to explore further the socio-cultural and political issues related to the administration of common property resource management at the lowest level of the Thai administration, *mooban*, which has been sparsely touched on in previous research.

CHAPTER FOUR

BACKGROUNDS OF BAN NUA PHRU AND BAN BON LAY

4.1 Introduction

'People in Ban Khao Suai do not catch fish as much as we do. They grow rice quite a lot, since land there is very fertile and water is not as sour (acidic) as here.' (An elder in Ban Nua Phru)

'People in Bueng Yai are professional fishers. They have been living on fish ever since. One fisherman there uses hundreds of traps, and several *hua* (pieces) of floating nets. They even come up here during the flooding season. We here only catch fish for consumption. Only a small excess is sold. We cannot do fishing full time here as there has no enough fish to be caught for the whole year round.' (A fisherman in Ban Thung Samet)

'Life here had been very tough. Before the road was built a few years ago, we had to travel several hours by long-tailed boats (*reua haang yao*) to Thung Yaang market to buy necessary items. Officers rarely came here. We lived on our own.' (An elder in Ban Thung Samet)

'Bueng Yai Lake used to be very rich in fish, and we have enough land to grow rice. Thirty or forty years ago, no one would imagine the life we are facing today. Because it was easy to live here, villagers did not think to seek for other resources or to move out to other places, rather people from other communities preferred to move into this community. Therefore, the population has increased rapidly. But life has been changing very much in the last twenty years or so, mainly through more and easier contacts with outside...Patterns of consumption have changed very much. People need much more money today than in the past. They do every thing they can to earn more to meet their increasing needs...The fish is scarce now not only because of environmental problems, but also because we exploit it so much.' (A key informant in Bueng Yai Community)

The above remarks illustrate how people in different communities view their own communities and other communities within the Phru Thung Samet and Bueng Yai Lake ecosystem. They describe the relationships between people in different communities and surrounding natural environments which differ across the ecosystem. They also reflect the changes occurring in the communities, their relationships with the wider society and the consequences on their lives. The large area covered by Phru Thung Samet and Bueng Yai Lake ecosystem provides variations in its physical characteristics, its resource endowment, and its accessibility from outside. These variations influence the characteristics of villages settling in different parts of the ecosystem. Clearly there are some similarities shared among rural communities in the ecosystem and with other rural communities elsewhere in Thailand. However, differences in their physical settings, their access to natural resources and their historical interactions with the outside world are also influential in the evolution of each community, and the present forms and structures of the communities. Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay are no exception. Although they are located near to each other, they are situated in different parts or ecotypes of the ecosystem, and have different histories of settlement and contact with outside. Their similarities and differences are important for the understanding of community organisations and their relationships with natural resources management.

Based on the field investigation made in this study and in the PSU-CDS project on floodplain fisheries, together with information available from secondary sources, this chapter intends to describe and compare the similarities and the differences in the backgrounds of Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay where most of this research was undertaken. The presentation will cover their physical and historical settings, as well as their social, economic, and political structures. It will also consider the relationships between these different aspects with regards to natural resource exploitation and management in these two villages.

4.2 Physical and Historical Settings

4.2.1 Physical Settings

a) Ban Nua Phru

Ban Nua Phru is located on the bank of Khlong Thung Yaang (Thung Yaang River) at the north-west part of Phru Thung Samet. It is about 6 kilometres from the nearest town of Thung Yaang where the headquarters of Thung Yaang district is located. The village covers a total area of about 3,500 *rai* or around 56 square kilometres. Over seventy per cent of the area is floodplain, used mainly for cultivating swamp rice and grazing animals. About ten per cent of the area is low lying swamp covered partly by swamp forest (*paa samet*). This low-lying swamp is important for the community, as it is full of sedge grasses, especially *krajoot* which is valuable for handicrafts commonly practised in this area. *Krajoot* is abundant in the low-lying swamp of Ban Nua Phru. Moreover, the low-lying swamp also forms the main fishing ground for the village population. Administratively the village is one of ten villages in Tambon Thung Samet, Thung Yaang district, Nakhon Si Thammarat province. Although the distance between the village and the town of Thung Yaang is not far in physical terms, travelling from the village to the town was not convenient until thirteen years ago when the road between Thung Yaang town and Ban Thung Samet was improved. Prior to this improvement, the road was poorly built and only seasonally accessible. Additionally, people had to depend on limited transportation privately run by local residents through modified pick-up trucks (*rot saung theao*) or motorcycles. Most people travelled to the town of Thung Yaang either by their own long-tailed boats or by a larger boat service operated twice daily along Khlong Thung Yaang and other water channels. Due to these communication difficulties, the village was regarded by officials as one of the most remote villages in this area, and was rarely visited. The villagers also had limited contact with the market prior to the road improvement. These conditions isolated of the village from outside penetration, both by the state and the market.

b) Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai Community

Ban Bon Lay is part of Bueng Yai community located on the west bank of Bueng Yai lake. It is located 15 kilometres from Khuan Mangkhud town where the Khuan Mangkhud district headquarters is situated. The village covers an area of about 1,800 *rai* or about 29 square kilometres. About forty per cent of this area is used for agricultural production, mostly rice cultivation. The residential area occupies about six per cent of the total area; the remainder is either covered by low-lying swamp, swamp forest or fallow land which is partly used for grazing animals. Sedge grasses can also be found in some parts of the low-lying swamp in this village, but the availability of *krajoot* grasses is limited and far below the demand for the growing handicraft making in the village. Some villagers grow their own *krajoot*, but they still need to import much of it from communities in the swamp. The swamp also provides a fishing ground for the villagers, but it is less important than the lake as most fishing activities in the swamp are limited to only a few months of the year. Administratively Bueng Yai community comprises seven villages and is divided between two sub-districts or *tambon;* Tambon Bueng Yai and Tambon Khuan Phanang (see Map 4). Ban Bon Lay belongs to Tambon Bueng Yai, which includes five of the seven villages in the community. Contacts with outside communities have been much better established in Bueng Yai community and Ban Bon Lay than in Ban Nua Phru. The community is now easily accessible through a good metalled road connecting it with Khuan Mangkhud town and extending to other nearby towns. The road was first built about thirty years ago and it was metalled about ten years after that. Even before this road was built, people used to travel extensively by boats across the lake and through water channels. Travelling to the town of Khuan Mangkhud and other towns used to be by boat to Ban Tha Rua where access to road and train has long been established. The difference in contacts with outside and wider communities between Ban Nua Phru and Bueng Yai community, and hence Ban Bon Lay, is one of the important factors behind the broader difference between these two villages, which will be discussed later in this thesis.

c) Climatic Conditions

The climatic conditions of these two villages are very similar, as they are located close to each other, and their proximity to the eastern coastline of southern Thailand is also of a comparable distance. Like other areas in southern Thailand, the village climatic conditions are influenced by monsoons. Though there are generally two seasons, dry season and rainy season, the monsoon influence makes the dry season less apparent than the rainy season. From February to April the weather is generally quite dry. From May onward, the coming of the south-west monsoon brings rains to the area. The rainfall continues at a moderate rate until September. Then the coming of the north-east monsoon, beginning in September, increases precipitation dramatically and often causes flooding, especially in low-lying areas in which these villages are situated. The heavy rains continue until January. The average rainfall of the area, as measured at a station near Khuan Mangkhud town, was 1,751.4 millimetres per year between 1980 and 1989, with over sixty per cent of this amount measured between September and January (CORIN and FEKU, 1994). The average temperature was 29.5 degrees Celsius with the highest often found in April, but the variation in temperature is generally not significant throughout the year.

4.2.2 Historical Settings

Differences in historical settings between Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay are also significant. There are two major areas of their historical differences which need to be considered in relation to this study -- their settlements and their contacts with outside.

a) Ban Nua Phru

Ban Nua Phru can be considered a newly settled village. From several discussions with elders and key informants, it is quite clear that the first settlement in this village began

around eighty years ago. The first group of settlers came from Ban Joot Ngaam, a neighbouring village to the east (see Map 2). They found the area was suitable for conversion to rice fields which they did not have enough of in their old village. At that time, having rice fields was crucially important for household food security, as the economy of a rural community as this village depended almost exclusively on their own production. At the same time, being located in the floodplain closed to the low-lying swamp allowed them to engage in fishing. This pioneer group of settlers comprised six families. They first settled on the bank of Khlong Thung Yaang close to the place where the village temple, Wat Nua Phru, is now situated. When they decided to stay permanently, they started to clear the land. They first began with clearing the more elevated land for housing and growing some field crops. Later they extended to the low-lying land for rice cultivation. They worked together and divided squatter land (*teedin jabjaung*) among them equally. During this time, some of their relatives (*yaat pee naung*) and close companions (*phak phuak* or *kloe*) came to join them. When the community was growing, they started to think about building a temple. The temple was then founded about ten years after the settlement. At that time, there were only about twenty households settled in this community, and all of them came from Ban Joot Ngaam and its neighbouring village of Ban Dong Joot. The foundation of the temple was led by an elder who was among the pioneer settlers and respected by the community as their leader. This man was later appointed by the state to be the first *phu yai ban* of the village when the village was firstly formalised into the state administrative system about forty five years ago. This point is raised here to illustrate the connection of these pioneer settlers with the present leadership structure of the village, as it is important for the understanding of the current pattern of the organisation of the community. In fact, the first leader of the community is the grandfather of the present abbot (*chao aawaat*) of Wat Nua Phru. It is also important to note that all males who were pioneer settlers were regarded as leaders of the community at that time. One of them was selected to be the second *phu yai ban* of the community after the retirement of the first *phu yai ban*. The present village formal elder (*phu song khunnawut*) is a son of this second *phu yai ban*.

During the early period of its settlement, there was very limited contact with the outside. Most of the contacts they had were with their old communities, as some of their relatives and their companions remained there. Additionally, they also had close contact with a rice growing community called Ban Khao Suai located at the eastern edge of the swamp in Hua Sai district. This occurred through the old connection which the leader of this village at that time had with a leading member of Ban Khao Suai. Because rice growing was not yet well established at the beginning of the settlement and the availability of rice from their old communities was insufficient, an attempt was made in contacting Ban Khao Suai to exchange rice for field crops and fish cultivated in this community. Through this contact, the relationship between this community and Ban Khao Suai grew even closer than before, and led to some intermarriages between their children, with most new couples settling in Ban Nua Phru.

Contacts with officials and towns were even more limited. As the village was not formally recognised as a separate village until about forty five years ago, officials hardly ever visited. Even after the village was formally established, the inconvenience of transportation seemed to be the main excuse officials used for not visiting. Only school teachers came regularly on their duties during that time, but their roles were limited to educational missions for children, whilst their influence on the village administration was limited and indirect. Consequently, the village had been left to run almost independently from state interference until the road connection to the village was made possible. Contacts with towns followed in the same manner. Villagers only visited to the town of Thung Yaang, which is only a few kilometres away, to sell their small excess products in exchange for other necessary goods. This happened only once or twice a month for most households. Contacts with other towns were even more limited. Only a few households had experience of visiting towns far away during that time, since most of them depended very little on towns for their living. Their living conditions were very basic. However, marked changes started to appear in the last two decades, when the road connection was established and mains electricity was also connected. Most state-led development projects undertaken in the village happened during this time. Even so, most households nowadays

are still highly dependent on produce available within the village for their daily consumption.

b) Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai Community

The settlement in Ban Bon Lay is believed to have taken place a long time ago. It emerged as result of an expansion of Bueng Yai community due to the increase in its population. Though there is no evidence concerning the time Bueng Yai community was first settled, a discussion with a prominent elder together with other evidence supports the view that it is one of the oldest communities in this area. This includes the age of the main community temple, Wat Bueng Yai, which is over three hundred and seventy years old, according to a written document available in the temple. There is also a written document published by the main provincial school in Patthalung province in 1935, which included a story related to the development of the area. According this document, Bueng Yai community had already grown to be a small town over one hundred years ago. In 1907 the town was designated as the headquarters of Khuan Mangkhud district for a short period, before it was moved to another town nearby and later to the present location (Rongrian Patthalung, 1935). One of the main factors behind the growth of Bueng Yai community was its location on the bank of Bueng Yai lake, at a point that is easily accessible to other inland communities and towns located around the Songkhla Lake to the west and the north-west. At the time when road transportation was limited, many communities settling on the eastern side of the lake often travelled by boats to Bueng Yai before making connection with other inland destinations to the west and the north-west of the lake. The location of the community was also seen as being prosperous due to its richness of natural resources, especially fish and *krajoot*. As a result, a significant number of people migrated to settle in the community, which enhanced the expansion of its population and residential area. This expansion has been most marked in the last seventy years. The number of households has increased from around four hundred households seventy years ago to about eight hundred households thirty five years ago, and one thousand four hundred and forty two households at the time of this study. Accordingly,

the number of administrative villages drawn from the community has also changed from two villages fifty years ago to seven villages at the present. Now the community as a whole is very crowded. Most of the residential area appears like a slum area in the middle of the city.

The community also has been long exposed to outside. Contacts with the state have been much better established than in Ban Nua Phru. As mentioned earlier, the state located the district headquarters in this community due to its growth and its geographical significance. Even after the withdrawal of the district headquarters the interactions between the community and the state have continued to a large extent. Apart from the provision of infrastructure, especially roads and mains electricity, many state agencies have conducted their projects of various forms in this community under the label of development projects. In many cases the community was assigned top priority for allocation of development projects and was targeted under the 'rural development poverty eradicating scheme' (Suphakason, 1993). Several local organisations were established at different times. These include savings co-operatives, housewives' groups, fishermen's groups, handicraft development groups, community self-defence groups, etc. Though the achievements of these projects have been mixed, inevitably they have had an impact on the community, either directly or indirectly. It is not my intention to discuss the details of these impacts in this study. However, it is worth noting that through these long term interactions the community organisation has been moulded from their original traditional arrangement.

The community's contacts with the market appear to have happened earlier than in Ban Nua Phru. The exchange of local produce, especially fish and mats, for cash and for other products, began even before the extension of the road from Ban Tha Rua to the community. However, they have been more profound and more extensive after the construction of the metalled road connected with Khuan Mangkhud town was completed in 1974. The more convenient transportation has allowed for the improvement of market links which led to the increase in volume of goods exchanged between the community

and the market. Considering the flow of products from the community alone, available evidence indicates that fish trading has grown significantly, and the system of measurement started to change from volume measurement to weight measurement after this road improvement. The growth of fish trading and the change in the system of measurement reflect the expansion of fish market for fishermen in this community and the adaptation they made to deal with measurement system common to the trading system outside the community. The expansion of the market has also increased demand for handicrafts from *krajoot,* and enhanced the development of its production patterns. Through support received from the Ministry of Industry's Local Industrial Promotion Unit and the Ministry of the Interior's Department of Community Development, several other products from *krajoot* have been developed, mostly for outside markets. The community's connection with mains electricity happened shortly after the road was metalled, and marked another important breakthrough in the relationship of the community with the market. Many consumption goods, especially electric appliances, have increasingly been imported into the community. These changes have meant an increase in the community's dependence on a market economy, which in turn has increased the demand for resources used as means of production (for a detailed discussion about the change towards a market economy and its consequences, see for example, Sahlins, 1974; Parry and Bloch, 1989). The marked decline in fishing in this community has been strongly determined by these changes. Also, the community now depends highly on other communities in the swamp for its supply of *krajoot,* as demand for *krajoot* increases due to an expansion of the handicraft market.

4.3 Population, Household and Out-Migration

In terms of population and number of households, Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay differ slightly in their sizes. However, the differences in the size of population and number of households alone may not be so meaningful in the understanding the difference in the relationship between the population and other components of the communities which feature their overall difference. Therefore, details about population structure are required

for further consideration. This section will present some detail of population and household structures in these two villages. It will also include a brief discussion of out-migration emerging in these two villages, as it is an important factor determining the trend of change in population.

4.3.1 Population

Ban Nua Phru is a large village by Thailand's standards. By April 1995 it had one hundred and sixty five households with a population of eight hundred and seventy three. The average size of a household is five members per household. Of the total population, the proportion of the male population is almost equal to that of the female population. By categorising those aged from fifteen years old to sixty years old as the work force, sixty six per cent of the total population falls into this category. The proportion of males and females in the work force is about equal. Of those who are outside the work force, twenty five per cent are aged below fifteen years old and nine per cent aged above sixty years old. The population density is sixteen persons per square kilometre.

As with Ban Nua Phru, Ban Bon Lay can also be considered as a large village. However, the size of its population is slightly larger than in Ban Nua Phru. It has two hundred and three households with a population of nine hundred and twenty six. The average size of a household is also similar to that of Ban Nua Phru; that is about five members per household. Again, the proportion of the male population is about a half of the total population. About sixty two per cent of the total population is in the work force age-range. The proportion of male and female work force is accounted for fifty two and forty eight per cent respectively. Of the remainder, thirty per cent are aged under fifteen, whereas those who are aged over sixty represent eight per cent of the total population. This age structure differs slightly from that of Ban Nua Phru -- a higher proportion of the population aged below fifteen is found in Ban Bon Lay than in Ban Nua Phru, against that of the work force age-range. With respect to the population density, because the number of the total population in Ban Bon Lay is higher than in Ban Nua Phru whereas

its acreage size is much lower, the population density of Ban Bon Lay is much higher than that of Ban Nua Phru. Ban Bon Lay has a population density of thirty two persons per square kilometre, twice as high as in Ban Nua Phru.

Table 4.1: Population structure in Ban Nua Phru, Ban Bon Lay, and Bueng Yai Community 1995

Items	Ban Nua Phru	Ban Bon Lay	Bueng Yai Community
1. Number of households	165	203	1,442
2. Population			
2.1 Total population	873	926	6,850
2.2 Male proportion (%)	49	50	50
2.3 Female proportion (%)	51	50	50
3. Age structure			
3.1 Age below 15 (%)	25	30	30
3.2 Age 15-60 (%)	66	62	56
3.3 Age over 60 (%)	9	8	14
4. Population density (persons/km^2)	16	32	33

Source: The Official Basic Needs Census, 1995

Compared to Bueng Yai community of which Ban Bon Lay is a part, data for population structures is similar. Bueng Yai community has a population of six thousand eight hundred and fifty, and comprises one thousand four hundred and forty two households. Its population density is thirty three persons per square kilometre, which is comparable to that of Ban Bon Lay. The proportion of the male and the female population is also about the same. The figures on age structure between Bueng Yai community and Ban Bon Lay are also very close, except the proportion of those aged over sixty years old, where the figure in Bueng Yai community is almost twice as high as in Ban Bon Lay.

4.3.2 Household

There are different types of households found in both Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay. In this part of Thailand, there appears to be no strict tradition of maintaining an extended family. However, there is a likelihood that at least one of the children in each household will remain with their parents in order to care for them when they are old. At the same time, there is a possibility of finding four generations of members sharing the same house, though this is rare. In order to provide a clearer picture, household types have been divided into three categories; sub-nuclear, nuclear and joint (Table 4.2). This categorisation is adapted from Cain (1978) based on his study in Bangladesh (Cain, 1978, quoted in McGregor, 1991).

Table 4.2: Household types and definitions

Household Types	**Definitions**
1. Sub-nuclear	A single individual, or elderly member(s) with or without grand child(ren).
2. Nuclear	Parents with child(ren), or childless married couple.
3. Joint	Married couple with married or unmarried child(ren), grand child(ren), and/or elderly parent(s).

Source: Adapted from Cain (1978), quoted in McGregor (1991).

Based on the above categorisation, the majority of households in Ban Nua Phru, Ban Bon Lay as well as in Bueng Yai community, are nuclear. However, high proportions of joint households are found in all these communities. Households of sub-nuclear type are also

found in Ban Nua Phru and in Bueng Yai community, but not in Ban Bon Lay (Table 4.3). It is observed that people prefer to have a nuclear household and the trend is moving towards this direction. At the same time, values of caring for elderly parents as well as young married couples who are not yet ready to settle on their own continuing to live with are also strong. Occasionally, young married couples may leave the communities to seek employment outside, but leave their small child or children temporarily behind with their elderly parents. Therefore, it is not uncommon to find some households in which four generations stay together. In very rare cases, all members who are in the work force age-range leave the community to seek jobs outside the communities, while their houses are left for their elderly parent(s) to look after, possibly with one or two grand children. These elderly parents normally receive some financial support from their children who work outside the community. This is likely to happen among poor households whose assets are insufficient to support their stay in the communities.

Table 4.3: Distribution of household types in Ban Nua Phru, Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community

Unit: percentage

Household Types	**Ban Nua Phru**	**Ban Bon Lay**	**Bueng Yai Community**
1. Sub-nuclear	13	0	8
2. Nuclear	60	67	50
3. Joint	27	33	42
Total	100	100	100

Source: PSU-CDS survey.

4.3.3 Out-Migration

Since out-migration is a common phenomenon nowadays in both Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay, and also in Bueng Yai community, it is important to consider some relevant features. Though out-migration is not new to both villages especially among males (a few males who are in the 'middle-age' range revealed having experiences in working outside the villages in the past), the number of out-migrants was said to have increased significantly in the last few years. Moreover, the migration pattern has also changed. In the past, almost all out-migrants were males who were heads or important economic contributors of households, and who went out to seek wage work on a temporary basis to support their families back home. Nowadays, out-migrants are from different age groups of both sexes, and the majority are young members who cannot see the future of continuing farm work at home. Many of them have migrated-out permanently or at least intend to do so. The increasing influence of the cash economy and the notion of modernisation on the communities is clearly a major factor behind the perceptions of these people in favour of out-migration. The increase in their dependency on cash and in the need for changes in their lifestyle influenced mainly by media, has induced them to go out to seek more cash and more modern lifestyles, to which they have less access if they remain in the communities.

Looking at the total number of out-migrants, it was found that as many as eighty per cent of households in Ban Nua Phru had their members migrating out at the time of this study. The overall figures from Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community differed significantly. Only about forty and fifty five per cent of households in Ban Bon Lay and in Bueng Yai community respectively, had members migrating out, either on a temporary basis or on a permanent basis (Table 4.4). In this study, permanent out-migrants are defined as those who work and stay outside the village continuously for a period of over one year, but who may come back for a short visit; others are defined as temporary out-migrants. By dividing out-migrants based on the above criteria, there was a slightly higher proportion of households with permanent rather than temporary out-migrants in all cases, and a

considerable proportion of households had both permanent and temporary out-migrants. Of the total households in Ban Nua Phru, sixty per cent had members migrating-out on a permanent basis whereas forty seven per cent had members migrating out on a temporary basis. Among these, twenty seven per cent had both permanent and temporary out-migrants. In Ban Bon Lay, households with permanent out-migrants and those with temporary out-migrants accounted for twenty seven per cent and twenty per cent of the total households in the village, respectively. The proportion of those having both permanent and temporary out-migrants accounted for seven per cent of the total households. Considering Bueng Yai community as a whole, forty one per cent of the total households had members migrated out on a permanent basis against twenty seven per cent representing those with temporary out-migrants. Those which had both permanent and temporary out-migrants represented eighteen per cent of the total households.

Table 4.4: Out-migration in Ban Nua Phru, Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community in 1994

Items	Ban Nua Phru	Ban Bon Lay	Bueng Yai Community
1.Households with out-migration (% of total households)			
1.1 Permanent out-migration	60	27	41
1.2 Temporary out-migration	47	20	27
1.3 Both categories[1]	80	40	60
2. Estimated number of out-migrants			
2.1 Permanent - male	77	41	562
2.2 Permanent - female	132	54	562
2.3 Temporary - male	33	68	346
2.4 Temporary - female	66	27	216
2.5 Total number	308	190	1,686

Note: [1] Some households had both permanent and temporary out-migrants.

Source: PSU-CDS survey.

Jobs undertaken by out migrants vary according to places of migration, and depending on skills the migrants have. It was also observed that there exists an association between gender and types of jobs undertaken. Two main types of work common to out-migrants in this area are construction work and work in garment factories. Other types of work such as secretarial work, shop assistance, and different kinds of labouring work were also found, but in rare cases. Working in garment factories was the most common among young members, especially females who migrated to Bangkok. Some of them were trained before leaving home; others received their training in their work places. Working on construction sites was commonly done by males, especially those who migrated out on a seasonal basis to nearby towns such as Hat Yai and Patthalung. No particular skills are needed for this type of work, though having a particular skill will be of benefit to the workers, as they can be allocated to certain tasks in which they are specialised. In return, they are likely to be better paid than normal labourers.

One major factor behind the variation in the number of out-migrants between these communities is the difference in the linkages they have with job opportunities outside the villages. The most common linkage was the existence of members of each village who established their relationships with outside businesses, and brought more labour into these businesses. This type of linkage was quite clear for those who migrated out to work in garment factories in Bangkok. Another type of linkage that was less common, was the existence of friendship relations with outsiders who had connections with businesses. This was true in the case of construction and other labouring work. These linkages were found to vary between these communities. Moreover, the variation in the practice of income generating activities within each village, especially handicrafts for females, also seems to determine the variation in the number of out-migrants between villages. This is evident in the intensity of handicraft practice, which is more intensive and widespread in Ban Bon Lay, as well as in Bueng Yai community as a whole, than in Ban Nua Phru. This difference is related to the better established market for handicraft products and the more advanced production appearing in Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community as compared to Ban Nua Phru. The improvement of handicraft practice in Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai

community has occurred through a series of training provided by concerned state agencies to targeted communities.

The above discussion includes the household measurement of out-migration only, and does not show the quantity of individual out-migrants, but I feel it would be useful to have this information for each village. From data collected through the village survey based on a small sample under the PSU-CDS project, it can be estimated that the total number of out-migrants could be as high as three hundred and eight in Ban Nua Phru at the time of this study. Two hundred and nine of these, or about sixty eight per cent of the total number of out-migrants, were permanent out-migrants. The number of out-migrants in Ban Bon Lay was also high but still much lower than that of Ban Nua Phru, and even in terms of households the data was significantly different. There were approximately one hundred and ninety out-migrants altogether in Ban Bon Lay of which about ninety five members or fifty per cent were permanent out-migrants. In Bueng Yai community as a whole, the overall number of out-migrants could be close to seventeen hundred which is very high, and those who migrated out on a permanent basis accounted for over sixty per cent. Though the figures from these different communities vary, they all illustrate how significant the number of out-migrants is to the population of each village. Moreover, it seems that the number of out-migrants is likely to increase unless alternative income generating activities can be developed significantly in the community itself.

As mentioned earlier, most out-migrants were among young members of households who are in the work force age-range. This phenomenon was common to both Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay. The average age for out-migrants was eighteen years old for females and twenty nine years old for males. There were also gender differences and differences in marital status among out-migrants and between different categories of out-migration. The proportion of females was slightly higher than that of males among permanent out-migrants. In contrast, the male proportion was considerably higher than the female proportion among temporary out-migrants. Most permanent out-migrants were single, whereas the majority of temporary out-migrants were married. This is logical as it seems

to be rather difficult for married members to migrate out permanently unless proper working and living conditions can be arranged for their families in working places. Quite often among married couples, it was found that males migrated out and left their wives to stay at home with the children. These circumstances do not allow them to migrate out easily on a permanent basis.

4.4 The Economy of the Villages

Economically, both Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay can be considered as farming and fishing based communities. As briefly mentioned in Chapter One, rice farming and small-scale fishing are the two most common activities performed by their households. Additionally, handicraft production from *krajoot* is also commonly practised in both villages. There are some other activities undertaken by members of some households, but each of them is less extensive than the above three. Even though in a broad view most households are similar in their involvement in economic activities and there is no formal delineation of class among them, variations in economic status among households do exist in both villages. These variations appear to be associated with occupations of households and access to main resources. To provide a clearer picture of the economy of these two villages, this section will focus mainly on the occupational structure and the overall economic structure of these two village communities.

4.4.1 Occupational Structure

All households in Ban Nua Phru were involved in rice farming at the time of this study. At the same time most of them were also involved in fishing. The proportion of fishing households accounts for eighty seven per cent of the total number of households in the village. Additionally, about sixty seven per cent of the total number of households practised handicrafts from *krajoot*. These are three predominant economic activities prevailing in this village. Apart from these three activities, a considerable number of households raised livestock and had members involved in rubber cultivation, either on

their own rubber plots or as share tappers (Table 4.5). All these kinds of activities, except rubber cultivation, are also common to Ban Bon Lay, but the proportions of households involved in these activities differ between these two villages. Though the proportion of households involved in fishing in Ban Bon Lay was close to that in Ban Nua Phru, the proportion of households involved in rice farming was considerably lower. However, the proportion of households engaging in handicrafts was considerably higher in Ban Bon Lay than in Ban Nua Phru. Only about sixty seven per cent of the total households in Ban Bon Lay engaged in rice cultivation at the time of this study, whereas the number of households engaging in handicrafts accounted for eighty seven per cent. Only four per cent of the households in Ban Bon Lay had members engaged in rubber cultivation and less than half of the total households raised livestock, mainly cattle. Apart from the above activities, a considerable number of households in both villages were involved in trading of various forms, although this was less common in Ban Nua Phru. A handful of households also had members working in wage works in nearby towns of Patthalung and Khuan Mangkhud.

When considering the level of production of three major activities found in both villages -- rice cultivation, fishing, and handicrafts -- the extent to which the villagers are involved in these activities can be seen to vary between these two villages. With the first two activities, i.e. rice cultivation and fishing, it is vital to compare their level of production whilst understanding the economic patterns of these two communities. They are both related to the issue of food security, and at the same time, their produce can be sold for cash. To avoid the terms 'subsistence' and 'semi-subsistence' as they both are argued to be vague in meanings (see Hill, 1986, pp. 17-19), I would rather explain the level of production of these two activities by looking at the villagers' effort in pursuing them in terms of labour, the level of resources naturally available to them, especially land, technologies employed, and intensity in marketing the produce.

Table 4.5: Occupational structure of households in Ban Nua Phru, Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community[1]

Unit: percentage

Items	Ban Nua Phru	Ban Bon Lay	Bueng Yai Community
Rice cultivation	100	67	75
Fishing	87	80	58
Handicrafts	67	87	71
Rubber cultivation	47	4	15
Trading[2]	10	20	36
Others[3]	93	67	85

Note: [1] All households have more than one occupation.

[2] This heading includes petty trading, fish trading and other forms of trading.

[3] This heading includes farming activities outside rice and rubber cultivation, and any other activities which are not classified under previous headings.

Source: PSU-CDS survey.

a) Rice Cultivation

Rice production in Ban Nua Phru can be considered as traditional-oriented. Most households grow rice mainly to secure their needs by cultivating only part of the land available to them, mostly on a single cropping basis, either in the rainy season or in the dry season. Most of the land is cultivated during the rainy season, as it often faces water shortage problems in the dry season. However, cultivating rice in the rainy season is also risky since rice fields are located in low-lying areas which flood evenly. Rice cultivation is carried out mostly by household labour with a possibility of labour exchange between households through a reciprocal arrangement (*khaw mue*), a practice which has long

prevailed in rural communities in Southern Thailand (see Nartsupha and Lertwicha, 1994, Chapter 3). Chemical fertilisers and small hand-tractors are commonly employed. A few traditional varieties of rice are the most common for rainy season cultivation, whereas in dry season cultivation, a few improved rice varieties of *'kaw-khaw'* brand, which are developed by the Thai Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives' Rice Research Division, are used. Considering land which forms the most important resource for rice cultivation, the average size of land allotted for this purpose was 16 *rai* per household at the time of this study. This is higher than the sufficiency level for moderate productivity, say between 250 to 300 kilograms per *rai* per season. In this area, cultivating 10 *rai* of rice on a single cropping basis per year is perceived to be sufficient (*paw kin*) for feeding an average size household of five to six members. Most households in Ban Nua Phru are self-sufficient in rice. Very few of them have experience of selling surplus rice in a good production year, after assessing that they have reasonable amount of rice in stock to secure their household's needs in the coming year. At the same time, a few households buy a portion of rice to meet their needs every year. It is noteworthy here that even rice production is not intensive in its practice, either in terms of land used or labour and technology employed, but it is referred to by villagers as being among the main occupations undertaken by members of most households. This illustrates how important rice farming is perceived to be for the household economy in this village community.

Table 4.6: Rice cultivation in Ban Nua Phru, Ban Bon Lay-and Bueng Yai community

Items	Ban Nua Phru	Ban Bon Lay	Bueng Yai Community
1. Average size of rice landholding (*rai*)	15.9	6.7	11.1
2. Cultivating households (%)	100	67	75
3. Households cultivating as a main occupation (%)	100	20	44
3. Estimated number of members involved	424	365	2,466

Source: PSU-CDS survey.

As with Ban Nua Phru, rice cultivation in Ban Bon Lay is also traditional-oriented in its operation. It has formed a main part of villagers' livelihoods over a long time, and is still practised by the majority of them. Nevertheless, the proportion of households involved in rice cultivation was considerably lower than in Ban Nua Phru at the time of this study. The shortage in the availability of land for rice cultivation was observed to be the major factor behind this phenomenon, since most households which did not cultivate rice did not own rice fields. Approximately twenty per cent of the total households were landless in this village whereas no landless household was found in Ban Nua Phru. Moreover, the average size of holding for rice fields was 6.7 *rai* per household, which was significantly lower than in Ban Nua Phru. However, the shortage of land cannot be assumed to be the sole factor, as there appear to be a few households owning rice fields who did not cultivate or only partially cultivate the land themselves. Rather, access to other occupations, and the perception of the importance of rice farming itself, is of significance. Most households holding the rice land but not cultivating it were actively engaged in other economic activities, which are considered to be better alternatives than rice cultivation. To many people in this village, rice cultivation is seen as important to household food security, but it is no longer the prime economic activity to be undertaken if there are other economic activities which they can rely upon to secure their household expenses including food. Interestingly, the majority of rice farming households interviewed did not regard rice farming as among the primary occupations undertaken by their members, a perception which is contradictory to that of the majority in Ban Nua Phru. In terms of technology and labour employed, the cultivation of rice in this village does not differ from Ban Nua Phru. Most households cultivate rice only once a year, mainly in the rainy season. They depend mostly on family labour except for ploughing, since hand tractors are commonly employed even among those who do not own the machine themselves. Traditional rice varieties are commonly used for the rainy season cultivation whereas the dry season cultivation depends very much on improved varieties introduced by the state.

The importance of rice farming in Bueng Yai community as a whole is similar to Ban Bon Lay. About three quarters of households in the community were engaged in rice farming at the time of this study. However, it was observed that the distribution of rice farming households is uneven among different villages due to their difference in access to rice land. Villages located on the edge of Bueng Yai lake have slightly less access to rice land than those located further inland. Though there is no rule about limiting access to land outside the boundary of each village, it was observed that most of the land cultivated by villagers in each village is likely to be within the village boundary, or not far away. The average size of holding for rice field was slightly higher in Bueng Yai community than in Ban Bon Lay. Again, this was observed to vary among villages. With respect to patterns of practices and technologies employed, no difference was observed from those in Ban Bon Lay.

b) Fishing

Like rice farming, fishing in Ban Nua Phru is also not highly cash-oriented. Fishermen spend only a few months a year, when the water level is high enough, setting most types of fishing gear commonly employed. Because the activity is undertaken only a few months a year and its yields are quite low, it is commonly regarded as a non-primary activity (see Table 4.7). Villagers usually refer to their levels of fishing as '*jab khae paw kin*', which means to catch for consumption only. Nevertheless, most fishing households view the activity as a very important livelihood for members of the community, since it forms a major source of non-cash income for most households and fish is the only main source of protein in their diet. Several types of fishing gear were used at the time of this study including gill net, barrier and trap, hook and rod, cast net, and large lift net. The first three were the most common, and were used mostly in the low-lying part of the swamp during the rainy season -- hook and rod however was used intensively in the dry season (Table 4.8). There was another method also commonly practised, that is, the excavation of fish trap ponds. The pond is known locally as '*baw law pla.*' Cultivating fish from the pond is done by dewatering the pond using diesel water pumps when only a

small amount of water remains in the pond. This is usually done in the dry season beginning from March and ending around August every year. Fishing via this method was observed to be the only method of fishing aimed mainly at cash, as it yields a considerable amount of fish once a pond is dewatered.

Table 4.7: Fishing in Ban Nua Phru, Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community

Items	Ban Nua Phru	Ban Bon Lay	Bueng Yai Community
1. Fishing household (% of all households)			
1.1 Total Fishing households	87	80	58
1.2 Households with fishing as a main occupation	0	60	37
1.3 Households with fishing only for consumption	40	7	2
3. Estimated number of fishers			
3.1 Total	209	231	1,095
3.2 Average per fishing household	1.5	1.4	1.3
4. Number of gears used per fishing household (%)			
4.2 One type	23	25	46
4.2 Two types	38	42	31
4.3 Three types	38	8	14
4.4 Four types	0	8	3
4.5 Five types and above	0	17	6
4.6 Total	99[1]	100	100

Note: [1] Round-up error.

Source: PSU-CDS survey.

Table 4.8: The fishing calendar for the main types of fishing gear in Ban Nua Phru, Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community 1992

Ban Nua Phru

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Gill net	**	*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**	**	**
Seine net	0	0	*	*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Barrier/trap	**	*	*	0	0	0	0	0	*	**	**	**
Hook & rod	*	*	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	*	*	*
Large lift net	*	*	*	*	0	0	0	0	0	*	*	*
Cast net	0	0	0	*	*	*	*	*	0	0	*	*
Dewatering	0	0	*	**	**	*	*	*	0	0	0	0

Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai Community

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Gill net	***	**	*	*	*	*	*	*	**	***	***	***
Seine net	0	*	*	**	**	**	**	**	**	*	0	0
Fish trap	*	*	*	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	*	*
Shrimp trap	0	*	*	*	**	**	**	*	*	0	0	0
Hook & Line	*	*	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	0	0	*
Barrier/trap	0	0	**	**	*	0	0	0	*	*	0	0
Dewatering	0	0	*	**	**	**	*	*	0	0	0	0

Key: *** = intensive use

** = heavy use

* = normal use

0 = no use

Source: PSU-CDS survey

Compared to Ban Nua Phru, the dependency of villagers in Ban Bon Lay on fishing is clearly higher. Fishing activity here is more intensive and more cash-oriented than in Ban Nua Phru. Although the proportion of households involved in fishing at the time of this study compared to the total households was slightly lower, the proportion of fishers to the work force was higher in this village than in Ban Nua Phru. Moreover, most fishing households surveyed regarded the activity as among the primary occupations undertaken by their members, done not only for consumption but also for sale, in contrast to those in Ban Nua Phru (see Table 4.7). The intensity of fishing in this village can also be determined from the number of months the fishers spend on the activity a year. The survey data shows that sixty per cent of fishing households fished the whole year round in 1994. The average number of months spent by all fishing households was nine months a year. The variation in the number of months between households undertaking this activity, was observed to be related to types and number of gear they employed. Types of fishing gear commonly used in this community are gill net, fish trap, shrimp trap, hook and line, and seine net. A small proportion of fishermen use barrier and trap as well as refuge trap pond (Table 4.8). Gill net and fish trap can be used the whole year round since they have access to both Bueng Yai lake and the nearby swamp, whereas the use of other types of gear varies from five to nine months a year. It was found that approximately three quarters of fishing households employed more than one type of gear, and the average number of gear used was three types per household. The highest number of gear used in this village was six types per household, while in Ban Nua Phru the average number was two types per household with the highest number of three types per household. More importantly, the scale of gear used in Ban Bon Lay is much higher than in Ban Nua Phru. For example, a household in Ban Bon Lay employed three hundred units of fish trap, whereas the highest number of fish traps employed per household in Ban Nua Phru was only thirty units. The difference in the extent of access to other resources, especially land, between villagers of Ban Bon Lay and those of Ban Nua Phru, together with the difference in their dependency on cash, determine the level of their effort in fishing.

Similar to its member village of Ban Bon Lay, fishing is important for settlers in Bueng Yai community as a whole, but its level of importance is slightly less than in Ban Bon Lay, as a wider range of activities are available to settlers in Bueng Yai community. In fact, the proportion of fishing households in some villages in Bueng Yai community are much lower than in Ban Bon Lay. Actually, Ban Bon Lay is among three villages in the community in which fishing households still remain in a very high proportion. There are some variations in gear specialisation and in the number of types of gear used among these villages. Gill net, fish trap, and hook and line are three types of gear common to all villages. Only in three villages including Ban Bon Lay are shrimp trap and barrier widely employed. These variations are also determined by fishing territories divided informally between villagers in different parts of the community, as some types of fishing gear are more suitable to be set in some places than in others. Overall it can be said that fishing is still important to the majority of Bueng Yai community as a whole, since over half of the total households still depend on it, though in various degrees.

c) Handicrafts

The case of handicrafts provides a good illustration of how differences in access to the market and in state intervention on the production of a commodity influence the development of that commodity. Handicraft practice in both Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay is derived from the traditional practice of mat weaving from *krajoot,* available in the surrounding swamp. Originally, mat weaving in both communities was practised predominantly for home use. Exchanging the produce was very limited as its demand in local markets was limited. Later increase in demand for handicrafts from *krajoot* resulted from the expansion of market to other localities and the development of new forms of products for different purposes. These two factors interact with each other and play an important role in determining the differences in the intensity of the activity and the extent to which the activity has developed in these two communities.

In Ban Nua Phru, approximately sixty seven per cent of households at the time of this study were involved in handicraft production using *krajoot* abundantly available in the swamp. It was estimated that there were around one hundred and forty members, predominantly females, involved in the activity. The activity forms the most common income-generating activity among females who choose to remain in the community. Despite the possibility of producing different forms of products from the same material, handicrafts in this village are limited to mat weaving. The lack of skills in making other forms of products such as hats, bags and assorted items of souvenir-like products, together with the weakness of outside markets for these items, hinders the development of handicrafts in this community. Neither has there been any strong effort from concerned government agencies to organise training, nor any strong push from inside the community to seek help from outside in developing skills for making new products. Comparing these two factors, the establishment of market links with the outside seems to play a more important role in pushing the development of handicrafts of these types. Once the market is improved, it will induce changes in the techniques which are already available through the assistance of related government agencies.

Handicrafts in Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community are practised more widely and more intensively than in Ban Nua Phru. They were practised by as many as ninety per cent of the total households in Ban Bon Lay, with an estimate of workers of two hundred and seventy three at the time of this study. In Bueng Yai community, about seventy one per cent of the total households, with an estimation of one thousand two hundred and seventy workers, were engaged in the activity. As with Ban Nua Phru, most workers are females, but more males are also involved in the activity. It was observed that the expansion of the activity to cover a wide range of products increasingly allows male members to participate. This is because more labourers are needed and there exist some tasks perceived as not unsuitable for males to perform, and vice versa. The market for these products is much better established in this area. A few local traders are available in Ban Bon Lay, and many more in Bueng Yai community. These traders have connections

with traders in other places, especially large cities and tourist places such as Hat Yai, Phuket and Bangkok.

The development of the market for the products began from a few local traders who travelled to other areas to introduce the products. These traders also brought the idea of modifying the production from mat weaving to different forms of products, as they saw the market opportunity for these new products outside the community. Later, they worked together with some *phu yai ban* to request related government agencies to organise a series of training scheme to develop skills in producing new products. In Ban Bon Lay alone, there have been three training sessions in the last ten years, and sixty females were trained under the scheme. They also received a small loan after the training to invest in improving their production. Now *krajoot* products from Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community are widely recognised throughout the region. Bueng Yai community itself has recently received support from the state to establish the *krajoot* handicraft development centre at Ban Talard. Because the production is so extensive among households in this community, it can no longer depend on *krajoot* available in the community alone, and most of the *krajoot* used now is brought in from the swamp villages in Phru Thung Samet, where they buy it from local collectors.

4.4.2 The Economic Structure

Apart from looking at the occupational structure of households in both villages, an investigation was also made to differentiate the level of the overall economic difference among households in each village. The investigation was done through discussions with leaders, key informants, and a few villagers from different economic groups, by asking their views on the economic structure of households in their villages. Moreover, the survey which was based on small samples undertaken as part of the PSU-CDS project, also included items which allow for estimating the difference in economic conditions among households. The estimation from the survey data was done by calculating wealth points of households based on scoring items which are identified as important indicators

for measuring economic difference (see Appendix Three). From these two sources of information, four groups or classes of households can be categorised -- the very poor (*jon maak*), the poor (*jon*), the average (*paan klaang*), and the well-off (*kawn kaang dee*). This categorisation and the terms applied are based mostly on the perceptions of the majority of people I talked to. The term '*kawn kaang dee*' for example, is preferred over the term '*ruay*', or rich, since villagers do not perceive any rural inhabitants in this area as rich.

By applying the above categorisation, none of households in Ban Nua Phru can be called very poor. All of them have access to land and other common property natural resources available in this area for their survival. The former *phu yai ban* who just retired in 1993 noted:

> 'No one in this village is starving (*od yaahk*). There are enough resources available in the swamp either fish or *krajoot* for them to survive. Every household own rice fields though some are small in size. They will not be starving if they are not too lazy' (personal communication).

However, it is generally accepted that there exists a small group of households who are poor on one side and another group of similar size who are well-off on the other side. The majority of households in Ban Nua Phru have average access to resources. Considering the distribution of wealth points calculated from the surveyed data, households falling into the 'poor' category accounted for thirteen per cent of the total households at the time of this study, whereas households in the 'well-off' category were twenty seven per cent of total households. The majority households fall into the 'average' category. This shows that there is some degree of economic disparity among households in this village.

To the question which may be asked about the bases of the economic disparity in this village, available information reveals that there is a strong link between the economic status of households and ownership of land. Most well-off households hold a considerable amount of land. The survey data shows that there tends to be a positive relationship between size of landholding and wealth points. All the well-off households

hold land over 30 *rai* as compared to the overall average of 16 *rai* per household. However, it is not the size of landholding alone that matters, but also the quality of land. According to a key informant, most of the well-off households have improved their economic well-being by means of the natural resources available on their land and the productivity of their land. These households are mostly among descendants of the early settlers whose ancestors had a better chance of selecting good quality of land which was then passed on to them. Insufficient good quality land for cultivation is common among the poor. Moreover, it was also observed that there is an association between types of primary occupation undertaken by household members and household economic status. All well-off households surveyed had members involved primarily in occupations outside farming and fishing, especially in small-trading, while the households still maintain farming and fishing activities. Though combining farming and fishing with other activities was also not uncommon among households in the poor and the average category, types of work outside farming and fishing undertaken by members of these households were mainly labouring and relatively low-paid. The difference in the type of non-farm work was observed to relate to the difference in the opportunity to seek jobs between members of the well-off households and the others.

Table 4.9: Distribution of wealth groups among households in Ban Nua Phru, Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community

Unit: percentage

Wealth group - (wealth score range)	**Ban Nua Phru**	**Ban Bon Lay**	**Bueng Yai Community**
1. Very Poor - (0)	0	7	4
2. Poor - (1-3)	13	13	23
3. Average - (4-7)	60	73	61
4. Well-off - (≥ 8)	27	7	12
Total	100	100	100

Sorce: PSU-CDS survey.

Table 4.9 shows that although the majority of households in Ban Bon Lay belonged to the average economic status which was similar to Ban Nua Phru's, the proportion of poor households was significantly higher than of well-off households. About twenty per cent of the total number of households fell into the poor category, whereas only about seven per cent of the total number of households fell into the well-off category. Among the poor households, about one third of them or seven per cent of the total number of households in the village can be considered as very poor. Interestingly, all of the very poor households were observed to be landless, but not all landless households were included among the very poor, as they were also found in the average category.

The difference between the very poor landless households and the average landless households is their occupational access. All the very poor households included in the survey depended solely on fishing and handicrafts, and again their ability to invest in these activities was limited. Their fishing was limited in types and scale of gear used. Most of them depended on a few pieces of gill net. At the same time, their handicrafts were limited mostly to simple mat weaving, the most basic form of handicrafts with the lowest price. Their capital shortage together with their limited access to credit, either from formal or informal sources, form an important factor in restraining them from improving their investments in these activities. On the contrary, the 'average' landless households had their members involved in other activities outside the villages which generated a better cash income than fishing and handicrafts alone. It is worth noting from my observation that joining in other jobs outside the village is not only limited by the scarcity of jobs available, but also by the availability of members who are able to participate and their connections with the sources of work as mentioned earlier.

The ownership of land and types of occupations of household members are also major factors in the differentiation between other categories. According to key informants, the ownership of land, which to a high degree is related to its inheritance -- the major means of land transfer among villagers -- determines the difference in the status between the average and the well-off households. In other words, those who inherited a large amount

of land from their parents and ancestors are very fortunate, and likely to be well-off. An elder explained that in the past twenty to thirty years, when rice cultivation was still profitable, villagers with large landholdings were advantaged, as they could accumulate capital from selling their excess produce. From this they could make savings which then transferred to the investment of more land, other valuable assets, businesses and even education for their children. This explanation is supported by the data derived from the survey and observations that households with a considerable landholdings (i.e. over 10 *rai* which is considered to be the sufficient level of landholding) fell into the average and well-off wealth score ranges. Moreover, most of those who had high wealth scores were engaged in some forms of business, especially operating their own grocery stores in the village, and their children received a better education when compared to others. It was also observed that members of these households were unlikely to migrate out of the village unless they obtained good jobs. This finding indicates not only the likelihood of an association between the economic status of households and their landholding size, but also the interrelationship between their economic status and occupations of their members. Further analysis reveals that there exists an association between the economic status of households and primary occupations undertaken by their members: The very poor households were found to be involved primarily in fishing and handicrafts; the poor households mostly concentrated primarily in either farming or fishing together with handicrafts; the average households concentrated primarily in both farming and fishing at the same time, and took handicrafts as a subsidiary occupation. None of the well-off households practised fishing as their primary occupation. They considered either farming or non-farm work, excluding handicrafts, as the primary occupation of their members.

4.5 Religious Institutions

The importance of religious institutions in Thai society is well recognised by many social scientists, for example, Frank J. Moore, Angela Burr, S. J. Tambiah, Ernst W. Gohlert (Moore, 1974; Burr, 1972; Tambiah, 1976; and Gohlert, 1991). In rural areas of Thailand, almost all aspects of life have some connection with religion and other forms of belief.

Hence religious leaders hold a high status in rural communities. Among Buddhists who comprise the vast majority of the country's population, monks (*phra, bhikkhu* or *piksu*) are revered and central to all groups in the society. In rural Buddhist communities, Buddhist temples not only function as the religious centre, but also as the social centre of each community (Wijeyewardene, 1967). Given the high status they hold, religious leaders who are active and able to combine ritual activities with secular activities can be very influential in the politics and development of the rural communities in which they reside or serve. Though the close relationship between monks and community is a common phenomenon in rural areas, patterns of their relationships may be dynamic and vary from place to place. It is often argued that most monks concentrate on the spiritual aspects of Buddhism and therefore are unlikely to be concerned with worldly affairs such as political movements and development activities. This argument can only be partly true as evidence indicates that some Buddhist monks are also active in political and development activities. Moreover, the trend has been changing also in recent years with a growing number of Buddhist monks taking part and forming a significant driving force in development activities (see Tambiah, 1976; Suksamran, 1984; Gohlert, 1991; Taylor, 1993; Judd, undated). The influence of this changing ideology may vary among different monks, which in turn affects patterns of the relationship between monks and the communities in which they reside or serve.

Both villages in this study are Buddhist communities. There are no adherents of other beliefs residing in both villages. Nevertheless, patterns of relationship between the communities and their religious institutions appear to differ considerably. The bond between the religious institutions and the community is much stronger in Ban Nua Phru than in Ban Bon Lay. Ban Nua Phru has its own temple, namely Wat Nua Phru, where regular attendants of the temple are mostly members of this community, whereas in Ban Bon Lay, no temple is located in the village itself. The villagers of Ban Bon Lay are divided in their regular attendance between two temples -- Wat Bueng Yai which is located in the middle of Bueng Yai community, and Wat Dawk Pradoo which is located in a neighbouring village of Ban Rim Na. The majority of villagers attend Wat Bueng Yai

which is the larger and older one. Apart from the difference in physical attachments of these communities to their religious institutions, the functional aspect of religious institutions towards these communities also differs. Though the difference in their physical attachments seems to determine the functional relationship between the temples and the communities in these two villages, it is also apparent that the difference in the perceptions of individual monks, especially the abbots (*chao aawat*) of these temples, about their roles with respect to secular activities is substantial.

In Ban Nua Phru, Wat Nua Phru not only serves the community in ritual manners, but also functions as the community centre to serve secular activities. All formal communal meetings are held in the temple, in which the abbot himself frequently participates. Moreover, the abbot of this temple is very concerned with the development and the well-being of the community. He habitually makes use of his spare time discussing secular matters with leaders of the community. His personal background is of importance. He was born in the community as a grandson of the first leader of the village and was ordained at an early age in the nearby temple. After being ordained, he spent sometime in other monasteries studying Buddhism before receiving the invitation to return to this temple to take up the post of abbot. Recently, he has acted as the ecclesiastical leader of Tambon Thung Samet (*chao khana Tambon Thung Samet*). He is in his mid thirties, which is very young compared to others who hold such a position. To villagers, he is among those very rare monks who are active in both religious and secular activities. He is respectfully called '*phra nak pattana*' or 'development monk' among villagers. It is believed that his thinking is influenced by the revival Buddhist ideology promoted under recent movements in Thai Buddhism, including the teachings of the late Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, the most prominent contemporary philosophical monk in Thailand. The movements are popular among young and well-educated monks (see Tambiah, 1976; Gohlert, 1991). His involvement in the development of the village is not merely to strengthen the spiritual drive of leaders in bringing betterment to the community, but also in providing constructive ideas and financial support from the temple's purse for development work. Combining his roles in both in religious and secular activities, he is

highly respected and central to all parties in the community. In turn, he is very influential behind the development drive of the community.

Unlike Wat Nua Phru, both Wat Bueng Yai and Wat Dawk Pradoo serve the surrounding communities almost exclusively on religious matters and education, and appear to be detached from any political or other secular concerns. Even though the temples may be used for social gatherings, some of which can be political, it is done without the actual involvement of the monks. Though a question may arise about the role of lay committees, or *kammakaan wat,* who may involve the temple in secular activities (as noted by Pongquan, 1988), there appears no evidence of such incidence in Ban Bon Lay and in Bueng Yai community as a whole. Moreover, even though some leaders sit on the committees of both temples, the committees are dominated by respected elders who have long been involved in religious activities. It is these elders who direct that functions of the lay committees be detached from secular activities. At the same time, formal leaders are reluctant to disturb them as they also perceive the practice as appropriate. Available information reveals that the specification of the temples' roles in only religious and educational activities has existed here for a long time. An elder who has served as the chair of Wat Bueng Yai lay committee for many years pointed out that the practice follows the conventional interpretation of Buddhist ideology which emphasises the preference of monks avoiding secular or worldly affairs. Such a perception is widespread in Thai Buddhism (Suksamran, 1984). The fact that the abbots of Wat Bueng Yai and Wat Dawk Pradoo are both very old monks who are very conservative, also supports the exclusion of the temples from secular activities. It was also observed elsewhere in Thailand that many older monks are very conservative and are not influenced very much by the new trends of changes in Buddhist ideology (Tambiah, 1976; Gohlert, 1991).

4.6 Politics and Administration

Since 1892, during the reign of King Rama V, the reform of the state administrative structures has co-opted all villages into the formal administration system. The reform

marked the new era in the Thai administration system and introduced the foundation of the present administrative structures. Under the new system, an administrative village (later will be referred as 'village') or '*mooban*' is assigned to be the lowest administrative unit led by the village official leader (*phu yai ban*) who is recruited through the village election. This rule superseded the previous arrangement of rural settlements which were based mainly on a hamlet unit (*ban*), and its leader was drawn from natural leaders or elders. The establishment of a village under the new system is based mainly on the size and the degree of physical attachment of each settlement to other settlements nearby. This implies that if the size of a settlement in terms of household numbers is large, it can be divided into more than one village. From the administrative point of view, a village should not comprise more than two hundred households. At the same time, a small settlement can be established as a separate village, if it is isolated from it nearest settlement and the communication between the settlements is inconvenient (see STU, 1983a). Therefore, a variation in sizes and patterns of settlements can be found among different villages in Thailand. They range from a small single settlement, a large settlement of several hamlets, to a portion of a very large single settlement which is divided for administrative purposes. Because of this variation, researchers seem to have different perceptions about the village units selected in their studies (see Wijeyewardene, 1967, pp. 69-72). It is not my intention to discuss the differences in size and type of villages in Thailand in detail, but the existence of such differences among villages and their potential influence on the patterns of their politics and administration, should be borne in mind.

The administrative structure presently applied to rural Thai villages is recognised as being dominated by formal leaders, i.e. *phu yai ban* and his colleagues in the village committee (*kammakaan mooban*) (see Rubin, 1974; Moerman, 1979; Rigg, 1991). The village committee comprises *phu yai ban* as the chairman, two deputy *phu yai ban* for administrative affairs (*phu chuay phu yai ban fai pokkraung*) as appointed members, and at least two elected members from within the village. Generally, there are between five and nine elected members in each village committee. Each of these members is

responsible principally for one of the various aspects of the village administration such as security, treasury, health, social welfare, education, occupational development, culture, etc. The designated role of the village committee is broadly described as 'to provide advice (*kam preuksaa*) and suggestions (*kam naehnam*) to, as well as to assist (*chuay leuah*) *phu yai ban* in conducting his administrative duties' (Department of Local Administration, 1991). This formal leader group is the only group officially recognised by the state as having the authority to deal with village administrative matters. Other groups may be established by different state agencies to promote their development work at the village level, however, their roles are more specific and their activities are attached to the village administration. The village committee functions in accordance with administrative laws and commands directed by the Department of Local Administration (*krom kaanpokkraung*) under the Ministry of the Interior. Each village committee is independent in the administration of their own village from other villages. Although this rule looks reasonable in an administrative sense, its application can be problematic in dealing with matters which extend beyond the boundary of a single village. Moreover, the recognition that only the village committee should play a role in all aspects of village administration can also undermine the importance of other local actors, including spiritual leaders and leaders of interest groups, who have the potential for making contributions to the development of the community. In the following discussion on the politics and administration of Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay, the issue of the village boundary and the involvement of other actors will also be taken into account.

With respect to the issue of the village boundary and the village administration, the difference between Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay as mentioned earlier is that Ban Nua Phru is a clearly demarcated unit served by a school and temple, whereas Ban Bon Lay is part of Bueng Yai community where schools and temples are shared among different villages. Although Ban Nua Phru settlement is not far away from adjacent villages, its political boundary and its communal boundary (i.e. the boundary which distinguishes its community socially from other communities nearby) is commonly understood and quite clear among villagers. Even the village settlement is scattered and can be divided into

four clusters, these clusters join together in all aspects of communal activities and share all communal resources. Sharing of communal resources such as fishing grounds, swamp forest, grazing fields, and *krajoot* from the swamp, occurs almost in an exclusive manner among these four clusters. Being a clearly demarcated unit, Ban Nua Phru administration is quite independent from other villages. The condition makes it easier for the village to operate its administration in general as well as in relation to the management of common property resources.

Unlike Ban Nua Phru, the settlement in Ban Bon Lay is physically inseparable from Bueng Yai community. The political boundary of the village has resulted from the official delineation in order to make it a unit of manageable administrative size, since Bueng Yai community has a large population. However, this delineation does not necessarily correspond to patterns of social interaction and resource sharing within the community. The occurrence of many social interactions and the sharing of common property resources were observed to relate to the community as a whole, rather than being limited within each individual village boundary. As Bueng Yai community is quite large, comprising seven villages and divided between two sub-districts, some complications arise with respect to the administration of each village, especially in dealing with common property resources which are shared by the whole community.

With respect to actors' involvement in the village politics and administration in 1994 and 1995, the situation in Ban Nua Phru was of particular interest. Although the village administration is formally led by the present *phu yai ban*, Mr. Ruam, it cannot be said that he plays the leading role in all aspects of the village administration. Other actors, especially the former *phu yai ban* (Mr. Jai), who has recently retired but is still active in development work, and the abbot of Wat Nua Phru (Somparn Chayanto) are also very influential. There are two other figures who are also active in the village administration and development -- a deputy *phu yai ban* (Mr. Luang) and the village *phu song khunnawut* representing the village at the *sapha tambon* of Tambon Khuan Samet (Mr. Suk). Mr. Jai, Mr. Luang and Mr. Suk appear to be congenial. They have been working

together for sometime and have had a good relationship since the time when Mr. Jai was in the leadership position. They are all well regarded by villagers as being morally good, active and competent in administrative and development work. Interestingly these leaders have all had some experience of working outside the village when they were young. The newly elected *phu yai ban*, Mr. Ruam, receives support mainly from a few young members who have been elected recently to the village committee. However, these young members do not seem to be experienced and influential in administrative and development work. Being the religious leader, Somparn Chayanto appears to keep his involvement as neutral as possible. However, he is well known as being an active and progressive monk who is interested in combining spiritual work and secular work. At the same time, he has been working closely with Mr. Jai, Mr. Luang and Mr. Suk. Apart from these leaders, there are no other obvious leaders involved in development work in the village.

Although the present *phu yai ban* has the authority to lead the administration in the village, his recent recruitment together with his lack of direct experience seems to weaken his ability to dominate the village administration. At the same time, the active involvement of the former *phu yai ban*, who has a great deal of experience and is well known for his administrative reputation, makes the present *phu yai ban* less independent in exercising his power. The influence of the former *phu yai ban* also goes through Mr. Luang and Mr. Suk, who still hold their official positions. Though there seems no serious conflict emerging between the present *phu yai ban* and the former *phu yai ban* and their supporters, there appear some tensions in their interactions which shape the politics of decision-making in the village organisation. It is the abbot who by virtue of being the religious leader, stands in the midst of these tensions and acts as intermediary between these two parties. Moreover, a wide knowledge of development work which the abbot has accumulated through his experience of serving and studying in various temples before returning to his home village to accept the post, allows him to apply in his interactions with both parties. It can be said that the politics of administration and development in this village is dominated by the exercise of power between the former *phu yai ban* and the

present *phu yai ban*, while the abbot plays a role as the influential arbitrator and resource person.

Actors from outside who have connections with the community through their work or authority are also influential in some respects. In particular, the field Community Development Officer (*pattanakorn*) responsible for the area seems to have the most influence among outsiders on the decision-making regarding development activities in the village. Most state-led development activities in rural areas are channelled through the field level *pattanakorn,* and it is his duty to promote such activities by persuading village leaders to adopt them in practice. Consequently, many development activities in the village were initiated by the state and were channelled through the *pattanakorn.* Frequently the adoption of such activities results from the successful attempt of this official to persuade the village leaders' team, which may not necessarily correspond to the needs of villagers. The influence of other officials such as the *kamnan* of Tambon Thung Samet and the headmaster (*khru yai*) as well as other teachers in the village primary school, are not significant in this village, though elsewhere they seem to be very influential (see for example, Moore, 1974; Turton, 1987, Chapter 5). They are not actively involved in the village administration and in decision-making. Their involvement in village politics can be considered as quite neutral and not beyond their routine work. Even with the *kamnan* who can be politically influential, there is no evidence of his domination in the politics of this village. Perhaps the village's achievements under the leadership of Mr. Jai, which are well known in the area, makes the *kamnan* so hesitant in intervening in the village administration. On most occasions, these 'actors from outside' are likely to play roles in facilitating the village leaders in their attempt to overcome problems related to their duties.

The political environment of Ban Bon Lay differs significantly from that of Ban Nua Phru. The village administration is centred on the village official leader, Mr. Naam. Apart from Mr. Naam, other important actors within the village include his four assistants who were selected by him, the village formal elder (*phu song khunnawut*) and a few members

of the village committee who were elected by villagers. Nonetheless, none of these actors can be considered as very active, and they do not seem to have a close personal relationship with Mr. Naam. There are no distinct elders or religious leaders who are influential in village politics. At the same time, there is no apparent opponent challenging Mr. Naam's power in running the village, but there appear to be a few villagers who can be considered as having the potential to be leaders, and who sometimes create difficulties for Mr. Naam's administration. Therefore, the *phu yai ban* of this village can be considered as playing the most dominant role in the village administration. Yet, despite his active involvement in administrative activities, he does not seem to be very influential; not only on his colleagues but also on ordinary villagers. There is not a strong tie between him and his colleagues, either as part of historical influence or as related to kinship and cultural connections. There are also no prominent traditional leaders central to the majority of villagers, comparable to the position of the abbot in Ban Nua Phru. All the problems facing the politics of the village administration rely highly on the effective application of the modern system of village administration, which is led by the *phu yai ban.* Nevertheless, the application of the modern system of administration in this village is also problematic, due to lack of co-operation among members of *kammakaan mooban.*

The involvement of actors from outside the community does not differ significantly from that of Ban Nua Phru. Only the *pattanakorn* responsible for Tambon Bueng Yai makes frequent contacts with the community. As in Ban Nua Phru, the role the *pattanakorn* plays is concentrated on promotion of activities related to the community development work he is in charge of. The best example appearing in this village is the establishment of the *krajoot* product development group (*klum pattana palittapan krajoot*) as part of an occupational development programme for villagers. The decision to establish this group was highly influenced by the *pattanakorn*, and through his advice and co-ordination, a variety of *krajoot* products have now been developed. However, the *pattanakorn* does not seem to be involved in other aspects of the village administration. There do not appear to be any other officials or school teachers who are actively involved in village politics or who are influential on the performance of the *phu yai ban* and his colleagues. The fact

that the village does not have any school located within the village may abridge a strong affiliation between teachers and village leaders. The involvement of the *kamnan* of Tambon Bueng Yai also appears to be minimal, despite the fact that the present *kamnan* is a long time friend of the *phu yai ban* of this village. Further discussion about the involvement of the *kamnan* will be included in the following section.

Outside the village of Ban Bon Lay, it is important to consider the political situation in Bueng Yai community and its potential effects on the politics of Ban Bon Lay. Since Bueng Yai community is administratively divided between two sub-districts -- Bueng Yai sub-district and Khuan Phanang sub-district -- the structure of power in this densely populated community is quite complex. Moreover, given the fact that the community is large and densely populated, its population was observed to be heterogeneous in social and economic backgrounds, and the pressure of population over natural resources is also high. These two conditions, coupled with the administrative division of the community between two sub-districts, have caused administrative and political tensions within the community. Conflict of interests was observed among formal leaders as well as between formal leaders and leaders of interest groups. Though their conflicts may have several causes, their conflicting interests in controlling resources, either those available in the area or those provided by the state for development purposes, appear to be among the main causes. Factions have emerged in this community, and three are predominant -- the faction led by the *kamnan* of Tambon Bueng Yai, the faction led by the *kamnan* of Tambon Khuan Phanang, and the faction led by a charismatic well-off trader of Ban Talard. Conflicts emerge clearly between the group of the *kamnan* of Tambon Bueng Yai and the group of the *kamnan* of Tambon Khuan Phanang, and between the group of the *kamnan* of Tambon Khuan Phanang and the group of the charismatic trader. Though the group of the charismatic trader does not show any conflict with the group of the *kamnan* of Tambon Bueng Yai, it seems to operate independently most of the time. Members of this group use their personal connections with politicians and some high level officials in pursuing their interests. Much of the discussion about their conflicts is reserved for the next chapter, however it is worth noting that these conflicts cause division among

villagers as well as among *phu yai ban*, which then shatter the co-operative spirit of the community. The split occurring among these leaders clearly forms one of the main obstacles to building co-operation among different villages for the common good of the community as a whole. This issue is crucial for the management of natural resources which are shared among members of different villages.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter provided a comparison of the backgrounds of Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay where most of this study was undertaken. In the case of Ban Bon Lay, a comparison was also made with Bueng Yai community -- the larger community from which Ban Bon Lay is administratively separated. Several aspects of these communities have been discussed and compared. They include physical and historical settings, population, households, out-migration, economic condition and structure, religious institution, and politics and administration. It can be seen from the discussion so far that there are some similarities as well as differences between Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay, and even between Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai Community. In this concluding section, I will highlight some of these similarities and differences which are crucial for the understanding of the organisation of these two village communities, and the roles of their official leaders. The focus here will be only on the comparison between Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay, as the inclusion of Bueng Yai community in the above discussion was mainly for the purpose of clarifying the conditions of Ban Bon Lay, which in many respects cannot be treated as separate.

The similarities between Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay are found in the size of the communities, types of natural resources available, the size and structure of their population and households, and types of prevailing occupations. Both villages can be considered as large villages by Thailand's standards, and the size of their populations is not significantly different. The structure of their populations is also similar, both in terms of sexual and age group compositions. They are both composed of about equal

proportions of male and female population. In terms of age structure, both villages are dominated by members in the work force age-range, representing over sixty per cent of the total population of each village. Though the difference exists in proportions of those below and above the work force age-range, it is not significant. The majority of households in both villages are of nuclear type with a considerable proportion of joint households. Moreover, the average size of households in these two villages is also very close. Out-migration is also a common phenomenon in both villages, where a considerable number of villagers migrate out to seek jobs outside the communities, both on a temporary and permanent basis. With respect to types of natural resources available, they both have similar types of main natural resources including rice land, grazing land, swamp and other waterbodies, and sedge grasses. These main natural resources determine the types of occupations performed by the majority of their populations, which are also similar. The types of occupations commonly found in both villages are rice farming, fishing and handicrafts. All these occupations are based mainly on natural resources available in the communities or in surrounding communities.

The main differences between these two villages include the level of population pressure over natural resources, the history of their settlements, the form of their settlements, the relationship between communities and their religious institutions, and their political patterns. When considering the population pressure over natural resources, it is quite clear that the level of the overall population pressure over natural resources available is lower in Ban Nua Phru than in Ban Bon Lay, as the population density in Ban Nua Phru is much lower than in Ban Bon Lay. Moreover, the availability of land and sedge grasses which are among the main resources are clearly higher in Ban Nua Phru than in Ban Bon Lay. With respect to fish resources, though a clear comparison cannot be made either qualitatively or quantitatively between these two communities, it appears that the level of competition over the resources is lower in Ban Nua Phru than in Ban Bon Lay. The difference in the history of settlements between these two villages seems to determine their difference in the patterns of social relationships and leadership in the communities. The higher degree of cohesiveness among villagers and leaders found in Ban Nua Phru as

compared to Ban Bon Lay, seems to relate to the historical ties the villagers and leaders have among themselves. The difference in the level of their cohesiveness is also related to the difference in their relationships with their religious institutions. The active involvement of the *chao aawat* of Wat Nua Phru in secular activities contributes significantly to the more harmonious political environment observed in Ban Nua Phru than in Ban Bon Lay. With respect to forms of settlement, being a demarcated unit allows Ban Nua Phru to be more independent in its politics and administration than Ban Bon Lay, which is attached to Bueng Yai community in various aspects. The final point concerns the difference in their political patterns. It is quite clear that the political environment in Ban Bon Lay is more complex than in Ban Nua Phru. Though the main cause of the complexity in the politics and administration in Ban Bon Lay seems to be related to the complexity of the administrative division of Bueng Yai community itself, the difference in various aspects between Ban Bon Lay and Ban Nua Phru mentioned above also determines their difference in political environment.

The similarities and differences between these two village communities are important in analysing the attributes of these communities in dealing with the implementation of policies at village level, since it is argued that the role and attributes of the community is crucial for its achievement (Ostrom, 1990; Singleton and Taylor, 1992). Moreover, the strength of community organisation should also play a vital role in the achievement of community-based resource management system, if this system is to be promoted.

CHAPTER FIVE

COMMUNITY ORGANISATION AND POLITICS OF COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

5.1 Introduction

In contemporary rural societies in developing countries, the ways rural communities are organised and administered are likely to be a compromise between the evident social tradition of each society and modern forms of administration brought in by the national government of each individual country. However, the extent to which traditional and modern systems are integrated varies depending on the stage of political development which each society has reached. Riggs (1964) states that in 'old' societies a model of administration existed which fitted their socio-cultural and economic systems. Any new model or administrative system to be established or introduced can only displace but not replace the traditional systems, especially at the village level. As a society enters into the process of modernisation and industrialisation, it moves to a transitional stage in which the old and new systems exist side by side in a heterogeneous mixture. This creates a situation in which some overlaps and cross influences between the two systems are inevitable.

In the case of rural communities in Thailand, penetration of the modern administrative system brought in by the state, is regarded by some academics as unique (Nartsupha, 1986; Dilokwittayaratana, 1986). The level of state penetration may differ locally in its intensity, subject to differences in levels of attachment with state governing bodies among different localities. This creates different effects on the relationship between villages and the wider community in which they are located. The implication of these arguments for the study of rural communities is that any understanding of the ways

these communities are organised must take account of interactions between the traditional and formal system, and the ways they effect rural communities. This requires an understanding of the historical perspective, physical characteristics, and the stage of development of different communities. Hence, exploration of historical and physical influences, as well as of social and political changes within each community, is crucial to the understanding of the contexts in which development policies are implemented at the village level.

Earlier in Chapter Two, I proposed a framework for the analysis of development policy in rural Thailand. In this framework, I argued that the implementation of policy at the local level must be seen as occurring in both organisational context and local societal context. However, the influence of the organisational context is unlikely to be strong, due to complications within the local political environment and the lack of competence of local implementors or official actors in dealing with local conditions. Rather policy implementation is likely to occur in a form of 'implementation structures', in which all actors, including official actors and local actors from various groups, interact with each other. Policy outcomes are, therefore, strongly determined by the interactions of these actors under given conditions. In applying this framework to this study, which focuses on policy implementation at the village level, it is necessary to locate the village community which is used as a unit of analysis within the proposed framework, and compare its status with the implementation structures.

This chapter will discuss the organisational aspects of two communities under this study. It will cover a discussion of the relationship between the villages and the state, which determines organisational arrangements in the villages, as well as considering situational factors behind the differences in their organisational arrangements. There are two main purposes of this discussion. Firstly, it will allow us to locate the position of the village community organisation in the framework of policy implementation at the local level. Secondly, it will provide a better understanding of the attributes of community organisations within these two villages. These two domains of community organisations form two important grounds for the analysis of the role of *phu yai ban,* which will be discussed in the next chapter.

5.2 Village Communities, the State and the Management of CPRs

Common to the conventional analysis of rural differentiation and the relationship between a rural community and the state, is the adoption of the encapsulation paradigm. Central to this model is the assumption about the emergence of two different political structures at the different ends of the 'tradition-modernity continuum.' These two structures are referred to as the 'encapsulated structure' representing the structure of the village at one end, and the 'the encapsulating structure' representing the structure of the state at the other end. The cleavage of these two structures marks at the boundary of the village (Wood, 1976). The existence of this dichotomy is viewed as creating structural tension in the development towards modernisation, and rural institutions are seen as 'obstacles.' To bring about modernisation, it is believed that this structural tension needs to be resolved through the dissolution of the encapsulated structure into the encapsulating structure. This conception forms the cornerstone of the political process of development and nation-building in most developing countries influenced by modernisation theory (Wood, 1976; see also Wood, 1974). The application of this conception also dominates the contemporary development and political process in Thailand. Nevertheless, as with its application in other developing countries, this conception seems to be controversial. This is because the model's assumptions regarding the characteristics of rural communities and their relationships with the state, seem to be misguided (see Wood, 1976; Harriss, 1982; Nartsupha, 1986).

With respect to the conceptualisation of the differentiation of village communities in Thailand, only limited literature is available. Apart from the notion that village communities have an encapsulated structure, which seems to be blindly adopted by some academics and political elite in the government, there exists a claim that characteristics of village communities in Thailand are unique. This view perceives the existence of a high degree of local independence, self-reliance, and internal solidarity in Thai village communities. These characteristics are argued to be derived from the system of traditional village organisation in the pre-modern period of Thai society, where the village was an 'autonomous society' (see Thongyou, 1986; Nartsupha, 1986).

This view was challenged by some scholars as being too idealised, since a village community with these features has never existed in the history of Thailand. This is due to the influence of the Thai feudal system (*rabob sakdina*) in the past, and the more recent penetration of modernisation and capitalist ideologies, which followed the collapse of the *sakdina* system (Kemp, 1989; Kemp, 1991; Hong, 1984). Nevertheless, protagonists of the idea of village autonomy seem to be confident about their views, as they see that the impact of the *sakdina* system and modern administration system on village communities in Thai society have not occurred in the same manner as in western societies. They argue that state control over the village and penetration of modern systems into village communities, have been limited, and the essence of tradition has been largely undisturbed. The extent to which interference from outside impacts on a community varies, depending on its physical distance, and on its social as well as individual connections with centres of power, i.e. cities and elites (Nartsupha, 1986). This observation is consistent among those who closely observe changes within rural communities in Thailand, as variations in the degree of traditional-modern integration are seen between more remote communities and less remote communities, even today (Kemp, 1989; see also Nartsupha and Lertwicha, 1994; McVey, 1984).

Though there appears to be no definite agreement about the characteristics of rural communities in Thailand, both with respect to their internal social structures and their relationships with the state and wider societies, there seem to be some consensus on the perceptions about variations in the degree of integration between the traditional system and modern system among different communities. Moreover, variations in physical and social attachments with centres of power appear to be the major factor behind the difference in levels of traditional-modern integration. These are important points to discuss here in relation to the conditions within Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay. However, before entering into a detail discussion about the actual integration of traditional and modern system apparent in these two communities, I would briefly like to clarify the essence of traditional and modern systems of organisation, as applied to the village level in this area. The discussion is based on information gathered through informal discussions with elders, and from my observations in several villages in the study area.

Although a full application of the traditional system of community organisation at the village level can no longer be observed in this area, by asking elders to recall their memories about the recent past when the village organisation was still highly traditional, a valuable picture can be discerned. In brief, when the traditional system dominated the village administration in the past, elders played a dominant role in maintaining law and order in rural communities. In each community, there were a few elders who were regarded as leaders. These leaders gained power through their merits of good deeds or specialisation in certain areas, such as traditional medicine and religious or ceremonial affairs. Some leaders might be bandits or *nakleng* who are powerful and believed to be strong men who can protect the community from unpleasant interruptions from outside (see Johnston, 1980). These leaders respected each other. Seniority was very important in their relationships; the most senior one was likely to be the most respected and regarded as the top leader. They normally communicated through face-to-face contact. However, there could be conflict among these leaders, and serious conflict could end up forcing the weaker leaders out of the community.

Governing the community was mainly based on norms passed from one generation to another, with state rules and regulations having little influences. When major issues needed to be resolved, the traditional leaders would form an informal council to make decisions. Rules in managing common property resources (CPRs) were also developed in this way. Most of the rules were also bound up with spiritual beliefs which functioned in controlling people's behaviour through supernatural powers (see Nartsupha and Lertwicha, 1994; Moerman and Miller, 1989; Vallibhotama, 1989). This strong link between norms and spiritual beliefs created strong links between these leaders and monks, as most ceremonial work was led by monks. Hence, the relationship between religious institutions and the community were very strong and interdependent. Although this pattern of community organisation has been weakened by the attempt to 'encapsulate' the village community into the modern system of administration, it has remained very significant and has been recognised by local government officials in the past few decades. Indeed, it is a feature that remains in the memory of today's elders.

Interestingly, most official leaders such as *kamnan* and *phu yai ban,* in the past, were drawn from these leaders rather than through actual elections in the democratic sense. In the view of elders, the way the leaders were recruited in the past meant they were naturally very influential, both in official and cultural senses. People followed them not only because they had authority, but also because people respected them.

Under the modern system, which is currently applied to village administration in this area, only official leaders' groups led by *kamnan* and *phu yai ban* are recognised by the state as having authority to deal with administrative affairs at the *tambon* and *mooban* levels. Unlike in the past, these leaders, especially *kamnan* and *phu yai ban,* are recruited through elections. Although it is possible for natural leaders or elders to enter these elections, this is only likely to happen on rare occasions. In cases where some traditional leaders enter the elections, only those who are young are likely to contest them. Normally the most senior traditional leader does not show his desire to be in one of these positions. In this sense, it is less likely that official leaders, especially *kamnan* and *phu yai ban,* will be recruited from among influential traditional leaders. Therefore, the actual status of *kamnan* and *phu yai ban* nowadays, with respect to their relationships with their people, is not the same as leaders in the past. It can be said that traditional leaders nowadays are generally excluded from the official domain under the formal administrative arrangement. Though a few traditional leaders are observed to sit on the village committee in each village and in the *sapha tambon* of each *tambon* as their elected members, they do not at first appear to be very influential as they hold only a subordinate status in these two bodies. In most cases, their status can be described as advisors to *kamnan* and *phu yai ban,* who lead these two official bodies. At the same time, it is also possible to find cases where *kamnan* or *phu yai ban* are in conflict with traditional leaders who are elected to these bodies, due to their different interests. Outside these bodies, elders still hold influence, and are respected by individual villagers. Many villagers still seek advice and help from them, though much of this appears to relate to personal matters, and has little connection with politics and administration. It seems that the traditional leaders themselves realise that changes in the power structure of local organisations have occurred, which means they are no longer in a politically influential position.

The above discussion illustrates the difference in structures of power between the traditional system and modern system of administration at *tambon* and *mooban* levels in Thailand, and with reference to the study area. Although the full operation of the traditional system may no longer exist, since it has been displaced by the modern system of administration, I would like to argue that this modern system has not also been fully applied. Both *mooban* and *tambon* current administrative patterns within the study area are composed of both traditional and modern components standing side by side with different levels of integration, as stated by Riggs (1964). This difference in the extent of integration can also be seen in Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay.

As far as Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay are concerned, there are two important factors which determine the difference in organisational arrangements in these two village communities. These two factors are the historical and geographical perspectives of their settlements. Since most of the details relating to the differences in these two factors were discussed in the preceding chapter, this section will only take account of those elements which appear to be associated with patterns of organisational arrangement of these two village communities.

5.2.1 Historical Factors and Community Organisation

It was mentioned in Chapter Four that settlement of Ban Nua Phru occurred quite recently. Their pioneer settlers have been regarded as their leaders, and are highly respected by the current settlers. The emotional tie the villagers have with these leaders is still strong in today's community life. Part of this respect is reflected through the trust they have given to these leaders and their descendants to lead the community since its establishment. At the present, the abbot, the village *phu song khunnawut,* and the former but still highly influential *phu yai ban,* are all immediate descendants of those pioneer settlers. Although all these leaders are competent, which should be the most important criterion for their recruitment, being descendants of respected pioneer settlers is certainly a benefit for them, gaining them support to lead the community. The historical ties which these leaders have create good relationships among themselves and

between them and villagers. This is a major contribution to the high degree of solidarity observed within the community, and one of its most important attributes in handling administrative problems effectively. Additionally, this high degree of community solidarity appears to play a major role in maintaining the high degree of political independence observed in this community. Consequently, the organisational arrangement of this community was observed to be less influenced by the state, as compared to its neighbouring communities and Ban Bon Lay. At the same time, village harmony is better maintained through the combination of modern and traditional approaches that these leaders employ in handling their administrative work. Formal and traditional leaders, especially the abbot of Wat Nua Phru, work closely in various activities undertaken in the community. The active involvement of the abbot in secular activities cannot be seen as solely a matter of individual interest. His status as a grandson of the founder of the village, appears to be behind both his motivation to be involved in the development work of the community, and also the respect he receives from all parties in the community. Interestingly, the mutual contribution between spiritual and secular leaders in bringing harmony and prosperity to the community in this village which emerges from the internal drive of this community, helps in creating a promising atmosphere in the village administration. In other words, through active participation of both traditional and official leaders, the organisational arrangement of the community is likely to move to become better integrated with respect to traditional and modern components. This significance has been rarely pointed out in previous studies related to rural community organisation in Thailand.

Unlike in Ban Nua Phru, Ban Bon Lay community does not have a strong tie with a glorious history of settlement. Being part of the very large and old settlement of Bueng Yai community, the social structures of the village appear to differ considerably from those of Ban Nua Phru, especially with respect to leadership of the community. The nature of the settlement in this village, which forms an extension of the larger community of Bueng Yai, has complicated the social structures of this village where settlers do not necessarily have strong kinship ties, nor a long harmonious relationship among them. Many settlers moved in from other communities and are quite isolated from these traditional connections. In other words, the nature of the settlement in this

village is more cosmopolitan than in Ban Nua Phru. The lack of strong socio-cultural connections among villagers and the cosmopolitan characteristic of the village, seem to determine its organisational arrangement and its leadership pattern. Together with the long experience of contact with the state, the present organisational arrangement in this village is more influenced by the modern system than in Ban Nua Phru. This can be seen from the recruitment of leaders, especially *phu yai ban* and *phu song khunnawut*, which are clearly bound to the election system prescribed by the state regulations. The present *phu yai ban* and *phu song khunnawut* came to their positions through elections, with no sign of any historical influence. Rather, they were elected as a result of their perceived personal qualifications and campaigns, similar to the recruitment of members of the village committee. The recruitment of *phu chuay phu yai ban,* which is based on the decision of the *phu yai ban,* also did not reflect any sign of historical influence. The selection appears to have been based on the personal qualifications of individuals in dealing with administrative work anticipated by the *phu yai ban.* In the absence of a strong connection with a religious institution which may influence the organisational arrangement of the community, the village administration appears to rely largely on the modern system of administration.

Nevertheless, the clear domination of the modern system of administration seems to have taken place only quite recently. Additionally, the domination of the modern administration system in this village cannot be said to be a sign of great improvement in the village administration. The discrepancy between the modern and traditional components of its community organisation creates complications and ineffectiveness in the modern system currently employed. As official leaders attempt to apply most of the formal rules of administration, many villagers still prefer to employ many traditional rules to solve their problems and fulfil their needs. For example, village leaders expect villagers to inform and consult them with problems, so that they can proceed to the higher levels of government in order to seek help. Most villagers, on the other hand, prefer to discuss these matters with relatives and neighbours, rather than informing their official leaders. In the first instance, villagers attempt to solve disputes that may arise between themselves or through traditional leaders, before involving official leaders. Similarly, they rarely make direct propositions about their ideas or needs relating to

development of the village community to official leaders. The fear of being rejected by official leaders, which results in 'losing face' (*siah naa* or *khaai naa*), makes them prefer the more traditional path of informal consultation with neighbours, friends, and elders (see Mulder, 1994). However, these practices have their own limitations under the present day's village administration. Elders and informal leaders are no longer in the position of being able to effectively calm disputes and allocate resources to serve the villagers' needs. This is because the action of these leaders is often neglected by official leaders or higher level officials, except if they work together with official leaders.

5.2.2 Geographical Factors and Community Organisation

The difference in the location of these two villages in relation to surrounding communities and natural resources they share with other communities has the main influence on the difference in the organisational arrangement of these communities. To clarify this point, it is essential to recall the difference in the settlements of these two villages described earlier in Chapter Four.

As mentioned in Chapter Four, the settlement of Ban Nua Phru comprises clusters of households stretching out over the area delineated as its administrative boundary. Surrounding these household groups are privately occupied land, either on a formal or informal basis (i.e. with land titles or without land titles), and the swamp area which is communally owned. Although the settlement is scattered within its political territory, it is clearly demarcated from the neighbouring villages. The physical demarcation of the village appears to determine the pattern of resource sharing, which is almost exclusive to the members of the community. This applies to most major natural resources, including swamp forest, sedge grasses, and fishing grounds. These resources are customarily shared only by members of the community, therefore they can be categorised as CPRs. Similar practices were observed in other communities settling in this part of Phru Thung Samet swamp, with each community drawing its territorial boundary over the CPRs used. Although the delineation of each CPR territory does not strictly follow the political boundary of each village, as some natural resources are

located across areas governed by different villages, political boundaries are nevertheless used as the main basis for delineation. The rule that applies to this system is simple and based on the value of mutual respect, that is, each community must respect other communities by utilising only CPRs available within its own political boundary. In cases where some natural resources are located beyond a single community boundary, sharing these resources is limited to those communities within which the resources are located. Taking into account of two major CPRs -- *krajoot* which is used for handicrafts, and the swamp area which is used as the main fishing ground -- Ban Nua Phru has a clear territory of its own for utilising these resources exclusively for members of the community. Sharing CPRs only among members of one village makes it easier for them to manage the resources under the present administration system, as decisions on related issues could be taken within one village. This means that the village administrative body has to deal primarily only with the interactions of actors within the village, while actors from outside the village are excluded. This condition makes the politics of natural resource management in this village less complicated than when actors from both inside and outside the village are involved.

In contrast to Ban Nua Phru, the physical and social attachments of Ban Bon Lay with its neighbouring villages, which are aggregated as Bueng Yai community, make its political boundary less significant for the actual village administration. There are a few matters, including the management of CPRs, which cannot be manipulated independently on a single village basis. Most CPRs used by members of Ban Bon Lay are located across the political boundaries of different villages, and shared among users throughout Bueng Yai community. Taking into account the fishing grounds including Bueng Yai lake, the surrounding swamp, and even the floodplain area which is transformed into a fishing ground when flooded, no clear territorial boundaries are drawn among users from different *mooban*. However, there exists an intangible division among fishermen using Bueng Yai lake, the most important fishing ground for the community, which divides them into two groups -- fishermen living on the edge of the west bank of the lake, and fishermen living in the inner part of the community. Fishermen who live on the edge of the west bank of the lake occupy the south-western half of the lake, while fishermen residing in the inner part of the community, including

Ban Bon Lay, occupy the other half of the lake (see Map 1 and Map 4). There is no clear physical boundary drawn among different groups. Additinally, evidence shows that the division emerges through the internal evolution of a customary system of resource allocation to cope with changes in the level of resource scarcity, since it appears to be a recent phenomenon. There is strong evidence that this waterbody used to be an open access fishing ground where fishing was not limited only to members of the community. Even under the present arrangement, the division of the waterbody between different groups of fishermen is quite loose. According to key informants, the division happens as a matter of respect among fishermen themselves. There is no specific collective agreement about using communal sanctions as a means of punishment for contenders; control occurs through the common norm of mutual respect, and sharing the benefits from communal resources, either between individual fishermen or between groups of fishermen. However, some forms of personal interference were observed to be used towards contenders. The most common form of interference is the stealing of fishing gear by fishermen occupying the area, if fishermen from the other group intrude into their territory.

No matter how the lake is divided, fishery resources are still shared by all fishermen within the larger community of Bueng Yai. Hence, the community as a whole should be responsible for the management of the waterbody. Though this pattern of organisational arrangement sounds appropriate for the nature of resource allocation in this community, the way the present formal management is arranged is based on the conventional rule of local administration, in which each village is responsible for managing the resources located within its political boundary. This implies that each village can only deal formally with problems occurring within its own political boundary. For instance, if problems related to CPR management occur outside Ban Bon Lay, though still within Bueng Yai lake, they fall under the direct responsibility of the administrative body of the village where the problems occurred. If the administrative body of the village where the problems take place is reluctant to take action to solve the problems, Ban Bon Lay and other villages do not have direct authority to interfere. Considering the concern of Ban Bon Lay administrative body in handling problems related to fishery resource exploitation, its official leaders nevertheless hesitate to take any action if the problems

occur outside the village, and do not involve any members of the community. Although most official leaders in Bueng Yai community are personally concerned with the future of fisheries in their villages, and most of them are fishermen themselves, they do not believe they have the right to intervene in the administration of other villages. Similar situations were observed in other villages in Bueng Yai community. On the whole, effective management of CPRs depends on mutual agreements and aggregated actions of all villages in Bueng Yai community, rather than on the strength of any single village. This makes the task of managing the CPRs more complicated than a single village such as Ban Bon Lay alone could handle effectively, even if its administrative body is energetic. It may be argued that all villages can work together in solving problems affecting the whole community. However, this is unlikely to happen automatically in a community where the administration is divided not only into many villages, but also between two sub-districts. If all the villages are in the same sub-district, the conflict between villages can possibly be sorted out easier through the function of *sapha tambon.*

The complication emerging in relation to CPR management at the local level discussed in this section, is determined not only by basic characteristics of the resources themselves, but also by the organisational arrangements of management bodies at the local level. From the above discussion, it is clear that assuming CPR management can be done effectively under formal administrative arrangements, while ignoring various forms of traditional arrangements existing in different local communities, can be misleading. This is because patterns of resource allocation can vary across communities. Ideally each pattern should reflect the evolution of community-resource relations in each community. Any new approaches introduced by the state can be problematic without seriously considering integrating the traditional arrangements that already exist in particular communities. Generalising a certain approach to CPR management from outside the community as a 'ready-made package' for wider application, may force users' communities to adopt an 'incompatible system', which may result in displacing or weakening the existing traditional system in their communities.

In Thailand, the state's assumption that CPR management at the local level should be handled through the formal administrative system, where each *tambon* and *mooban* governing bodies should be responsible for problems arising in their own political territories, can be problematic. This is especially difficult when their political boundaries are inconsistent with the territorial boundaries of CPRs in question, as illustrated by the case of Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community. Since the political boundary of each administrative unit is drawn mainly to serve general administrative purposes, with the size of population in each unit appearing to matter most, the chance of this arrangement being appropriate for CPR management may be very rare. The arrangement may be appropriate for CPR management in demarcated villages, and where CPRs are used exclusively within each village as in Ban Nua Phru. However, it is likely to be difficult to apply in villages which form part of the larger community and where CPRs are shared by members of the larger community, as in Ban Bon Lay. Even in the case of demarcated villages, the application of the formal arrangement alone is also doubtful. The case of Ban Nua Phru illustrates that a combination of traditional and formal systems appears to work best. In a large community which is divided into different units of administration, whilst CPRs are still shared within the large community, the conventional state's arrangement is unlikely to work. Specific rearrangement is necessary, if the management of CPRs is to be effective.

5.3 Economic Change, Resource Pressure, and Political Environment

Besides the state's attempts to transform the village's political and social systems into the modern system of administration, as discussed in the preceding section, the influence of factors such as economic changes in the wider society which penetrate the village communities, and population growth which increases pressure on natural resources, are also important in understanding local political patterns. From the background description in Chapter Four, there appears to be evidence which suggests some degrees of disparity in the stage of market penetration and the difference in population pressure on natural resources between Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay.

These differences will be analysed further in this section by focusing on how they influence the political patterns surrounding CPR management in these two villages.

To understand the economic difference between Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay, it is essential to examine and compare the difference in patterns of production of the majority households in these two communities. The discussion about the economy of these villages in Chapter Four revealed that although there is some similarity in the types of occupations of the majority households in both villages, the production orientation of each activity is apparently different. The three major economic activities are rice farming, fishing, and handicrafts; though rice farming in both villages is aimed predominantly for household food security, fishing and handicrafts have production patterns which are more market-oriented in Ban Bon Lay than in Ban Nua Phru. The difference in patterns of production of fishing and handicrafts cannot be a matter of accident. It must link with the transition towards a market economy, which was observed to differ between these two villages. The better and longer established contact with outside communities of Ban Bon Lay, has meant the community economy and consumption patterns of its people have changed towards a market economy more than in Ban Nua Phru. Since the economic activities in these villages are highly dependent on the natural resources surrounding the communities, the more market-oriented the production patterns are, the higher the exploitation of natural resources is likely to be. This argument corresponds to the finding that the level of exploitation and the degree of depletion of major natural resources, are higher in Ban Bon Lay (and Bueng Yai community) than in Ban Nua Phru. This is clearly because the competition over these natural resources is higher in Ban Bon Lay than in Ban Nua Phru. Once the competition is higher, the politics of managing the resources is likely to be more complicated.

Taking into account fishery resources which are important for the livelihoods of both villages and have recently come under threat, the intensity of fishing activities was observed to be higher in Ban Bon Lay than in Ban Nua Phru. Although this difference is determined by the difference in the nature of their main fishing ground that determines the length of time they can fish effectively each year, there is clear evidence that fishermen in Ban Nua Phru do not employ as much effort, even when the

conditions permit them to do so. Nor do they employ fishing methods which allow them to extend their fishing over a longer period. This is contrary to the situation in Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community, where most fishermen were observed to put much greater effort into capturing fish throughout the year.

Clearly, the difference in the level of fishing effort between these communities partially reflects the difference in the cash dependency of their population, as well as the difference in the degree of importance of fishery resources in generating their cash incomes. It also reflects the difference in the pressure over the resources between these two communities. There is much evidence to support these assertions. For Ban Nua Phru, fishing could be carried out more intensively than was actually occurring at the time of this study, but fishermen were hesitant to do so. Considering the capacity of fishery resources, there is evidence which suggests that greater effort can be made. It was observed that some fishermen in neighbouring villages who fish in the same fishing environment could generate a significant amount of income by employing different types of gear and by fishing in different surrounding waterbodies throughout the year. This signifies that most fishermen in this village have not yet faced the high economic pressure to increase their level of exploitation of fishery resources in order to meet their needs for cash. Compared to Ban Bon Lay, where fishing is more intensive and much greater effort is made by fishermen in order to earn a living, the circumstances in Ban Nua Phru suggest that their needs for cash in their livings are not as high as in Ban Bon Lay. Not only fishing in which less effort is made, other cash-generating activities, particularly handicrafts, were also found to be less intensive in Ban Nua Phru than in Ban Bon Lay. For Ban Bon Lay as well as Bueng Yai community, there is evidence indicating that the need for cash has increased rapidly in the last two to three decades. In the past when cash was not as important as nowadays, fishermen did not put much effort in their fishing either. A key informant in his early seventies recalled the situation when he was around forty years old: 'Though fish were abundant in the past, we did not catch much of it, it did not have a high value at that time.' Another much younger key informant insisted: 'The decline in fishing in this area is not a matter of a decrease in amount of fish caught each time (catch per unit effort) alone, but also because fishermen need much more cash nowadays than before.'

These assertions contradict the claim of some fishermen that fishery resources are scarce and inadequate for the needs of fishermen. The claim might not necessarily reflect the actual phenomenon. Evidence available from a biological estimation under the PSU-CDS project also does not support the claim that fishery resources in the area are in a condition of over-exploitation (Heady *et al.,* 1995). Therefore, it can be said that the difference in the degree of fishery resource exploitation between Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay has a strong linkage to the difference in the degree of market-orientation of the economy of these two communities. The higher dependency on cash of fishermen in Ban Bon Lay means that the exploitation of fishery resources is higher than in Ban Nua Phru. In other words, the pressure over the fishery resources is higher in Ban Bon Lay than in Ban Nua Phru, as the resources are among the main bases of cash income of the majority population. The relationship between the extent of market orientation and the level of natural resource exploitation of different communities is reflected in the analysis of various traditional societies in different parts of the world by Sahlins (1974). The difference in the level of natural resources exploitation among different communities is observed to be influenced not only by different modes of production employed by these societies, but also the difference in social relations among members of these societies. In 'primitive communities', the sense of community is likely to be stronger than in 'modern industrial communities' where the relations are more individualistic. The difference in social relations among members of these communities determines the level of natural resource exploitation; the more individualistic the community is, the higher the competition over natural resources for individual benefits. Although Ban Nua Phru cannot be considered as a 'primitive community', and Ban Bon Lay is also not a 'modern industrial community' in a real sense, there are considerable differences in the extent to which they are involved in the market economy.

In general, it seems clear that there is a strong relationship between the extent of change towards the market economy and the pressure of resource use. Once the pressure of resource use is higher, the competition to utilise them is likely to be more intense. As a consequence, problems related to over-exploitation of the resources are likely to increase. The situation in Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community corresponds to this

view. Compared to Ban Nua Phru, problems related to illegal fishing are more common in Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community. Despite the belief in the need to 'respect each other' often cited by villagers, some fishermen behave in ways which are distressing and detestable to their fellow fishermen. It was observed that use of harmful fishing methods, especially by passing high voltage electric current from large batteries equipped with adapters, are critical. The method is denounced as being wicked and harmful for the future of fisheries in the area, as it destroys fish of all sizes and in great numbers randomly. Apart from this illegal method, fishing in spawning seasons, using brush piles to set fish traps in the lake, and setting barriers across water ways, which are restricted under fishery regulations (see Appendix Two), are also common. It is interesting to note that these practices are overlooked by most authorities and likely to be persistent, although the practices are perceived by many fishermen as threatening for the future of the fisheries. The persistence of such problems cannot simply be blamed on results from the insufficiency of the Department of Fisheries manpower to subjugate offenders and to control the situation. This is because apart from the District Fisheries Officer (*pramong amphoe*) who is directly in charge of fisheries management in the district as a whole, Bueng Yai community is also served by a police station equipped with more than ten officers, whose main priority is to maintain law and order in this particular community. This size of police force should be adequate for overseeing the community. Moreover the area, especially the lake, is recognised widely among officials as an important fishing ground to be maintained, therefore, it should receive priority from concerned bodies to consider its problems. Available information makes it more proper to assume that the persistence of problems involves the complication of politics, and the difference in perceptions and interests among authorities, especially between police and local leaders, which leads to inefficiency in applying the state mechanism in handling the problems. It was also observed that a lack of understanding and interests among powerful officials leads to a lack of co-ordination between them and local leaders in combating the problems. Additionally, lack of co-ordination is also found among local leaders from different villages, due to their different interests and political conflicts derived from other causes as mentioned earlier in Chapter Four.

Problems of illegal fishing also exist in Ban Nua Phru, but to a lesser degree. Some fishermen were said to have attempted to set fishing gear in restricted areas and have used a poisonous chemical substance known as *'luuk khao'* (white pellet), which is believed to be cyanide compound, to poison fish in refuge trap ponds or in remaining holes in the dry season. However, these problems have not persisted due to the firm action of local leaders against them. The low pressure on the resources together with the more harmonious and independent political environment in Ban Nua Phru, as compared to Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community, does help in restoring the situation.

It can be summarised that the difference in the degree of competition over natural resources, especially fishery resources, between Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay, appears to be linked to the economic changes of the wider society which affect these two communities in different ways. The more long-term contact Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community have had with the outside, has led their economy to be more market-oriented than that of Ban Nua Phru. Coupled with their different population density, the difference in their levels of dependency on cash has driven these communities to face different levels of pressure over fishery resources which form a major source of cash income for the majority of their population. These differences determine the political environments of the communities, especially those concerning problems related to the management of CPRs. In Ban Nua Phru, where population density and dependency on fishery resources for generating a cash income are not so high, the political environment appears to be harmonious. Conflict resulting from competition among fishermen over resources appears to be negligible and controllable. In contrast, the situation in Ban Bon Lay is more complicated. A high degree of dependency on fishery resources to generate a cash income together with the pressure of population density, has led to greater competition over the resources. Many problems emerge in connection with overexploitation of the resources. These problems are much more complicated than in Ban Nua Phru, as a large number of people from different villages are involved. Solving these problems is also complicated, as they are frequently related to several villages. This means that various actors, including leaders from different villages, are involved. Complications emerge due to the various interests

and commitments of these actors with relation to the problems. Even officials whose duties are directly concerned with solving the problems are also found to be negligent.

5.4 Participatory Aspect of Community Organisation

From the discussion in the preceding section, we can see that two village communities selected for this study differ considerably in the way the communities are organised. Based on this observation, it can be said that the patterns of integration between the traditional system remaining in the communities, and the modern system introduced by the state differ quite significantly, and result in the difference in their leadership and power structure. In connection with these differences, questions regarding the participation of ordinary people may arise, since the differences in leadership styles and power structures are likely to determine patterns of participation in community organisations (see Ross and Lappin, 1967: pp. 193-198). However, in investigating issues of popular participation in rural development at the local level, it is important to delineate forms of participation which are substantial for a specific subject of interest. Without making the subject specific, the investigation of popular participation will be too broad and difficult. A great variety of people's involvement in rural development can be branded as 'popular participation' (see Cohen and Uphoff, 1980). As far as this study in concerned, only participation in problem identification and decision-making related to the development and management of community projects is emphasised. Other forms of involvement in development activities which have no substantial connection with understanding the political power of local people, such as contribution of labour and financial resources without playing any roles in decision-making, are excluded. This section will discuss the extent to which popular participation occurs in the two communities under study, by relating it to their types of organisational arrangements. It will also stipulate factors associated with the difference in the extent of popular participation observed in these two communities.

Considering the participation of ordinary community members in problem identification and decision-making related to community development, no clear distinction of patterns of participation was observed between Ban Nua Phru and Ban

Bon Lay. In both villages, participation of ordinary community members can be considered to be very low. Even in Bueng Yai community, where the emergence of interest groups and non-official political actors is more apparent than in the other two villages, the situation which allows ordinary villagers to be induced into the political arena is still not very clear. Only leaders and a few key figures were observed to have access to actual participation in problem identification and decision-making regarding the development of the community. In order to have a clearer understanding of the degree of involvement of ordinary villagers in problem identification and in decision-making related to community development, it is important to explore the ways these two tasks are operated. It is observed that there are two main ways in which problem identification and decision-making related to community development are made at the village level -- through the village meeting and through the village committee council.

The village meeting may be called at any time by the *phu yai ban* of each village. In this meeting, every household should send at least one mature member to attend. In principle, the meeting should be held at least once a month, to correspond with the *sapha tambon* meeting and the monthly meeting for local leaders at the district office. This is to allow the leader of each village to formally identify problems and to assess needs concerning village administration and development for further considerations and proceedings in the latter two meetings. However, in practice not all villages in the study area organise the village meeting regularly every month. A clear comparison of these different practices can be seen from Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay. Though the village meeting is organised regularly every month in Ban Nua Phru, the meeting in Ban Bon Lay only occurs occasionally when there are important issues to be discussed. Yet, it is not the frequency of the meeting which is crucially important for assessing the extent of participation of villagers, rather the formulation of the meeting, especially the interaction between leaders and villagers. Since most rural people in Thailand are socially underprivileged, a feature which is strongly influenced by the predominance of the hierarchical social system, active participation in such meetings, which are considered to be rather public and formal, is unlikely unless encouraged (see Cornish, 1988). This assumption is reflected by findings through observation made in a few villages in the study area.

From my observation in a few village meetings in Ban Nua Phru, Ban Bon Lay and two other villages, the way the meetings are structured does not promote participation of ordinary villagers in problem identification and community decision-making. All formal meetings were dominated by either *phu yai ban* or officials from district offices who are responsible for related activities in the area where each village is situated. In these meetings, field officials including Community Development Officers and Public Health Officers, attended the meetings to promote government policies related to their areas of work. They informed and clarified related policies, which are commonly referred to as 'state commands' (*kamsang khong taang ratchakaan*), and finished with calls for co-operation (*kwaam ruammue*) from leaders and villagers to follow these commands. In the case of Ban Nua Phru, the abbot of Wat Nua Phru was present in the village meetings. I was told that he is always present in the village meeting, except when absent from the village because of official duties. In two meetings which I observed, he was present and stayed in the meetings for most of their duration. On both occasions, he was asked to preach to the gatherings at the beginning of the meetings. His preaching was strongly related to village development issues discussed in the meetings. In addition, he also suggested possible solutions to the issues. Apart from the presentations from officials and the abbot, the rest of the meetings were dominated by the *phu yai ban.* Other leaders, including *phu chuay phu yai ban* and village committee members, only played supporting roles by adding some information or comments when asked to do so by the *phu yai ban.* Most ordinary villagers did not actively participate in discussions, nor did they seem to be very keen of proposing ideas or asking questions. Only a few villagers asked some questions. Even when there were important issues to debate, no substantial discussions were observed. It was the *phu yai ban* who often raised questions he had heard from outside the meetings. The former *phu yai ban* and the present *phu chuay phu yai ban* occasionally played the leadership role in the meetings. Normally villagers were asked for comments before any decisions were made. However, very few of them appeared to be courageous in making comments or raising questions.

The village committee council is generally informal. A *phu yai ban* may call the village council at any time to discuss matters related to village administration and development. In principle, the council involves the *phu yai ban*, the assistant *phu yai ban*, the village *phu song khunnawut*, and members of the village committee. However, in practice some of these members may not be called regularly when the council takes place. Quite often the council is held between the *phu yai ban* and his assistants. The council is generally not less important than the village meeting. This is because many decisions can take place without going through the village meeting, especially when dealing with urgent issues.

In Ban Nua Phru, the *phu yai ban*, his assistants and the village *phu song khunnawut,* were observed to use the council for preparing the village meeting, for further discussion after the village meeting, and for consideration of urgent issues. Occasionally, the former *phu yai ban* and the abbot were also invited. The discussion taking place in the council was more technical and involved more details than in the village meeting. Many decisions took place in the council. Some of these decisions were processed further without going through the village meeting, and others were used as guidelines for discussions in the village meeting.

In Ban Bon Lay, the council played a more significant role than the village meeting, since no regular village meeting was held. The council is generally composed of the *phu yai ban*, his assistants, and the village *phu song khunnawut*. Only occasionally were the village committee members called to join the discussion, when very important issues were involved. Most decisions in this village came from the council.

As mentioned earlier, ordinary villagers do not actively participate in formal discussions, such as in the village meeting, which is supposed to be the most important floor for them to express their ideas and problems related to the development of their community. It is important to further explore this particular characteristic of rural people in this area. It is also crucial to investigate how leaders gather information to assess problems and the needs of their fellow villagers, and how they use these assessments in the planing process.

It is often argued that attempts to introduce a participatory approach in rural development in Thailand face many obstacles and are unlikely to be successful. Hirsch (1990) concludes from his study in two villages in the Lower Northern region of Thailand that obstacles to participation for the rural poor can be described in terms of obstacles to control over production which result from the problem of fragmentation. Two common characteristics are found to contribute to this fragmentation; lack of control over basic resources for production, and intensification of work. Because of the lack of control over basic resources, many poor villagers are forced to migrate out, either temporarily or permanently, to seek opportunities outside the village. At the same time, many poor villagers are committed to intensification of work, in order to overcome financial problems often faced in connection with capitalisation of agricultural production. Such fragmentation affects participatory initiatives by reducing the time available for the organisational aspects of participation, and undermining the potential communality of interest. There is another set of obstacles to participation; the obstacles which are connected to the traditional values that determine the power relationships between master and follower. In brief, there exists a system of patron-client relationship in traditional Thai social structure, which divides the village community into two different groups based on their power status; the patrons and the clients. An important effect of this system is that it generates a feeling among the powerless majority that 'certain domains remain the affairs of others' (Hirsch, 1990, p. 227).

All the above obstacles are found in Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay, and out-migration is also a common phenomenon in both villages. Out-migration is dominated by mostly young villagers, who otherwise could make significant contributions to the development of the community. On the other hand, the majority of those who remain in the village are busy with their work, and do not concern themselves very much with public affairs. The master-follower values also remain and affect the perception of the majority villagers about their involvement in development affairs. Though these types of obstacles are similar to those found by Hirsch (1990), their effects on participation were observed to be different. Hirsch seems to stress powerlessness caused by the lack

of control over basic resources and intensification of work as being more significant than the master-follower values. However, the findings in both Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay do not support Hirsch's view. The differences in the control over resources and intensification of work do not appear to be significant between the majority villagers and their leaders. At the same time, only a few economically advantaged villagers actively participate in village politics; most of them appear to concentrate on their businesses and ignore village politics. Most leaders and politically active villagers are from the average economic class, rather than from the well-off group. Those who are from the poor economic class are also found to be politically inactive. In comparison with the effect of fragmentation, the influence of traditional values appears to be stronger. Most villagers see that it is their leaders who should play a dominant role in decision-making and initiating development activities. They see their duties as followers, who should anticipate calls from their leaders to promote the common good. Even to express their ideas or disclose their problems publicly is unfamiliar to most villagers. The feeling of being subordinates who should show deference in dealing with their superiors discourages these villagers from interacting vigorously with their leaders, especially in public places such as the village meeting. Rather they prefer to form circles among their close friends and relatives, where they can discuss a wide range of subjects more openly. The fear of 'losing face' (*siah naa*), which is often cited in explaining why they do not propose ideas in the meeting, reflects the feeling of subservience in interacting with their leaders. They are afraid of being refused or ignored by their leaders, which is considered to be embarrassing. Under the conditions explained here, active participation in problem identification and decision-making related to village development is unlikely to occur easily among ordinary villagers. The tasks of problem identification and decision-making are therefore likely to be undertaken predominantly by the leaders' council. The question is how the leaders gather information to be used as the basis for their decision-making?

According to my observation, most information used by the leaders is gathered by means of informal communication and observation. Informal discussion in social circles such as the drinking circle (*wong lao*), and the chatting circle (*wong sontana*) at village grocery stores or tea shops (*raan khaai khaung* or *raan naam chaa*) , is common

in these two villages. These two forms of informal gatherings are also common to rural areas elsewhere in southern Thailand. The drinking circle is organised on a casual basis among close friends and relatives where drink, mostly cheap liquor known as '*lao khao*', is shared. This is common only to males, since females do not normally drink. However, females who are members of the host family may join the circle and serve snacks (*kab klaem*). Because the circle is generally composed of close friends who know each other well, the discussion taking place is open, varied in its subject matters and very informal. The chatting circle is looser in its structure than the drinking circle. It is more flexible in its participants, although some members regularly attend. It may involve drinking, but the drink is not necessarily shared. As it normally takes place in a more public space and involves a wider range of participants, the discussion was observed to cover fewer subjects. However, it seems that only the discussion on personal matters is limited, whereas the discussion on public matters is unlikely to be different from that in the drinking circle. These two types of informal gatherings form good sources of information for leaders. Though not all subjects discussed are valuable for the village administration, some topics contain very useful information. Official leaders receive information from these two circles either through their participation in the circles themselves, or through observing the wider conversations connected to matters discussed in the circles. Matters which are found to be important are then compiled and brought into the village committee council and the village formal meeting.

General observation is also an important means of gathering information for leaders. Most leaders see general observation as essential, because many villagers behave in a reserved manner; they do not join any social gatherings mentioned above, or discuss problems with others. Moreover, many communal issues may be considered by the majority of villagers as being not critical, or may be too complicated for them to think about; examples might be issues of forest degradation, or restricting certain fishing methods. Through general observation, these problems are compiled and sorted in a similar way as received from social gatherings, before processing to further steps of the village planning. The process may be called 'problem formation', in which leaders may make their own judgements about the significance and priority of problems.

It can be seen from the above discussion that ordinary community members are unlikely to participate actively in problem identification and decision-making related to village administration and development, although the space has opened for them to do so in the village meeting. The duty of problem identification and decision-making is left mostly to official leaders. In playing their role, it is unavoidable for official leaders in making their own judgements in selecting, prioritising problems, deciding how to proceed with them, and even to make final decisions themselves on some issues. Therefore, it is important to consider the accountability of official leaders on the actual problems and needs of the majority village members.

In order to assess the accountability of official leaders with regard to the actual problems and needs that are common to their communities, attempts were made to find out the extent to which they care about the problems faced by different groups of villagers, and how villagers perceive the characteristics and performance of their leaders.

In Ban Nua Phru, a few official leaders, including the formal village elder, an assistant *phu yai ban* and the former *phu yai ban*, were observed to be very active and concerned with the well-being of their fellow villagers. They were described by their villagers as very knowledgeable, trustworthy, and highly concerned about the well-being of others. Moreover, they were seen as very influential in the decision-making of the present *phu yai ban*. The present *phu yai ban* was also seen as very active. However, because he was still new to the position, he was also seen to be still at the learning stage. More importantly, the active role of the abbot and his influence must not be overlooked. His interview responses verified his commitment to improving the well-being of the community by combining material and moral development. His involvement is derived from his feeling of belonging to this village, and his concern over unfavourable changes in the community, which confirm his knowledge of the problems facing the community. By working together and interacting with other leaders, the outcomes of problem identification and decision-making in this village are likely to correspond greatly to the real needs of the majority villagers.

The situation was observed to be rather different in Ban Bon Lay. Although the *phu yai ban* himself was observed to be quite active, other official leaders are not. Most of them are only concerned with routine work passed to them by the *phu yai ban,* but do not seem to contribute much to development initiatives in the village. As there were neither Buddhist priests nor other types of informal leaders who were active and influential in this community, the tasks related to problem identification and decision-making were undertaken predominantly by the *phu yai ban.* Consultation with some of his colleagues and a few elders in the community was merely to help him to exercise his power. Based on the brief assessment of a few development projects undertaken in this village, most of them were found to be initiated by concerned officials, and the *phu yai ban* was only asked for approval. Other projects, mostly infrastructural projects, were initiated by the *phu yai ban* himself and then later other leaders were consulted. A few villagers interviewed provided mixed feelings about their leaders' role. Although the majority have positive views about their leaders, they also have some questions about the truthfulness and prejudice of their leaders. In the absence of clear opposition, it is likely that some decisions made by the *phu yai ban* and his colleagues involve prejudice. This is in contrast to the circumstance in the larger community of Bueng Yai where a few informal leaders are active and influential, and many of them disagree among themselves and with some official leaders. The conflicting interests that emerge among these leaders divide them into three main groups as mentioned earlier in Chapter Four; two of these groups are led by the *kamnan* of each *tambon.* This division creates competition between the groups to control available resources and to direct the development of the community. In principle, this competition should benefit the majority of the population if it is constructive and aimed primarily to improve the living conditions of their people. But evidence shows that some of these leaders are more concerned about their personal benefits. Moreover, because the movements of each group were least constrained by the movements of the other group (since they are led by the leaders of different sub-districts which are administratively independent), each group seems to concentrate only in attracting people within each territory, while ignoring the unity of the whole community. As a result, many projects undertaken in

Bueng Yai community faced conflicting reactions from different groups of community members, which caused difficulties in their management.

Comparing the differing circumstances of interaction among leaders between Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay, it can be said that the situation in Ban Nua Phru where different leaders interact substantially and constructively for the benefit of the community is likely to account for actual problems and needs of the community, more than in Ban Bon Lay where the *phu yai ban*'s role is more dominant. The situation in Bueng Yai community is neither similar to that in Ban Nua Phru nor in Ban Bon Lay. The administrative separation of the community into two sub-districts has meant that the influence of different actors with conflicting interests, is less effective than it should be. Consequently, problem identification and decision-making done under conflicting leaderships as far as this community is concerned, are likely to be difficult and disintegrated rather than integrated.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter has dealt with the analysis of links between historical and physical settings of the village communities under study, and their organisational arrangements. It also analysed how changes in the wider society and the state's attempt to encapsulate village communities induce changes in the organisational arrangements of these communities. Ultimately, it explored how different changes in the organisational arrangements of the communities affect the management of the CPRs that are at stake.

The findings showed that their historical and geographical variations influence the organisational arrangements of these two village communities. The more isolated location of Ban Nua Phru, coupled with its history of less intensive exposure to commercialisation of its production system and modernisation of its administration system, have led the village community to differ considerably in its economic orientation and organisational arrangement from Ban Bon Lay. Ban Nua Phru economy is more subsistence-oriented whereas Ban Bon Lay economy is more market-oriented. The organisational arrangement of Ban Nua Phru community is more integrated

between the traditional system prevailing in the community and modern system of administration introduced by the state. Its official leaders and cultural leaders, especially the head priest of the village Buddhist temple, work together and consult each other in almost all aspects of the community administration. Therefore, any outcome of decision-making related to community development is likely to result from cumulative agreements among them, rather than from the domination of either group. On the other hand, Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community's organisational arrangements closely follow the modern form of administration. Religious institutions and traditional leaders are excluded from the formal decision-making process. However, only religious and traditional leaders are clearly excluded; interest groups were observed to be influential, but are in conflict due to their different interests.

The differences in economic orientation and administrative arrangements of these communities were observed to create different impacts on the CPRs they have exploited, and on their management. Considering fishery resources alone, the competition over the resources was much higher in Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community than in Ban Nua Phru. This was not only because of their differences in population pressure on the resources, but also because differences in economic conditions between these communities. The higher competition over the resources and the more market-oriented its economy has brought about higher resource exploitation and more serious conflict among resource users in Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community than in Ban Nua Phru. When it comes to the management of fishery resources, the more integrated form of administration that exists in Ban Nua Phru was observed to run more smoothly than the conflicting modern form of administration that exists in Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community.

These findings confirm that even at the lowest level of administration in Thailand, analysis of policy implementation cannot be based on the conventional assumption that policies will be effectively implemented by official implementing bodies according to what has been decided, as proposed in the conceptual framework presented in Chapter Two. The formal administration at this level does not function in a vacuum. It exists in the context of historical, geographical, social and cultural environment, both at micro-

social and macro-social levels. These surrounding environments influence as well as interact with the organisational arrangements of the community in implementing policies related to CPR management. In other words, the difference in the surrounding environment of different localities determines the performance of local implementing bodies and the outcomes of policy.

CHAPTER SIX

THE ROLE OF *PHU YAI BAN* IN LOCAL COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

6.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapter, the discussion focused on structures of community organisation in the study villages and their influence on village administration and management of natural resources, especially CPRs. It revealed the interactions between different components of the organisational structures which provide the context in which different actors interact to exercise power in order to utilise, as well as control the resources available in the community. Among different actors within each village community, the position of *phu yai ban* or the official village leader is particularly important. Being the official leader of the village, he/she is given the authority not only to administer the community in general, but also to manage natural resources available in the community in accordance with policy guidelines.

As stated earlier in Chapter One, the importance of natural resources for rural inhabitants in Thailand is still crucial, even though it is decreasing. This is because the rural inhabitants still represent the majority of the country's population, and most rural people base their livings on natural resources available in their communitie. Despite their importance, many natural resources, especially CPRs, in rural areas are at risk, mainly because of the oversight of government policies in the past and the ignorance of local people with regard to the consequences of exploitation. For this reason, natural resource degradation has recently become an important issue in national political debate and is viewed as strongly related to the country's development policies, which predominantly emphasise economic growth without careful consideration of the environmental consequences. The issue of natural resource degradation has caused many concerned

bodies to feel apprehensive and concerned about the effects on Thailand's long-term development. The Siam Society, a leading national organisation working in the area of culture and environmental conservation, gives a warning:

> 'The speed of change in Thailand is causing the country to face environmental problems of unprecedented severity which have the potential of severely undermining the benefits of economic development, and which may debase the quality of life for future generations and have disturbing implications for the future evolution of Thai culture.' (Moerman and Miller, 1989, p. 304).

The increasing pressure and awareness of environmental problems have led the state to include them in policy agendas. Recent development policies, as guided by the country's national five-year economic and social development plans, have included environmental and natural resource conservation among their prime concerns. According to these policies, the battle over issues of environmental degradation and natural resource depletion, is viewed as not only the concern of macro-social actions, but also the micro-social actions at various local levels. This has brought about a marked cabinet decision in 1989 to assign every provincial government to encompass in its guidelines, 'the management of natural resources and the environment' as part of the provincial rural development plan. As a result, provincial and district level development administrative bodies should extend their rural development plans to cover the management of natural resources and environment (CBAMNREP, 1990). Though the primary emphasis of this new idea is to encourage provincial and district administrative bodies to develop and implement the plans, the process of planning and implementation at the local level also involves *sapha tambon* and village committees. It is at the village level that this study investigates how the issue of natural resource and environmental degradation is handled.

Earlier in Chapter Three it was mentioned that the present Thai administrative structure as applied to the administration of development policies, requires the village committee (VC) to play dominant and official roles in any activities related to administration and development taking place in each village. These include managing natural resources and the environment either as the executive body or as a facilitator to concerned agencies in undertaking related projects within its political boundary. The VC is chaired by the *phu*

yai ban of each village, and consists of elected and appointed members from within the village. As the official leader of the village, the chairman of the village committee, and a member of *sapha tambon*, the role of *phu yai ban* in dealing with the management of natural resources and the environment at the village level and sub-district level, cannot be underestimated. Although the *phu yai ban* is not the only actor involved in the management of local CPRs, observation suggests that the *phu yai ban* is the central figure who should be emphasised in the analysis of the role of local leaders in the management of natural resources and environment at the village level.

In general, roles assigned to *phu yai ban* are wide ranging, the role in natural resource and environmental management forming only part of their wider roles. Hence, when considering the *phu yai ban*'s commitment to natural resource management, an understanding of their general roles cannot be omitted. Because natural resource management provides a new dimension to the roles officially designated to *phu yai ban*, several limitations may be apparent when compared to their wider and well-established role in general administration. Moreover, assigning *phu yai ban* to oversee natural resource management on top of their already abundant administrative work means understanding the relationships between the two cannot be avoided, if the role of *phu yai ban* in natural resource management is to be clearly understood. For this reason, this chapter will also discuss roles of *phu yai ban* in general administrative work, although much of the discussion will emphasise their role in natural resource management. Additionally, the chapter will also contemplate expectations of both higher officials and villagers, *phu yai ban*'s responses to these expectations, and their interactions with other actors. Two case studies related to natural resource management, one from each village, will be used to support the analysis.

6.2 Recruitment of *Phu Yai Ban*

The *phu yai ban* post and its recruitment are bound up in the long history of Thai administration. The origin of the post can be traced back to the Ayudhya period (AD 1351-1767), but no particular time within the period is indicated in the available literature. The recruitment of the post has involved changes along with the evolution of

the Thai administrative system until the present day. These changes will be briefly presented here, together with the present recruitment system which is generally applied to the post.

In the Ayudhya period, the smallest unit of administration was *ban,* which referred to a cluster of households settling together in the same locality. The *ban* headman was called *phu yai ban,* and was recruited through an appointment made by each provincial ruler (*chao hua muang*). This system continued until the reign of King Rama V in the Bangkok period, when a marked reform was introduced to the Thai administrative system. Following this reform, the first local administrative act was introduced in 1897. Then in 1912, during the reign of King Rama VI, the second local administrative act was introduced. This act is still in use today with some modifications, and in conjunction with other related acts. According to this act, the smallest unit of administration was changed from *ban* to *mooban,* or village, as it remains in the present. A *mooban* can be established and re-established based on the size of population and/or the geographical isolation of a settlement. In general, the population of not less than 200 households is used as the main criterion in establishing a new village, together with the isolation of the settlement. Each *mooban* is led by the *phu yai ban,* whose recruitment comes through the village election from qualified candidates within the village (for detail see STU, 1983a and 1983b).

There are several criteria in the act which a candidate of the *phu yai ban* post must fulfil. A candidate must be aged between 25-60 years old and must have been residing in the village of nomination for not less than six months. The lowest educational attainment is grade four primary school or other equivalent certificates. It is also stated in the act that a candidate must have a good moral reputation and must not have been imprisoned, unless he/she had been released at least three years before. Finally, a serving clergy man, religious priest, or government official, cannot be a candidate for the *phu yai ban* position. All criteria are applied to most other formal leader's positions at the village and sub-district levels. It should be noted that for the most part these criteria are quite basic and so can be met by the majority of villagers. In practice, as will be discussed, other credentials are also important for a candidate to be elected.

As was mentioned earlier, the *phu yai ban* position is attained through the village election. It is important to briefly discuss the form of election taking place, the type of candidate who is likely to be elected, and other characteristics which are relevant for a candidate to be elected. There is no particular form of election mentioned in the act. It only states that the election must be 'democratic in which every eligible voter has one vote, and a candidate receiving the highest vote will be officially appointed to the post' (STU, 1983a). The official appointment is made by the provincial governor of each province after the result of the election is given to him by the district officer. With respect to the type of candidate to be elected, most literature related to the subject frequently mentions that the *phu yai ban* position, as well as other local formal leaderships, is held by members of the upper stratum, in social or economic terms, of each community. There exist also some arguments which suggest that the post is likely to be taken by a powerful figure (*nakleng* or *phu mii ittipol*), within the community (see for example Rigg, 1991; Turton, 1987). These arguments appears to be true in most cases, as being socially or economically well-off and being a powerful figure are among the main bases of an individual power in local Thai communities. There is evidence which supports the view that the power of *nakleng* or *phu mii ittipol* which is derived from less legitimate or even criminal means, has long been recognised in local Thai communities, not only by local people but also by local officials (see Johnston, 1980; Turton, 1987). Moreover, the high level of competition of the present day election system provides a better chance for these people to attain the post than traditional leaders. However, it is important to note that there are also some respected traditional leaders who hold the position of *phu yai ban* (see Wetchaphitak, 1991), but this is very rare. Moreover, it appears that *phu yai ban* who come from different backgrounds have different qualities in dealing with development work in their villages. In order to provide a better understanding of *phu yai ban* in the study area, an investigation should be made into their backgrounds and the ways by which they came to the position.

Based on the investigation in two villages under this study, and in other villages nearby, it was found that the recruitment of *phu yai ban* does not always follow the rules stated in the Local Administration Act. The way these rules are actually applied seems to evolve

over time, and varies from one location to another; adherence to these rules appears to improve with time. For example, the first *phu yai ban* of Ban Nua Phru was drawn from prominent leaders among the earliest settlers. An elder aged over 70 in Ban Nua Phru recalled of appointing the *phu yai ban* over 40 years ago:

> 'The first *phu yai ban* I knew was appointed by the *nai amphoe* at that time. There was no election. It took place when the village was large enough to be separated from the village we used to be part of. The *nai amphoe* and his followers came to the village and asked a few elders to name a person suitable for the job. If there were more than one name given the official would further search the most suitable among them. Then the nominated person was appointed.'

This case is not exclusive to the area under the study as similar information was found in nearby villages. A retired *phu yai ban* in a neighbouring village of Ban Nua Phru who was in his early 70s mentioned that he was also appointed by the *nai amphoe* in a similar way. He stated:

> 'I was asked by the *nai amphoe* of this district whether I would accept the position or not. The *nai amphoe* mentioned that he had consulted some elders in the village and they suggested me to be the *phu yai ban*. When I agreed, he said that he would send my name to the *changwat* for official appointment.'

An elder in Bueng Yai community asserted that in the past *phu yai ban* and *kamnan* were not recruited through election. Rather they were appointed through the process of selection made by officials from the district office. In most cases, persons selected were drawn from informal leaders within individual communities. It is important to note that elders in each community played a significant role in the selection process, as mentioned above. Although their role was only to advise the district officer, their comments were important in influencing him. Selection criteria were said to be made simply on the basis of getting 'someone workable' -- that is, someone who could communicate easily with both officials and villagers. The educational attainment criterion was not strictly applied as most rural leaders at that time seldom completed primary education. The turning point occurred around 30 years ago, when the system of election was introduced. All the present *phu yai ban* in the area came to the position through elections which took place after this time. However, the types of election varied with time. In the early stages of this

type of system, nominations were made at the meeting specially organised for the election purpose, and an open vote was applied. More recently, the method was changed to that which is presently applied, with candidates having to nominate themselves, and a secret vote rule being used. In addition, the competition is higher. Nowadays, elections are commonly accompanied by big and often costly campaigns.

According to Mr. Jai, who had just retired from the post in Ban Nua Phru in 1993, the recent election in this village was quite exciting and very different from when he was elected over 30 years ago. At that time, there were only three candidates nominated by villagers at the meeting organised by the district office. There was no formal campaign as the time and opportunity did not allow for it. Neither was there any expense involved in campaigning. However, an informal approach to seeking support was practised. Such campaigns were undertaken informally by supporters of each potential candidate, rather than by the candidate himself. This does not mean that potential candidates did not accede to such a campaign, but rather they preferred to remain unresponsive. By keeping silent, tension between candidates could be avoided, which was suitable for the social atmosphere at that time. Over 30 years, the situation has changed dramatically. In the latest election, three self-nominated candidates staged substantial campaigns, which were said to be quite costly for such a small election. The costs were estimated to vary from around 15,000 baht to over 30,000 baht (approximately £375 to £750) for each candidate. The most common form of the campaign was organising campaign parties in which food and drinks were served at the expense of each candidate. In each campaign party, the candidate who paid for it gave a talk about his intentions and promises. The talk often included some attacks on other candidates. In general, such parties do not only give each candidate the chance to convey his message and promises, they also show how generous (*jai kwaang, jai yai*) the candidates are. It is commonly perceived in this local community, and also in rural communities elsewhere in Thailand, that the more the costs involved, the more generous the candidate is to villagers.

Costly campaigning for the post was reported to be a recent phenomenon, beginning around 10 years ago. Prior to that, only verbal campaigns were employed. The recent popularity of this excessive form of campaigning was said to be influenced by the

practice widely adopted in higher level political campaigns, both for seats at provincial councils (*sapha changwat*) and at the house of parliament (*sapha phutaen ratsadorn*). This view is shared by many key informants in both Ban Nua Phru, Ban Bon Lay and in Bueng Yai community. Mr. Naam, the *phu yai ban* of Ban Bon Lay, noted that none of candidates in the election he won in 1983 organised such parties before the election. Such costly campaigns mentioned above were observed to be effective as it was found to be the case in the three most recently elected *phu yai ban* in the study area, including Ban Nua Phru, where those who spent the most money on campaigns were elected. Two of them were observed to be from well-to-do families, another was from an average family, but he sold his cattle for the campaign. Therefore, it can be said that the economic status of a candidate can be an important means by which he is elected, though not necessarily the most important factor.

Mr. Jai, Mr. Naam and a few villagers noted that though competition for election is very fierce, and campaigns are very costly, candidates are nevertheless prepared to make this investment on the basis of the potential benefits if successful. Being *phu yai ban* or *kamnan* nowadays often means a better opportunity to get access to benefits from resources available in the area they govern. In areas where valuable resources are abundant, *phu yai ban* and *kamnan* may join powerful officials or merchants to exploit resources for their own benefit. This can occur easily in Thai society, where abuse of power and corruption are widespread.

Other factors which are also influential include communication skills, contributions to the community and having experience outside the village. The present *phu yai ban* of Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay are both skilful in public communication, as are two newly elected *phu yai ban* in two neighbouring villages. All of them are among those who have wide experience of working outside their own villages, mostly in towns. All except one were reported to be actively involved in communal social activities before they were elected. Two of them used to serve as members of their village committees. These factors are viewed by many villagers as being important for their leaders to fulfil their duties, either those assigned by the government or those expected by their fellow villagers.

The historical perspective of the *phu yai ban* post and their recruitment system discussed here so far, provides an insight into their power in the administration of their villages, and their relationships to both their communities and the state. Changes in the recruitment from the less formal selection system, where candidates were drawn from among existing traditional leaders, to the more formal type of election based on competition, increases the formality and democratic status of the position under democratic perspective. On the other hand, it creates a clearer division between traditional leaders who are naturally influential, and formal leaders whose power is legitimised in governing the village community. A clear division between these groups of leaders is not beneficial for *phu yai ban* in their roles to govern their villages, since not all matters can be dealt with effectively, without the advocacy of traditional leaders.

6.3 General Roles of *Phu Yai Ban*

The extent of *phu yai ban*'s role is very broad, and can be roughly categorised into two areas: general roles and specific roles. The former refers mainly to their role in general and routine village administration, whereas the latter refers to their role related to specific issues, such as natural resources management. In playing these roles, a *phu yai ban* is placed in between higher officials who are their superiors or masters, and villagers who are their subordinates or clients. Being in such a position, the *phu yai ban* must take into account the expectations of these two groups, as well as his/her formally assigned roles. Therefore, the discussion about roles of *phu yai ban* should consider both aspects of their roles, which I would like to call 'roles in official perspective' and 'roles in villagers' perspective.' Moreover, it is important to investigate how *phu yai ban* actually adjust themselves to deal with expectations of both officials and villagers in performing their duties. The discussion in this section will deal with general roles of *phu yai ban* in both perspectives mentioned above, and as actually performed by *phu yai ban,* with reference to the study villages.

6.3.1 Roles of *Phu Yai Ban* in Official Perspective

From an official point of view, a *phu yai ban* is regarded as an official representative who, by the line of administration, is a state official under the Ministry of Interior's Department of Local Administration. However, his/her status and roles relate not merely to work undertaken by the Local Administration Department, but also relate to activities of several central ministries and departments taking place in the village under the responsibility of each *phu yai ban.* In general, roles of each *phu yai ban* are broadly stated as 'to rule people in his own village, and to maintain peace and order of villagers' (STU, 1983a, p. 27). From this statement, the primary roles of each *phu yai ban* can be viewed as the 'top leader', 'peace keeper' as well as 'peace maker' of the village he/she leads. Apart from being the official peace keeper and peace maker, the Local Administrative Act includes other roles such as roles in village occupational development, sanitary maintenance and promotion, and village development planning. These stated roles form guidelines for every *phu yai ban* to perform his duties as both an agency of the state and the most important representative of villagers he/she serves in communicating with the state. In practice, as the official representative at the village level, every *phu yai ban* is expected to follow and oversee any official policies and commands related to village administration and development issued by the central government (STU, 1983a; Department of Local Administration, 1991). In relation to these expectations, several duties are designated to all *phu yai ban.* These duties can be summarised as follows (STU, 1983a). Firstly, they are mandated to promote government policies and to abide by commands and other similar rules applied to their villages. Secondly, they are expected to notice and inform concerned state officials at higher levels of any incidents which affect, or may affect, the well-being of their villagers. Thirdly, they are entitled to apprehend any wrongdoers or anyone suspected of committing a crime within their administrative villages, before sending them for prosecution. Fourthly, they are required to assist the state services as well as to help their villagers in making access to the state services. This includes helping any official work or projects taking place within their villages. Finally, they are obliged to care for any public properties situated in the villages. This wide range of duties appears to be a burden for *phu yai ban,* as they have other roles to play in order to meet expectations

outside the official arena. The burden of office seems to be recognised by their superiors especially *kamnan* and *nai amphoe,* who work closely with *phu yai ban.*

Discussions with the present *kamnan* of Tambon Bueng Yai and the former *kamnan* of Tambon Thung Samet who had just recently retired in 1993, revealed that they both agreed that *phu yai ban* are overburdened by roles and duties assigned to them by the state, as they are abundant and very broad. To perform all their duties actively can be very costly and contrast with the very low stipends available to them. Hence, fulfilling all required duties are beyond their capabilities. To them, the basic requirement for *phu yai ban* is to have a good grasp of situations and problems facing their villagers, so that they can give immediate responses to higher level officials whenever they are needed. Moreover, they see that being active in administrative work, and honest in dealing with development work, are among the most important characteristics of all *phu yai ban.* Nevertheless, they both confessed that less than half of *phu yai ban* in their *tambon* meet these qualities.

In a meeting with the *nai amphoe* of Khuan Mangkhud district together with his Senior Under-Secretary, similar views were expressed regarding the duties of *phu yai ban.* The *nai amphoe* admitted that great responsibilities are assigned to *phu yai ban,* but not to other officials and leaders. He mentioned that their responsibilities have extended even further over time. This change has resulted from both structural reforms of the administrative systems and changes in society, leading to more problems and more complexity in their work. He stated; 'To be a good *phu yai ban* at the present time is more difficult than in the past, many forces exist that challenge *phu yai ban* in their attempts to exercise power effectively and correctly.' Because of the great deal of responsibilities *phu yai ban* have, the *nai amphoe* and his Senior Under-Secretary make allowance in their expectations of the performance of *phu yai ban.* They perceive that it is very difficult for every *phu yai ban* to fulfil all requirements given by the state. From his experience the *nai amphoe* sees that on average, the *phu yai ban*'s performance with respect to official expectations is satisfactory. He finally confessed, 'Most of them (*phu yai ban*) sacrifice a lot for their work, though their stipends are very low.'

The above discussion covered the broad official expectations of the roles of *phu yai ban,* both as related to the Local Administrative Act and as perceived by higher officials who are in close contact with *phu yai ban.* It indicates how important *phu yai ban* are for local administrative work. At the same time, it shows how much the work is prescribed by the state. The abundance of official duties makes it difficult for *phu yai ban* to handle effectively all duties assigned to them. Apart from the duties and expectations discussed above, there exist other duties prescribed under other regulations, which are more specific, and roles expected by the villagers they represent. The former includes duties with respect to the management of natural resources and the environment, and other specific duties in connection with functions of several ministries. The latter is related to expectations of villagers who are subordinate to *phu yai ban,* and who elect them to the post . Villagers' expectations of the role of *phu yai ban's* will be discussed in the following section. Later in this chapter, a specific section will be dedicated to the role of *phu yai ban* in relation to natural resources and environmental management.

6.3.2 Roles of *Phu Yai Ban* in Villagers' Perspective

As the official leader of the village, every *phu yai ban* is also expected to represent their fellow villagers in interacting with the state. Being elected by his/her fellow villagers, a *phu yai ban* is regarded as the most important official representative who should act on the villagers' behalf in communicating with the state. This aspect of roles places all *phu yai ban* in a position different from other officials who are appointed by the state.

Being resident in the village he/she leads, it is generally seen that every *phu yai ban* is the official who has the closest relationship with villagers in his/her village, and understand their conditions, problems and needs best. Therefore, he/she is in the best position to report any problems occurring in his village, in order to seek solutions. With respect to development planning, a *phu yai ban* is seen to be in the best position to identify the needs of his/her people so that they can be included in development plans. In the day-to-day administration, he/she is expected to help his/her people to making contact with the state in any related matters. Moreover, villagers also expect their *phu yai ban* to deal with many personal and social problems they face. Helping his/her people to

meet their needs is often complicated as different needs and interests often emerge. Ideally, each *phu yai ban* should react in response with needs and problems of the majority. However, the existence of different classes and the resultant inequality of power among them creates difficulties for each *phu yai ban* to make decisions, especially when needs of different groups are in conflict.

Based on informal discussions with people of different socio-economic status in the villages under the study, it was found that though some expectations are common, there are also differences in villagers' needs and interests. In both Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay, all the respondents regard their *phu yai ban* as the top leader of the villages, despite the existence of other leaders whom they respect in different ways. They expect their *phu yai ban* to bring about development in their villages, to ease problems that emerge in the villages, and to resolve disputes among villagers. They also expect their leaders to be trustful (*suesat*) and honest (*sujarit*) in dealing with all development activities. The terms *suesat* and *sujarit* are often used together as '*suesat sujarit*', referring to a lack of corruption in managing resources available for development activities, and a lack of bias in mediating conflicts. These attributes form the broad expectations of villagers with regard to their leaders. Nevertheless, both *suesat* and *sujarit* values are very subjective, because it is technically very difficult to measure their qualities. At the same time, the acceptability of the qualities of their leaders with respect to these values can vary locally. It was observed that villagers' overall weighting of the quality of their *phu yai ban* matters most in the relationship between each *phu yai ban* and his people; no particular attributes receive main priorities in their assessment of their leaders' quality. Most villagers I talked to are happy with the qualities of their present leaders in relation to most of these expectations. They see their *phu yai ban* as being among the more active when compared to *phu yai ban* in neighbouring villages. The only difference in the perception was found with respect to the stance of their leaders in calming conflicts emerging among villagers, and in distributing help provided from outside the village. All respondents from well-to-do households in both villages did not make any complaints, and were not so concerned about issues of calming conflicts and distributing help from outside the community. Among respondents from poor and average households, perceptions are divided. In both villages, the majority agreed that their *phu yai ban* are

just in dealing with these issues, and confessed that dealing with the issues is very difficult to satisfy everyone. Only a small minority were unhappy with the way their leaders deal with the subjects as they perceive some biases in the act of their leaders towards *'phak phuak'*, those who have a close social relationship with the leaders, and their relatives (*pee naung*). Nevertheless, there exists evidence which contradicts the claim that *phu yai ban* acts in favour of their relatives. For example, some villagers in Ban Bon Lay who are relatives of the *phu yai ban* mentioned that they experienced biased treatment from him in disputes they had with their neighbours. Complaining about unfair distribution of help and gifts from outside was also received from poor villagers who view that they were not given priority. This is the consensus of the majority who view that help received from outside is equally distributed among villagers regardless of their differences in socio-economic status. Because villagers from different socio-economic status are disparate in their needs, undifferentiated distribution among them can be regarded as unfair, as the poor may feel they should have priority in receiving help.

When it comes to *phu yai ban*'s role with respect to the advancement of the villages, the majority of villagers in both villages expect their *phu yai ban* and village committee members to play a dominant role in identifying problems and initiating ideas to be proposed. They perceive that their leaders and their colleagues are well aware of the needs and problems common to villagers, and therefore, there is no need for them to express these directly to *phu yai ban* and the village committee members. At the same time, a few villagers in Ban Bon Lay mentioned that they expected their *phu yai ban* to be more open minded about their complaints, and their propositions regarding detailed ideas related to village development planning, because they felt most of the time their *phu yai ban* are dictatorial. This dictatorial style of *phu yai ban* discourages villagers from active participation in development planning. Coupled with the familiarity of planning from above, planning at *mooban* level is dominated by *phu yai ban* and their colleagues in the village committees. Participation by ordinary villagers has yet to be improved.

The above discussion outlined the expectations that villagers have with respect to the leadership duties of their *phu yai ban*. In reality, villagers also expect their *phu yai ban* to deal predominantly in social activities, which are not necessarily related directly to the position. Social events, either taking place within each village or in neighbouring villages which have a strong social connection with the village, need the *phu yai ban*'s participation and contribution. Several forms of ceremonies are common in these two villages and other rural communities in Thailand. Religious ceremonies such as *ngaan taud kathin* (*kathin* offering ceremony for Buddhist priests), *ngaan taud phaapaa* (*phaapaa* or robe offering ceremony for Buddhist priests), and *ngaan songkraan* (water festival), are commonly organised to mark different traditional and religious events every year. *Ngaan taeng ngaan* (wedding), ~~*ngaan sop*~~ (cremation), and *ngaan buat* (Buddhist ordination), which are more personal social matters, are also common. In all these events, *phu yai ban* are expected to participate and contribute in different degrees. Financial contributions in the form of charity (*tambun*) and gifts, or what is often known as 'help' (*khaa chuay ngaan*), are inevitable and burdensome for *phu yai ban,* since they cost a considerably large amount of money every year. It is also common for *phu yai ban* to be expected to make financial contribution more than ordinary villagers in all these ceremonies. Failing to participate actively and to make reasonable contributions, can discredit and humiliate *phu yai ban*, which undermine their popularity and support from the villagers.

People's expectations of the role their *phu yai ban* should play are very great, and comparable to thaose of officials. They cover not just those directly related to their duties as the official leaders of the villages, but also those which are personal and socially related. To respond to these expectations is demanding and requires a lot of energy and financial support. On the other hand, failing to react properly to these expectations can have a negative effect on their relationship with people. Taking into account these expectations and those of their official role, it is difficult for *phu yai ban* to manage to respond fully to all of them. Additionally, financial limitations also deter their response to these expectations. In connection with the values discussed above, some *phu yai ban* may seek opportunities to gain extra income from whatever channels are available to them; some of these channels can be morally unacceptable or even illegal.

6.3.3 Actual Roles of *Phu Yai Ban*

In previous sections, the discussion has dealt with the roles of *phu yai ban* which are designated by the state, and those which are expected by their superiors and by villagers. They did not fully reflect what *phu yai ban* actually do or what activities they generally perform, in accordance with official prescriptions and expectations of both their superiors and villagers. Since the coverage of roles and expectations in both official and villagers' perspectives are very broad, the question arises of what *phu yai ban* actually do in practice to respond to those prescribed expectations. In response to this question, it is important to note here that not all roles and duties prescribed for *phu yai ban* happen on a regular basis in practical terms. Additionally, *phu yai ban* do not act to fully respond to all expectations discussed earlier, as it is hardly possible to do so under these given conditions. Rather, their actual performances reflect their best selections of roles to be performed based on their individual assessments. Based on several discussions and observations made with *phu yai ban* in the villages under study, important commitments each *phu yai ban* have were found to include attending a monthly meeting at the district office, attending a monthly meeting at the *sapha tambon*, calling for and leading village meetings, visiting the district office for various purposes, and providing consultations for their villagers as well as acting as a primary arbitrator in solving conflicts among villagers.

a) The District Monthly Meeting

All *phu yai ban* and *kamnan* are required to attend a monthly meeting at the district office. The meeting is organised early in the first week of each month. The day of the meeting is combined with the pay day for *phu yai ban* and his colleagues. It is regarded as the most important event, and one which *phu yai ban* and *kamnan* must give top priority. From this meeting they receive state policies, commands and other official information which they should then transmit their substances to their villagers. All these official directives are normally known as '*khaw ratchakaan*', which is literally means 'official matters.' These 'official matters' are regarded as very important for *phu yai ban*

to keep in mind and apply to their administrative affairs. The meeting also provides a chance for them to inform and discuss any matters related to the well-being of their villagers. However, it seems that the function of transmitting *khaw ratchakaan* dominates the function of providing the chance for discussing administrative issues. According to both *phu yai ban* of Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay, the meeting forms the most important time of each month in which concerned officials, especially *nai amphoe*, have a chance to meet all local leaders to convey their messages and *khaw ratchakaan* to all of them. It is generally dominated by the *nai amphoe* who lead the meeting, and other concerned officials who attend the meeting, to formally convey their messages to local official leaders. Though in principle local leaders should relay any problems or raise any questions related to their administrative work, in practice this does not usually happen. Mr. Naam, the *phu yai ban* of Ban Bon Lay noted that only a few leaders often use the meeting to communicate with the officials, because it is too public and formal. Generally, these leaders prefer less public opportunities outside the meeting to discuss administrative matters with concerned officials. Mr. Naam added that most local leaders are not comfortable speaking in a public meeting place. Further analysis shows that it is the environment of the meeting where many high ranking officials are present makes local leaders feel uncomfortable to discuss or question openly (see Cornish, 1988). This type of atmosphere is not only common to local leaders like them, since it is observed to happen also at other levels of superior-subordinate relationships.

b) The *Sapha Tambon* Meeting

The *sapha tambon* meeting generally happens once a month at each *sapha tambon* office. All *phu yai ban,* as well as other members of a *sapha tambon,* must attend the meeting of their own *sapha tambon.* Officials who are involved in the *sapha tambon* are also required to attend the meeting. The meeting occurs after the monthly meeting at the district office. Primary functions of the *sapha tambon* meeting are to discuss problems related to administration and development of every village within each *sapha tambon,* and to find possible solutions among members. It also forms a part of the planning process of village and *tambon* development planning, as some of the problems discussed in each meeting will then be included in the *tambon* annual planning agenda. This agenda

is then brought into the most important meeting of each *sapha tambon,* devoted to formulating the *tambon* development plan to be proposed for official approval. Based on discussions made with a few *phu yai ban* in the study area, as well as with the former and the present *kamnan* of Bueng Yai and Khuan Samet sub-districts, the *sapha tambon* meeting is regarded as the most important chance for local official leaders to express their perceptions of problems, and to propose their ideas related to development of their villages and their *tambon.* Because the meeting is less formal and involves only a small number of participants who mostly know each other quite well, it provides a better atmosphere for members to actually participate in its discussions, as compared to that of the monthly district meeting. Though some field officials affiliated to *sapha tambon* are often present, most of them are also familiar to these leaders as they work mostly at the field level.

In two meetings of *sapha tambon* Bueng Yai I observed in 1994, every *phu yai ban* in *Tambon* Bueng Yai attended both meetings, whereas one or two elected representatives were absent. Apart from the *kamnan* who led both meetings as the president of the *sapha tambon,* almost every *phu yai ban* participated in discussions brought up in the meetings. Nevertheless, less than half of *phu yai ban* could be considered as actively participating in the discussions. Based on their backgrounds gathered through this study, personalities, personal experience of contact with outside the community, and communication skills appear to determine their degree of participation. A few *phu yai ban* who participated actively in the discussions were those who have better experience of outside contact and who are personally talkative and communicative. Other members were not as active as *phu yai ban* in participating in the meetings, except for one or two who were said to have wide experience of outside contacts. Though some field officials, apart from those attached to the *sapha tambon,* were present in the meetings, they were concerned only with issues that needed to be clarified. Those who were attached to the *sapha tambon,* i.e. the Community Development Officer (*pattanakorn*) and the local teacher who was appointed as the secretary, did not show clear domination in the meeting. They act more as facilitators than full participants. The meetings were not technically very formal, therefore members were allowed to interrupt at any time. Additionally, the language used was mainly southern dialect which is familiar to all members and field officials.

It can be concluded from two *sapha tambon* meetings I observed that the meeting forms an important event where *phu yai ban* can play their role of discussing problems related to development and administrative work, and construct solutions suitable for each locality. It provides an opportunity which they did not have before the introduction of the *sapha tambon* under the present structure. Because the number of participants in the meeting is quite small, and participants are familiar to each other, the atmosphere of the meeting appears to be less formal, and is more suitable for local leaders taking part in its discussion. Moreover, the meeting also functions as the most important opportunity for *phu yai ban* to participate in the planning process, which is marked by the special annual meeting allocated for the planning purpose. Although the chance to attend this special *sapha tambon*'s planning meeting was not available to me during the time of this study, it can be assumed from discussions with *phu yai ban*, *kamnan*, and some members of *sapha tambon* Bueng Yai, that the atmosphere of the meeting should not be very different from the regular monthly meeting . The formal status of *kamnan* and *phu yai ban* allows them to dominate the meeting. While the meeting provides a good chance for *kamnan* and *phu yai ban* to participate more actively in making decisions regarding development administration, it does not affect the participation of other members very much. Elected members whose status is not as important as that of *kamnan* and *phu yai ban*, are less active in participation. Therefore, it cannot be presumed that full participation operates and the decisions that are made are fully responsive to the needs of local people.

c) The Village Meeting

Organising the village meeting is in the hands of the *phu yai ban* of each village. As mentioned in Chapter Five, the village meeting should be organised regularly at least once a month, and extra meetings can also be called for whenever necessary. However, in practice not every village in the study area organises the village meeting regularly. As a matter of fact, none of the villages in Bueng Yai community had their regular meetings during the time of this study, whereas two villages observed in Tambon Khuan Samet have their village meetings every month. According to the *phu yai ban* of Ban Bon Lay,

the meeting is called only occasionally when there are important issues to be discussed and decided by villagers as a whole, rather than by the village committee. The village meeting is organised for several purposes. Its main purpose is to inform the villagers of policies, commands, and any official matters received from the state, and to discuss problems related to village administration and development. Moreover, the meeting can be called for specific purposes such as to organise public works, to distribute materials provided by the state after the flood, and to inform urgent official matters, etc.

As discussed in Chapter Five, *phu yai ban* play a dominant role in the village meeting. The meeting's atmosphere is mainly in the hands of *phu yai ban*. By chairing the meeting he/she can control its direction and discussions. Although participation of villagers is encouraged under the present concept of rural development planning, the continuing of master-follower tradition does not encourage ordinary villagers to take part in the discussion. As an effect of this tradition, the village meeting concentrates more on the function of informing, rather than discussing matters. Although it is important for the village to have regular meetings, these do not serve the purpose of directly promoting people's participation. Other means must also be used in helping *phu yai ban* to identify the problems and needs common to his/her villagers. These include participation in social circles, such as the drinking circle and the chatting circle, and the use of informal observation, as already mentioned in Chapter Five.

Making contact with the district office, providing consultations to villagers, and arbitrating disputes among villagers, form other routine work of *phu yai ban* which consumes a great amount of time. Visiting the district office happens weekly to each *phu yai ban* in the study area. Most of them mentioned that it happens about twice a week for different purposes. The visit is commonly used to help villagers to make contact with various concerned bodies in the district office. Sometimes *phu yai ban* are called by concerned officials to discuss matters related to their work. These frequent visits form an inevitable task for *phu yai ban* to respond to expectations of both villagers and officials. Additionally, they are often visited by their villagers when they are at home, to discuss various subjects. Villagers may bring problems they face and ask their leader for help. Common problems are disputes on various subjects with others, either occurring within

the village or with outsiders, in which the *phu yai ban* must arbitrate. Most villagers do not want any cases to end with formal legal actions as they involve complicated processes and high costs. Thus, in most cases they would expect their *phu yai ban* to seek solutions or agreements between them. Quite often villagers come to see their leaders to complain about unlawful things that have happened to them, expecting *phu yai ban* to take further actions to solve the matters. Concerned officials also visit *phu yai ban* to seek help in mediating official activities undertaken or anticipated to be undertaken in their villages. Sometimes they bring ideas of 'development projects', which form part of their central departments' policies, to see if they can be introduced to the villages. At other times, they bring routine work taking place at the village level to seek co-operation from the village committee members to accomplish.

Overall, though being a *phu yai ban* is seen to be quite low in its official status, it does involve a range of responsibilities. Each *phu yai ban* has to cope with abundant official directives and expectations of both their superiors and their villagers. Counting all the roles he/she has to perform in order to respond effectively to all directives and expectations, it is certainly difficult for each *phu yai ban* to cope under the current circumstances. Therefore, it is common that the *phu yai ban* concentrates primarily on various aspects of routine administrative work. Other types of work which are more specific to certain subject matters are given less priority. Duties in relation to natural resources management form part of these types of work, and are also new to *phu yai ban.* It is not uncommon for many problems to emerge when dealing with newly assigned duties. Some of these problems cannot be treated in isolation from the abundant general commitments *phu yai ban* have already had in general administrative affairs.

6.4 The Role of *Phu Yai Ban* in Natural Resource Management

The change in organisational aspects of natural resource development planning management is one of the most important reforms in the Thai administrative system which have been recently introduced by the state, and which are in the interest of concerned bodies. Apart from establishing new organisations to battle with the overall problems of natural resources depletion, the inclusion of local organisations in natural

resource and environmental planning and implementation is seen to be crucial. It is the first time in the history of Thai administration that local level administrative bodies, especially the *sapha tambon* and village committee, are viewed as important for the management of natural resources. However, because various administrative bodies are unfamiliar with the devolution of power to local organisations and the prevailing traditions of the Thai bureaucratic system, dealing with the issues related to natural resource management is difficult for local organisations and their leaders. Based on investigations related to attempts to manage natural resources in the study area, this section will highlight consequences of state attempts to include local official leaders, especially *phu yai ban*, in managing local natural resources, especially those of CPRs. It will begin with the commitment of local leaders on natural resource management in general. Then it will elaborate the involvement of *phu yai ban* in planning and implementing projects related to CPR at village and sub-district levels.

6.4.1 The Commitment of Local Leaders to Natural Resource Management

In the past, management of natural resources and the environment was divided among various central departments, and their responsibilities were quite independent. However, this system was later found to be complicated and ineffective in dealing with this subject, mainly due to a lack of co-ordination among different central departments and their subsequent agencies, and the fact that there was an overlapping of some work (Wirajnibhawan, 1992). Moreover, the system of dividing responsibilities proved to be inappropriate and unrealistic, as the management of natural resources and the environment is frequently related to several departments, and therefore requires integration between departments. These are the main reasons behind the change in the organisational structure related to natural resources and environmental management introduced by the state in the late 1980s under the Sixth National Economic and Social Development Plan as mentioned in Chapter One. Under this new structure, every province is responsible for drawing up its own plan for managing natural resources and the environment within its political boundary. The plan is included under the provincial development plan, and the rural development administrative structure is applied in the implementation of the plan in rural areas. This means that the involvement of local

bodies is stressed in the policy process following the new concept of development planning. However, unlike the process of rural development planning where the role of the *sapha tambon* and the village committee are emphasised, natural resource and environmental planning stresses the importance of provincial and district level planning bodies. This does not mean that the involvement of the *sapha tambon* and the village committee is excluded. There is a possibility of including planning bodies at these two levels, but no firm arrangement has been made (CBAMNREP, 1990; see also DEQP, 1994).

As far as the *sapha tambon* and the village committee are concerned, it can be assumed that their roles with respect to natural resource and environmental planning should not differ from those in the process of rural development planning. This implies that these two local organisations are entitled to propose their plans related to the management of natural resources and the environment, and to implement them within their political boundaries. Thes should happen in a similar manner as they do for the rural development plan. At the same time, it is part of their general duties to enforce existing legislation related to the management of natural resources and the environment, to keep peace and order among resource users, as well as to assist any concerned bodies in implementing related programmes and projects in their administrative territories (Wirajnibhawan, 1992). Nevertheless, the extent of their actual concern with these tasks depends upon the level of importance of problems and activities related to the subject taking place in their administrative areas. In two villages under the study, the level of problems related to natural resource management differs significantly as already discussed in Chapter Four and Chapter Five. Their difference seems to affect the role played by their official leaders, in dealing with natural resources in the villages. To illustrate what actually happens, further analysis will be made in this section. The emphasis will be on CPRs, especially fishery resources, which are important to the livelihoods of people in these communities.

There are several natural resources important to the livelihoods of the inhabitants of the area under this study. Some of these resources are viewed by local people and concerned officials as being at risk, particularly fishery resources. Since fishing forms an important

part of the livelihoods of the majority of the population, sustainable management of fishery resources is crucial for their well-being. In connection with fishery resources, the condition of the swamp forest is also crucial, and determines the condition of the fisheries. The poor condition of the swamp forest is an important cause of the decline in fishery resources in this area. These two types of natural resources are perceived to be under threat not only by people who depend on them, but also by concerned officials. Despite their useful knowledge about problems and the relationships between these two resources, proper management of these resources appears to be problematic and complicated. It involves issues related to the ownership and control over these resources, and the overall physical and social changes occurring in the villages and in the wider society to which they belong, as described in Chapter Four. Though these two types of natural resources should in principle be CPRs, the fact that most of the land available in the area is owned by their residents provides some rights over the resources. Additionally, the increasing scarcity of the resources against the increasing numbers of population and livelihood demands creates conflict in the competition over the resources. From a legal point of view, issuing regulations to control the use of these resources in order to prevent overexploitation and promote conservation is essential.

There are two sets of regulations which are applied to the management of swamp forest and fishery resources in the area: fishery regulations and forestry regulations. The fishery regulations cover subjects such as licensing of fishing, seasonal restriction of fishing, and restrictions of types and scales of fishing gear (Rientrairat, 1983; Department of Fisheries, 1980; see also Appendix Two). Under forestry regulations, any activities harmful to the forest and wildlife (with the exception of fish) in both public and reserve land, are prohibited (personal communication with a senior forestry official). In principle, all local leaders in this area, including *kamnan* and *phu yai ban*, are responsible for maintaining these rules within their political boundaries. Given that each *kamnan* also acts as the head of the village he represents at the same time, the role of *phu yai ban* in this respect also reflects the role of *kamnan*. Considering the actual role of *phu yai ban* in maintaining the above regulations, it appears that though he has much authority, he does not always use this fully. Moreover, the extent to which *phu yai ban* exercise their power

was not observed to be associated positively with the level of problems existing in their communities.

In Ban Nua Phru, only a few problems related to unlawful exploitation of fishery resources were evident during the period of this study, whereas no single problem related to the exploitation of swamp forest was evident. This does not mean that there are no offences against forestry regulations taking place in the village; minor offences may take place but they are regarded as being insignificant. Cutting a small number of trees for domestic purposes, such as fire wood, house repair, and livestock fencing, is not restricted in this area, though it is illegal. Construction of refuge trap ponds (*baw law pla*) in parts of the reserve forest area is also acceptable, although it is illegal. Therefore, neither their leaders nor local officials who work with the local forest protection unit take any action against these activities. All the problems related to fishery resource exploitation, were observed to be connected with the use of harmful fishing gear and methods in fishing. Though the problems are not yet widespread, poisoning of fish in private refuge-trap ponds, and setting fishing gear in prohibited areas such as by blocking waterways or in the temple reserve area (*khate sanghataan*), were evident. Moreover, construction of refuge-trap ponds in so-called public lands which are unofficially occupied is also commonly practised, regardless of any official permission.

It is particularly important to note that not all of the illegal practices mentioned above are perceived as wrongdoing by villagers and their leaders. The case of constructing refuge trap ponds is very clear. More than half of villagers own the ponds of which a considerable number are located in public lands informally occupied. A nation wide regulation of issuing licences for fishing in natural waterbodies is not yet officially enforced in the area, and most fishermen do not realise that such a regulation exists. It was observed that some official regulations may look good on paper, but they contradict traditional practices which are part of the livelihoods of local inhabitants. The practices of cutting trees and constructing refuge trap ponds illustrate conflicts taking place between common traditional practices and official rules which are based on an absolute perception of conservation. To local inhabitants these practices are morally acceptable as they do not perceive conservation in the same manner as does the state.

The conflict between official rules and people's perceptions in managing CPRs creates significant effects on the actual application of some policies. Because of these conflicting conceptions, villagers and local leaders do not pay much attention to rules they do not consider to be important. As a consequence, no attempt is made to control the practices and to arrest villagers who break these rules. However, activities which are perceived to be harmful for their resource conditions, such as fish poisoning, fishing in the temple reserve area, and using some types of fishing gear to block water ways, are seriously opposed. Personal warnings for those who are suspected of breaking these rules, and general public warnings in the village meeting, are frequently practised by *phu yai ban* as early steps of enforcement. Further action is likely to be taken if these early steps do not work. However, formal legal actions are preferably to be avoided in such a small community as this village. Rather social sanctions, such as through public condemnation of such practices and personal warnings by leaders, are preferred. Consequently, practices which are perceived to be unacceptable are seldom found. There were only two cases during the time of this study in which formal legal action could not be avoided, and two young fishermen were prosecuted by policemen who were called to the village. These two fishermen were described as being pigheaded (*due, hua khaeng*); they challenged the first attempt to stop them from setting their barriers across a water way in the village. The cases ended up with the offenders being fined and their fishing gear being destroyed. According to the former *phu yai ban,* such cases are very rare. He stated; 'Once it is taken, it gives warning to others not to challenge the law when their leaders give warning.' This indicates that enforcement of official regulations in relation to CPRs depends very much on the *phu yai ban* deciding to what extent he should exercise his power and authority. The decision of *phu yai ban* is determined also by perceptions of local values regarding the practices. Where restrictions are placed on practices which are perceived to be acceptable, they are likely to be ignored by local users as well as leaders. Failing to take proper action does not merely affect the effective enforcement of any particular regulations, but can also affect the leaders overall power in the village administration.

In Ban Bon Lay and the larger community of Bueng Yai, fishery resources are also more problematic than forest resources. Because fishery resources are more important to the economy of the community than forest resources, competition over the former is greater and leads to apparent overexploitation. As a consequence, various problems related to the deterioration of fishery resources are more apparent than those related to forest resources. As with the forest resources, perceptions of the use of the resources in this village are similar to those in Ban Nua Phru. Use of resources for certain purposes are acceptable by the community, even though this may contradict forestry regulations. Since the forest does not currently appear to be cut for predominantly commercial purposes, problems related to the exploitation of forest resources are overlooked.

The situation is different for fishery resources. Although not all activities stated under fishery regulations are perceived by local people as criminal, some practices are deemed to be unacceptable. A few prohibitions such as electric fishing using high voltage electricity adapted from a car battery (*chot pla*), setting barrier traps and other gear of a similar kind in the lake, and fish poisoning (*buea pla*), are generally perceived as criminal. Perceptions about other illegal activities, including using of fine-meshed gill nets, building brush piles in the lake, setting barrier traps across water ways, and use of some types of gear in spawning seasons, are mixed (for more details about fishery regulations, see Appendix Two). Most fishermen do not consider such activities to be unlawful, and they are therefore widely practised. On the other hand, the *phu yai ban* and his colleagues do perceive these activities as criminal, but not serious. As a consequence, little attempt is made to control such activities by the village administrative body apart from occasionally giving general warnings through the village loud speaker, the effect of which is marginal. The *phu yai ban* and his colleagues pay more attention to controlling activities which are commonly perceived as criminal. Besides giving warnings as the first step of taking action, they also report to the District Fisheries Office in order to take further action. Though the *phu yai ban* is authorised to prosecute offenders by himself, he seems to avoid this unless strong evidence is available, and co-operation from related bodies including the District Fisheries Officer and the head of the local police station is assured. There was no evidence during the time of this study that formal legal action is undertaken in Ban Bon Lay with respect to offences against fishery regulations, even

though such offences are commonly reported. However, there were two cases occurring in one of the adjacent *mooban* in which two fishermen were arrested. The arrest was made by local policemen who were accompanied by two village committee members.

Acting as a prosecutor in enforcing government regulations can be risky for *phu yai ban*, unless co-operation is assured by concerned officials, particularly the chief of local police. It is not uncommon that concerned officials, especially policemen, abuse their power in favour of offenders who have a close personal relationship with them, and come into conflict with local leaders. The *phu yai ban* of Ban Bon Lay recounted a bitter experience a few years ago, when he accompanied the newly appointed *pramong amphoe* to arrest a fisherman who was setting barrier traps in a restricted area in Bueng Yai lake. After the arrest, he and the fisheries officer destroyed fishing gear and sent the offender to the Bueng Yai Community Police Station, to proceed with the case. As the offender was later found to be among close companions (*phak phuak*) of local policemen, the case was treated by police in favour of the offender. Conversely, the *phu yai ban* and the *pramong amphoe* were accused of destroying the offender's fishing equipment. The case ended up with a compromise unofficially mediated by a powerful official from the district office. The offender was not charged and no further prosecution was undertaken, and the *pramong amphoe,* who was new to the area, was later transferred to a distant region. The *phu yai ban* admitted that he was embarrassed and began to be disillusioned with the legal system because it was unjust. Such a strange situation can happen when bribery is involved or an offender has a close personal relationship with influential officers. This reflects the practice of patron-client relationships which abuses the justice system and creates negative impacts on local administrative affairs. Some villagers and informal leaders revealed a few stories of biased and unjust threats made by officials, especially policemen, in relation to prosecution of fishery regulations as well as other crimes. In Ban Bon Lay and in Bueng Yai community as a whole, there are a considerable number of villagers who have close ties with policemen either through kin lines, as some policemen are locals or married to locals, or through the drinking circle (*wong lao*). Some of them are suspected of committing crimes because they have been seen doing so in the community, including breaking fishery regulations. Knowing that these people are among suspected criminals makes local leaders scared to take further

action, unless the 'green light' (*fai kheow*) is given by powerful policemen or powerful concerned officials, such as *nai amphoe.*

One of the main factors behind ineffective enforcement of official regulations is the limitation of *phu yai ban*'s authority to deal with natural resource management issues. Compared to policemen, the power of *phu yai ban* in dealing with the overall prosecution process is minimal. Even the *pramong amphoe,* who has direct responsibility for enforcing fishery regulations, does not have power comparable to that of the police. The complicated power relations among different concerned officials, and the emergence of corruption and paternalistic practices between powerful officials and their clients, create an unpleasant environment for *phu yai ban* to play their role effectively, even if they are willing to do so (a detail discussion about corruption in Thailand can be found in Scott, 1979). Many of them prefer to choose more delicate ways in dealing with problems such as informing the *pramong amphoe* in writing when a series of offences are apparent, placing the decision to take further action on the officer. Under such difficult circumstances, most regulations related to fishery resource management appear good only on paper, but in practice are poorly applied. The fate of the resources therefore depends mainly on the mechanism of traditional systems of resource allocation, with *phu yai ban* not having a direct role to play.

It is indicated in the above discussion that local official leaders, especially *phu yai ban,* are responsible for delivering any government policies related to sustaining and conserving valuable and scarce natural resources available at the local level. However, there are some complications in the delivery of these policies, mostly related to regulations and commands. Two common sources of these complications are: firstly, the disparity between official regulations and local perceptions of particular resources; and secondly, a lack of co-ordination in enforcing regulations related to these resources. Conflict then arises because regulations which are centrally designed for nation-wide application are frequently incompatible with deeply rooted traditional local practices. In such circumstances, though *phu yai ban* and other local official leaders are obliged to strictly oversee regulations, no effective enforcement should take place unless the matters are generally perceived to be important under given circumstances. Living among people

who share their social values, it is difficult for these leaders to act against perceptions prevailing among their fellow villagers in enforcing regulations which contradict their values and way of life. Consequently, only some regulations are seriously taken into account by local leaders, whilst others are ignored. This depends on the circumstances in a particular locality, with both traditional practices and the relationship between resource conditions and economic dependency of the people on those resources are counted. As with the co-ordination between concerned bodies in enforcing regulations, *phu yai ban* hold much lower status and power as compared to other concerned officials. Lack of co-ordination and support from other officials, especially policemen, is not uncommon and leads to disastrous and discouraging consequences, making it difficult for local leaders to perform their duties effectively. The lack of interest of concerned officials and the emergence of unjust treatment in the system of prosecution leads to deterioration in the actual practice of implementing CPR management in the study area. As a consequence, full enforcement of related regulations does not take place. In the case where official regulations and local perceptions are in conflict, the extent to which regulations are enforced depends very much on the determination of local official leaders, especially *phu yai ban,* to alter them under given circumstances and limited conditions. It can be concluded that the actions of *phu yai ban* are similar to the actions of 'street-level bureaucrats' in general, as suggested by Lipsky (1980). Even if they are ambitious in putting policies into practice, several limitations confront them when trying to do so.

6.4.2 *Phu Yai Ban* and Natural Resource Planning

The present structure of natural resource and environmental planning at the local level is integrated into the process of rural development planning. This means that each *sapha tambon* can participate in the process by including its own natural resource and environmental management plan into its annual development plan. As the *tambom* plan is mainly derived from several *mooban*'s proposals, each *phu yai ban* is also entitled to propose projects related to natural resource management of his/her own *mooban* to be considered by the *sapha tambon,* and then formulated into the *tambon* development plan. The concept is theoretically sound, but its application is substantially inconclusive. A few questions arise concerning the application, both in terms of the legal context of

participation of local leaders and the understanding of the subject itself, which is rather new to local administration.

Considering the legal context of participation, there is no doubt that there is recognition of the importance of local organisations in the planning process with respect to the management of local natural resources and the environment. As mentioned earlier, the *sapha tambon* acts both as an advisory body to the district committee in preparing the district natural resource and environmental plan, and as an active body to propose its own projects related to natural resource and environmental management as part of its annual rural development plan, which are later to be integrated into higher level development plans.

However, further investigation illustrates that the role of the *sapha tambon* in the first respect, i.e. as an advisory body to the district committee, is not clearly predetermined. Each *sapha tambon* and its contributory village committees do not have a direct role in the planning process. The extent of their participation depends on the view of the district committee of their inclusion into the process. Even if their inclusion is seen to be advantageous, their influence on the overall decision-making process should not be great. In other words, their involvement can only be partial, based on the wish of the district committee. This means that it depends on the district committee or concerned officials who sit on the district committee to decide upon the extent to which the *sapha tambon* and the village committee should be consulted. Combined with the perception of superiority existing among higher officials as often argued, the influence of local official leaders on the overall decision-making regarding natural resource and environmental planning in this respect is very low. This is demonstrated by a few natural resource related projects undertaken in the area, where only minor involvement of the *sapha tambon* and village committee was observed. The decision to have or not to have projects was determined predominantly by the district and higher level executive committees. Only some details of the projects, such as details about its location, problems related to the projects and solutions, were discussed with local leaders. Ultimately, problems related to property rights, especially the rights over land which was allocated for the projects, were left for local official leaders to sort out. The overall design of the projects

was based on existing regulations which do not allow for major adjustment. This implies that the chance to introduce self-generated regulations, which are often argued as important for community-based resource management projects (see Ostrom, 1990; Pomeroy, 1993), is very limited.

The recognition of *sapha tambon* as an active planning body in natural resource development is more meaningful than as an advisory body in a participatory sense. Under the present rural development planning process, each *sapha tambon* is entitled to draw its own annual development plan to be funded by the state under the rural development scheme. A fixed budget is allocated equally by the central government every year to every *tambon* throughout the country. This budget is then allocated to *tambon* and *mooban* level projects which are approved by each *sapha tambon.* Generally, the *tambon* development plan is generated from several village development proposals submitted to each *sapha tambon.* The *sapha tambon* then reformulates these proposals into the *tambon* level plan. Every *phu yai ban* has two important roles in this planning process: as the leader of his own village committee who oversees the preparation of the village development proposal; and as a key member of the *sapha tambon* who contributes to the *tambon* level decision-making. These two basic roles place the *phu yai ban* in a good position to include issues concerned with natural resources that emerge in his/her village onto the planning agenda, and to defend their importance both at the *mooban* and *tambon* levels. However, the question is whether they actually play these roles? And, does the surrounding environment permit them to participate actively in the planning process?

Observation in the two villages under this study reveals that there is no doubt that *phu yai ban* play these two important roles in the rural development process, but their perceptions of the importance of natural resource management in the development are dubious. Most development projects undertaken were observed to be stereotypical and limited to infrastructural and small group development. Construction of roads, bridges, meeting places, clean water storage tanks and wells, and establishment of village savings groups as well as small occupational development groups, are common to most villages. These conventional types of project dominate rural development ideas, not only in this

area, but also elsewhere in Thailand. More importantly, they form a continuum of government initiated development schemes. One of the reasons is that rural development (*kaanpattana chonnabot*) is often interpreted as 'bringing advancement and modernisation to rural areas' (*kaan nam kwaamjaroen kaonaa su chonnabot*). To advance and modernise the villages, infrastructural development and establishment of so-called interest groups are seen as major components. This perception of advancement and modernisation still dominates the views of *phu yai ban* and other formal leaders in the villages under study, as they usually refer to infrastructural development when replying to questions about rural development projects. The fact that none except one project recently proposed to *sapha tambon* of both sub-districts in which the study villages belong, is related to natural resource management, provides support for this argument. The dominant view of state-led rural development in the past still has a strong influence on the present system, and cannot be underestimated in explaining this phenomenon. The domination of this view certainly influences the way of thinking of concerned field officials and local official leaders in dealing with development planning. Both field officials and local official leaders gain this viewpoint through their training, government publicity, and interactions with their superiors whose concept of development has changed very little, despite the attempt of central policy making bodies to introduce the new concept of planning. Moreover, the new concept of planning which encourages the participation of local leaders in initiating development planning is also not fully operational. Many *tambon* and *mooban* level projects proclaimed as a product of purely *sapha tambon* decisions were observed to be controversial. Frequent contact and interactions between local leaders and concerned field officials, either formally or informally, significantly influences local leaders' development initiatives. Since the understanding of field officials about rural development does not appear to have changed very much, their influence on local official leaders' initiatives has consequences on the *tambon* and *mooban* development planning, which undervalues natural resource and environmental problems. Projects such as the construction of clean water storage tanks, the establishment of savings groups, the construction of meeting places, are examples where the influence of officials is implied.

The limitations facing rural development planning which lead to a lack of emphasis on natural resource management, are also subject to the complexity of the content of natural resource management itself. Although p*hu yai ban* and other local leaders realise the existence of natural resource management problems, they do not have a clear understanding of the causes. Clearly they have an idea about what the causes are, but they have difficulties in ordering their importance and in understanding linkages among different causes. Taking fishery resources into consideration, some leaders see over-fishing as the main cause, whereas other groups view environmental degradation in broader terms. Villagers blame the use of harmful fishing gear and fishing methods, such as small-meshed monofilament gill nets, spears connected with electric current, seine nets, brush piles, and long bamboo barriers, as not only destructive to fishery resources in the short term, but also affecting the sustainability of fish stocks in the long term. Environmental problems, such as change in water quality and water flow system, shallowness of waterbodies, and deforestation of swamp forest, are seen as having connection with degradation of fishery resources. Moreover, in very dry years a lot of fish in the swamp die from drought and forest fire. The overexploitation of fishery resources through the use of harmful fishing gear and fishing methods is apparent, whereas villagers' explanations of broader environmental degradation are less clear. This is mainly because environmental degradation in this particular ecosystem is complicated and also related to changes occurring over time. This causes difficulties not only for local leaders but also concerned officials in developing a consensus view about its real causes and consequences. Hence, to address problems of environmental degradation effectively is a difficult task; even if more information is available, it will not necessarily result in an effective solution.

The complexity of problems related to CPR management, as illustrated in the case of fishery resources above, can deter local official leaders from pursuing environmental management. The effect of policy content on policy implementation corresponds to Grindle's assumption of the importance of policy content on the reaction of policy implementors which affects the outcome of a policy (Grindle, 1980a). Traditional leaders who have an interest in the issues also face similar obstacles. Although all these leaders realise the existence of the problems and their anticipated impacts if the problems are left

unsolved, they also face difficulties in finding solutions to the problems, because a wide range of causes are involved, and some are interlinked. Furthermore, many of these causes, especially those concerned with ecological changes, are beyond their understanding, for example changes in water flow system and their relationships with shallowness of waterbodies, consequences of improperly designed infrastructural development on water flow system, and so on. Even concerned field officials also have limited knowledge about them. Some problems are strongly perceived to be the main cause of declining fisheries, such as use of harmful fishing gear and shallowness of waterbodies, and therefore most *phu yai ban* and traditional leaders have shown their willingness to use appropriate strategies to combat them. Nevertheless, the existing strategies employed by the state, which appear mainly in the form of imposing regulations to prevent and control fishing activities, are perceived to be ineffective and not completely reliable. If the conventional practice of enforcement which is perceived as corrupt and unjust remains unchanged, this implies that conventional management strategies in the short run will not work, since dramatic changes in the enforcement system are unlikely to take place easily. To battle with the increasing shallowness of waterbodies, they believe that a large project of re-excavation, especially of the lake, is the only effective solution. However, such a project requires a great amount of money, which is unlikely to be forthcoming through the normal procedures of development planning, where only a limited annual budget is assured for each *tambon*. All these perceptions deter *phu yai ban* from including CPR management issues into village development planning.

Realising the above obstacles makes some informal leaders, who are very concerned about these issues (especially a group led by a charismatic trader in Bueng Yai community), struggle for support from outside the official arena to deal with these problems. They joined NGOs working in other fishing communities, in campaigning for community-based sustainable fishery management in the Songkhla Lake complex as a whole. They also made direct contact with powerful local politicians in seeking support from special budgets which these politicians have access to. So far, these attempts have not yet achieved any significant success.

Fishermen are more directly affected by the problems of fishery resource depletion than officials and their leaders, because to many of them the resources are their main source of livelihoods. However, whilst there is widespread acceptance that problems exist, there are a variety of opinions regarding their causes. The majority of them see the overall changes in the ecological system, together with an increase in the exploitation of the resources, as major causes. As with ecological changes, the shallowness of waterbodies caused by siltation is perceived as the most important cause. Hence, they share the common perception with their leaders that the conditions of the fisheries cannot be substantially improved unless re-excavation of waterbodies is undertaken. With respect to the exploitation of resources, the use of harmful fishing gear as described earlier is denounced. However, there are mixed views with respect to the use of some types of illegal fishing gear, especially small-meshed gill nets, and small brush piles, which are most common. Many fishermen see the use of these types of fishing gear, despite their illegality, as reflecting the economic pressure fishermen face in their struggle for their survival. Therefore, they agree to compromise with the use of these types of fishing gear, as they see many fishermen having to depend on them, and these types of gear are not perceived as having a particular negative impact. The majority of them presume that the rapid population increase in the community, and hence the increase in fisher population, is the main factor behind this pressure. However, some of them see that this pressure is also driven by the increasing needs for cash following the recent changes in lifestyle as a result of the shift towards a market economy and modernisation of the community. This argument is sensible as expansion of capitalism can create pressure on rural communities when job opportunities in the non-rural sector are limited, whereas the need for cash increases (for a detailed discussion on this subject with particular reference to Southeast Asia, see Evers and Schrader, 1994). In order to reduce these problems, even though most of them agree to stricter enforcement of existing regulations, they do not see the capacity of their official leaders to pursue these objectives under the present conditions. At the same time, they do not believe in the ability of their official leaders to create new projects to cope with the problems. To them, if the existing regulations are effectively enforced, these problems will be diminished dramatically.

Though issues related to the management of CPRs are complicated and receive a low priority in village and sub-district planning, it is not impossible for village or sub-district administrative bodies to initiate projects related to CPR management. However, initiating projects dealing with such complicated issues needs mutual support from various leaders whose strengths are recognised. By working together with shared interests, the strengths and power of these leaders can be pooled in constructing ideas to eliminate, or at least to diminish existing problems. Though this proposition may be argued as rather idealistic, as barriers between official and traditional leaders are likely to emerge, having a leader who is perceived to be politically neutral and culturally respectful, thus bridging the gap between them, will be helpful. The case of the Forest Reserve Project in Ban Nua Phru provides a good example of this type of co-operation, originating from within the village community. Both official and traditional leaders joined together in designing the project. Behind this co-operation is the interest and active involvement of the abbot of the village's temple. The abbot, whose merit is recognised and central to all community members, is very influential to the project initiation as he sees that the links between forest, water and fish must be taken into account in maintaining fishery resources in this area. By working closely with the former *phu yai ban,* who is recognised by the state as an active *phu yai ban,* and the official village elder, who is known to be knowledgeable, the project was made possible by starting with the simple idea of planting trees in public land covered by the already degraded swamp forest. Though the idea was also discussed with concerned officials, no positive response was received until after the project was started through local efforts. This instance indicates that local initiation of projects related to natural resource management under the given structural conditions is feasible under mutual co-operation of both official and traditional local leaders, providing they have a common understanding of the subject. Moreover, the charismatic property of local leaders is important in influencing villagers and attracting support from official bodies. The detail of this case project will be discussed later in this chapter. This finding indicates how important characteristics of leaders and cohesiveness among different leaders in the achievement of the community project. The cohesiveness of these leaders is then transformed into the cohesiveness of members of the community. In economic terms, high cohesiveness among members of the community means low transaction costs

in pursuing natural resource management, which is promising for successful management (see Ostrom, 1990; Singleton and Taylor, 1992).

It can be concluded from this section that although the importance of *phu yai ban* is recognised by the state in dealing with natural resource and environmental planning, both at the *mooban* and *tambon* level, several obstacles exist which hamper their active involvement. These obstacles emerge in relation to the organisational structure of natural resources and environmental planning, the persistence of conventional perceptions of development, and the unfamiliarity and confusion of local leaders on the subject. These obstacles obstruct *phu yai ban*'s ability to prioritise issues related to CPR management in village development planning. Therefore, initiation of projects related to CPR management at *mooban* and *tambon* levels is unlikely to take place easily through the effort of *phu yai ban* alone. However, there is still a chance of having projects related to CPR management at the local level, either through the initiation of higher administrative bodies or through the mutual co-operation of various leaders who are concerned about the issues. In any case, local leaders must be responsible for taking part in implementing such projects once they are established. The achievement of these projects depends also on the commitment of local leaders, especially *phu yai ban,* in implementing them.

6.4.3 Details of Case Projects

Earlier I mentioned about projects related CPR management in this area, and two projects were selected as study cases for an in-depth analysis of the roles of local organisations and local leaders in CPR management. The two projects selected are the Fishery Reserve Project in Bueng Yai community and the Forest Reserve Project in Ban Nua Phru. This section will present detail backgrounds of these two projects.

a) <u>The Fishery Reserve Project in Bueng Yai Community</u>

In May 1993, the Phatthalung Provincial Fisheries Office issued a declaration to establish 'The Fishery Reserve Area' in part of Bueng Yai lake. The coverage of this area is 605 *rai* (0.97 sq. km.). Legally, this project is allocated as a sanctuary area categorised as

'aquatic plants and animals protection area' (*khate raksa peutpan sat naam*), in which all plants and animals inhabiting the area are legally protected, and all fishing activities are strictly prohibited. Similar types of declaration have been issued twice in the lake prior to this declaration.

The first declaration was in 1934, covering an area of about 1,650 *rai* (2.64 sq. km.). This declaration was said to be based on the traditional practice existing in this area at that time. The management of this project lasted several years, under an integration of the traditional system existing in the community, and the formal system introduced by the state. However, it was said that the traditional system played a more dominant role than the formal system in its implementation. Unfortunately, the practice weakened, and eventually collapsed around twenty years ago. The blame was placed mainly on the pressure over resource use and the marked decline in traditional values emerging in the community. The second declaration was released in 1990 covering the area of 415 *rai* (0.44 sq. km.). According to key informants, this declaration completely failed to achieve its objectives, as no effective enforcement took place.

The present declaration was made to cover the area under the second declaration, but with some extension. The main purpose of the present declaration is to provide an undisturbed shelter where fish can seek refuge and breed the whole year round. Allocating some area for this purpose is believed to enhance and retain fish stocks in the lake, which will then benefit fishermen in this predominantly fishing community. Under this project, restocking some non-native species is also seen as an important supporting action.

The initiation of this project cannot be considered as local, though all parties in the community have no objection to the idea. This is because it commenced from the District Fisheries Officer (*pramong amphoe*) of Khuan Mangkhud district, who is directly responsible for fishery management in the area, putting forward a proposal to continue the idea of having a reserve sanctuary again after the failure of the previous declaration. The idea was then passed to both *sapha tambon* of Khuan Phanang and Bueng Yai sub-districts, in which the community falls, to ask for comments. Furthermore, a public

meeting was also called for in which most formal and traditional leaders and some villagers attended. The meeting was led by the *pramong amphoe* of Khuan Mangkhud district, and a few officials were presented, including the head of the Wildlife Protection Unit situated in the community.

According to key informants and some formal leaders who attended the meeting, the way the meeting was organised did not allow for full participation of local leaders and villagers, as it was dominated by the officials, especially the *pramong amphoe.* In the meeting, the *pramong amphoe* explained the concept of the project and its importance in some detail, and made his proposal for the project. Participants were given a chance to comment only about the project's size and location, after the *pramong amphoe* made his proposal. A brief discussion took place, as a few participants made some inquiries regarding the size and location, but most of them agreed with the proposed idea to keep the previously declared area, but with some extension. Although it appeared that the meeting aimed to use a participatory approach to decision-making, available information suggests that the participation of villagers in the meeting on the overall decision-making was minimal, as they were given only a limited chance. This is not surprising since this type of meeting and its non-participatory atmosphere is common to formal meetings organised by the state officials. The presence and dominance of high ranking officials at the meeting deter the participation of local leaders and normal villagers who feel subservient to officials, unless a more suitable atmosphere is intentionally prepared for fuller participation. In this case, the rules of the game were controlled by the officials with only limited opportunities for feedback, so that no real participation occurred. Not long after this meeting, the project was officially declared by the Provincial Fisheries Office, and an official letter was distributed to every *phu yai ban* in the area seeking co-operation for implementing the project, based on existing regulations and the general system of administration. No attempt was made to establish a special organisation to deal with the management of the project, despite the previous experience of failure when relying on the conventional state implementation system.

After the commencement of the declaration, the first step of implementation was to mark the boundary of the reserve area. An order was issued to every *phu yai ban* and *kamnan*

to call for mutual labour contributions from villagers to help in placing markers to indicate the boundary. Most of the village committee members and some villagers participated in this task. After that, the action was undertaken to remove all types of fishing gear which were placed within the declared boundary. In undertaking this action, first of all, an order was given to every *phu yai ban* to inform fishermen within each village to withdraw their fishing gear and not to practise any kind of fishing within the area. All types of fishing gear remaining in the area were removed within a few days after the public announcement was made. This caused dissatisfaction among some fishermen who fished in the area prior to the declaration. Consequently, an informal protest against the project by these fishermen emerged, with support from relatives and close companions.

It was estimated that around twenty fishermen were affected seriously by the enforcement of the regulations, as they regularly fished in the area and their chances of finding proper fishing sites in other parts of the lake were limited in the short term under such competitive conditions. However, the overall number of those who were affected, either directly or indirectly, and those who did not agree with the project were estimated to be around one hundred. Some fishermen who are quite poor were said to have faced immediate hardship as they received no compensation, and the chance to properly relocate their fishing gear was not immediately available under the existing traditional arrangement. Three months after the declaration, a few fishermen left the village to seek labouring wage work in nearby towns because of the immediate impact of the project on them. The number of fishermen affected by the project was considered to be insignificant as compared to the total number of fishing households in the community. For this reason, most leaders do not see the negative impact as being serious. They believe that the claim that there is a lack of places for fishing is untrue, since fishermen are free to set their gear anywhere in the lake. Additionally, they deny the existence of norms which affect the relocation of fishing gear of these fishermen as they see the lake as an 'open access fishing ground.' They also believe that everything will go back to normal after a few months, and therefore they underestimate the immediate hardship facing these fishermen. Those who were affected by the project expressed the view that they were treated unfairly. A poor fisherman who used to set fish traps in the area asserted that he and his

fellow fishermen should be reallocated a new place by their leaders, because finding a new place on their own is a difficult task in a situation where most suitable places are already occupied. Additionally, it is against the traditional practice to set fish traps too close to those already set. However, these limitations are not recognised by the leaders and concerned officials.

In terms of the importance of the project, all formal and traditional leaders view the necessity of having such a project. They perceive that if the project is effectively implemented as planned, it will improve the stocking condition in the waterbody which will benefit all fishermen in the community. Some of them even think that the size of the area is not large enough, and that a larger area is needed in order to improve the stocking condition in the lake. What they concern is how effective the implementation is going to be. They are unsure about the effectiveness of the formal implementation structure to handle the project, as they have experienced the negligence of state officials in overseeing general fishery regulations.

Most villagers share a similar view to that of their leaders, as they also see that the project will enhance the improvement of fish stocks in the waterbody. Only a few fishermen expressed their feeling of uncertainty about the project because the area is so small. The feeling of uncertainty is also connected with the issue of the effectiveness of the existing implementation structure in dealing with the project management. A few fishermen believe that the situation will not be stable for long, because there will be a few fishermen who dare to challenge the authorities over the rules. If the authorities are unable to show their strength and fairness in enforcing the rules, the project is unlikely to last very long. To them, it is quite difficult for local leaders to be active in managing the project without greater co-operation of concerned officials at higher levels. They also see that co-operation between leaders of different villages in the community is unlikely to happen naturally, as they perceive several barriers will emerge between these leaders. Moreover, they believe that problems may occur because the bias which exists among some leaders in favour of their relatives and *phak phuak* in dealing with offences. Nevertheless they mostly agreed that if the project is implemented effectively, it will be beneficial.

Even though the project is still in the early stage of its operation, its physical benefits are generally perceived to be positive. Local leaders and fishermen have consistent views on the increase in fish stocks in association with the implementation of the project. Frequently they expressed what they believe to be signs of improvement that they have witnessed. Some fishermen claimed to have seen the increase in amount of larger fish caught in the area around the project site, only a few months after the projects' commencement. Others claimed to have seen a remarkable change in the amount of fish in the area within the project boundary. The expression 'seeing plenty of fry' (*hen foong look pla tem pai mod*) around the spawning season indicates the suitability of the place for fish to spawn peacefully. This is a promising sign for improving fish stocks in the near future. Because the area is left largely undisturbed by any human activity, except sailing in the limited routes provided, it provides a good nursery ground for fish. Leaders and fishermen are confident about the upholding of the project on the improvement of fish stocks in the lake. However, any positive feedback can only provide a rough indication of its physical benefits at the time of the study. Its actual benefits, both in physical and economic terms, need to be evaluated more accurately in the future, if the effectiveness of its implementation over a longer period of time can be achieved.

During the first few months of implementation, the project ran quite smoothly. Attempts at rule-breaking were minimal, even though official patrolling was not frequently undertaken. However, the situation soon changed as later there were a few fishermen attempting to challenge the authorities by sneaking into the area at night. Village leaders, police and *pramong amphoe,* were informed about the situation by some anxious villagers and traditional leaders, but no firm action was taken. Warnings were only given publicly through the village loud speakers, though sometimes on personal basis to suspected fishermen. This type of soft reaction did not work effectively, and the situation continued to deteriorate, until June 1994, when firmer action was first undertaken. Two offenders were arrested by two members of the village committee of Ban Talard and brought to the police. They were both fined and their fishing equipment was seized. This action improved the situation for a while, but then problems started to arise again. Since no further firm action had been taken, the problems had been getting worse, and in a

short visit I made in August 1995, the problems were quite serious. A few leaders revealed that the number of offenders had increased. The project was abandoned by the authorities. Most leaders in the community were reluctant as they see the lessened interest of the leader of the village where the project is located. At the same time, neither the police nor *pramong amphoe* showed much interest in solving the problems. Some leaders and fishermen even believe that most of the offenders were among close companions or *phak phuak* of policemen and the head of the Wildlife Protection Unit. Hence, no one dared to take strong action against them. They also feel discouraged to inform the *pramong amphoe* and police, since they believe that none of them is fully reliable. Some informal leaders see that the situation will not improve under the formal organisational arrangement. To them the project will not work effectively unless reorganisation is made in the implementation structure. They see that the involvement of NGOs may be necessary for this kind of work, as their specialisation is well recognised in empowering and enhancing co-operation of the grassroots in solving problems through the revival of cultural values.

b) The Forest Reserve Project in Ban Nua Phru

In the early part of 1993, there emerged an idea to replant and conserve part of the swamp forest in public land covered with secondary swamp forest in Ban Nua Phru. The idea was generated from informal consultation between the abbot of Wat Nua Phru, Mr. Jai who was the *phu yai ban* at that time, and Mr. Suk, the village *phu song khunnawut*. The initiative came from Somparn Chayanto, the abbot, who was born in the community in a highly respected family descended from the founder of the community.

The abbot is known as a young active monk in this area, and is respected by other monks. His status allows him to be selected as the *tambon* head priest (*chao khana tambon*). He is believed to be among the 'reform monks' who have been known as a progressive group of Buddhist monks in contemporary Thailand. As a reform monk, he is interested not only in the spiritual aspects of Buddhism, but also in other philosophical aspects, especially with respect to the well-being of the community and its relationship with ecological changes. By observing changes in ecology and the livelihoods of villagers in

this community, as well as surrounding neighbourhoods, he perceives that ecological deterioration is a major factor behind the deprivation of rural life.

The abbot proposed an idea of conserving forest to improve fishery resource conditions in a discussion with Mr. Jai and Mr. Suk on one day when these two leaders came to consult him about their worry over the decline of fishery resources in the community. Through the exchange of their ideas, they eventually agreed to reconstruct a proper environment appropriate for fish to shelter and spawn. The abbot, who has a good grasp of the village geographical conditions, proposed to make use of public land informally occupied by villagers but under-utilised by claimants, for rehabilitating the swamp forest and making it a 'community forest project', in which conservation and utilisation purposes are combined. He suggested that Mr. Jai and Mr. Suk develop such a project under state support, since the government has been recently recognising natural resource issues as an important element of rural development. The idea was then brought into the discussion in a village monthly meeting to inquire about villagers' perceptions. It received a majority support in the meeting, and this marked the beginning of its formal action.

One of the first decisions made was about the size of the area to be covered. At the beginning it was decided to cover only about 25 *rai* of land, based on the availability of the land least disturbed by human activities. However, after a series of informal consultations among the community leaders, an area of 100 *rai* was agreed. Mr. Jai discussed the idea with the *nai amphoe* and the district forestry officer (*paamai amphoe*) of Thung Yaang district seeking possible support. The *nai amphoe* and *paamai amphoe* welcome the idea, but they did not assure formal material support as it had to go through the formal process of making a proposal. At the same time, they requested that Mr. Jai extends the area to cover around 500 *rai*. Though no objection was received from the abbot and his colleagues in the village committee, Mr. Jai mentioned that the expansion of the area created some difficulties in attaining extra land. The project was brought into the discussion at several village meetings, and eventually it was decided to cover 625 *rai* or 1 sq. km. Attaining this amount of land involved the difficult job of negotiating with some land occupiers who protested against it. It took a few months to clear up the

problem, and several people were involved in negotiations with land occupiers. They include the abbot, Mr. Jai, Mr. Suk, the *kamnan* of Tambon Khuan Samet, Mr. Ruam who succeeded Mr. Jai after his retirement in April 1993, and some members of the village committee.

The co-operation among leaders in this village is crucial in driving this project, and Mr. Ruam follows his predecessor in supporting the project, working closely with the abbot and Mr. Suk. At the same time, Mr. Jai is still actively involved in the project even though he has retired. It is observed that having the abbot at the centre helps these leaders to work together on the project, despite some tensions emerging in the administration of the village after the change of the *phu yai ban.* The abbot plays an important role in generating ideas and in attempting to solve problems emerging among villagers. He gains a lot of respect from villagers not only because he is the head of religious institutions in the community, but also because of his strong commitment to secular activities in the village. There have been many development activities in which the abbot has acted as a patron, providing support spiritually and financially. Frequently he decides to allocate some of the temple income to support the activities. Similarly, this project also receives strong support from him. It was said that he urged the leaders to continue the project even if outside support could not be attained, and he was prepared to provide some financial support to the project. His support has enabled the project to be implemented prior to its official approval.

The actual implementation started in 1994, by surveying the area and collecting seedlings from natural sources and nursing them. Since then, there have been two planting actions undertaken. The first was done in July 1994, and was organised through mutual co-operation of villagers without any support from outside. Necessary costs were gained through village collections, and lunch was mutually prepared by villagers on the basis of '*long khaek*', in which every household is entitled to prepare a set of meals (*samrab*) and then pools them together. It was said that almost every household sent its members to participate, and the abbot himself was present in the event and arranged for young monks to participate as well. A religious ritual was held at the opening session to bless the project. A hut was built for monks to reside in during the Buddhist Lent season (*khao*

pansa), so that they could help to look after the area during its early stages of planting. These religious practices help in highlighting the significance of the project. The project was given the name '*Suan Paa Sangha Pracha Raks'*, which literally means 'monks and people reserve forest.' The name was given by the abbot aiming to symbolise the original ideology behind the project.

The second planting action was undertaken in August 1995, and 10,000 baht was granted by the Department of Forestry through the District Forestry Office to be spent on it. This was the first budgetary allocation received from outside, and it was spent mainly on food, both during the seedling preparation and on the day of planting, and on transportation of seedlings. This planting action was done in association with the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the King's reign (*chalerm phra kiart haasip pee siri ratchasombat*). There were a few officials from the district office who came to observe, and about 30 villagers participated in the planting, quite a small number when compared to the first planting in 1994. The reduction in number of participants from the previous planting action was partly due to the absence of some villagers who had migrated out seasonally to work outside the village.

Based on discussions with the abbot, the abbot explained his hope for the project. In his view, the project should include not only reforestation of the area, but also the construction of a surrounding ditch, and also a ditch across the middle of the site. This ditch will provide a good sanctuary for aquatic animals throughout the year and will help to protect the forest from fire. Moreover, it is possible to restock fish in these ditches. Fishing in these ditches may be prohibited completely or limited to a certain period only. If this plan is achieved, he believes the project will improve fishery resources significantly as the ditches will provide permanent waterbodies for fish to seek refuge and spawn, as well as being nursing grounds. He explained: 'When floods come, some of fish will disperse throughout the swamp which allows swamp settlers to catch more fish. In the dry season, fish can seek refuge in the ditches which are undisturbed.' He perceives that at the present a lack of permanent waterbodies in which fish can seek refuge during the dry season, significantly contributes to the decline in the fisheries in the area. Therefore, having proper waterlogged ditches would provide sufficient shelter for

fish to survive over the dry season, complete its life cycle, and provide broodstock for the coming season. When the same cycle continually repeats, the condition of fish stock in the area will improve if overexploitation is under control. Moreover, he foresees the possibility of developing the area into a recreational park which is operated on the basis of eco-tourism, and envisages the construction of a proper road for access to the area, and other basic facilities for visitors. He stated: 'When the forest is grown to its maturity, there will be birds and other wildlife inhabiting the area. It will be a good place for those who love natural beauty to make a visit.' This idea presents a challenge for the future plan for the management of the project, if all these targets are to be achieved.

A proper management plan has not yet been developed as the project is still in its early stage. According to the abbot, the original idea of the project was to manage on the basis of community forestry, combining the concepts of conservation and utilisation. However, the inclusion of formal conventional conservation practice in part of the area will be inevitable, as part of the project has been allocated for the purpose of commemorating the special royal event in which conventional rules of banning all activities in the area are applied. The rest should however remain with the original idea. All leaders, including the abbot, Mr. Suk, the former *phu yai ban,* and the present *phu yai ban*, have not yet discussed the management details. At present, they only have a broad idea of the community forestry concept which they receive through media, especially television. Mr. Ruam, the present *phu yai ban* mentioned that he plans to make visits to other communities which run successful community forestry projects, in order to discuss about their management rules and practices. The abbot views management as the key to the success of the project, especially in the long run. He sees the role of leaders, especially *phu yai ban*, as crucial in bringing about successful management in the present day system. This is because the *phu yai ban* has direct responsibility for overseeing the project management which is recognised by villagers and officials. Other leaders, including the abbot himself, can only be benefactors. He stated: 'If the *phu yai ban* is not committed to the project, it is unlikely that the project will run smoothly or last very long. Moreover, without strong support from the *phu yai ban*, the efforts of other leaders may face many difficulties as conflict may arise among villagers.' The abbot also sees that leaders, either formal or informal, are driving forces behind the participation of

villagers in development activities. He further stated: 'Only a handful of villagers have a positive perception and are willing to co-operate with the project voluntarily. The majority needs a strong push from their leaders. If leaders split, villagers are divided, and then there will be no real co-operation on the project.'

In the meantime, all village leaders work together in pursuing the project. In order to fulfil all anticipated targets, a large amount of funds is also needed. The present *phu yai ban* and Mr. Suk work together seeking support by dividing the whole idea into a few small sub-projects. The first priority is the construction of the ditches which was estimated to cost around 3 million baht or about £75,000 at the exchange rate in 1995. Support is sought from various sources including the normal development budget through the *sapha tambon*, a special budget from the Department of Forestry, a special budget from members of parliament representing the province (*ngob pattana changwat khong soh-soh*), as well as from the private sector. There is a possibility that they may be allocated some budget funds through the normal development budget, if a small sub-project is proposed each year, as the annual budget for each *tambon* is limited. At the time of my last visit in August 1995, I was informed that a big oil company was interested in funding the road construction from the existing road to the project site, though this was not yet confirmed. Funding from other sources was in the process of being requested.

Though the project is still in the early stages of its implementation and its full operation is still far away, its origin and the motives of local leaders are very interesting. The fact that the project is locally initiated forms an important factor behind the motivation of local leaders to achieve its success. Moreover, the influence of the abbot on the project is another important factor which cannot be underestimated. The active involvement of the abbot, who is highly respected by all parties in the village and has a good reputation not only for religious activities, but also for secular activities, is crucial in securing co-operation among leaders and villagers.

6.4.4 *Phu Yai Ban* and Implementation of CPR Management Projects

It was mentioned earlier that projects related to CPR management at the local level which are officially recognised by the state, can occur in two ways: projects initiated by concerned government bodies above *tambon* and *mooban* levels and located in a particular area; and projects initiated by people within particular localities and approved by the state. The official point of view is that implementing projects of both types should be in accordance with existing regulations concerned with the particular natural resources with which each project is dealing. Special rules may be established locally but they should not contradict the existing regulations. Implementation of regulations and rules is under the responsibility of field officials who represent relevant central departments at the district level, and local official leaders at both *tambon* and *mooban* levels. However, because the number of field officials from relevant departments at the district level is generally limited to only one or two officers, and their duties cover a broad range of activities throughout the district, the main responsibility for enforcing regulations related to each project is placed primarily on local official leaders, especially the *phu yai ban.*

The main idea behind the designation of *phu yai ban* is not only because they are the lowest level administrative official whose main duty is to maintain law and order at the *mooban* level, but also because they are regarded as the only officials who reside in the *mooban* they serve. Therefore, they should have the closest relationship with their people and know the problems related to CPR management better than other officials. This idea is rational in the sense that they are based in their *mooban* most of the time, and have assistants to help them performing their duties. Moreover, each *phu yai ban* should be well informed and has an insight into matters happening within his/her territorial boundary. Therefore, he/she should be able to use his/her power and mechanisms available to him to enforce relevant regulations effectively.

In reality, full enforcement of rules and regulations related to CPR management is generally very difficult even with respect to specific projects which are rather small in scale. Apart from problems emerging from the inefficiency of the prosecuting system discussed earlier in this chapter, the extent to which local leaders are included in the

project planning process is also very important for the achievement of project management. I would like to relate this to Ostrom's (1990) view concerning the community commitment and the CPR management. Among several assumptions she made, three of them can be seen as having a strong connection with the commitment of local leaders in pursuing CPR management. First, rules applied to CPR management and expected to be followed must clearly define the set of users, or in her term 'appropriators.' Second, the rules are 'designed, at least in part, by local appropriators.' Third, 'they (the rules) are monitored by individuals accountable to local appropriators' (Ostrom, 1990, pp. 185-186). These three assumptions will be used as the main basis for analysing the two CPR management projects which follows.

The detail discussion in the preceding section revealed that the Fishery Reserve Project which is located in Bueng Yai Lake was established to provide a reserve sanctuary in the lake for the benefit of fishermen in the whole Bueng Yai community. In administrative points of view, the project's location which is at the south-eastern part of the lake, is under the administration of Ban Talard, village number 1 of Khuan Phanang sub-district. The establishment of the project was based on the idea that having a large reserve area will provide a protected nursery ground for fish, which will then improve fishery resources in the lake. Having such a protected area could in theory help to retain fish stocks for sustainable use, which is beneficial for fishermen in surrounding communities. The idea is not a new one as there have been such practices in the lake before, both through traditional and official arrangements. Though the idea is accepted by all parties in the community as well as concerned officials, local people and local leaders were not taken into account significantly in the decision-making process.

The project was initiated by the *pramong amphoe* with some consultations with community leaders and some villagers, through a meeting specifically organised for this purpose. According to key informants who attended the meeting, local participants were informed about the official plan to establish the project. Nevertheless, it was the *pramong amphoe* who proposed the present site of the project, instead of asking participants to propose. The main reason for proposing this particular site was because it used to be the reserve area before and it adjoins the office of the Wildlife Protection Unit which can

provide some protection for the area. The new proposition also included the extension of the area from that previously designated, and there was minimal discussion at the meeting regarding the size of the area. Formulation of the project in detail was undertaken solely by the *pramong amphoe*. The project was designed as an 'aquatic plants and animals protection area' (*khate raksa peutpan sat naam*), a category of reserve area stated in the Fisheries Act (Department of Fisheries, 1987). Once the project was approved, local leaders were informed and requested to co-operate in managing the reserve area.

The enforcement of rules related to this management is assumed to follow the conventional administrative practice, in which each *phu yai ban* or *kamnan* is in charge of his own territory. Hence, it is the *phu yai ban* of Ban Talard and the *kamnan* of Khuan Phanang sub-district who are in charge primarily of overseeing it. This assumption presents a problem for managing the project as the resources are used by fishermen from the whole Bueng Yai community. Ideally, therefore, every village leader in Bueng Yai community should take part in the management. Because of this conventional arrangement and the lack of interest of the *phu yai ban* of Ban Talard and the *kamnan* of Khuan Phanang sub-district, the project has not been implemented effectively by local leaders in the community. It was left mainly to the *pramong amphoe,* who rarely comes to monitor the project. Some *phu yai ban* of other villages and the *kamnan* of Bueng Yai community are concerned about the problems facing the management of the project. However, in practice they are reluctant to seek ways of improving it. According to Mr. Naam, the *phu yai ban* of Ban Bon Lay, there is an administrative barrier which prevents him taking action to enforce the rules in the project area, as it is not within his administrative territory. Similar views were expressed by the *kamnan* of Tambon Bueng Yai. It was observed that co-operation between leaders of different villages in the community to address the problems, also does not occur, due to the already existing tensions among leaders. Considering the role of Mr. Naam, who is known as one of active *phu yai ban* in Bueng Yai community, while Mr. Naam realises the importance of the project to his community, he is not fully committed to taking an active action in this complex situation. His hesitation is also due to the fact that fishermen from his village rarely use the area adjacent to the project site for fishing. Moreover, because the

organisational arrangement does not force official leaders of different villages to work together, it is difficult for individual leaders to play an active role on their own. Finally, because the design of the project was highly influenced by the *pramong amphoe*, and rules applied were based on existing regulations, affect the real commitment of these leaders to implement the project effectively.

It can be concluded from the above discussion that the management of the project according to the conventional administrative arrangement does not fit this type of project. Although the project site falls under the administration of one village, the resources are shared by members of the larger community. The conventional arrangement creates complications for the leader of any single village to deal with users from various other villages. Moreover, it also creates problems for leaders from other villages in taking action, if the leader of the village where the project is located is reluctant to do so. Therefore, the conventional arrangement of CPR management in this case is unconvincing, and a new form of arrangement in which all leaders in the area must share the responsibility for managing the project is needed. It is also necessary to reconsider rules for controlling resource use to be suitable to local physical and socio-economic conditions rather than depending solely on existing regulations. Some existing rules need to be changed in order to allow rooms for new organisational arrangements and self-regulated institutions. Considering the social organisation and structures of power at the village and sub-district level in this study area the new organisational arrangements and self-regulated institutions should result from joint decisions among concerned officials, and all *phu yai ban, kamnan,* traditional and interest group leaders in the community.

According to Mr. Naam, it is important to have an arrangement in which clear roles are stated and divided fairly among *phu yai ban* in the community. He also believes there are mechanisms which can be developed in the community and applied to overcome the problems. But these mechanisms cannot function properly without a clear guidance from concerned bodies. Because the community and their leaders are conflicting and divided, he believes that what is needed is an official rearrangement to make use these leaders and available mechanisms effectively. In doing so, he sees that good intentions of officials are needed to stimulate change in the organisational structure of project implementation,

and in co-ordinating local leaders. This is because under the present arrangement, re-organisation is unlikely to be initiated by local leaders themselves

The Forest Reserve Project is a newly established project located in Ban Nua Phru which has no connection with any project of similar kind previously established in this community. It differs in its origin and its structure from the Fishery Reserve Project. It was initiated within the village and can be described as an outcome of mutual efforts of the abbot of Wat Nua Phru and formal leaders of the village, especially the former *phu yai ban* and the village *phu song khunnawut*. The present *phu yai ban* who came to the position after the idea was formulated, also follows his predecessor in working closely with the abbot and the village *phu song khunnawut* who is still in the position.

At the time of this study, the project was still in its early stages. Nevertheless, a few activities had been conducted to mark the starting of the project, including selection of the project site, negotiation with land occupiers to obtain the land for the project, and planting some trees in part of the project site. These activities were planned mainly by village leaders. Nevertheless, some forms of villagers' participation in the activities were observed, both in forms of labour and general co-operation, including contributing food, preparing seedlings, and planting the trees. According to a key informant, the co-operation of villagers in the project is due to their respect for their leaders, rather than their understanding of the importance of the project itself. The mutual influence of both traditional and formal leaders has meant problems arising in connection with the project have become insignificant. At the beginning of the project, there were a few people who occupied some land in the area where the project is located who objected to the project. This problem was then resolved by these leaders working together to persuade the protesters to sacrifice their personal interests for the benefit of the community as a whole.

The project area is primarily located within the village administrative boundary, and the natural resources available in the area are used almost exclusively by villagers from this *mooban*. As the village is geographically demarcated, problems emerging from conflicts over CPR use are less complex than those of the Fishery Reserve Project; most of the problems can be solved within the village through mutual co-operation of these leaders.

The initiation of the project was also done through villagers' contributions. Support from outside the village came later, after assistance was sought by the *phu yai ban* to formalise the project. Concerned bodies, especially the Forestry Department, showed their desire to formalise the project as a conservation project once the project was established. Nevertheless, there was disagreement among local leaders as they opposed undertaking the project solely for conservation purposes in the conventional sense. They prefer the idea of establishing a community forestry project, in which the resources can be used with some restrictions in order to sustain the use. A compromise had been reached in 1994, with part of the project being allocated for conservation purposes to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the King's reign, and the remainder was yet undecided.

Though final outcomes of the project implementation remain to be evaluated in the future, some achievements of the project were clearly indicated by the commitment of the *phu yai ban* and the mutual effort between the *phu yai ban* and other leaders in forwarding the project and solving the emerging problems. The smoothness of the village administration, as influenced by its geographical setting and the solidarity of the community organisation, is of benefit to the village in eliminating problems occurring during its implementation.

Comparing the management of the Forest Reserve Project in Ban Nua Phru and the Fishery Reserve Project in Bueng Yai community, considerable differences were observed with reference to three of Ostrom's assumptions brought in earlier in this section: (1) the definition of set of appropriators; (3) the involvement of appropriators in designing the rules; and (2) the accountability of individuals who monitor the project. The Forest Reserve Project involves a much smaller set of users with a more clearly defined boundary of the resources than the Fishery Reserve Project (assumption one). These two projects differed in the appropriators' perceptions of their official leaders. The projects were also different in the involvement of their official leaders in the project design; the participation of official leaders is much clearer in the design of the Forest Reserve Project than in the Fishery Reserve Project (assumption two). As it is quite clear that the official leaders in Ban Nua Phru are accountable to villagers, members of Bueng

Yai community are divided in their perceptions of the various official leaders of the communities and the leaders themselves are also in conflict (assumption three). Counting all these three points together, it is clear that why the Forest Reserve Project was found to be better managed than the Fishery Reserve Project. Although these three points cannot be separated clearly in the analysis of the achievement of these two projects, my main interest here is in the connection between the commitment of official leaders in implementing the projects and the extent of their participation in the project designs. I shall conclude that the strong commitment of official leaders in Ban Nua Phru in the implementation of the Forest Reserve Project is influenced by their active involvement in the project design. This is opposite to the case of the Fishery Reserve Project in Bueng Yai community where the participation of official leaders in the project design was unclear and controversial. This finding can be explained in psychological terms; the more the leaders are involved in the planning of a project, the more they feel a part of the project. Moreover, the ineffectiveness of implementing CPR management projects is also related to the conventional organisational structure which limits the power of each *phu yai ban* only to his territorial boundary. This delineation of power does not always fit patterns of resource- sharing in rural communities, especially when the communities are large and divided into different administrative units, whilst the resources are still shared by the whole community. The apparent difference in the concern of local leaders between the Fishery Reserve Project in Bueng Yai community and the Forest Reserve Project in Ban Nua Phru was observed to be highly associated with these two factors.

6.5 Conclusion

The discussion in this chapter has dealt with the status and roles of *phu yai ban* as the lowest official in the Thai administration. The discussion covered the historical perspective of the *phu yai ban* post and their recruitment, roles of *phu yai ban* both with respect to general administrative work, and the management of natural resources and the environment at the local level.

The *phu yai ban* position can be traced back to the Ayudhya period before the Bangkok period. The position is always given to the head of the smallest unit of the administration

equivalent to village. Its recruitment has evolved over time. It was based on the selection made by officials in different ways until about a century ago when the election system was introduced. Nevertheless, the election system was not fully applied until recently. The change in the recruitment system from the selection system to the election system has had a significant effect on the status and power of *phu yai ban.* Based on the more recent phenomena recalled by elders in the study area, leaders recruited through the selection system were drawn among existing natural leaders, while in the election system, the opportunity exists for every qualified villager to contend. The result of the selection system was seen to assure qualities of those who were selected, while the result of the election system is questionable. Leaders who come to the power through the election system may not have remarkable leadership qualities as they may be elected because of their effective campaigns rather than on merit or competence. Moreover, the election system as applied to the study villages appears to alienate traditional leaders who are naturally influential but do not like the formality of power. As a consequence, the present village level administration is highly formalised from an official point of view, but is not necessarily effective unless both traditional leaders and formal leaders work together on the basis of shared interests. A clear division between traditional leaders and formal leaders can provoke conflict and distress in village governance. Such a situation does not help *phu yai ban* in playing their roles in fulfilling their commitments to the development of their communities.

As the leader of the village, a *phu yai ban* has a tremendous amount of duties to perform. He/she is an agent of the state in charge of any state activities in the village, and at the same, he/she is the official representative of people in his/her village in dealing with the state. Being in this position, all *phu yai ban* should follow state orders and serve their people. Most of the roles in relation to both the state and the people are labelled as administration and development, which cover a very broad range of subjects. The vast amount of work covering such a broad range of subjects makes it difficult for *phu yai ban* to fulfil all requirements. In general, they mostly deal with routine activities clearly assigned to them, and select some activities perceived to be important for their position and for maintaining reasonable relationships with both officials who represent the state, and villagers. Their roles in dealing with specific issues, such as natural resource

management, are only minor. In the past they only dealt with specific issues as a state agent to implement regulatory policies related to the issues. On this basis, their involvement was more of an administrative type in dealing with specific state regulations applied to situations in their villages. Recently, their role with respect to natural resource and environmental management has changed. The recent introduction of structural reform with respect to natural resource management makes their responsibilities greater than before. Their present role extends to also cover the participation in the planning process related to natural resource management.

By looking at both general responsibilities and commitments with respect to the new concept of natural resource management, empirical evidence gathered through this study shows some interesting findings. Under the old system which still remain in the area, most regulations related to the management of natural resources were ineffectively enforced. One of the main reasons behind this problem is the emerging conflict between some regulations which are centrally designed, and traditional practices and perceptions of local people. Though *phu yai ban* and other local leaders are supposed to enforce these regulations strictly, the prevalence of practices that contravene the regulations, together with the negligence of concerned officials and the emergence of biased practices in the system, discourages the active involvement of *phu yai ban.* As a result, many regulations that contradict the common practices of local people are largely disregarded.

The change toward the new system has not yet shown a remarkable improvement in the commitments *phu yai ban* have, both with respect to planning and implementing of projects related to natural resource management. In planning, their unclear role in the planning process and the complexity of the issues related to natural resource management hamper their appetite, despite the apparent importance of the issues. Moreover, their familiarity with the conventional development concept prevents them from fuller adoption of the new concepts. Since the priority is given to the district and provincial bodies to operate plans related to natural resource management, the involvement of *sapha tambon* and *phu yai ban* is at their discretion. If a village and *sapha tambon* initiate projects as a component of its rural development plan, they tend to face budget

limitations, unless the projects are small in size. A special budget allocation is generally applied only to projects operated by the district and provincial bodies.

There are several obstacles in attempting to include local leaders in the planning process, though the new concepts of national development planning provide a better opportunity for them to be more involved in the policy process related to natural resource management than in the past. To what extent this chance is used depends not only on the state intention to promote the participation of local leaders alone, but also on the strength and conformity of each community organisation itself. The case of Ban Nua Phru provides a good example of the achievement of a harmonious village organisation in initiating a community-based project with minimal help from the outside, whereas the case of Bueng Yai community provides a contrasting picture. The difference between these two communities also appears in the implementation of their projects, in which the commitments of their leaders, including *phu yai ban,* contribute significantly to their achievement. The strong commitment of official leaders in Ban Nua Phru is not only a matter of accident and personal characteristics of leaders, but also determined by the extent to which they are involved in the planning process of the project.

Finally, the strong commitment of local official leaders and the harmonious relationship between official and traditional leaders are important elements behind the success of planning and implementing CPR management at the local level. This implies that co-operation between these two groups of leaders should be encouraged, together with the effort to integrate formal and traditional institutions, in the management of local CPRs.

CHAPTER SEVEN

COMMUNITY ORGANISATION, *PHU YAI BAN*, AND THE MANAGEMENT OF COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES

7.1 Introduction

In Thailand, as in most other developing countries, economic growth receives the highest priority in the country's development, and natural resources are viewed as a possession to be used as a means of enhancing economic growth. In fact, natural resources are not only important for promoting the overall economic growth of the country, but also for the livelihoods of rural inhabitants who are the majority of the country's population. Because of this, overexploitation of natural resources will certainly affect the well-being of the rural population.

The recent rapid economic growth of Thailand has been termed 'uneven development' (Parnwell, 1996) and has occurred at the expense of many natural resources. Some natural resources face problems of over-utilisation as a result of efforts to increase production, and others have been affected by the negative impacts that have been generated through the processes of industrialisation and modernisation. Though problems related to natural resource and environmental degradation have been recognised, as demonstrated by recent structural reforms to deal with these problems, some questions regarding the real application of these reforms still remain. There is still a question of the extent to which these reforms recognise natural resources which are important for local inhabitants but may not contribute significantly to the country's economy as a whole. The state only seems to address the conservation of

major natural resources which contribute significantly to the country's economy, such as forest, coastal and marine fishery resources. Other natural resources which are less important for the national economy but significant for local inhabitants, such as freshwater fishery resources, appear to be neglected. Moreover, structural reforms which were intended to encourage the participation of local people in the development process do not seem to show a strong connection with the promotion of natural resource management at the local level, especially with respect to common property resources (CPRs).

The direction of the country's development policies as outlined above, coupled with obstacles emerging as part of the frequently cited 'bureaucratic culture' in putting policies into practice has led to issues of natural resource management at the local level having been overlooked and poorly understood. By undertaking a detailed exploration of freshwater fishery resource management and its obstacles at the village level, this study has explored some aspects of the relationship between policy and practice as related to CPR management at the local level in contemporary Thailand. It seeks to provide an insight into change of development policies during the implementation stage, especially at the lowest level of the policy process. It also seeks a better understanding of the contribution of local organisations and local power, and how these affect the success or failure of applying popular participation concepts in natural resource management.

In this concluding chapter, I would like to start by briefly reminding the readers of the theoretical debates related to the subject under study as reviewed in Chapter Two and Chapter Three. This will be followed by a discussion of the findings of this study in connection with the conceptual framework proposed. Finally, it will look at the prospects of sustainable CPR management in rural Thailand.

7.2 Theoretical Debates

The exploration of natural resource management at the village level was undertaken on the assumption that the success or failure of development policies cannot be

understood by analysing the quality of policies alone. Instead, both the organisational and societal contexts in which policies are implemented must also be taken into account. Based on this fundamental assumption, a conceptual framework for analysing development policy was proposed. The framework which was presented in Chapter Two was adapted from the framework developed by Merilee Grindle to explain the relationship between policy, implementation, and outcome, based on evidence from various developing countries (Grindle, 1980c). This framework stressed the importance of policy implementation in directing policy outcomes. Following Grindle's argument, the study does not deny the importance of policy qualities and the roles of bureaucracy in implementing development policies to fulfil their pre-set objectives, but it treats bureaucracy as located in the wider environment which can significantly influence its performance. At various levels of policy implementation, the bureaucrats or official actors who are in charge of it, are not viewed as the only actors, but they are surrounded by other actors who are involved in the implementation process for different reasons. In dealing with the organisational context which controls the original direction of each policy, official actors are bound to follow directives from above in their interactions with non-official actors whose ultimate aim is to pursue their interest.

The framework which was presented here also adopted the idea proposed by Hjern and his colleagues (see Hjern and Porter, 1993), which suggests that analysis of the policy implementation at the programme level should take place in the form of an exploration of implementation structures. In the implementation structures, all actors are more likely to proceed according to their individual interests, rather than being bound firmly by the framework of the organisations they represent. This study assumes that policy implementation at the project level in Thailand should be understood as taking place in a similar manner, but official actors are less independent than non-official actors in pursuing their interests. The official implementors are expected to implement the policy according to how it was designed by the central body, but at the same time they have to interact with local actors and more specific local environments. Local actors can include local official leaders, local interest groups, local opinion leaders, and resource users in general. For rural development

policies, interactions between official actors and non-official actors should be more apparent at the local level than at higher levels. This is because access to participation of non-official actors at the local level should be far better than at higher levels. Also, local actors are assumed to react in a way which they believe that can prevent their loss, when they experience the direct impact of policies at this level. Hence, the context of policy implementation at this level is likely to be more significant than at higher levels in affecting the outcomes of development policies.

The study applies the above mentioned framework in analysing the implementation of policies related to CPR management at the local level. Based on problems facing CPR management as discussed in Chapters One and Two, and as observed in the study area, the incompatibility of centrally designed policies with social and economic patterns of local communities is clearly a major problem for the effective implementation of state policies. Although these policies may aim to control the level of exploitation of CPRs for sustainable use, they tend to overlook patterns of relationships between local communities and CPRs. As stated by Ostrom (1990) and Berkes and Favar (1989), one of the most important characteristics of CPRs is their accessibility; to be a CPR, a resource must be shared among members of the users' community. In relation to this basic characteristic, it is common for CPRs to rely on traditional systems of management for their survival, prior to introduction of modern systems of management by the state.

It is argued in this study that the ability of the state intervention to control CPRs directly via state policies depends largely on wheter or not the state realizes the importance of the existing traditional system in each locality, and the attempt by the state to integrate it into the policy framework. However, since it is unlikely that central policies can be designed by taking various problems existing in different localities into account, they are likely to face several obstacles during their implementation. To overcome these obstacles, many students of CPRs regimes such as Robert Pomeroy, Elinor Ostrom, David Doulman, and Fikret Berkes, have reached a consensus that opportunities should be given to local people and local organisations to participate in project planning (see Pomeroy, 1991; Ostrom, 1990 and 1992;

Doulman, 1993; Berkes, 1989). The first step for the government is to recognise the importance of people's participation in the planning process. This means that the door should be opened in the planning structure for local people to participate in the planning process. In order to have a better understanding of problems associated with the application of a participatory approach to the implementation of policies related to CPR management, this study takes the view that the investigation of CPR management projects at the local level is prerequisite.

In Thailand, the present structure of planning organisation formally recognises the importance of local participation in rural development planning. As discussed in Chapter Three, local people can participate by proposing their ideas and needs through the village committee () led by the *phu yai ban.* Every year, the of each village formulates the needs and ideas proposed by villagers into the village development plan and submits this to the *sapha tambon* of the sub-district in which the village is located. The *sapha tambon* of each sub-district then decides which projects should be undertaken each year, based on the fixed annual budget allocated by the central government. Based on this decision, the *sapha tambon* formulates the *tambon* development plan which is passed on to the district development committee (DDC). The DDC then includes and formalises several *tambon* plans into the annual district development plan submitted to the provincial development committee (PDC). From PDC, the plans are submitted to the National Rural Development Committee (NRDC) for final approval. Although the final approval is made by NRDC, decisions made by each *sapha tambon* form the main basis for development activities undertaken at the *tambon* and *mooban* levels. This structure of planning applies also to natural resource development at the local level. Considering this structure alone, local participation appears to have its place in development planning. This leads many theorists to assume further that development planning should respond very well to the problems and needs of the majority of local people in each *mooban,* since the planning process starts at the *mooban* level. This assumption sounds theoretically reasonable. In practice, however, this assumption can only be partly correct, because there are several factors which may restrain effective popular participation, which is an essential means of identifying real problems and the needs of local people. Among the

most important obstacles to full participation are the hierarchical and patron-client values that are so characteristic of Thai culture.

Hierarchical and patron-client values are believed to have originated from the ancient feudal system prevalent in Thai administration before the fall of the absolute monarchy system. These values are deeply rooted in Thai society and widely influence patterns of relationships between individuals. They affect not only the relationship between superiors and subordinates in the Thai bureaucracy, but also between officials and ordinary people, as well as among ordinary people themselves. The prevalence of these values is argued as hindering the promotion of people's participation as ordinary people are likely to be submissive in interacting with their leaders and officials who are viewed as being superior to them (Samudavanija, 1987; Brahmanee, 1989). These values are unlikely to change in the short run, and hence effective participation is unlikely to occur among local people in the real sense, as they tend to perceive themselves as being powerless.

Despite the dominance of the above views, there is much evidence of active grassroots movements which indicates the potential of local communities to work together in attempting to protect their rights and to develop self-help organisations. Even though some of these movements receive support from outside, especially NGOs, it is observed that local traditional leaders also play an important role in the movements, and their attributes are important to the achievements of the movements. In these cases, patron-client relations between local traditional leaders and ordinary people at the local level can encourage active participation of local people, because local traditional leaders leads or at least support the movements. Clearly the role of local leaders is more profound than the role of ordinary people or followers in initiating grassroots movements in Thailand. Although the existence of this type of organisation may be seen to be contrary to the hierarchical and patron-client values mentioned above, the importance of local leaders in driving grassroots movements is logical, since ordinary people are likely to be submissive to their leaders.

The emphasis of this study on the investigation of the role of *phu yai ban* or village official leaders in the management of CPRs is generated from several assumptions discussed above, which can be summarised as follows. From a policy point of view, policy outcomes are determined largely by the contexts of policy implementation. Based on the view given by Grindle and Thomas (1989), two different contexts can be seen in the analysis of policy implementation -- the organisational and the societal contexts. The organisational context refers to the organisational structure of the state's implementing bodies, whereas the societal context refers to the wider social environment surrounding the implementation of each policy. Grindle and Thomas (1989) view the societal context as more crucial than the organisational context in influencing policy implementation in developing countries; its effect can shift policy outcomes away from those originally anticipated. Following this view, this study hypothesises that the performance of official actors at the local level, particularly the *phu yai ban* who is the lowest official actor in the hierarchy of Thai administration, is influenced significantly by the social environment surrounding him/her in implementing development policies passed to them. With respect to policy related to CPR management, the special characteristics of CPRs earlier discussed mean that the implementation of policies related to CPR management must recognise the nature of each CPR and its users. Because the relationships between different CPRs and their users are likely to vary locally, it is assumed that effective implementation of CPR management policies requires active involvement of local people and local leaders, not only in undertaking implementation activities as directed by the state, but also in the planning process of operational policies. Bearing in mind the hierarchical characteristics and patron-client tradition prevailing in the Thai bureaucratic system and Thai society as discussed in Chapter Three, the involvement of ordinary local people is unlikely to be great, as the structures of the Thai bureaucracy and society do not provide an environment supportive of public participation. However, recent reforms in the Thai administrative structure taking place during the Fifth Plan which aim to enhance local participation provide a better chance for and is more meaningful to local leaders, particularly *phu yai ban*, to take part in the process of development planning.

Based on the above assumptions, the discussion which follows will focus on the findings from this study with respect to the effects of the organisational and societal contexts of policy implementation at the local level, especially their influences on the performance of *phu yai ban* in handling problems related to CPR management at the village level.

7.3 The Organisational Context of Local CPR Management

From the policy point of view, the management of any natural resources should be targeted by means of issuing regulations or setting programmes to control the level of exploitation and maintain the quality of each type of resource. According to the conceptual model proposed in Chapter Two, the design and formulation of 'implementing programmes' and 'problem solving regulations' are generally done by national or regional bureaucratic chiefs of the administrative hierarchy. These programmes and regulations can be called 'operational policies.' In the conventional policy process, once these tasks are undertaken, they will be passed downwards to implementing bodies at various levels for actual implementation and enforcement. The implementing bodies at various levels are bound to follow directions from above in order to implement these operational policies according their pre-set objectives. In the process of implementation, two-way communication should occur so that responses can be made by these implementing bodies to the national or regional bodies if adjustments are needed. In supposedly more bottom-up approach currently being applied to the Thai planning process, the design and formulation of operational policies should be based on proposals made by various levels of planning bodies. Once the operational policies are designed and formulated, they are passed to implementing bodies at various levels for implementation.

However, it was observed that the present development programmes and problem solving regulations in Thailand are not solely designed according to proposals made by local level planning bodies. Many programmes and regulations form part of nation-wide operational policies which are centrally designed to serve the overall development emphasis and problem solving throughout the country. Moreover, any

projects proposed by local organisations should correspond to these nation-wide interests and are bound to follow existing regulations related to subject matters with which the projects deal. On this basis, it can be said that local organisations are not completely independent from the higher level planning bodies in developing as well as implementing their own plans. With respect to policies related to natural resource management, there is one important point which I would like to raise in this section in relation to the organisational arrangement of planning and implementation with particular reference to CPR management at the local level as observed in this study. This point concerns the actual status of local organisations, particularly the village committee (VC) and *sapha tambon,* in planning and implementation related to CPR management.

According to the current structure of planning organisations discussed in Chapter Three, both the village committee and *sapha tambon* function as local planning as well as implementing bodies in the development policy process. This means that they are responsible for both developing their development plans and implementing them in their administrative territories. At the same time, they are bound to follow commands from above and support programmes or projects undertaken by concerned state bodies in the areas they govern.

In developing their own plans, these local bodies must not develop projects which contain details that contradict the existing regulations related to the subject matter they deal with. Considering projects related to CPR management, there exist nation-wide regulations related to natural resources (in the case of the two villages under study are forest resources and fishery resources) which contain some details which do not correspond to conditions of the resource use and socio-economic patterns of local users. As a result, difficulties emerge in preparing projects which are appropriate for local users and meet the requirements of existing regulations at the same time. Most of these regulations are concerned with the clear prohibition or restriction of activities in relation to the natural resources in question. As these regulations cannot be changed by local people, development of any projects which correspond with these regulations means that there is no room for local organisations to set their own rules

independently, to meet with their perceived problems and needs related to the management of the natural resources they use, even if the existing regulations are inappropriate to the local conditions of resource use. Locally developed plans can only add further regulations on top of official regulations that already exist. This can be more burdensome to local resource users if the pressure over the resource use is already high. Consequently, it is difficult for local organisations to develop their plans or projects to reduce the problems facing the resources they use which do not adversely impact on their benefits from the resources. Even if new plans or projects are developed as in the case of the Fishery Reserve Project in Bueng Yai community, no full implementation of the rules set takes place. In the case of the Forest Reserve Project in Ban Nua Phru where the village committee would prefer the project to be based on self-generated regulations, the project was not yet formalised at the time of this study, but the committee had already begun to worry that formalising the project would affect their intention to allow the resources to be used in accordance with the self-generated regulations.

The status of the *sapha tambon* and village committee in implementing policies, especially with respect to projects initiated by the state and nation-wide regulations related to natural resources management applied at the local level, is as an arm of the state. They are bound to enforce these regulations and oversee projects as directed by higher level implementing bodies. This means that in principle they are not allowed to adjust the direction of the projects or to modify the existing regulations according to their perceptions of local conditions. As existing regulations were observed to be mainly designed for nation-wide application, as illustrated in the case of the fishery regulations discussed briefly in Chapter Six (see also Appendix Two), and the state-led projects are generally developed based on existing regulations, these local organisations have some difficulties in enforcing regulations and managing projects effectively when facing regulations which do not correspond to local conditions of natural resource use and socio-economic patterns of local users.

It can be concluded that although the *sapha tambon* and village committee are recognised under the current structure of development planning as legitimate bodies to

participate in the planning and implementation of policies related to natural resource management, their authority is limited and their role is still constrained by higher level government bodies and existing regulations. This condition does not permit these local organisations to have their full rights to seek their own means to tackle problems facing natural resources in their own territories.

7.4 The Societal Context of Policy Implementation at the Local Level and the Concept of the Implementation Structure

According to Grindle and Thomas (1989) and other students of policy analysis who are protagonists of society-centred concepts, the societal context is crucial to policy-making and policy implementation, as it greatly determines the direction and outcome of policies. By the societal context, they mean interactions of different actors both inside and outside official bodies, and the political, social and economic environments within which policy-making and policy implementation take place. The societal context can be local, national, or even international in its coverage. However, as far as this study is concerned, the emphasis is given mainly to the local societal context of policy implementation, with particular reference to policies related to the management of local natural resources. Among the different components of the societal context, my interest centres on the interaction of different actors at the local level (as illustrated in the conceptual model presented in Chapter Two), and their influences on the achievement of policy implementation. Nevertheless, it is impossible to consider the actors' interactions alone without considering the influence of the political, social and economic environments in which the actors are situated. Bearing in mind the dominance of patron-client tradition, the prevalence of corruption among officials and the hierarchical nature of Thai society, the context in which actors interact with each other should be analysed more carefully, with a mindful consideration of their influence.

In the discussion that follows I would like to synthesise patterns of actors' interactions in implementing natural resource policies in the villages under study by treating local political, social and economic environments as situational factors which influence the

interactions. Furthermore, I wish to relate and compare patterns of actors' interactions observed in the communities under study to the concept of the implementation structures suggested by Hjern and Porter (1993), by taking the difference in societal contexts into consideration.

7.4.1 Local Actors and their Interactions

In Thailand, at the local level starting from the district downwards, there are field officials representing various government departments, and who oversee the implementation of development policies related to their departments. These officials were referred to as 'official actors' in the framework proposed in Chapter Two. With respect to policies related to forest resources and fishery resources which are emphasised in this study, the District Forestry Officer (*paamai amphoe*) and the District Fishery Officer (*pramong amphoe*) are the field officers who are principally responsible for managing these two types of natural resources. At the *tambon* and *mooban* level, most responsibilities go to *kamnan* and *phu yai ban* who head these two administrative units. Although in principle, only these field officials and official leaders have authority to implement forestry and fishery policies at these levels, their performance depends greatly on patterns of relationships and interactions among themselves and between them and 'non-official actors', under the circumstances they face.

This study shows that, the achievement of implementation of policy related to CPR management at the local level, the pattern of relationship between local official leaders and non-official actors within each community is more important than the relationship between local official leaders and field officials. Harmonious relationships lead to constructive interactions among them, and form a positive drive to the achievement of effective CPR management, as illustrated in the case of Ban Nua Phru. On the other hand, conflicting relationships create tensions between them, which retard the progress of policy implementation, as illustrated in the case of Bueng Yai community. Additionally, different patterns of relationships among these actors affect patterns of communication among themselves and conformity among members

of the communities as a whole, as these actors are generally influential members of each community. The better communication and conformity to social rules found among members of communities with harmonious relationships contribute to the strength of the communities, which is seen as an important factor to successful local CPR management (Ostrom, 1990; Singleton and Taylor, 1992).

Considering the difference in patterns of interactions among field officials, local leaders and local non-official actors, it is the economic pressure over the resources they use, their interests in the resources and their perceptions of management strategies, that matter most in their interactions. Conflicting interests and outlooks among these actors result in negative interactions among them. Although field officials and local official leaders are bound with the organisational structure of policy implementation, the influence of the organisational structure on their performance is minimal.

Compared to the situation under 'the implementation structure' described by Hjern and Porter (1993), the finding from this study shows that patterns of interaction among different actors at the local level are not the same as those in Western societies described by Hjern and Porter, although there is a similarity in the sense that different actors do interact with each other, based on the circumstances they face with minimal influence of the organisational structure. Traditional values of status difference (i.e. hierarchical and patron-client values) remain important in local Thai communities, and are still influential in the relationship between actors. The influence of these values makes some forms of interaction occur in a lesser degree than others, especially among actors of different status. The actors of lower official status perceive themselves as being subordinate to those of higher status and vice versa. The subordinates avoid negotiation and confrontation with their superiors, and tend to adopt a compromising and reticent position in their interaction during the implementation process. As a result, the local leaders dominate ordinary villagers, and field officials dominate local leaders. It can be said that full participation of subordinate actors does not take place in decision-making process, which is part of the implementation process, due to the influence of hierarchical and patron-client values.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the content of interaction among local actors in the policy process in Thailand, is profoundly shaped by hierarchical and patron-client values. This creates a situation in which unequal participation is almost inevitable. This situation produces outcomes which do not fully satisfy subordinate actors. In the face of unsatisfactory outcomes, especially when the outcomes appear in the form of rules to be followed, avoidance or 'exit' is preferred by subordinate actors as a common alternative to action. This type of response also happens in dealing with regulations and commands from the central government. It is evident from this study that, although official actors and official leaders are bound to follow official rules and regulations in their interactions with other actors, it is common for them to avoid rules and use their own judgement in dealing with the conditions, especially when adverse conditions press upon them. This is why effective enforcement of some regulations, which are inappropriate to the socio-economic patterns of local users or commonly unacceptable to members of communities, does not occur. The behaviour of official implementors in this sense is comparable to that of 'street-level bureaucrats' characterised by Lipsky (1980).

7.4.2 Situational Factors and their Influences on Actors' Interactions

The difference in the patterns of relationships between local official leaders and non-official actors is influenced by several situational factors, including the historical setting, and the socio-economic, cultural and political conditions of the communities. Based on the discussion on the background of the villages under study in Chapter Four, the effect of these situational factors can be summarised as follows.

a) Historical Factors

The difference in historical backgrounds between Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay determines the solidarity of these communities. The strong tradition of solidarity in Ban Nua Phru has a strong connection with the history of settlement of the village. Official leaders and non-official leaders interact with each other harmoniously not

only because they respect each other's personal behaviour, but also because they are bound together by the history of the settlement and the struggle to build up the community. By remembering how hard their immediate ancestors worked together to build up the community, their interactions are more for the benefit of the community rather than to compete with each other based on their own personal interests. Even when conflicting ideas emerge among them, agreements can be met easily when the common good of the community is put at the centre of their interactions. Similar solutions cannot be made easily in Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community where there is no common historical connection. When conflicts or disagreements emerge among actors, confrontation and bargaining take place based on personal interests rather than for the common good of the communities. When compromise cannot be met, harmonious relationships do not occur.

b) Socio-economic Conditions

The difference in socio-economic conditions between communities as observed in the case of Ban Nua Phru, Ban Bon Lay as well Bueng Yai Community is illustrated by the degree of homogeneity among households in terms of socio-economic status, access to natural resources important for their livelihoods, and the extent of changes towards the market economy. All these factors differ considerably between Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay as well as Bueng Yai community. Households in Ban Nua Phru are more homogeneous in their socio-economic status (as measured by occupational and wealth score differences) and their access to natural resources (including land, fishery resources and *krajoot*), but slightly less affected by the market economy, than in Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community. As Ostrom (1990) and Taylor and Singleton (1993) observe, homogenous communities are more efficient than heterogeneous communities in managing their common property resources, as conflicts over the use of the resources tend to be minimal among members. Moreover, it is commonly agreed among CPR management students that the abundance of natural resources reduces competition over the resource. At the same time, the higher the communities orientation towards the market economy, the higher their dependency on cash and the more intensive their production patterns are, which

increase their level of exploitation of natural resources used in their production (see Parry and Bloch, 1989, especially paper by David Lan). When competition and exploitation over the use of CPRs is high, tensions and conflicts are high and compromise becomes difficult.

c) Cultural Conditions

Cultural factors influence patterns of interactions of different actors and local people. Traditional values of respect for traditional leaders and master-follower relations determine the way different actors interact each other. Observations from both villages show that the involvement of traditional institutions in development activities, especially religious institutions, is beneficial in enhancing harmonious relationships among and between actors and ordinary people. In Ban Nua Phru where the religious leaders and the temple are highly integrated with its formal administrative organisation, resolution of conflicts related to development administration and CPR management can be done more easily than in Ban Bon Lay and Bueng Yai community where religious institutions are detached from development administration and 'worldly affairs.' The prevalence of master-follower values means that real participation of ordinary people in development planning cannot occur easily or automatically once the chance is opened, as formal and direct interactions between leaders and ordinary villagers are not common in rural communities. Therefore, participation is more meaningful to leaders than to ordinary villagers.

d) Political Conditions

Political conditions at the *tambon* and *mooban* levels as observed in the communities under study are not only related to power structures within the communities alone, but also the state administrative system at these levels. These two factors determine the organisational arrangements of the administration of different communities which affects their effectiveness in implementing natural resource policies.

The existence of the traditional system standing side by side with the formal system makes the interactions between the power of traditional leaders and the power of official leaders unavoidable. Different forms of interactions between traditional leaders and official leaders create different power relations between them. Harmonious relationships between traditional and official leaders strengthen community organisations in solving conflicts over the use of CPRs shared by members as power from these two sources is pooled. In contrast, when traditional and official leaders are in conflict or when community organisations are clearly dominated by the formal administrative system, the importance of traditional leaders is ignored. These two different forms of power relations are illustrated by the case of Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay. A high degree of traditional-modern integration in the organisational arrangement of the village administration in Ban Nua Phru increases the village's ability to control natural resource exploitation and to initiate its own project to improve CPR conditions. On the other hand, the organisational arrangement in Ban Bon Lay, which is clearly dominated by the formal system of administration, does not show enough strength to enforce regulations as well as to develop new ideas to reduce problems facing CPR exploitation within the community. Similar situations happen in Bueng Yai community.

With respect to the state administrative system applied to the *tambon* and *mooban* levels, the main problem concerns the administrative territory of each unit of administration and the management of CPRs. One of the most important characteristics of the present administrative system applied in Thailand is that every unit of administration has a clear political boundary which limits its power. Though several criteria are used as bases for drawing the boundary at each level, including geographical characteristics, historical characteristics, together with population, there seems to be no clear-cut rule about the priority of each of these criteria. At *tambon* and *mooban* levels, population size appears to be the most important criterion in dividing the units of administration. This is arranged to make general administration in each unit easy as the size of population does not vary greatly between villages, but it creates complications for more specific aspects of administration if no adjustments are made. CPR management signifies an aspect of administration which is observed to

be problematic for the application of conventional administrative boundaries, as the administrative boundary of one *mooban* or *tambon* can be inconsistent with the territory of CPR utilisation. The case of Ban Nua Phru and Ban Bon Lay illustrates two different examples of CPR management where different types of arrangement take place, and different achievements are observed, due to variations in the relationships between political boundaries and CPR territories.

The physical characteristics of their settlement described in Chapter Four and Chapter Five, make Ban Nua Phru a demarcated village. This is in contrast to Ban Bon Lay which forms a small part of the larger community of Bueng Yai. Moreover Bueng Yai community is divided between two *tambon*; Tambon Bueng Yai and Tambon Khuan Phanang. The clear physical separation of Ban Nua Phru settlement from its neighbouring villages makes the community more autonomous in managing its CPRs which are divided quite clearly from their neighbouring villages. Though the division of CPRs may not strictly follow the political boundary of each village, all villages know their own and their neighbours' resource territories. Together with social forces which can be sanctioned more easily within a community, problems related to unacceptable practices and overexploitation of CPRs appear to be minimal. Even when problems do occur, decisions about how to handle them can be made independently by the governing body of the community. On the contrary, the separation of Ban Bon Lay from other *mooban* within Bueng Yai community does not mean that territorial division of CPRs occurs in the same manner. CPRs, especially fishing grounds, are still shared among fishermen from different *mooban* in Bueng Yai community. Although traditional territories appear to exist, they are not based on the present village division, and are not as clear as the territorial division between Ban Nua Phru and its neighbouring *mooban.* Problems concerned with fishery resource management cannot be handled independently within each village community. Yet, the present management relies on the village-by-village approach: the approach which applies for general administration purposes. Coupled with problems of conflicting interests and high competition over resources, effective CPR management cannot be achieved under the conventional village-by-village management approach. The problem appears to be recognised by some concerned officials, since co-operation

from every leader was called for in overseeing the Fishery Reserve Project recently established in Bueng Yai lake. However, the call was observed to be fruitless in the absence of a clear strategy to reorganise leaders from various communities, whose interests are also in conflict.

As far as the modern administrative arrangement is concerned, CPR management at the local level cannot be based only on the conventional administrative arrangement which delineates all administration activities within the boundary of each administration unit, either *tambon* or *mooban.* Rather, it should consider the appropriate territorial arrangement of each CPR to be managed. Because the territorial arrangements of CPRs vary depending on the nature of CPRs and types of settlements of users' communities, reconsideration of special organisational arrangements to meet local variations is essential for effective CPR management.

7.5 *Phu Yai Ban* and Local CPR Management

In the previous section, I referred to local official leaders (i.e. *kamnan* and *phu yai ban*) as the most important official implementors in overseeing policy implementation at the *tambon* and *mooban* levels. However, I emphasised the importance of the policy implementation context, rather than the role and performance of *phu yai ban* who is placed at the centre of all actors. The discussion in this section will be more specific to the role of *phu yai ban* in handling problems related to CPR management, their performance and the conditions they face, as observed in the study villages.

The discussion in Chapter Six reveals that, from an official point of view, each *phu yai ban* represents the central government in dealing with any administrative matters in the village he leads. At the same time, he is entitled to represent people in his village in communicating with higher level officials and the government. All together, there are many responsibilities given to *phu yai ban* by the state, most of which are related to routine administrative work. However, recent structural reforms designed to promote a more decentralised approach to development administration have included *phu yai ban* and other local leaders in the planning process with respect to rural

development. Natural resource management planning is also considered as a part of rural development planning. In the planning process, the *phu yai ban* is entitled to accumulate problems at the *mooban* level and formulate them in the village plan to be considered by the *sapha tambon* where he/she sits as an elected member. Moreover, he/she is also responsible for overseeing and assisting concerned officials in implementing policies at the village level. In principle, the position where the *phu yai ban* stands is critical to designing and implementing plans at the local level, as compared to higher level officials. Nevertheless, translating principle into practice appears to meet with several obstacles. These include those that emerge from the organisational structure itself, the persistence of culture which hampers active involvement of *phu yai ban*, and personal limitation of *phu yai ban* themselves.

Further analysis shows that in the planning process the role of the village committee led by *phu yai ban* does not appear to be clear, particularly with respect to natural resource management. The emphasis is on the *sapha tambon* as the lowest local organisation eligible for preparing its own plan, and advising the district committee in preparing the district plan. It is in the first aspect of planning where the *sapha tambon* should play an active role, while in the second aspect the opportunity for the *sapha tambon* to take part in the planning is insubstantial, since it depends solely on the decision of the district committee to consult the *sapha tambon* in the process. Considering the first aspect alone, it appears from this study that natural resource management issues receive a low priority in *tambon* and *mooban* development planning. The fact that rural development planning has for a long time emphasised infrastructural development, has meant that the importance attached to natural resource development has been minimal. The state itself does not provide any special mechanism to alert local leaders to consider natural resource development as having a high priority in rural development planning. Therefore, it can be said that the inclusion of local organisations, especially the *sapha tambon* and village committee, does not sufficiently promote the participation of local leaders under the present organisational structure. This is because planning related to natural resource management at *mooban* and *tambon* levels is not distinguished from more general rural development planning. Without strong encouragement from the state to prioritise

natural resource management issues in rural development planning at the local level, it is difficult for *phu yai ban* as well as other local leaders to realise the significance of the issues which are new to the rural development agenda, as being more important than infrastructural issues which have long dominated the rural development agenda.

Cultural values, especially master-follower values, still remain strong in Thai society. They influence patterns of relationships between different levels of officials and between official leaders and ordinary villagers. In the relationship between *phu yai ban* and higher level officials in the planning process, the domination of these values means that *phu yai ban* hold subordinate status in their interactions with higher level officials. The superiority in the hierarchy of administration and educational qualifications of field officials enable them to dominate local official leaders easily. The effect of the master-follower values on the relationship between *phu yai ban* and ordinary villagers also occurs in a similar manner. Actual participation of ordinary villagers in the planning process is limited by their perceptions of being subservient in their interactions with their leaders, and the idea that development planning is the domain of their leaders. However, this does not always mean that ordinary villagers have no influence on the performance of *phu yai ban* in any manner, but their influence is rather indirect. Comparing the influence of field officials to that of ordinary villagers, the officials' influence appears to be greater. This can be seen from the way the problem formation is undertaken at the village level in which *phu yai ban* plays a dominant role in interpreting problems received from villagers through their observations and based on their perceptions and judgements. The village meeting which is supposed to provide the most important space for participation purposes does not function efficiently to serve these purposes. Many decisions take place in the meeting of informal village council, where ordinary villagers do not directly participate. On the other hand, frequent personal contacts with field officials allow these officials to transfer many ideas related to development projects to local official leaders substantially.

Obstacles to improvement of CPR conditions at the local level are also related to the personal limitations of *phu yai ban.* Personal limitations of *phu yai ban* in initiating

ideas pertaining to CPR management can be explained in terms of their lack of knowledge about the complex natural characteristics of the resources and the causes of degradation. Although they have ground-level knowledge about the resources in their communities and their conditions, they still lack confidence about the real causes of resource degradation. This is due to the fact that changes in CPR conditions can be caused by several factors at the same time, including both natural and man-made causes. The latter may be generated from outside, as well as from within each community. To understand all these causes thoroughly is difficult even for natural scientists. Even though *phu yai ban* and other local leaders see that natural resource degradation is caused by several factors, they still have difficulties identifying levels of importance among different factors. Findings discussed in Chapter Six indicate that they perceive natural causes and man-made causes from outside as being more important than man-made causes from inside their communities. Because most man-made causes from outside and natural causes are complex, and costs involved in eliminating or reducing these problems (either by re-excavating waterbodies or minimising the negative effects of previous development projects) are high, they regard that it is beyond their ability to handle the problems. This kind of perception hinders *phu yai ban*'s appetite and ability to solve the problems because of the limited mechanisms available to them.

The involvement of *phu yai ban* in the implementation of policy is more common than in planning. From a legislative point of view, policy implementation at the village level has always been part of *phu yai ban*'s administrative duties. Any projects or activities derived from policies and undertaken at the village level should involve *phu yai ban* directly or indirectly, whether they are planned locally or not. It is part of *Phu yai ban*'s duties to oversee policy implementation themselves or assist concerned authorities to undertake their implementation.

As stated earlier, policies related to CPR management appear as general regulations to control the exploitation of specific types of natural resources or specific projects which deal with problems emerging in specific areas. Dealing with general regulations means that each *phu yai ban* should work together with concerned officials in

enforcing regulations in his/her administrative territory. The implementation of special projects also takes place in a similar manner, but instead of dealing with general regulations, specific rules may apply to specific projects. Although these two forms of policies may differ in the origin of regulations, the responsibility of *phu yai ban* is not different. Observation in the study villages suggests that duties of enforcing regulations related to fishery resources are left mainly to *phu yai ban* and *kamnan*, since the number of concerned officials at the local level are often limited. However, there are several obstacles that deter *phu yai ban* from enforcing state regulations related to CPR management. These mainly emerge in relation to the power of *phu yai ban* in prosecuting offences, the conflict between state regulations and local conditions of CPRs, and difficulties in dealing with different interests that emerge among people.

Phu yai ban hold limited power in prosecuting offences. They are entitled to arrest offenders, but they need co-operation from concerned officials at higher levels, especially local police, in proceeding with a full legal action. Lack of co-operation from the police, whose role is often controversial in Thai society, limits *phu yai ban's* active involvement. As a result, enforcement of most regulations is lax, even in situations where offences are widespread.

The conflict of some state regulations with local conditions of CPRs and patterns of resource use creates difficulties for *phu yai ban* in enforcing such regulations. Because most natural resource and environmental policies presently applied to rural areas are centrally designed and aim at nation-wide application, this problem is not uncommon. As illustrated in Chapter Six, some rules imposed by fishery regulations overburden local fishermen and are in conflict with the perceptions of local people. This finding corresponds to findings of previous studies in local areas in other countries (see for example, Pomeroy, 1991; Gibbs and Bromley, 1989). Dealing with such rules is difficult for *phu yai ban,* who on the one hand should enforce the rules, but on the other hand should consider the impact of enforcement of the rules on the well-being of their fellow villagers. As a result, such rules are often ignored by *phu yai ban* as well as *kamnan.* Even opinion leaders, who are highly interested in improving fishery

conditions, are also reluctant to act against practices which are commonly perceived as not unreasonable, though they are against the law.

Finally, a *phu yai ban* is not the only actor in each community who is interested in controlling CPRs. As discussed in Chapter Six and earlier in this chapter, there are other actors such as opinion leaders and interest group leaders, whose aims and objectives can be different from those of *phu yai ban.* These actors can also be influential in policy implementation. Their interactions with ordinary villagers and *phu yai ban* affect the atmosphere of policy implementation, which in turn can alter the judgements of *phu yai ban* in dealing with CPR problems. Moreover, issues related to CPR management may go beyond a single village boundary, especially if resources are shared by users from more than one village community. Extending beyond a single village boundary means an increase in the number of actors who are from different units of administration, and more official leaders are involved. These actors and leaders can either act to support or oppose the existing directions of policy implementation. When different and conflicting interests emerge among these actors, constructive interactions are unlikely to take place automatically. If conflicts emerge among *phu yai ban* who lead different villages which share the same CPRs, the management of such CPRs is more complicated and less effective, unless proper rearrangements are made.

7.6 Towards Local CPR Management

The previous discussion in this chapter summarises general findings of this study related to the roles and performance of community organisations and local official leaders, especially *phu yai ban*, in implementing policies and dealing with problems concerning natural resource management at the local level. Much of the discussion stresses conditions which limit the performance of local organisations and local official leaders in tackling problems facing CPRs which are important to the livelihoods of members of their communities. In order to improve conditions facing local community organisations and local leaders, which is one of the ultimate aims of this study, I would like to make more specific conclusions which can be applied to the

improvement of policy implementation related to CPR management at the local level in Thailand.

First, it should be understood that the conventional concept which assumes that the state organisational structure has clear domination of the process of policy implementation at the local level, and that policies are implemented by official implementors with minimum changes and adjustments to their directions, is not accurate as far as rural and natural resource development policies are concerned. The local societal context where policy implementation takes place has a significant influence on the direction of policies while they are implemented, which in effect helps to determine the outcomes of the policies in question. It is the influence of the societal context of social, cultural, economic and political environments which forces official implementors, including local official leaders, to adjust their roles to meet with the conditions they face, which in turn modifies the original idea of policies in question. This finding corresponds to the framework proposed by Grindle and Thomas (1989) which is used as a basis for the conceptual framework proposed in this study. An application of this finding is that it is important for concerned bodies and high level officials to determine carefully the local social, economic and political environments in designing programmes and projects to be undertaken at the local level. This does not only mean that the participation of local leaders is imperative in deciding what programmes or projects should be undertaken, but also how they should be designed to meet conditions in each locality.

Second, the influence of the local societal context does not apply only to official implementors, but also to non-official actors who interact with official implementors to shape policy implementation in the directions which respond to their interests. For non-official actors, the organisational context of policy implementation is less influential on their behaviour. While the official implementors, especially local official leaders, are bound to follow the organisational context, the pressure they have in their interaction with non-official actors leads them to show discretion and to adjust their performance to reduce the pressure. Therefore, it should not be viewed that official attachment of local official leaders places them in a better position to

manipulate their interactions with non-official actors in favour of the state's policies. Rather both sides are almost equally important in forcing policy directions; a situation that is similar to 'the implementation structure' suggested by Hjern and Porter (1993). In this sense, it is important to understand that local official leaders are not merely state agents who will strictly follow policy directions and commands from above, with minimal discretion in playing their roles in implementing policies at the local level. It is also important to recognise the ability of local non-official actors, including interest groups and traditional leaders to manipulate policy implementation. Therefore, these traditional leaders must be included in the process of policy implementation, so that their needs can be formalised, and their ability can be used to promote the common good.

Third, cultural factors should be given an important place in implementing development policies at the local level, especially those concerning CPR management. Cultural elements such as the values of respect for elders and merits of religious leaders should be recognised and applied in enhancing community solidarity and resolving conflicts among resource users and actors. To integrate cultural values into the practice of CPR management in rural Thailand, it is important that religious leaders should be included and given a leadership position standing side by side with official leaders in the process of planning and implementing CPR management projects. Although there appears much evidence of the contribution of cultural leaders to the achievement of local resource management movements in Thailand and other parts of the world, the importance of including cultural leaders in planning and implementation is rarely stressed.

Fourth, it is important for the state to reconsider the organisational arrangements of CPR management organisations separately from that of general administrative arrangements which are based on the administrative territory of each administrative unit. This is particularly important when CPRs in question are shared among users from more than one village or unit of administration. The arrangements of CPR management organisations should be based on the territorial boundary of each CPR which may involve more than one unit of administration. In this reorganisation,

official leaders from different administrative units should be assigned clear responsibilities which are different from those governing a single unit of administration. The emphasis of this rearrangement should be on the mutual contribution of personal abilities and official power to the ability of these leaders to oversee CPR management projects and to lead their followers to support the projects.

Fifth, with respect to the role of *phu yai ban*, it is important to realise that though the present status of *phu yai ban* is important for CPR management, we should not overlook the weakness of *phu yai ban* and the associated village administrative arrangements in dealing with the complexity of CPR management issues. Under the present administrative arrangements, it is unlikely that *phu yai ban* alone are capable of handling CPR management effectively, through mechanisms made available to them by the state. Their limited power, coupled with a lack of co-operation from officials at higher levels, hamper the *phu yai ban*'s ability to overcome the complexity of CPR issues and challenges from various actors and users in controlling and exploiting CPRs. To strengthen the power of *phu yai ban* in handling CPR management problems, the state must realise the importance of enhancing co-operation between *phu yai ban* and traditional leaders, especially religious leaders. Moreover, the state should be sincere in allowing *phu yai ban* and other local leaders more independence from conventional rules in developing CPR management projects for the benefit of their communities.

Finally, while promotion of community-based resource management is perceived as imperative for moving the management of CPRs towards sustainable use, it is inaccurate to generalise that every community is capable of developing community-based management on its own. Additionally, it should be realised that in the face of changes resulting from the state's concerted attempts to reorganise village community organisations, traditional organisational systems in rural communities have been displaced or weakened by new systems of administration. However, the degree of displacement varies from community to community. This implies that different communities may have different capabilities in developing community-based management by themselves. In developing a community-based resource management

project, it is therefore important for concerned bodies to investigate carefully the strengths and weaknesses of each community. Moreover, a reconstruction of traditional arrangements by strengthening and modifying the traditional values that remain in each community is inevitable if community-based management is to be achieved. However, this is unlikely to occur easily in the absence of assistance from outside. Once the concept is adopted, the role of the state should move from issuing regulations and developing programmes to control resource users, to supporting resources that enable users to develop their own strategies and for NGOs to strengthen local organisations.

APPENDIX ONE

Questionnaire for Household Survey

No. ☐

Name of HH head ..... **Sub-district**..... **Village no.**.....**House no.**..... .
Date of visit...../...../..... **Interviewer**.....

Family tree: (those who sleep most of the time in this house, including non-family members).

Key: male = ☐, female = ○, sleeps elsewhere = ⬚/◌, age = 24

Income-generating occupations of residents (in order of importance to the household)
(*include non-resident unmarried children of resident parents*)

Sex	Age	Occupations	* if non-residents

Key: Agriculture, Craft, Education, Fishing, Trading, Rubber, Building, Garment, Others.

When does this household catch fish?
J F M A M J J A S O N D

When does this household work in agriculture (including rubber)?
J F M A M J J A S O N D

At what time of year does the household feel most prosperous?
J F M A M J J A S O N D

At what time of year does the household feel least prosperous?
J F M A M J J A S O N D

Fishing for home consumption only? Y / N

If fishing at all, specify types of gear used in last year.
Gills **S**eine **F**ishtrap **B**arriertrap **S**hrimptrap **E**eltrap **C**astnet **H**ook **L**ift **O**ther(Specify).....

Assets

Paddy land _____ rai
Rubber land _____ rai
Trap pond _____ units _____ sq. m.
Other land _____ rai.

Cassete player	**y / n**
T.V.	**y / n**
Electricity	**y / n**
Gas stove	**y / n**
Fridge	**y / n**
WC	**y / n**
Sewing Machine	**y / n**
Motorcycle	**y / n**
Brick/concrete wall or floor	**y / n**
Children in grade 7 or above now	**y / n**

APPENDIX TWO

FRESHWATER FISHERIES POLICY

Revised from

POLICY AND MANAGEMENT OF FRESHWATER FISHERIES IN SOUTHERN THAILAND

By

Awae Masae

Coastal Resources Institute
Prince of Songkla University
Hat Yai, Songkhla
Thailand

Internal Report Submitted to The Bath University
Centre for Development Studies

October 1993

POLICY AND MANAGEMENT OF FRESHWATER FISHERIES IN SOUTHERN THAILAND

1 INTRODUCTION

Fisheries play an important role in the daily life of the Thai people and the economy of Thailand. Though fisheries have not contributed much to the GNP of the country, they have been an important source of income and employment for a large number of people. It was estimated that over 300,000 people engaged in fisheries and associated industries in 1981 (Rientrairat, 1983). This did not include rural people who catch fish for household consumption and for supplementing their earnings.

Though marine fisheries are more significant both in terms of volume and value of fisheries' products, the importance of freshwater fisheries as part of rural people's livelihoods has long been recognised (Bhukaswan, 1987). In the old days when marine fishing techniques were not yet well developed, rural people who resided further inland depended largely on freshwater capture fisheries. Freshwater capture fisheries were conducted mainly on a traditional basis for subsistence purposes. Therefore, they were crucially important for traditional ways of life. However, the importance of freshwater capture fisheries has recently decreased. While marine capture fisheries have grown fast in the past few decades due to the development of marine fishing technologies, freshwater capture fisheries have not grown as they might have done. This is partly due to policies and management strategies related to fisheries development which have not much emphasised the improvement of freshwater capture fisheries under their given conditions. This paper intends to present existing policies and management strategies related to freshwater capture fisheries in Thailand. The focus will be on the situation in

Southern Thailand by referring to the freshwater capture fisheries in Bueng Yai Lake and Phru Thung Samet. These fisheries are now under threat of overexploitation.

2 OVERALL FRESHWATER FISHERIES POLICY

According to Thailand's National Economic and Social Development Plans, the most important guidelines for the country's development policies, freshwater fisheries development policies have not changed very much since the First Plan was introduced in 1961 (see Rientrairat, 1983). During the First National Plan (1961-1966), the main focus was on promoting the overall freshwater fisheries and fish farming, but the target was vague. In the Second National Plan (1967-1971), freshwater fish production was targeted at a level of 100,000 tons. This was to be achieved mainly by rehabilitating fish habitats and restocking of freshwater fish in irrigation canals, dam reservoirs, and natural waterbodies. The Third National Plan (1972-1976) did not specifically emphasise the development of freshwater fisheries. It put more emphasis on deep sea fishing and coastal shrimp farming to meet with the needs to improve the overall economic conditions of the country. The Fourth National Plan (1977-1981) focused on the increase of fisheries production, both marine fisheries and freshwater fisheries. A stronger emphasis was put on brackish water fisheries development. It also stressed the conservation of marine fish resources as well as rehabilitation of freshwater fish habitats. The Fifth National Plan (1982-1986) emphasised the need to increase of freshwater fisheries production, not only for domestic consumption but also for export. The emphasis was given to the development of management regulations and strategies. It also stressed the promotion of fisheries production through a village fish farming development programme *(khrongkaan pramong mooban)* in which people's participation in the fisheries development programme is emphasised. The Sixth National Plan (1987-1991) focused more on research and development to increase the productivity of some fish species which are economically important(see also Suraswadee, 1989). This included the development of multi-disciplinary research, improvement of the working efficiency of fisheries research stations, acceleration of the freshwater rare fish species rehabilitation programme, development of joint programmes

for rehabilitation of waterbodies between concerned development agencies, and dissemination of knowledge related to capture fisheries, aquaculture and fish resource conservation. The Seventh National Plan (1992-1996) placed more emphasis on the need to speed up the amendment of laws and regulations related to the conservation and development of fish resources. It focused also on encouraging the co-ordination of fishermen's associations to develop fishing technologies, and dissemination of knowledge related to wise use of fish resources. No separation of policies was made between freshwater and marine fisheries.

3 FRESHWATER FISHERIES POLICY FOR SOUTHERN THAILAND

Freshwater fisheries in Southern Thailand overall are much less important than marine fisheries to the economy of the region. It shares only about 1 per cent of the total fisheries production of the region. This is partly due to the geographical characteristics of the region where waterbodies suitable for freshwater fishing are limited, and because the region is encompassed by long coast lines. This gives predominance to marine and coastal fishing. However, as marine fisheries in Thai water have been declining and facing several problems in the last few years, the Thai government has been interested in the development of the freshwater fisheries in the region in order to reduce the problems related to fisheries as well as to improve living conditions of fishermen who depend highly on freshwater fishing. Furthermore, development of freshwater fisheries is aimed at improving protein uptake of the poor in rural inland areas. In order to improve freshwater fisheries conditions in Southern Thailand, the following policies have been drawn up (see Rientrairat, 1983; Office of Agricultural Economics, 1986);

1) Increasing the productivity of large reservoirs such as Cheao Larn Dam in Surat Thanee Province, Bang Laang Dam in Yala Province, and main rivers throughout the region, by restocking fish species which are economically important and have become rare in the wild,

2) Increasing the productivity of Songkhla Lake by attempting to develop the lake as a major fishing ground of the region, and promoting freshwater prawn culture in the upper and the inner part of the lake,

3) Increasing freshwater fishing resources through the development of reservoirs left from mining to become fishing grounds additional to natural waterbodies.

At present, there are six freshwater fisheries research stations in the region which play an important role in implementing the above policy guidelines. These research stations are responsible for conducting research relating to fish breeding, restocking fish, and maintaining main waterbodies in the region. These research stations are located in the following provinces; Trang, Pattani, Yala, Patthalung, Satun and Surat Thanee. There exists also a freshwater fisheries development centre situated in Surat Thanee. The centre plays a crucial role in fish breeding, both for restocking and aquacultural promotion. It is also responsible for providing intensive aquacultural training for fisheries officers and interest groups in order to promote aquaculture in the region.

4 FRESHWATER FISHERIES REGULATIONS

There are two sets of regulations which directly affect the development and the management of the fisheries sector in Thailand. These are The Fisheries Act of B.E. 2490 (1947) and The Act Governing the Right to Fish in Thai Fisheries Waters of B.E. 2482 (1939). However, only the Fisheries Act is concerned with freshwater fisheries, while the other is related more to marine fisheries. In addition to the Fisheries Act, there are notifications, regulations and rules related to freshwater fisheries. These notifications, regulations and rules had been drawn up under the Fisheries Act for the purposes of clarification and specification of some articles in the Act to be appropriate for different conditions and localities. This section will present the contents of the Fisheries Act and other regulations related to freshwater fisheries only.

4.1 The Fisheries Act

The Fisheries Act is composed of 73 articles within 7 parts: Fishing Areas, Cultivation Ponds, Licensing, Fisheries Statistics, Fisheries Control and Prosecution of Offences, (Department of Fisheries, 1987; Rientrairat, 1983).

4.1.1 Fishing Areas

Fishing areas are divided into 4 categories; sanctuary, leasable area, permitted area and public area. Subject to the approval of the Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives, each Provincial Council is empowered to declare any water body to become one type of these fishing areas.

1) A sanctuary includes areas in or nearby monasteries, in navigation locks, weirs, dams or any places suitable for conservation of aquatic animals. Such areas are reserved areas where any fishing activity is prohibited without permission of the Director General of the Department of Fisheries.

2) Leasable areas refer to areas reserved for individual licence holders who gain licences through auction. These areas must not be within irrigated areas for agriculture, or areas where fishing could affect rice cultivation or water transportation. Fishing in such areas is subject to compliance with the conditions imposed by the Director General of Department of Fisheries or competent officials.

3) Permitted areas refer to areas reserved for individual licence holders who gain licences under permitted conditions. The licences can be issued for capture fisheries, aquaculture, and refuge trap ponds. Fishing in such areas is subject to compliance with the conditions imposed by the Director General or competent officials.

4) Public areas cover any areas which are not declared as sanctuary, leasable or permitted areas. Fishing and culturing of aquatic animals in public areas is permissible for everyone under conditions imposed by the Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives, and published in the Government Gazette.

Additional to the above descriptions of fishing conditions in different fishing areas, there exist restrictions related to the use of the areas, which can be summarised as follows.

a) Any construction, cultivation of any crops, and dewatering of the areas, are not allowed in any types of the fishing areas without permission from competent officials.

b) Construction of refuge trap ponds can be done in legally owned land, however, it must not disturb aquatic animals in reserved sanctuaries. On the other hand, construction of refuge trap ponds in public areas is not allowed without permission of competent officials.

c) Use of electricity and explosive substances in fishing is prohibited. Moreover, fish caught by using these methods are not allowed to marketed.

d) Any change in the natural conditions of fishing areas or lands which are not entitled to anyone is prohibited without permission of competent officials.

e) Construction of dams and dike, and placing of fishing gear which blocks waterways and that can affect fish movement, are not allowed without permission from competent officials, except if such activities are beneficial for agricultural activities in lands entitled to anyone.

4.1.2 Cultivation Ponds

The concern of this part is with the construction of cultivation ponds and fishing in the cultivation ponds. Construction of cultivation ponds in public areas requires official permission, but no restrictions are given on fishing in cultivation ponds.

4.1.3 Licensing

In this part, the designation on different levels of authorities to issue notifications concerning licensing is stated. Generally, it can be summarised as follows.

1) The Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives is empowered to issue notifications to require anyone engaging in fisheries related activities, including fishermen, fish traders, and fisheries product factory owners, to request permission in conducting their activities. The Minister is also empowered to require owners of any types of fishing gear to enter registration of ownership. The Provincial Commissioner, subject to the approval of the Minister, can withdraw any licences or auction concessions for public or official benefit. The Provincial Council, subject to the approval of the Minister, is empowered to issue notifications concerning the licensing period appropriate to any localities based on a 12 month period. Normally, the licensing period starts from 1st April and finish on 31st March every year. However, The Minister, or the Provincial Commissioner with the approval of the Minister, is empowered to declare the following regulations within each provincial boundary;

a) To define mesh size, gear size, gear type, amount and composition of any types of fishing gear,

b) To prohibit the use of any type of fishing gear in the fishing areas,

c) To determine the site for placing any particular types of fishing gear,

d) To set up methods of using any types of fishing gear,

e) To declare the spawning season appropriate to each locality within its administrative boundary, and to limit types of fishing gear and methods of fishing in the spawning season,

f) To limit the type, size and amount of aquatic animals that can be caught,

g) To set up rules prohibiting the catching particular fish species.

2) This part also covers the following regulations related to freshwater fisheries management:

a) The setting up or installing of stationary types of fishing gear, such as bamboo screens or barriers, set bags, and large lift nets, in public areas is prohibited. In other types of fishing areas, these types of gear are allowed with the permission of competent officials;

b) Fishing in permitted areas is allowed only for fishermen who hold permitted licenses;

c) Fishermen who hold fishing licences and auction concessions must always carry them while fishing;

d) Competent officials have the right to withdraw fishing licenses, permitted licences or auction concessions, if permitted fishermen do not follow the given conditions;

e) Request for fishing licences and payment of licence fees may be done in the period of 1st April to 31st March, each year.

4.1.4 Fisheries Statistics

In relation to statistical collection, the Minister is empowered to require a statistical collection in any area if necessary. Once required by the Minister, the Director General may request anyone engaging in fisheries related activities to provide statistical data for official purposes. If necessary, the competent officials designated for this particular purpose have the right to require provision of statistical data from requested persons.

4.1.5 Fisheries Control

This part contains regulations related to the designation of different levels of authority in controlling the fisheries sector according to the Act. Subject to the approval of the Minister, the Provincial Council is empowered to declare restrictions on entering fishing areas of non-license holders without permission of the competent officials. The Provincial Commissioner is empowered to issue an order to license holders to demolish their fishing gear and constructions in fishing areas, if they are illegal or if their licences are already expired. The license holders carry any costs of demolishing in this case. The competent officials is empowered to enter any fishing area or fishing boat to inspect the commission of offences. They are also empowered to arrest any offenders under this Act, including seizure of any materials and equipment found. Then, court legal action will be taken against offenders

4.1.6 Prosecution of Offences

This part of the Act outlines penalty fees and/or imprisonment terms for offences against various articles of the Act.

4.2 OTHER FORMS OF REGULATION

Apart from the Fisheries Act, there are other forms of regulation including royal decrees, ministerial enactments and notifications. These regulations have been released at different times in accordance with the Fisheries Act, in order to clarify and specify some of its articles (see Department of Fisheries, 1980). In terms of their application, some of these regulations are nation-wide, while others are specific to a particular area. This section will present some of these regulations which are related to the management of freshwater fisheries both nation-wide regulations and those specifically related to Songkhla Lake and Bueng Yai Lake. The freshwater fisheries regulations included here can be divided into 4 groups; regulations concerning fishing areas, regulations concerning fishing seasons, regulations concerning fishing methods and fishing gear, and regulations concerning licensing.

In relation to fishing areas, it is stressed that every province should consider the declaration of sanctuaries in the following places which adjoin water bodies; monasteries, government offices and state schools. There are also policies related to improvement of swamps and reservoirs for increasing freshwater productivity. In order to improve such reserves, the Department of Fisheries declared cancellation of auction units in swamps and reservoirs throughout the country. Then, the Department of Fisheries would be responsible for controlling and overseeing swamp areas and reservoirs which are suitable for reserves, both for the purposes of conservation and for the improvement of fisheries conditions.

In relation to the fishing season, only restrictions of fishing in the spawning season are stated. The nation-wide spawning season of freshwater fishes was declared to be between 15th May to 30th September every year. Nevertheless, there is a provincial notification which sets up another spawning season for Songkhla Lake, including Bueng Yai Lake, between 1st October and 31st January every year. This was said to be appropriate for the area within which 'two-water fish species' are abundant. The 'two-water fish species' are referred to the species which can survive in both fresh and brackish water, such as *Hampala macrolepidota*, *Osteochilus hasselti*, and *Mystus spp.* Because the specific spawning season was declared additional to the nation-wide spawning season, fishing in this area is limited by two spawning seasons which cover more than eight months a year, which is too long for fishermen who depend largely on fishing to observe. Fishing in the spawning seasons is limited to some types fishing gear only. These are divided into 3 groups: (1) hook with exception of long line; (2) dip net, scoop net, and lift net, which are not larger than 2 metres in diameter; and (3) any kind of trap. However, fishing in cultivation ponds is not restricted in the spawning period.

With regard to fishing methods and fishing gear employed, there exist several regulations which impose restrictions on fishing. Most of these regulations are concerned with restrictions of methods and gear types to be set in relation to fishing areas and localities. These can be summarised as follows.

(1) It is prohibited to use all kinds of net except scoop net with diameter not more than 2 metres, and barriers, for fishing in the following public fishing areas; canals, creeks, gullies and irrigation ditches.

(2) It is prohibited to use trawler, seine net and push net or other kinds of fishing gear which have similar effects to these types of gear, in reservoirs throughout the country. Using these types of fishing gear together with motorised boats is also prohibited in rivers and canals. These rules apply also for fishing in Songkhla Lake and Bueng Yai Lake. However, the use of seine net in Songkhla Lake and Bueng Yai Lake was then changed to be restricted only to gear which is 200 metres and above in length, 2.50 metres deep or wide and over 1.50 cm in mesh size. This change was made as a

response to the request for catching freshwater anchovy which is abundant in the lake, and seine nets are used for catching this type of fish.

(3) Set bag, winged-set bag, and other similar types of fishing gear, are prohibited in all waterbodies throughout the country without permission from competent officials.

(4) Block net and bamboo screen block traps (or barrier traps) are prohibited in all waterbodies throughout the country.

As a part of fishing methods, construction of refuge trap ponds is also subject to permission, if it takes place in public areas. Permission for construction of a refuge trap pond is subject to the following conditions; (1) the distance between the edge of the pond and the edge of nearby public waterbodies must not be less than 8 metres, (2) there must not be any water ways to connect the pond and public waterbodies, and (3) dewatering of the pond cannot exceed twice a year. It should be noted here that dewatering of fish trap ponds, either the ponds are in public areas or in areas owned by fishermen, requires permission from competent officials.

In relation to licensing, fishermen can apply for any kinds of license, either fishing licences or permitted licences, except auction concessions, at each local district fisheries office. Requesting an auction concession requires a process run by the auction committee appointed by the state at each province.

4.3 ENFORCEMENT OF REGULATIONS IN THE STUDY AREA

Although there appear to be several regulations and rules related to freshwater fisheries management, both in the Fisheries Act and in other forms of regulations, effective enforcement of existing regulations is open to question. From informal discussions with several people including fishermen, village heads, elders and the district fisheries officer of Khuan Mangkhud District, together with some observation in the study area, there is much evidence which leads to an assumption that there is no strong and effective enforcement of existing regulations in the area. Although most of the area is a public

fishing ground where access is open to all community members, there have been attempts to establish reserved sanctuaries in Bueng Yai Lake three times. The first attempt occurred more than 60 years ago. The second and third attempts have been made in the last few years. The results of these attempts were mixed. It was said that at the beginning of the first attempt the management of the sanctuary went very well. Most fishermen obeyed the rules prohibiting fishing in the sanctuary. A combination of official enforcement and traditional social sanction was employed in the management of the sanctuary. However, when the number of fishermen increased and with a decline in the fisheries productivity, some fishermen started to break the rules. The loose official enforcement together with the decline in the practice of social sanction, led to the sanctuary area being overlooked. The second declaration of a sanctuary area which was made in 1990 and failed completely in its implementation. The latest declaration of a sanctuary area, which was made in 1993, is still too soon for a firm judgement about its effectiveness to be made.

In general, the actual enforcement of fisheries regulations in the area has been very limited, either in relation to restriction of fishing in both sanctuary and public fishing areas, or in relation to licensing. In fact, the licensing system has not yet been officially applied to fishing in Phru Thung Samet, but it was said it would be applied soon. For Bueng Yai Lake, it appears that only serious offences are taken into account for prosecution. These include electric fishing, dynamite fishing and fish poisoning. There has been evidence of arresting fishermen due to these offences. Other general offences, such as fishing without licences, and use of other illegal fishing gear, do not appear to be enforced seriously. In most cases, warnings are given to offenders as a first step. Though this seems to be enough to stop most fishermen from making further offences, it does not appear to be strong enough for the small minority who dare to challenge the authorities. The absence of serious enforcement in the area has meant that offences against fisheries regulations are not uncommon, but only a few fishermen are involved.

The loose enforcement of fisheries regulations is related strongly to problems with the prosecution process. In the prosecution of offences, main responsibility is given to the

local district fisheries officer. At the same time, each village official leader (*phu yai ban*) and sub-district official leader (*kamnan*) are also empowered to arrest offenders. In practice, the district fisheries officer or *phu yai ban* should be accompanied by other officials, which are local policemen, to inspect and arrest. Non-cooperation from police may cause problems.

Limitations in the enforcement of fisheries regulations is also related to the responsibility and commitment of district fisheries officers. For example, in Khuan Mangkhud district, there are only two officers representing the Department of Fisheries, and one of them was assigned to work in a neighbouring district, thus only one officer is on duty in the district. Generally the district fisheries officer is responsible for overseeing various fisheries activities in the district he serves, therefore the time available for working on the inspection of offences in waterbodies within the district is limited. It was estimated that only about ten days a month can be allocated for this duty by the fisheries officer of Khuan Mangkhud district. As there are many waterbodies in the district, the time he could spend on patrolling Bueng Yai Lake is minimal.

As part of the management, according to policies to increase the productivity of freshwater fisheries in the area, the Department of Fisheries' research station at Patthalung had restocked fishes twice in Bueng Yai Lake by the time the study finished in 1993. Four fish species had been restocked, including common silver barb, golden little barb, Jullien's golden-price carp and Nile tilapia. Other activities related to the management of freshwater fisheries in Bueng Yai Lake which are conducted by the Department of Fisheries include conducting research related to fisheries conditions in the area, collecting fisheries statistics, and promoting aquaculture. However, these activities do not seem to have been well organised in the past. Moreover, most research work was observed to be narrow in its scope, such as the study to identify fish species available, the study of water quality, etc. Additionally, it seems that be no continuous research has been done. This makes the data available about fisheries in the area very limited. Aquacultural promotion has also not been successful in reaching wider groups

of fishermen; only a few better-off fishermen have tried and adopted the techniques introduced by officials.

5 THE TRADITIONAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Considering the survival of freshwater fishing in the area, especially in Bueng Yai Lake which has been an important freshwater fishing area for a long time, it should be a management system which is effective and rooted from fisherfolk tradition. However, the finding from this study does not show that there is a firm traditional management system in the area which is effective for the management of fish resources. All the waterbodies in the study appear to be of common pool type, therefore, everyone in the community has a free choice to fish. Rules that control fishermen behaviour in making use of fish resources do exist in forms of general norms and neighbourhood perceptions in which maintaining good relationships with neighbours is considered as vary important. Being neighbours they should care for each other in various aspects of living. With respect to fishing, fishermen in Bueng Yai community try to allocate the fish resources among themselves similar to the way they share other resources with their neighbours. When conflicts occur in the allocation of limited resources, they prefer to discuss each other and try to solve the problems themselves. Only when the cases are so serious their leaders were involved. For example, one fisherman would not set his gill net too close to other fishermen's gill nets which were already set, even if the place used to be his fishing ground. Another example is when a fishermen needs to pump his refuge trap ponds, he will call his neighbours for help by offering only a meal and the neighbours will take some fish for consumption when the task is finished. This system is observed to be used in combination with economic consideration and inheritance system. The inheritance system applies only for stationary types of fishing gear and other related methods, such as lift net, barrier and brush pile for seine net fishing. Places used for setting these types of gear can be passed from parents members of their families.. It is observed that the neighbourhood system can work well to reduce conflicts between fishermen but does not mean much for the management of fish resources

towards sustainabiltiy in this area. This is because there are no clear norms of controlling overexploitation of the resources.

Traditional land claims the public and reserved areas also affect the management of fisheries in this area. This practice created some restrictions on fishing places. Construction of refuge trap ponds in public land can be done only in the land claimed by the owners of the ponds without any legal titles, or in the swamp forest area which the fishermen clear after fire damage.

Though most fishermen did not seem to have clear views about the relationship between resource degradation and fisheries conditions in the future, there is a group in Bueng Yai community formed by some present fishermen and some former fishermen who have some experience with people from outside who believe that they can do something to improve fisheries conditions in the area. This group used to seek assistance from concerned government agencies to organise fishermen from the community to clear aquatic weeds. Moreover, some of its members are also involved in the recent movement to stop using seine nets throughout Songkhla Lake, as they considered that using seine net is harmful to fish stocks. The group were observed to be active not only in fisheries related activities, but also in other development activities.

6 CONCLUSION

Fisheries policies in Thailand has focused strongly on marine fisheries since the First National Economic and Social Development Plan which was introduced in 1961. Though freshwater fisheries have been important for the livelihoods of rural people, their economic contribution either to the country as a whole or to the southern region of Thailand has been minimal. This status of freshwater fisheries did not encourage policy makers to emphasise development planning of the country. Evidence can be seen in the broad policies drawn in the past which have not changed much since the beginning of the National Economic and Social Development Plan, and also most of the related policies have no clear target. As a result, the development of freshwater fisheries,

especially capture fisheries, has been very slow, and fisheries conditions have declined significantly. The recent development policies place more emphasise on promotion of freshwater fish culture, as most of natural freshwater fish resources have been degraded to such an extent that full rehabilitation is difficult.

From the management point of view, there exist the Fisheries Act and other forms of regulation and rules which cover various aspects of freshwater capture fisheries management. However, problems arise regarding the effective enforcement of these regulations. Findings from this study indicated that in common pool fishing areas where every fisherman from the defined community feels free to fish, there is a likelihood of having activities which are harmful to fish resources in the long term. Although there are some traditional rules to control resource allocation and exploitation, the enforcement of these rules does not seem to be strong enough in the present social conditions in the area. There also exist official regulations and rules which cover most aspects of problems presently faced. But the question of how to enforce these regulations effectively arises. So far, it can be said that the enforcement of regulations and rules related to the management of the freshwater fisheries in this area is minimal. Moreover, there appear to be some regulations and rules which are nation-wide and which may not be appropriate for some local conditions. This would not be a serious problem if the provincial competent officials attempt to find out what the real problems are, and set up new rules which are more appropriate for each locality in the province to replace the nation-wide rules which are inappropriate. Finally, it seems that the Department of Fisheries' local branch office mainly emphasises restocking fish and promoting fish culture, whereas other management alternatives are neglected.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bhukaswan, T. (1987). "Freshwater Fisheries of Thailand." In Department of Fisheries, *Proceedings of Seminar between Government and Non-*

government Sectors on Fisheries Development, 4-6th June 1989. Bangkok: Department of Fisheries.

Bhukaswan, T. (1980). *The Development and Management of Freshwater Fisheries Resources*. Bangkok: Department of Fisheries.

Department of Fisheries (1987). *Fisheries Laws*. Bangkok: Department of Fisheries.

Department of Fisheries (1980). *A Manual on Fisheries Notifications and Regulations*. Bangkok: Department of Fisheries.

Office of Agricultural Economics (1986). *Fisheries Resource Conditions of Thailand*. Bangkok: Office of Agricultural Economics, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives.

Office of Agricultural Economics (1986). *Fisheries Resource Conditions of Southern Thailand*. Bangkok: Office of Agricultural Economics, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives.

Rientrairat, S. (1983). *Fisheries Development Planning System in Thailand*. Bangkok: Department of Fisheries.

Suraswadee, P. (1989). "Thailand's Fisheries Development Policies." *Thai Fisheries Gazette* 42, no. 3: 193-195.

APPENDIX THREE

WEALTH POINT CALCULATION

Household wealth points used in classifying socio-economic groups in this study was calculated from data obtained through the household survey undertaken for the PSU-CDS Floodplain Project. The calculation was made by scoring household's asset ownership and educational attainment of children. The score is given as follows:

a) 1 point for having a member studying above Grade 6;
b) 1 point for owning each of the following assets; a cassatte player, a TV, a gas stove, house with brick or concrete wall/floor, a WC in the house, a sewing machine, a refrigerator and a motorcycle.

The distribution of cumulative household wealth points was used in categorising the household socio-economic status. The wealth points distribution and household socio-economic categorisation resulting from the calculation of cumulative wealth score of all households surveyed are as follows:

Wealth Points	Frequency (%)	Categorisation
0	4	very poor
1-3	16.3	poor
4-7	64.7	average
≥ 8	15	well-off

THAI TERMS USED

amphoe	district
ban	village, also *mooban*
baht	unit of Thai currency; 1 *baht* is approximately £0.025
baw law pla	refuge trap pond, used for trapping fish seeking refuge
Bhasa Klaang	Central Thai Language, the official language of Thailand
Bhasa Pakstai	Southern Thai Dialect, the dialect commonly used in Southern Thailand
bon	on
buea pla	a method of fishing using chemical substance, especially of cyanide compound to taint fish
bueng	natural reservoir
chang khaw-paw-taw	a member of Sub-district Rural Development Operational Committee selected from villagers knowledgeable about construction
chaat	nation
chalerm phrakiart haasip pee siri ratchasombat	the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the King's reign or 'Golden Jubilee'

changwat	province
chao aawaat	abbot of Buddhist temple
chao hua meuang	provincial ruler during the time of absolute monarchy Thailand
chao khana	Buddhist ecclesiastical leader
chao khana tambon	sub-district ecclesiastical leader
chuay leuah	assist, help
chot plaa	a method of fishing by passing electric current from a battery into water to kill fish
due, hua khaeng	obstinate or pigheaded
fai kheow	green light
hen foong look pla tem pai mohd	seeing plenty of fry; an expression
hua	literally means 'head', but it is referred in this study to as 'piece' of gill net according to local measurement of its quantity
huana, huana suan	head, head of office or section
huana samnak-ngaan changwat	Head of the Provincial Office

huana suan ratchakaan radab changwat	head of staff from each central department at the provincial level
jab khae paw kin	catch (fish) just enough for consumption; an expression
jai kwaang, jai yai	generous, kind-hearted
jatusadom	'The Four Pillars of State', an ancient Thai administrative system which is centralised and divided into four departments; civic affairs, palace affairs, financial affairs, and agricultural affairs
jon	poor
jon maak	very poor
joot nooh	a type of sedge grasses, but is not suitable for mat weaving or handicrafts
lao khaao	a type of liquor made from rice
lay, le	short forms of '*thale*' commonly used in the southern region, literally means 'sea' but sometime refers to any large waterbodies
long khaek	mutual help practice
look khaao	local name for a chemical substance used for tainting fish

kab klaem	snacks served while drinking liquor
kammakaan mooban,	the Village Committee, the official administrative body
khana kammakaan mooban	at village level
kammakaan wat	Buddhist temple lay committee
kamnan	sub-district headman, the official leader of *tambon*
kam naehnam	suggestion
kam preuksa	advice
kamsang khong taang ratchakaan	state orders or commands
kaan mii suan ruam khong prachachon	participation of people
kaan nam kwaamjaroen kaonaa su chonnabot	bringing advancement and modernisation to rural areas
kaanpattana chonnabot	rural development
kaw-chaw-chaw	short name for the National Rural Development Committee (*khana kammakaan pattana chonnabot haeng chaat*)
kawn kaang dee	well-off (economic status)
kaset amphoe	District Agricultural Officer

kaset tambon	Sub-district Agricultural Officer
kaw-khaw	name of a series of high yielding rice varieties developed by the Thai Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives' Rice Research Division
khaa chay ngaan	gifts or help offered to hosts in ceremonial events
khana tam-ngaan sanabsanun kaanpatibat-ngaan pattana chonnabot radab tambon	the Sub-district Rural Development Operational Committee
khao pansa	Buddhist Lent season, beginning around July and ending around October every year
khaaratchakaan prajam	permanent civil servant
khate raksa peutpan satnaam	an aquatic plants and animals protecttion area, a category of fishery reserve area
khaw mue	reciprocal labour arrangement
khaw-paw-taw	short name for the Sub-district Rural Development Operational Committee
khaw ratchakaan	official directives or official matters
khlong	canal, water channel

khrongkaan pramong mooban	village fish farming development scheme promoted under the Fift Plan (1982-1986)
khru	teacher, especially primary school teacher
khru yai	school headmaster
khuan	hill or 'island' in the middle of the swamp area
khwai lehk 'iron	an informal name for hand tractor, literally means buffalo'
klum kasettakorn	government organised farmers' group
krajoot, joot	a type of sedge grasses used for mat weaving and handicrafts.
krawb nayobai	policy framework set by each indidvidual ministry
krengjai	respect, awe
krom kaanpokkraung	Department of Local Administration
kwaam ruammue	co-operation
mooban, ban	village, the lowest administrative unit in the Thai administration
Muang Faai	a traditional irrigation system found in Northern Thailand

nai amphoe	the District Officer, the head of district office
nai-phrai	the dominant form of master-follower relationships in the absolute monarchy system of Thailand
nakleng	tough men, powerful men or local mafia
ngaan buat	Buddhist ordination
ngaan songkraan	water festival taking place in April every year
ngaan taeng ngaan	wedding ceremony
ngaan taud kathin	an offering ceremony made to all Buddhist priests in a temple taking place in around November every year
ngaan taud phaapaa	robe offering ceremony for Buddhist priests
ngaan sop	cremation
ngob pattana changwat khong soh-soh	a special budget allocated for individual members of parliamnet to be used in the development of their constituencies
nua	north
od yaahk	starve or starving
ongkaan borihaan suan changwat	a kind of local government at the provincial level

ongkaan borihaan in suan tambon	the most recent form of local government introduced 1995 to be operated at the *tambon* level
paa	forest
paamai amphoe	District Forest Officer
paan klaang	average (economic status)
paa samet	swamp forest
palad	under-secretary
palad aawuso, palad amphoe aawuso	Senior District Under-secretary
palad amphoe	District Under-secretary
palad changwat	Provincial Under-secretary
pattanakaan amphoe	District Community Development Officer
pattanaakorn	community development worker working at *tambon* level
paw kin	sufficient for household consumption, especially food
pee naung	relatives (cf. *yaat pee naung*)
phaet prajam tambon	sub-district doctor or sub-district paramedic
phak phuak, kloe	close companion

phra, bhikkhu, piksu	Buddhist monk
phra nak pattana	development monk, a group of reform Buddhist Monk
phru	swamp, marsh, wetland
phu chuay phu yai ban	deputy village headman
phu chuay phu yai ban fai pokkraung	deputy village headman for administrative affairs
phu mii ittipol	powerful person or mafia (cf. *nakleng*)
phu song khunnawut	literally means 'elder' or 'knowledgeable person', in this research it is generally referred to elected village official elder representing at *sapha tambon*
phuwa ratchakaan changwat	Provincial Governor
phu yai ban	village headman, the official leader of *moobaan*
pramong amphoe	District Fisheries Officer
rabob sakdina	the Thai mode of feudal system existing during the period of absolute monarchy, in which different amount of land was allocated to noblemen according to their ranks, and these noblemen were empowered to control local labour
raan khai khaung	grocery store

raan nam cha	tea shop
rai	unit of land measurement officially used in Thailand, 1 *rai* is approximately 0.16 hectare
rawng phuwa ratchakaan changwat	Deputy Provincial Governor
reua haang yao	long-tailed boat used by small-scale fishermen
rot saung theao	modified pick-up truck used for public transportation
ruay	rich
samet, ton samet	a type of tree grown in swamp area, its wood is good for making charcoal
samnak-ngaan	office
samnak-ngaan ongkaan borihaan suan changwat	Provincial Administrative Office
samrab	a set of meal
sapha tambon	sub-district council, the lowest level planning body in the Thai administration
sapha changwat	provincial council
sapha phutaen raatsadorn	the House of Representatives

sataranasuk amphoe	District Public Health Officer
sataranasuk tambon	Sub-district Public Health Officer
Suan Paa Sangha Pracha Raks	the name of the project, literally meaning 'monks and people reserve forest'
sueksatikaan amphoe	District Educational Officer
suesat sujarit	trustful and honest
sukaapibaan	a type of local government existing in urban or semi-urban area, mostly district towns
tambon	sub-district, the second lowest administrative unit in the Thai administration
tambun	paying charities or making good deeds
teedin jabjawng	squatter land
tesabaan	a type of local government existing in urban area, mostly in provincial capitals
thale	sea, sometime may be used in the meaning of large waterbody.
thung	plain area, large field
wat	Buddhist temple

wong lao	drinking circle which is normally organised among close friends and relatives
wong sontana	chatting circle, similar to drinking circle but covers broader range of participants
yaat pee naung	relatives
yai	big, large

ACRONYMS

B.E.	Buddhist Era
CBAMNREP	Committee for Budget Administration for the Management of Natural Resources and Environment at the Provincial Level
CDS	Centre for Development Studies at University of Bath, UK
CORIN	Coastal Resources Institute at Prince of Songkla University, Thailand
CPR(s)	common property resource(s)
DEQP	Department of Environmental Quality Promotion
DDC	District Development Committee
FEKU	Faculty of Engineering at Kasetsart University, Thailand
GNP	Gross National Products
MOI	Ministry of the Interior
NEDB	National Economic Development Board, the former name of NESDB
NESDB	National Economic and Social Development Board
NGO(s)	non-governmental organisation(s)
NRDC	National Rural Development Committee
NRDCC	National Rural Development Co-ordination Centre
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PDC	Provincial Development Committee
PRDS	Provincial Rural Development Sub-committee
PSU	Prince of Songkla University, Thailand
SRDOC	Sub-district Rural Development Operation Committee
STU	Sukhothai Thammaathiraat University, Thailand

UNRISD	The United Nation Research Institute for Social Development
VC(s)	Village Committee(s)
YFA	Yad Fon Association

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anderson, J.E. (1975). *Public Policy-Making.* London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd.

Atiphothi, K., P. Iamprayoon, W. Wisrutpich, and S. Nitikraiphot (1991). *Ruam Kotmai Pokkhraung* [Collective Administrative Laws]. Bangkok: Prakai Preuk Press.

Ayal, Eliezer B. (1992). "Thailand's Development: The Role of Bangkok." *Pacific Affairs* 65, no. 3: 353-367.

Barraclough, S. (1971). "Farmers Organizations in Planning and Implementing Rural Development." In R. Weitz, ed., *Rural Development in a Changing World.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

Barrett, S., and C. Fudge (1981a). "Examining the Policy-Action Relationship." In S. Barrett and C. Fudge, eds., *Policy and Action: Essays on the Implementation of Public Policy.* New York: Mathuen & Co. Ltd.

Barrett, S. and C. Fudge, eds. (1981b). *Policy and Action: Essays on the Implementation of Public Policy* New York: Mathuen & Co. Ltd.

Bell, C. and H. Roberts, eds. (1984). *Social Researching: Politics, Problems, Practice.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Bernard, H.R. (1988). *Research Method in Cultural Anthropology.* Newbury Park, CA: SAGE publications.

Berkes, F. (1985). "Fishermen and 'The Tragedy of the Commons.'" *Environmental Conservation* 12: 199-206.

Berkes, F., ed., (1989). *Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-based Sustainable Development.* London: Belhaven Press.

Berkes, F., and M.T. Farvar (1989). "Introduction and Overview." In F. Berkes *Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-based Sustainable Development.* London: Belhaven Press.

Berkes, F., D. Feeny, B. McCay, and J.M. Acheson (1989). "The Benefits of the Commons." *Nature.* 340: 91-93.

Blowers, A. (1993). "Master of Fate or Victim of Circumstance: The Exercise of Corporate Power in Environmental Policy-Making." In M. Hill, ed., *The Policy Process: A Reader.* London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Bogdan, R., and S.J. Taylor (1975). *Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods.* New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Brahmanee, Sawai (1989). "*Rabob Ratchakaan Kab Kaanborihaan Kaanpattana Chonnabot: Koranee Sueksa Krongkaan Khorat Pattana* [Administrative System and Rural Development Administration: A Case Study of Khorat Development Programme]." Unpublished Dissertation, College of National Defence, Bangkok.

Brummelhuis, H.T. and J. Kemp, eds. (1984). *Strategies and Structures in Thai Society.* Amsterdam: Anthropological and Sociological Centre, University of Amsterdam.

Bruns, B. 1993 "Promoting Participation in Irrigation: Reflections on Experience in Southeast Asia." *World Development* 21, no. 11: 1837-1849.

Bryant, C., and L.G. White (1984). *Managing Rural Development with Small Farmer Participation.* West Hartford: Kumarian Press.

Bulmer, M., and D.P. Warwick, eds. (1993). *Social Research in Developing Countries: Surveys and Censuses in the Third World.* London: UCL Press.

Bunnag, Jane (1979). "Loose Structure: Fact or Fancy ? Thai Society Re-examined." In C.D. Neher, ed., *Modern Thai Politics: From Village to Nation.* Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Company.

Burgess, R.G., ed. (1982). *Field Research: A Sourcebook and Field Manual.* London: George Allen & Unwin.

Burr, A. (1972). "Religious Institutional Diversity, Social Structure, and Conceptual Unity: Islam and Buddhism in Southern Coastal Village." *Journal of the Siam Society* 60: 183-215.

Chaisurojana, Boonyeun (1990). *Rabob Settakit Thai* [Thai Economic System]. Bangkok: Ton Aw Co. Ltd.

Chambers, R. (1974) *Managing Rural Development: Ideas and Experience from East Africa.* Upsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.

Chopra, K., G.K. Kadekodi, and M.N. Murty (1990). *Participatory Development: People and Common Property Resources* New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Chua, T.-E., and D. Pauly, eds. (1989). *Coastal Area Management in Southeast Asia: Policies, Management Strategies and Case Studies.* ICLARM Conference Proceedings, no. 19. Manila: International Centre for Living Aquatic Resources Management.

Coastal Resources Institute, Prince of Songkla University [CORIN] and Faculty of Engineering, Kasetsart University [FEKU] (1994). *Phru Kuan Kreng Water Resources Development Project.* Bangkok: Royal Irrigation Department.

Cohen, E. (1991). *Thai Society in Comparative Perspective*. Study in Contemporary Thailand, vol.1. Bangkok: White Lotus.

Cohen, J.M., and N.T. Uphoff (1980). "Participation in Rural Development: Seeking Clarity through Specificity." *World Development* 8: 213-235.

Collins, H.M. (1984). "Researching Spoonbending: Concepts and Practice of Participatory Fieldwork." In C. Bell and H. Roberts, eds., *Social Researching: Politics, Problems, Practice.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Committee for Budget Administration for the Management of Natural Resources and the Environment at the Provincial Level [CBAMNREP] (1990). *Khumue Kaanjadtam Paen Sappayakorn Thammachaat Lae Singwaedlom Radab Changwat Lae Amphoe* [A Handbook for Preparing Natural Resource and Environmental Plan at the Provincial and District Levels]. Bangkok: The Ministry of Interior.

Cornish, A. (1988). "Two Meetings: Contrast Use of Space by Malay Villagers and Thai Officials in Southern Thailand." *Mankind* 18, no. 2: 90-101.

Daley, H.E. and T.N. Townsend, eds. (1993). *Valuing the Earth: Economics, Ecology, Ethics*. Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Demaine, H. (1986). "Känpatthanä: Thai Views of Development." In M. Hobart and R.H. Taylor, eds., *Context, Meaning, and Power in Southeast Asia.* Ithaca: Cornell University.

Demaine, H., and R.E. Malong, eds. (1987). *Decentralization: Area Development in Practice in Asia.* Bangkok: Asian Institute of Technology, Division of Human Settlement and Development.

Department of Fisheries (1980). *Khumue Keaokab Rabiab Lae Prakaat Khong Krom Pramong* [A Manual on Fishery Regulations and Notifications]. Bangkok: Department of Fisheries.

Department of Fisheries (1989). *Kotmaai Pramong* [Fishery Laws]. Bangkok: Department of Fisheries.

Department of Local Administration (1991). *Samud Banteuk Khawmoon Kaanborihaan-ngaan Moobaan Lae Tambon* [Notebook for Village and Sub-district Administration]. Bangkok: Department of Local Administration, The Ministry of the Interior.

Department of Environmental Quality Promotion [DEQP] (1994). *Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act B.E. 2535.* Bangkok: Department of Environmental Quality Promotion, The Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment.

Devereux, S., and J. Hoddinott, eds. (1992a). *Fieldwork in Developing Countries.* Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Devereux, S., and J. Hoddinott (1992b). "Issues in Data Collection." In S. Devereux and J. Hoddinott, eds., *Fieldwork in Developing Countries.* Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Devereux, S., and J. Hoddinott (1992c). "The Context of Fieldwork." In S. Devereux and J. Hoddinott, eds., *Fieldwork in Developing Countries.* Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Donner, W. (1982). *The Five Faces of Thailand.* Brisbane: University of Queensland Press.

Doulman, D.J. (1993). "Community-based Fishery Management: Towards the Restoration of Traditional Practices in the South Pacific." *Marine Policy* 17, no. 2: 108-117.

Dror, Y. (1968). *Public Policymaking Reexamined.* Stranton, Pennsylvania: Chandler Publishing Company.

Duclaud-Williams, R. (1990). "The State and Education." In J. Simmie and R. King, eds., *The State in Action: Public Policy and Politics.* London: Pinter Publishers.

Dunsire, A. (1978). *Implementation in a Bureaucracy: The Execution Process I.* Oxford: Martin Robertson.

Dye, T. R. (1978). *Understanding Public Policy.* Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Easton, D. (1965). *A Framework for Political Analysis.* Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Easton, D. (1979). *A Systems Analysis of Political Life.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific [ESCAP] (1983). *Administration of Rural Development in ASEAN Countries.* Bangkok: Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific.

Edwards, G.C. and I. Sharkansky (1978). *Policy Predicament: Making and Implementing of Public Policy.* San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company.

Eisenstadt, S.N. and L. Roniger (1984). *Patrons, Clients and Friends: Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Embree, J.F. (1950). "Thailand: A Loosely Structured Social System." *American Anthropologist* 52: 181-193.

Esman, M.J. and N.T. Uphoff (1984). *Local Organizations: Intermediaries in Rural Development.* London: Cornell University Press.

Evers, H.D. and H. Schrader, eds. (1994). *The Moral of Trade: Ethnicity and Developing Markets.* London: Routledge.

Farrington, J. and D.J. Lewis, eds. (1993). *Non-Governmental Organizations and The State in Asia: Rethinking Roles in Sustainable Agricultural Development.* London: Routledge.

Feeny, D., F. Berkes, B.J. McCay, and J.M. Acheson (1990) "The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenty-Two Years Later." *Human Ecology* 18, no. 1: 1-19.

Ferrer, E.M. (1989). "People's Participation in Coastal Area Management." In T.-E. Chua and D. Pauly, eds., *Coastal Area Management in Southeast Asia: Policies, Management Strategies and Case Studies.* ICLARM Conference Proceeding 19, Manila: International Centre for Living Aquatic Resources Management.

Fetterman, D.M. (1989). *Ethnography: Step by Step.* Newbury Park: SAGE Publications.

Francis, E. (1992). "Qualitative Research: Collecting Life Histories." In S. Devereux and J. Hoddinott, eds., *Fieldwork in Developing Countries.* Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Frankenberg, R. (1982). "Participant Observers." In R.G. Burgess, ed., *Field Research: A Sourcebook and Field Manual.* London: George Allen & Unwin.

Fudge, C. and S. Barrett (1981). "Reconstruction the Field of Analysis." In S. Barrett and C. Fudge, eds., *Policy and Action: Essays on the Implementation of Public Policy.* New York: Mathuen & Co. Ltd.

Gans, H.J. (1982). "The Participant Observer as a Human Being: Observations on the Personal Aspects of Fieldwork." In R.G. Burgess, ed., *Field Research: A Sourcebook and Field Manual.* London: George Allen & Unwin.

Garcia-Zamor, J-C., ed. (1985). *Public Participation in Development Planning and Management: Cases from Africa and Asia.* Boulder: Westview Press.

Gibbs, C.J.N. and Bromley D.W. (1989). "Institutional Arrangements for Management of Rural Resources: Common-Property Regimes." In F. Berkes, ed., *Common Property Resources : Ecology and Community-based Sustainable Development.* London: Belhaven Press.

Girling, J.L.S. (1981). *Thailand: Society and Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Gohlert, E.W. (1991). *Power and Culture: The Struggle against Poverty in Thailand*. Bangkok: White Lotus.

Gordon, I., J. Lewis, and K. Young (1993). "Perspectives on Policy Analysis." In M. Hill, ed., *The Policy Process: A Reader*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Government Gazette (1994). *Phraratchabanyat Sapha Tambon Pho. So. 2537* [The Sub-district Council Act B.E. 1994]. Bangkok: The Office of the Prime Minister.

Gray, A. and W.I. Jenkins (1985). *Administrative Politics in British Governments*. Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Grindle, M.S. (1980a). "Policy Content and Context in Implementation." In M.S. Grindle, ed., *Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Grindle, M.S., ed. (1980b). *Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Grindle, M.S. (1980c). "The Implementor: Political Constraints on Rural Development in Mexico." In M.S. Grindle, ed., *Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Grindle, M.S. and J.W. Thomas (1989). "Policy Makers, Policy Choices, and Policy Outcomes: The Political Economy of Reform in Developing Countries." *Policy Sciences* 22: 213-248.

Gunn, L.A. (1978). "Why is Implementation so Difficult?" *Management Services in Government* 33: 169-179.

Haas, D.F. (1979). *Interaction in the Thai Bureaucracy: Structure, Culture, and Social Exchange*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Ham, C. and M. Hill (1984). *The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State*. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Ham, C. and M. Hill (1993). *The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State* [2nd edition]. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Handley, P. (1991). "A Taste of Power: Local Officials Get Bigger Role in Rural Development." *Far Eastern Economic Review* June 6, 1991: 18-19.

Handley, P. (1992)."Back to Grassroots: New Premier Stresses Rural Development." *Far Eastern Economic Review* October 29 : 21.

Hanf, K. (1993). "Enforcing Environmental Laws: The Social Regulation of Co-operation." In M. Hill, ed., *New Agenda in the Study of the Policy Process.* Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Hara,Y. (1981). "Institutional Change in A Central Thai Village." *The Developing Economies* 19, no. 4: 305-313.

Hardin, G. (1968). "The Tragedy of the Commons." *Sciences* 162: 1243-1248.

Hardin, G. (1993). "Second Thoughts on 'The Tragedy of the Commons.'" In H.E. Daley and K.N. Townsend, eds., *Valuing the Earth: Economics, Ecology, Ethics.* Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Harriss, J. (1982). *Capitalism and Peasant Farming: Agrarian Structure and Ideology in Northern Tamil Nadu.* Bombay: Oxford University Press.

Hart, G., A.Turton, and B. White, eds. (1989). *Agrarian Transformation: Local Processes and the State in Southeast Asia.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Heady, C.J., J.A. McGregor, and A.B. Winnett (1995). *Poverty and Sustainability in the Managemen t of Inland Capture Fisheries in South and Southeast Asia: End of the Project Report.* Bath: Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath.

Heginbotham,..S.J. (1975). *Cultures in Conflict: The Four Faces of Indian Bureaucracy.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Hewison, K.J. (1985). "The State and Capitalist Development in Thailand." In R. Higgott and R. Robison, eds., *Southeast Asia: Essays in the Political Economy of Structural Change.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Hewison, K.J. (1993). "Non-governmental Organizations and the Cultural Development Perspective in Thailand: A Comment on Rigg (1991)." *World Development* 21, no. 10: 1699-1708.

Higgott, R. and R. Robison, eds. (1985). *Southeast Asia: Essays in the Political Economy of Structural Change.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Hill, M., ed. (1993). *New Agenda in the Study of the Policy Process.* Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Hill, M., ed. (1993). *The Policy Process: A Reader.* London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Hill, Polly (1986). *The Development Economics on Trial.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hirsch, P. (1989a). "Local Contexts of Differentiation and Inequality on the Thai Periphery." *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 19, no. 3: 309-323.

Hirsch, P. (1989b). "The State in the Village: Interpreting Rural Development in Thailand." *Development and Change* 20: 35-56.

Hirsch, P. (1990). *Development Dilemmas in Rural Thailand.* Singapore: Oxford University Press.

Hirsch, P. (1992). "A State of Uncertainty: Political Economy of Community Resource Management at Tab Salao, Thailand." *SOJOURN* 10, no. 2: 172-197.

Hjern, B. and C. Hull (1982). "Implementation Research as Empirical Costitutionalism." *European Journal of Political Reseacrh* 10: 105-116.

Hjern, B. and D.O. Porter (1993). "Implementation Structures: A New Unit of Administrative Analysis." In M. Hill, ed., *The Policy Process: A Reader.* Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Hobart, M. and R.H. Taylor, eds. (1986). *Context, Meaning, and Power in Southeast Asia.* Ithaca: Cornell University.

Hoddinott, J. (1992). "Fieldwork under Time Constraints." In S. Devereux and J. Hoddinott, eds., *Fieldwork in Developing Countries.* Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Hong, L. (1984). *Thailand in the Nineteenth Century: Evolution of the Economy and Society.* Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Hudson, B. (1993). "Michael Lipton and Street Level Bureaucracy: A Neglected Perspective." In M. Hill, ed., *The Policy Process: A Reader.* Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Huq, M.A., ed. (1976). *Exploitation and the Rural Poor -- A Working Paper on Rural Power Structure in Bangladesh.* Kotbari, Comilla: Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development.

Ingavata, Chaichana (1990). "Community Development and Local-Level Democracy in Thailand: The Role of *Tambol* Councils." *SOJOURN* 5, no. 1: 113-143.

Jenkins, W.I. (1978). *Policy Analysis: A Political and Organisational Perspective.* London: Martin Robertson.

Johnston, D.B. (1980). "Bandits, *Nakleng*, and Peasant in Rural Thai Society." *Contributions to Asian Studies* XV: 90-101.

Jorgensen, D.L. (1989). *Participant Observation: A Methodology for Human Studies.* Newbury Park: SAGE Publications.

Judd, L.C. (undated). *In Perspective: Trends in Rural Development and Programs in Thailand, 1947-1987.* Chiang Mai: Payap University Center for Research and Development.

Kambhu, Tongsri (1984). "Thai Administrative Structure and Reform: Problems with Decentralization." *Philippine Journal of Public Administration* XXVIII, no.1&2: 65-96.

Kathlene, L. and J.A. Martin (1991). "Enhancing Citizen Participation: Panel Designs, Perspectives, and Policy Formation." *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 10, no. 1: 46-63.

Kemp, J. (1989). "Peasants and Cities: The Cultural and Social Image of the Thai Peasant Village Community." *SOJOURN* 4, no. 1: 6-19.

Kemp, J. (1991). "The Dialectics of Village and State in Modern Thailand." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 22, no. 2: 312-326.

Keyes, C. (1979). "Local Leadership in Rural Thailand." In C.D. Neher, ed., *Modern Thai Politics: From Village to Nation.* Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Company.

Khoumkhainaam, Tanongsak, Bunsri Keawdamsri, Kowit Puang-ngaam and Preeda Chote-chuang (1991). *Kaanpattana Chumchon Cheung Patibat* [Community Development: A Practical Approach] Bangkok: Bophit Kaanpim.

King, R. (1990) "Policy Process in the Modern State." In J. Simmie and R. King, eds., *The State in Action: Public Policy and Politics.* London: Pinter Publishers.

Korten, D.C., ed. (1987a). *Community Management: Asian Experience and Perspective.* West Hartfort: Kumarian Press.

Korten, D.C. (1987b). "Conclusion: Community Management and Social Transformation." In D.C. Korten, ed., *Community Management: Asian Experience and Perspectives.* West Hartford: Kumarian Press.

Korten, F.S. (1987). "The Policy Framework for Community Management." In D.C. Korten, ed., *Community Management: Asian Experience and Perspectives.* West Hartford: Kumarian Press.

Korten, D.C. (1980). "Community Organisation and Rural Development: A Learning Process Approach." *Public Administration Review* 40, no. 5: 480-511.

Krongkaew, Medhi (1985). "Agricultural Development, Rural Poverty and Income Distribution in Thailand." *The Developing Economies* XXIII, no. 4: 325-346.

Lan, D. (1989). "Resistance to the Present by the Past : Medicine and Money in Zimbabwe." In J.Parry and M.Bloch, eds., *Money and the Morality of Exchange*. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

Lane, J.E., ed. (1987). *Bureaucracy and Public Choice.* London: SAGE Publications.

LePoer, B. L., ed. (1989). *Thailand: A Country Study.* Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.

Lindblom, C.H. (1979). "Still Muddling, Not Yet Through." *Public Administration Review* 39: 517-526.

Lindblom, C.H. and E.J. Woodhouse (1993). *The Policy-Making Process* (3rd Edition). Englewood: Prentice Hall.

Lipsky, M. (1980). *Street-level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of Individuals in Public Service.* New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Lockwood, M. (1992). "Facts or Fictions? Fieldwork Relationships and the Nature of Data." In S. Devereux and J. Hoddinott, eds., *Fieldwork in Developing Countries.* Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Lohmann, L. (1995). "No Rules of Engagement: Interest Groups, Centralization and the Creative Politics of 'Environment' in Thailand." In J. Rigg, ed. *Counting the Costs: Economic Growth and Environmental Change in Thailand.* Singapore: ISEAS.

London, B. and K.L. Anderson (1986). "Rural-Urban Hierarchy and National Development: The Role of Elites in the Distribution of Scarce Resources to Thai Hinterland." *Social Science Quarterly* 67, no. 3: 545-560.

March, J.A. (1978). "Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice." *Bell Journal of Economics* 9, no. 2: 587-608.

Masae, A. (1994). *Equity in the Fishery: A Study of a Floodplain in Southern Thailand.* CDS Report R94D. Bath: Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath.

Masae, A. and J.A. McGregor (1996). *Sustainability under Conditions of Rapid Development: A Freshwater Fishery in Southern Thailand.* Occasional Paper 01/96. Bath: Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath.

Mazmanian, D.A. and P.A. Sabatier, eds. (1981). *Effective Policy Implementation.* Lexington: Lexington Books.

Massey, R.I. (1994). "Impediments to Collective Action in A Small Community." *Politics & Society* 22, no.3: 421-434.

McCall, G.J. and J.L. Simmons, eds. (1969). *Issues in Participant Observations: A Text and Reader.* Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.

McClintock, C. (1980). "Reform Government and Policy Implementation: Lessons from Peru." In M.S. Grindle, ed., *Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World.* New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

McGregor, J.A. (1991). "Poverty and Patronage: A Study of Development and Change in Rural Bangladesh." Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Bath.

McGrew, A.G. and M.J. Wilson, eds. (1982). *Decision Making: Approaches and Analysis.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

McVey, R.T. (1984). "Change and Consciousness in a Southern Countryside." In H.T. Brummelhuis and J. Kemp, eds., *Strategies and Structures in Thai Society* Amsterdam: Anthropological and Sociological Centre, University of Amsterdam.

Mingmaneenakin, Wanraks (1988). *Kaanpattana Chonnabot Thai* [Thai Rural Development]. Bangkok: Thammasaat University Press.

Minogue, M. (1993). "Theory and Practice in Public Policy and Administration." In M. Hill, ed., *The Policy Process: A Reader.* London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Moerman, M. (1979). "A Thai Village Headman as Synaptic Leader." In C.D. Neher, ed., *Modern Thai Politics: From Village to Nation.* Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Company.

Moerman, M. and R.L. Miller (1989). "Changes in a Village Relation with its Environment." In The Siam Society, *Culture and Environment in Thailand.* Bangkok: The Siam Society: 109-137.

Montgomery, J.D. (1972). "The Allocation Authority in Land Reform Programs: A Comparative Study of Administrative Process and Outputs." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 17, no. 1: 62-75.

Montgomery, J.D. and M.J. Esman (1971). "Popular Participation in Development Administration." *Journal of Comparative Administration* 3, no. 3: 358-383.

Moore, Frank J. (1974). *Thailand: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture.* New Haven: Hraf Press.

Mulder, Neils (1994). *Inside Thai Society: An Interpretation of Everyday Life.* Bangkok: Duang Kamol Book House.

Na Chiangmai, Chartchai (1985). *Rabob Ratchakaan Kab Kaanpattana Chonnabot: Botwipaak Taang Kaanmeuang* [Administrative System and Rural Development: A Political Critique]. Bangkok: National Institute of Development Administration.

Na Chiangmai, Chartchai (1988)."*Kaanprasaan Rawaang Saakhaa Nai Kaanpattana Chonnabot Daan Sataranasuk* [Intersectoral Co-ordination in Rural Development with Reference to Public Health]. *Thai Journal of Development Administration* 28, no.2: 141-182.

Nakata, Thinapan (1987). "Political Culture: Problems of Development of Democracy." In Somsakdi Xuto, ed., *Government and Politics of Thailand.* Singapore: Oxford University Press.

Nartsupha, Chattip, and Pornpilai Lertwicha (1994). *Wattanatam Mooban Thai* [Thai Village Culture]. Bangkok: Saang San Publications.

National Economic and Social Development Board [NESDB] (1982). *The Fifth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1982-1986).* Bangkok: NESDB.

National Economic and Social Development Board [NESDB] (1987). *The Sixth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1987-1991).* Bangkok: NESDB.

National Economic and Social Development Board [NESDB] (1992). *The Seventh National Economic and Social Development Plan (1992-1996).* Bangkok: NESDB.

National Institute of Development Administration [NIDA] (1982). *A Study on Provincial Development Planning: Final Report.* Bangkok: NIDA.

Neher, C.D., ed. (1979). *Modern Thai Politics: From Village to Nation.* Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Company.

Nixon, J. (1980). "The Importance of Communication in the Implementation of Government Policy at the Local Level." *Policy and Politics* 8, no. 2:127 -144.

Office of National Cultural Board [ONCB] (1991). *Rai-ngaan Kaansammana Taang Wichakaan Reuang Phoompanya Chaoban Kab Kaandamnern-ngaan Daan Wattanatam Lae Kaanpattana Chonnabot* [Proceedings a Conference on Indigenous Knowledge and its Application to Cultural and Rural Development], 26-28 March 1991. Bangkok: ONCB.

Ostrom, E. (1990). *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ostrom, E. (1992). "Community and the Endogenous Solution to Commons Problems." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 4, no. 3: 343-351.

Page, E.C. (1992). *Political Authority and Bureaucratic Power: A Comparative Analysis* [2nd edition]. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Pakting, Buapan., Suraswadi Hunpayont, and Sucheela Tanchaiyanand (1989). *Rai-ngaan Kaanwijai Reuang Kaanpattana Chonnabot: Kaan Khao Mii Suanruam Nai Krabuankaan Pattana Khong Chaoban* [A Research Report on Rural Development: Villagers Participation in Development Process]. Bangkok: Thammasaat University.

Panpiemrat, Kosit (1982). *Rural Thailand 1982.* Bangkok: National Economic and Social Development Board.

Panpiemrat, Kosit (1990). *Sappayakorn Thammachaat Kab Kaanpattana Chonnabot* Natural Resources and Rural Development]. Bangkok: Rungsilpa Press.

Panyakul, Vitoon, ed. (1992). *People Centered Development: An Overview from Development Experience in Thailand* [2nd Edition]. Bangkok: Local Development Institute.

Parnwell, M.J.G. (1988). "Rural Poverty, Development and the Environment: The Case of North-East Thailand." *Journal of Biogeography* 15: 199-208.

Parnwell, M.J.G., ed. (1996). *Uneven Development in Thailand.* London: Avebury.

Parry, J. and M. Bloch ,eds. (1989). *Money and Morality of Exchange.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Peters, B.G. (1982). "Insiders and Outsiders: The Politics of Pressure Group Influence on Bureaucracy." In A.G. McGrew and M.J. Wilson, eds., *Decision Making: Approaches and Analysis.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Peters, B.G. (1987). "Politics and Bureaucrats in the Politics of Policy-Making." In J-E. Lane, ed., *Bureaucracy and Public Choice.* London: SAGE Publication Ltd.

Piker, S. (1979). "The Relationship of Belief Systems to Behavior in Rural Thai Society." In C.D. Neher, ed., *Modern Thai Politics: From Village to Nation.* Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Company.

Piriyatanalai, Suwimon (1993). "*Ongkorn Chumchon: Kaan Kawkerd Lae Pattanakaan Khong Ongkorn Chaoban Tambon Laempho, Amphoe Yaring, Changwat Pattani* [Community Organisation: The Formation and Development of Peasants' Organisation in Laempho Sub-district, Yaring District, Pattani Province]." *Lae Tai* no. 12: 54-57.

Pomeroy, R.S. (1991). "Small-Scale Fisheries Management and Development: Towards a Community-Based Approach." *Marine Policy* 15, no. 1: 39-48.

Pomeroy, R.S. (1993). "A Research Framework for Coastal Fisheries Co-Management Institutions." *NAGA, The ICLARM Quarterly* January, 1993: 14-16.

Phongphit, Seri, ed. (1986). *Back to the Roots: Village and Self-Reliance in a Thai Context.* Bangkok: Rural Development Documentation Centre.

Pongquan, Soparth (1988). *Participatory Development in Villages of Central Thailand.* Bangkok: Asian Institute of Technology.

Pongquan, Soparth (1992). "Participatory Development Activities at Local Level: Case Studies in Villages of Central Thailand." Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Lieden.

Poosakulsuk, Nikhom and Amphorn Keawnooh (1994). "*Phru Khuan Khreng: Jaak Phru Seuamsoam Pen Teekepnaam 150,000 Rai* [Phru Khuan Khreng: From Degraded Swamp to a 150,000 *Rai* Reservoir]." *Lae Tai* no. 13: 22-33.

Pressman, J.L. and A. Wildavsky (1973). *Implementation.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Priyakorn, Pakorn (1989). *The Ministry of Interior: Strengths and Weaknesses of Ministerial Level Agencies in Development Administration.* Bangkok: Thailand Development Research Institute Foundation.

Quick, S. (1980). "The Paradox of Popularity: 'Ideological' Program Implementation in Zambia." In M.S. Grindle, ed., *Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World.* New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Rajchagool, Chaiyan (1994). *The Rise and Fall of the Thai Absolute Monarchy.* Bangkok: White Lotus.

Ratanadilok Na Phuket, Pichai (1990). "*Krongsaang Amnaat Lae Chonchannam Nai Chonnabot Thai: Sueksa Koranee Mooban Dangduem Lae Mooban Tee Kamlang Plianplaeng* [The Power Structure and the Eliteship in the Rural Thai Villages: A Case Study of the Traditional and the Transitional Thai Villages]". Unpublished MA Thesis, National Institute of Development Administration, Bangkok.

Rientrairat, Somying (1983). *Fisheries Development Planning System in Thailand.* Bangkok: Department of Fisheries.

Rigg, J. (1991). "Grass-Roots Development in Rural Thailand: A Lost Cause?" *World Development* 19, no. 2/3: 199-211.

Rigg, J. (1993a). "A Reply to Kevin Hewison." *World Development* 21, no. 10: 1709-1713.

Rigg, J. (1993b). "Forests and Farmers, Land and Livelihoods: Changing Resource Realities in Thailand." *Global Ecology and Geography Letters* 3: 277-289.

Rigg, J., ed. (1995). *Counting the Costs: Economic Growth and Environmental Change in Thailand.* Singapore: ISEAS.

Riggs, Fred W. (1964). *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Riggs, Fred W. (1966). *Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity.* Honolulu: East-West Center Press.

Rittibhonbhun, Niti, Pisit Chansanoh, Sutanya Thongrak, and Rapeepan Suwannatchote (1993). "Community-Based Mangrove Rehabilitation and Management: A Case Study in Sikao District, Trang Province, Southern Thailand." *Regional Development Dialogue* 14, no. 1: 112-122.

Robison, R. (1989). "Structure of Power and the Industrialisation Process in Southeast Asia." *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 19, no. 4: 371-397.

Rongrian Patthalung (1935). *Nangsue Teeraleuk Ngaan Peemai Changwat Patthalung Pho. So. 2479* [The Book Published for the New Year Event of Patthalung Province 2479 B.E.]. Bangkok: Pittayakarn.

Ross, M.G. and B.W. Lappin (1967). *Community Organisation: Theory, Principles and Practice* [2nd Edition]. New York: Harper & Row.

Rothenberg, I.F. (1980). "Administrative Decentralization and Implementation of Housing Policy in Columbia." In M.S. Grindle , ed., *Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World.* New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Rubin, H.J. (1974). *The Dynamics of Development in Rural Thailand.* Center for Southeast Asian Studies: Northern Illinois University.

Ryan, R.W. (1985). "Participation in National Food and Nutrition Programs: Some Lessons from West Africa." In J-C. Garcia-Zamor, ed., *Public Participation in Development Planning and Management: Cases from Africa and Asia.* Boulder: Westview Press.

Sabatier, P.A. and D.A. Mazmanian (1979). "The Conditions of Effective Implementation: A Guide to Accomplishing Policy Objectives." *Policy Analysis* 5: 481-504.

Sabatier, P.A. and D.A. Mazmanian (1981). "The Implementation of Public Policy: A Framework of Analysis." In D.A. Mazmanian and P.A. Sabatier, eds., *Effective Policy Implementation.* Lexington: Lexington Books.

Sabatier, P.A. (1993). "Top-down and Bottom-up Approaches to Implementation Research." In M. Hill, ed., *The Policy Process: A Reader.* London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Sahlins, M. (1976). *Stone Age Economics*. London: Tavistock Publications.

Samudavanija, Chai-anan (1989). "The Bureaucracy." In Somsakdi Xuto, ed., *Government and Politics of Thailand.* Singapore: Oxford University Press.

Scott, J.C. (1979). "Corruption in Thailand." In C.D. Neher, ed., *Modern Thai Politics: from Village to Nation.* Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Company.

Silcock, T.H., ed. (1967). *Thailand: Social and Economic Studies in Development.* Canberra: Australian National University Press.

Simmie, J. and R. King, eds. (1990). *The State in Action: Public Policy and Politics.* London: Pinter Publishers.

Simmie, J. (1990). "Varieties of States and Actions." In J. Simmie and R. King, eds., *The State in Action: Public Policy and Politics.* London: Pinter Publishers.

Singleton, S. and M. Taylor (1992). "Common Property, Collective Action and Community." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 4, no. 3: 309-324.

Skocpol, T. (1993). "Bringing the State Back In." In M. Hill, ed., *The Policy Process: A Reader.* London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Smith, B.C. (1988). *Bureaucracy and Political Power.* Sussex: Wheatsheaf Book.

Staudt, K. (1991). *Managing Development: State, Society, and International Contexts.* Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications.

Suksamran, Somboon (1984). "Political Monks: Personalism and Ideology." In H.T. Brummelhuis and J. Kemp, eds., *Strategies and Structures in Thai Society.* Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, Anthropological and Sociological Centre.

Sukhothai Thammathiraat University [STU] (1983a). *Ekkasaan Kaansaun Raiwicha Botbaat Lae Sathaanaphaab Khong Phunam Radab Tambon Moobaan Nuaitee 1-4* [Teaching Document on Roles and Status of Sub-district and Village Leaders, units 1-4]. Bangkok: Sukhothai Thammathiraat University.

Sukhothai Thammathiraat University [STU] (1983b). *Ekkasaan Kaansaun Raiwicha Botbaat Lae Sathaanaphaab Khong Phunam Radab Tambon Mooban Nuaitee 5-8* [Teaching Document on Roles and Status of Sub-district and Village Leaders, units 5-8]. Bangkok: Sukhothai Thammathiraat University.

Sukhothai Thammathiraat University [STU] (1985). *Ekkasaan Kaansaun Raiwicha Kaan Muang Kan Pokkhraung Radab Tambon Moobaan Nuaitee 5-8* [Teaching Document on Politics and Administration at the Sub-district and Village Levels, units 5-8]. Bangkok: Sukhothai Thammathiraat University.

Suphachalasai, Suphat and Direk Patmasiriwat (1990). "Poverty and Government Policy in Thailand." *Singapore Economic Review* 35, no. 2: 78-106.

Suphakason, Ruethaiwan (1993). "A Study of Poverty in Thale Noi Community." Unpublished MSc Thesis in Environmental Management, Prince of Songkla University, Thailand.

Sussman, G.E. (1980). "The Pilot Project and the Choice of an Implementing Strategy: Community Development in India." In M.S. Grindle, ed., *Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World.* New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Tagoporn, Yongyuth (1983). "Administration of Rural Development in Thailand." In ESCAP, *Administration of Rural Development in ASEAN Countries.* Bangkok: Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific.

Tambiah, S.J. (1976). *World Conqueror and World Renouncer.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tansakul, Reungchai (1987). "*Niwetwittaya Khong Thale Saap Songkhla* [Songkhla Lake Ecology]." *Wittayasart* 41, no. 2: 690-701.

Tansakul, Reungchai (1992). *Environmental Impacts of Saltwater Barrier Construction in Songkhla Lake.* Paper Presented at the Seminar on Saltwater Barrier in Songkhla Lake at Hat Yai Grand Tower Hotel, 220-21 January, 1992. Hat Yai: Prince of Songkla University.

Taylor, J. (1993). "Social Activism and Resistance on the Thai Frontier: The Case of Phra Prajak Khutajitto." *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 25, no. 2: 3-16.

Taylor, M. (1992). "The Economics and Politics of Property Rights and Common Pool Resources." *Natural Resources Journal* 22, no. 3: 633-648.

The Siam Society (1989). *Culture and Environment in Thailand.* Bangkok: The Siam Society.

Thomas, J.W. and M.S. Grindle (1990). 'After the Decision: Implementing Policy Reforms in Developing Countries' *World Development* 18, no. 8: 1163-1181.

Thomas, T. (1985). "Reorienting Bureaucratic Performance: A Social Learning Approach to Development Action." In J-C. Garcia-Zamor, ed., *Public Participation in Development Planning and Management: Cases from Africa and Asia.* Boulder: Westview Press.

Thongyou, Apichart (1986). "Village: Autonomous Society." In Seri Phongphit, ed., *Back to the Roots: Village and Self-Reliance in a Thai Context.* Bangkok: Rural Development Documentation Centre.

Tongdeelert, Chatchawan and Larry Lohmann (1991). "The *Muang Faai* Irrigation System in Northern Thailand." *The Ecologist* 21, no. 2: 101-106.

Tongsawate, M. and W.E.I. Tips (1988). "Coordination between Government and Voluntary Organization (NGOs) in Thailand's Rural Development." *Public Administration and Development* 8, no. 4: 401-420.

Turton, A. (1976). "Nothern Thai Peasant Society: Twentieth-Century Transformation in Political and Jural Structure." *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 3, no. 3: 267-298.

Turton, A. (1987). *Production, Power and Participation in Rural Thailand: Experiences of Poor Farmers' Groups.* Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Turton, A. (1989). "Local Powers and Rural Differentiation." In G. Hart, A. Turton and B. White, eds., *Agrarian Transformations: Local Processes and the State in Southeast Asia.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Vallibhotama, Srisakra (1989). "Traditional Thai Villages and Cities: An Overview." In The Siam Society, *Culture and Environment in Thailand.* Bangkok: The Siam Society.

Van Meter, D.S. and C.E. Van Horn (1975). "The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework." *Administration & Society* 6, no. 4: 445-488.

Vandergeest, P. (1991). "Gifts and Rights: Cautionary Notes on Community Self-help in Thailand." *Development and Change* 22: 421-443.

Vandergeest, P. (1993). "Hierarchy and Power in Pre-National Buddhist States." *Modern Asian Studies* 27, no. 4: 843-870.

Verhelst, T.G. (1990). *No Life Without Roots: Culture and Development* [Translated by Bob Cumming]. London: Zed Books.

Voratheppputipong, Thavan (1984). "Planning and Implementing Rural Development Programs in Thailand: An Analysis of Major Problems and Prospects of the New Approach to Rural Poverty-Stricken Area Development." *Thai Journal of Development Administration* 24, no. 3: 423-436.

Wade, R. (1988). *Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action in South India.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wallis, M. (1989). *Bureaucracy: Its Role in Third World Development.* London: Macmillan Publishers.

Warr, P.G. (1993a). "The Thai Economy." In P.G. Warr, ed., *The Thai Economy in Transition.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Warr, P. G., ed., (1993b). *The Thai Economy in Transition.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Weitz, R., ed., (1971). *Rural Development in a Changing World.* Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Werlin, H. (1989). "The Community: Master or Client? - A Review of Literature." *Public Administration and Development* 9, no. 4: 447-457.

Wetchaphitak, Surachet (1991). "*Phoompanya Chaobaan Kab Kaandamnern-ngaan Daan Wattanatam Lae Kaanpattana Chonnabot* [Indigenous Knowledge and Application to Cultural and Rural Development]." In ONCB, *Proceedings a Conference on Indigenous Knowledge and Application to Cultural and Rural Development, 21-28 March 1991.* Bangkok: ONCB.

White, A.T. (1989). "Two Community-based Marine Resources: Lessons for Coastal Management." In T.-E. Chua and D. Pauley, eds., *Coastal Area Management in Southeast Asia: Policies*, Management Strategies and Case Studies. ICLARM Conference Proceedings. Manila: International Center for Living Aquatic Resource Management.

Wijeyewardene, G. (1967). "Some Aspects of Rural Life in Thailand." In T.H. Silcock, ed., *Thailand: Social and Economic Studies in Development.* Canberra: Australian National University Press.

Wildavsky, A. (1972). "The Self-Evaluating Organisation." *Public Administration Review* 32: 509-520.

Wilson, D.A. (1979). "Political Tradition and Political Change in Thailand." In C.D. Neher, ed., *Modern Thai Politics: From Village to Nation.* Cambridge, MA : Schenkman Publishing Company.

Wirajnibhawan, Wiraj (1987). *Panhaa Uppasak Samkhan Khong Kaanpattana Chumchon: Prachaachon, Khaaratchakaan Lae Phunam Rattabaan* [Problems

and Obstacles Which Are Important to Community Development: People, Civil Servants and Government Leaders]. Bangkok: O.S. Printing House.

Wirajnibhawan, Wiraj (1992). *Kaanborihaan Lae Kaanjadkaan Sappayakorn Thammachaat: Botbaat Khong Ongkorn Nai Taungthin* [Natural Resource Administration and Management: The Roles of Local Organisations]. Bangkok: O.S. Printing House.

Wirajnibhawan, Wiraj (1993). *Kaanborihaan Ngaanpattana Chonnabot* [Rural Development Administration]. Bangkok: Odean Store Publications.

Wirawattananond, Winai (1994). *Singwaedlom Lae Kaanpattana* [Environment and Development]. Bangkok: Reuankeaw Press.

Wood, G. (1974). "A Peasantry and the State." *Development and Change* 5, no. 2: 75-76.

Wood, G.D. (1976). "The Political Process in Bangladesh -- A Research Note." In M.A. Huq, ed., *Exploitation and the Rural Poor -- A Working Paper on Rural Power Structure in Bangladesh.* Kotbari, Comilla: Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development.

Xuto, Somsakdi, ed. (1989). *Government and Politics of Thailand.* Singapore: Oxford University Press.

Zelditch, M., Jr. (1969). "Some Methodological Problems of Field Studies." In G.J. McCall and J.L. Simmons, eds., *Issues in Participant Observations: A Text and Reader.* Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.